100 Iowa 697 | Iowa | 1897
I. The facts- essential to a conclusion are quite extended. They were found by the district court, and, slightly modified, they are without dispute. They are as follows:
“(1) On the thirtieth day of July, 1894, the plaintiff and the defendant T. K. Riddick entered into a written contract by which said defendant agreed to sell to the plaintiff certain tracts of land, situated in Fayette county, Tenn., civil district No. 4, and described as follows: The Boyd place, containing six hundred and
“(2) The defendant also agreed to furnish the ■plaintiff an abstract of the title to said lands on or before the fifteenth day of August, 1894, and to execute a warranty deed for said land to Wilson, and
“(8) Wilson was further required to execute to .Riddick promissory notes for the last four payments to be made on the land, to be secured by vendor’s lien retained on the land. And also to secure to Riddick the payment of the five thousand dollars to be paid. January 1, 1895, by depositing with the cashier of the First National Bank of Storm Lake, notes or other valuable securities of the value of five thousand dollars, and to procure and forward to Riddick a certificate of said cashier that said notes or securities, properly indorsed, and made negotiable, had been deposited on or before the fifteenth day of August, 1894.
“(4) Possession of the property on both sides was to be delivered on January 1,1895, and at that time an ■exchange of papers was to be had.
“(5) On or prior to August 8, 1894, the plaintiff executed a deed to the Storm Lake property to Riddick in accordance with the terms of said contract, and deposited the same with the First National Bank of Storm Lake, and at the same time deposited with said bank the sum of five thousand dollars, and caused a notification thereof to be made by the president of said bank, and sent to the defendant Riddick, notifying him that the plaintiff had placed in said bank, as per said contract, five thousand dollars cash and a warranty deed to defendant duly executed for the Storm Lake property.
“A) At the time of the execution of the contract of July 30, the defendant Riddick did not have title to the Tennessee land, but the title thereto was
“(8) The defendant Riddick did not execute and deposit with the Payette County Bank, of Somerville, Tenn., a deed to Wilson for said land by the twentieth day of August, as required by the contract; but prior to that date Wilson was informed that, owing to some difficulty in completing the survey of that land, it would not be convenient for Riddick to deposit the deed by that time, and, being so informed, Wilson acquiesced in and consented to further time.
“(9) Cn the twenty-fifth day of August the defendant and his wife executed a warranty deed for the several tracts of land described in the contract to
“(10) During the latter part of August, while the plaintiff was in Tennessee, this deed was exhibited to him for examination and inspection, and for that purpose he retained it several days, and then returned it to Riddick. During this • time the deed was read over, and the lines were traced out and compared with the plat of the land in plaintiff’s possession, and the plaintiff was fully informed of the shortage in the quantity of the land, and of the reservations made in the deed, and of the form in which the deed was made and executed, and knew at the time that the title •was vested in the name of the wife of the defendant Riddick.
“(11) At that time it was mutually understood between the plaintiff and defendant Riddick that the condition of the title and the deed in the form in which it had been executed was satisfactory to both parties,’ and that the parties would go on and close up the deal, and that plaintiff would take the land, and pay for the actual number of acres in the tract at the rate of seven dollars and seventy-five cents "per acre; and with that mutual understanding between the parties Riddick went on and deposited said deed with the bank, as required by the contract.
“(12) The plaintiff went on to make his arrangements to vacate the Storm Lake property, and to take possession of the Tennessee property, thereafter treating the contract as still in force; and during the months of September, October, and the early part of
“(18) On November 6, the plaintiff wrote the defendant Riddick, telling him that R. H. Brown was asserting a claim against him of five hundred dollars, for commission, and that he was threatening to commence suit, and saying: “My goods are all packed, and we are sleeping on a borrowed bedstead. Will you please notify the bank that you declare the trade off, and I will bring the deed with me. I don’t want to be detained. At your request, I will sell the house if I don’t get over twenty-five hundred dollars for it, or bring the deed to you, and you can deed to whom you please.” And, again, on the twentieth day of
“(14) Prior to the writing of this letter, and on the tenth day of November, the plaintiff filed his petition in the clerk’s office, and commenced this action. After the commencement of the action by Brown against the plaintiff, the plaintiff did nothing more towards moving to Tennessee to take possession of the land, nor did he give to the defendant any notice of his purpose in relation to carrying out the contract, other than is contained in the several letters hereinbefore referred to.
“(15) The defendant Riddick appeared in Storm Lake at the January, 1895, term of court, when he was advised that the plaintiff would not proceed further in carrying out the contract for the purchase of the land. But prior to this time Wilson had drawn out of, the First National Bank the money that he had formerly deposited, and had requested the bank to return to him the deed to the Storm Lake property. This the bank refused to do.
Up to the time of the commencement of this action, the defendant had complied with all the conditions of the contract, to be performed by him, furnishing to the plaintiff an abstract , of title to the Tennessee lands, and making Wilson a sufficient warranty deed, executed by himself 'and wife, and
To meet the contentions in this court, there should be added to the foregoing facts, the following: That at the time of making the contract for the exchange of property, the plaintiff was the head of a family and a married man; that the Storm Lake property that the plaintiff was to convey was his homestead; that his wife did not sign the contract for the exchange of lands, but she did sign, with her husband, the deed of the homestead placed in escrow with the defendant bapk.
It is thought there is a.want of mutuality of obligation that should defeat the decree, but we do. not discover it. In all essential particulars, the contract as enforced by the decree has met the assent of the parties, and we do not see an equitable claim against