Wilson v. Pleasant

possession illegal drugs assessed after imposed penalty criminal the state has Jeopardy

the same conduct violated Double

Clause). majority agree

I with the the CSET Hayse's privilege. against

violates neither process rights.

self-incrimination nor his due WILSON, Individually,

Mary and as the

Administrator of the Estate of James al.,

Darryl Wilson, Deceased; Appel- et

lant, Jr., PLEASANT,

William G. General Corporation, Appellee. 64S03-9506-CV-693.

No. of Indiana.

Dec. 1995. Selby Concurring

Opinion by Justice Concurring in

in Part and Result

Jan.

Rehearing Denied March III, Valparaiso, David H. Myers, W. James Merrillville,

Knobel, Appellant. for Bayliff, Harrigan, Harrigan, Daniel J. P.C., Kokomo, for amicus Maugans, Cord & Lawyers Trial Association. curiae Indiana Landau, Heilbron, Leslie G. David M. Enersen, McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & San Dimitrief, California, Francisco, Kirk- Alex Ellis, Eric L. Kir- Chicago, land & Beckman, Kelly schner, Nye, & J. Randall Galvin, Galvin, Hammond, Smith, Frank Kirschner, Hammond, Ap- & Stalhmack pellee. PETITION TO TRANSFER

ON SULLIVAN, Justice. National Traffic that the Federal

We hold ("Safety Act of Motor Vehicle pro t"),1 safety regulations certain Ac it, pre-empt a state mulgated do negligence based claim of law tort airbag. to install an on failure prior We will cite to the (1988). Code. United States The current §§ 1381-1431 15 U.S.C. court, parties, U.S.C. the trial Act is found used of The codification version Appeals in this case. a 1994 reco- Court of and the 30101-30169 pursuant transportation provisions dification 1892(d). In addition to the Facts U.S.C. clause, Act contains a was On November James Wilson "Compli- state common law clause: driving manu- a 1986 Chevrolet automobile any ance with Federal motor vehicle ("GM") factured when he General subchapter standard issued under this was hit head on an automobile driven exempt any person liability under Wilson, William Pleasant. who was not 1897(k). common law." 15 U.S.C. wearing his seat belt at the time of the accident, died at the seene. authority granted Pursuant (and others, Wilson's estate various collec- Safety Secretary Transporta the U.S. "Wilson") tively brought known as suit promulgated tion Federal Motor Vehicle against alleged Pleasant and GM. Wilson ("Rule 208")2 Safety Standard (1994). $4.1.21-84.12%8 negligent designing, that GM was manu- C.E.R. 571.208 facturing, selling a vehicle that was not gave the manufacturer Wilson's crashworthy because the vehicle did not con- possible 1986 automobile three choices for system. passive tain an restraint providing passenger protection. crash The option-frontal/angular choices were: "First response,

In GM filed motion for sum- protection system.... op automatic Second mary judgment, claiming Safety protection sys tion-head-on automatic safety regulations promulgated and certain option-lap tem.... Third and shoulder pre-empted it Wilson's common law protection system warning." belt with belt claims. airbag system complied An have Id. would granted The trial court GM's motion for option. with the first or second The automo summary judgment. Appeals The driving at bile Wilson was the time of the affirmed the trial court's decision and found equipped with a manual accident was seat although express Act did not system fully complied belt with the third ly pre-empt law claim a common such as option. case, impliedly asserted in this it did so. one (1994), Ind.App., v. Pleasant Wilson II N.E.2d 638. Supremacy Under Clause I Constitution, federal law is United States Congress passed the Act in 1966 to supreme law of the land. U.S. Const. inju- and death and "reduce traffic accidents VI, police art. cl. 2. While "the historic persons resulting from traffic acci-

ries to super powers [are] of the States not to be (1988). provi- dents." 15 U.S.C. 1381 Two by ... Act unless that [is] seded Federal Safety Act relevant to this Congress," Rice sions of the are clear and manifest intent of First, pre- case. Act contains Fe Elevator 331 U.S. v. Santa 1392(d). 1146, 1152, emption clause in section 91 L.Ed. 1447 67 S.Ct. emption clause states: (1947), grounds 331 U.S. rev'd on other (1947), it has 91 L.Ed. safety vehicle Whenever a Federal motor Maryland, 17 subchapter settled since M'Culloch v. established under this been standard Wheat.) (4 316, 427, 4 L.Ed. 579 political subdivision U.S. effect,

is in no State or conflicts with federal law any authority either that state law that of a shall have State Louisiana, effect, Maryland establish, effect." v. to continue in is "without or 2114, 2129, 725, 746, respect any motor vehicle or item of (1981). Congress's intent equipment any stan- L.Ed.2d 576 motor vehicle 1.¢., may express, "ex aspect per- pre-empt state law applicable to the same dard language," in the statute's or equip- plicitly stated formance of such vehicle or item i.e., "implicitly contained in "implied," [the is not identical to the Federal ment which purpose." Jones statute's] structure standard. or; 1, 1973, September frequently. and before Sub- tured or after 208 has been amended 2. Rule 1, 1986, 4.1.2, September is at issue in this case. covering passenger manufac- cars section (1990). also See L.Ed.2d Packing Rath (1977). F.Supp. Corp., 756 the Heath L.Ed.2d 604 Motors General (S.D.Ind.1991) (finding no ex 1144, 1146-47 congressional com express of an absence cases). collecting press preemption; if that mand, law is law, see actually conflicts with Pacific Con Energy Resources & Electric Co. Gas IV Comm'n, 461 U.S. Dev. servation if, and argues that even General 75 L.Ed.2d 752 204, 103 S.Ct. though, Appeals held that even the Court (1983)3 pre-empt expressly Safety Act does not issue, impliedly law claim at TII law claim actual the common so in that Appeals of agree with the Court We regulation. Wil the federal ly conflictswith expressly pre Safety Act does weight of son, The clear 645 N.E.2d case. claim this law empt a state common supported General authority prior to 1992 pre-emption Wilson, The N.E.2d at 641. 645 impliedly Safety Act view Motors's explicitly re in the clause found like the law claims state common pre-empts fers, "any motor vehicle or respect to with See, Pokorny, e.g., Wilson. one asserted only equipment," to motor vehicle item of 1116; Motors Kitts v. General F.2d 902 applicable to the "safety standard[s] state (10th cert. Corp., F.2d 787 875 Cir.1989), such vehicle performance of aspect of same 1781, 1065, 108 110 S.Ct. 494 U.S. denied not identical to which is equipment of or item (1990); Taylor, F.2d 875 LEd.2d 783 1892(d). 15 U.S.C. standard." the federal Wood, to F.2d 395.4 We will return 865 and addition, presence In opinion of this parts V and VI these cases express pre of any notion negates concept vitality of of first address but There law claims. emption common of state following airbag cases implied pre-emption fore, Safety Act does not we find that the United States Su decisions of recent law claim pre-empt a state expressly Court, Lig Cipollone v. particularly preme Accord, Pokorny Ford Motor case. this 2608, Inc., 504, 112 S.Ct. gett Group, 505 U.S. (3d Cir.1990), 1116, cert. 1121 902 F.2d Freightliner and 407 120 L.Ed.2d 147, 853, 112 denied, 111 S.Ct. 498 U.S. Corp. v. U.S. (1990); Mo Taylor v. General L.Ed.2d 113 (1995). 1483, L.Ed.2d 385 131 (11th Cir.1989), 816, 825 Corp., 875 F.2d tors A-1 1781, 1065, 110 S.Ct. denied 494 U.S. cert. airbags or even not involve Cipollone did (1990); Wood General 783 108 L.Ed.2d Rather, law (1st involved common safety. auto 402 Cir. Corp., F.2d 865 manufacturers, 1988), cigarette against 494 U.S. denied claims made cert. rejected of the manufacturer's to such them, the courts In addition of argument. express pre-emption In companion with federal conflict due to an actual state law Wood, lengthy persuasive dissent. (sometimes pre-emption"), is a there called "conflict J., Wood, (Selya, dissenting). In pre-empted if federal law so 865 F.2d law is also Circuit, affirming legislative field "'as to thoroughly occupies Pokorny, while the Third Congress summary left grant judgment for the inference of make reasonable court's district claim, supplement it.'" Fi plaintiffs' to never- for the States no room on the defendants plaintiffs' auto- claim that the Cuesta, la 458 reinstated Ass'n v. de theless Fed. Sav. & Loan delity L.Ed.2d 73 equipped protec- have been mobile should Rice, (1982) 67 (quoting 331 U.S. at F.2d netting on the windows. Pokorny, tive 1152). Finally, uniform in these cases are not latter branch This S.Ct. pre-emption." called "field is sometimes example, problem. For Po- their pre-emption in this claim of field There is no rejected de- korny specifically the Wood court's o design case. foresee did not termination therefore the sav- in 1966 and that defects suits preserve interpreted to ings should not say while auto 4. We feel constrained also, Heath, F.Supp. at 1148. See them. their im- generally prevailed on manufacturers Union, A.G., 389 Gingold v. Audi-NSU-Auto prior airbag cases plied defenses (1989) (finding no Pa.Super. A.2d 312 necessarily result in did not these cases implied pre-emption). express or most complete for the defendants. victories express language [the responsibility the death alleging following Act" for the rea Cipol- of each lung clauses] cancer victim Rose smoker and son: on The manufacturers defended lone. claims were

grounds that the common law the issue Congress has considered When Cig by the terms of the Federal pre-emption and has included Act,5 Advertising Labeling and enact arette provision explicitly legislation enacted (the successor, Act"), in 1965 "1965 and its ed issue, pro addressing that and when Cigarette Smoking Act of the Public Health provides of con vision a "reliable indictum (the Act"). "1969 respect au gressional intent with to state thority," v. White Motor Malone began analysis by Supreme Court its The [497,] 505, 1185, 1190, [98 435 U.S. principles pre-emp setting forth basic 443,] to infer there is no need L.Ed.2d Clause; presump Supremacy tion-the congressional pre-empt intent police powers super tion that state are provisions of laws from the substantive clear law unless that is "the seded legislation. Federal Sav Congress;" California intent of and manifest Guerra, ings & Loan Assn. implied pre-emp express definitions 93 L.Ed.2d [107 the Third then noted that tion. MarsHatL, J.). 613,] (opinion of its Appeals had conducted Cireuit Court reasoning is a variant of the familiar Such analysis of the clauses pre-emption principle expressio of unius est reading a whole. Re by Acts the statute as exclusio provi a Congress' enactment of alterius: approach, jecting this defining pre-emptive reach of a pre-emptive scope of each sion that the concluded beyond implies that matters "governed entirely by the statute acts was of the two (1982). emphasis given by it the Stevens and lieve the 1334 15 U.S.C. Cipollone opinions and the White Blackmun against pre-emption greatly appropri presumption opinion was a has and 6. This in Easterwood two-jus- major point thinking ately of contention between influenced the about See, minority by Justice Scalia and the sev- post-Cipollone e.g., tice lead v. Freu cases. majority by 1516, (11th Cir.1994), en-justice lead Justice Stevens. Corp., 13 F.3d 1527 hauf -- argued that there While Justice Scalia's dissent Freightliner Corp. v. sub nom. aff'd U.S. newly of 1483, "no merit to this crafted doctrine --, was S.Ct 131 385 115 L.Ed.2d construction," Cipollone, 505 U.S. at Leonardo, narrow (1995); v. 180 Ariz. Hernandez-Gomez J., 544, (Scalia, dissenting), the 112 S.Ct. at 2632 183, 297, 17, P.2d 191 n. 17 305 n. 884 opin- majority opinion quotes the 1947 Stevens America, Volkswagen granted cert. sub nom. - Corp. Hernandez-Gomez, Fe Elevator to the effect ion of Rice v. Santa 115 U.S. Inc. v. police powers [are] historic of the State that "the 1819, (1995) LEd.2d 742 and vacated 131 superseded by ... Act unless not to be Federal light Freightliner decision in and remanded in purpose of Con- the clear and manifest [is] 1483, 115 S.Ct. U.S. Corp. Myrick, Id., 516, gress." 505 U.S. at v. Ford Motor 385; 131 L.Ed.2d Tebbetts 1152). at (quoting Rice, 230, 331 U.S. at (N.H.1995); Attocknie v. A.2d Carpenter supplied additional Blackmun substantial Justice (Okla.Ct.App.1995); Mfg., Inc., 901 P.2d authority position Stevens' in concur- for Justice Motors, Inc., Heiple 666 A.2d v. C.R. Id., majority opinion. ring part of the in that (Pa.Super.Ct.1995); Alvarado v. Motor Hyundai 531-34, (Black- 112 S.Ct. at 2625-26 505 U.S. at (Tex.Ct.App.1995); 908 S.W.2d joined Souter, J.J., and mun, J., by Kennedy Ford, Inc., 882 S.W.2d Loulos v. Dick Smith dissenting). concurring And in the next (Mo.Ct.App.1994). following Cipollone, major pre-emption Jus- case wrote for the entire court: tice White 5(b) 7. Section "No of the 1965 Act provided: avoiding en- interest of unintended In the relating smoking to and health should statement States, on the croachment authority advertising any cigarettes required in the be however, interpreting federal statute a court conformity with packages are labeled in which traditionally governed subject pertaining to a chapter." provisions of this find law will be reluctant to 5(b) provided: Act "No of the 1969 Thus, Section emption. will not lie unless smoking prohibition on requirement or based purpose of Con- clear and manifest it is "the imposed State law and health shall gress." advertising promotion Easterwood, respect or Transportation, Inc. CSX packages are labeled any cigarettes of which 123 L.Ed.2d 387 chap- provisions conformity of this (1993). with the give special here to We attention ter." against pre-emption because we be presumption (4) the 1965 case, reading comports with "This In this pre-empted. reach are not 519, 112 purpose." Id. at 1969 Act's statement of the 1965 and provisions the other regulatory con- "The beyond § look S.Ct. at no cause to Acts offer supports also such Therefore, only the 1965 Act need identi- text of each Act. reading." Id. pre-empted fy expressly the domain As the 1965 and of those sections. each substantially, we provisions differ B each in turn. consider Cipollone, several subsequent In cases 517, 112

Id. at Cipollone language from employed the courts IV-A-1, interpret supra, and quoted A-2 mean that because ed it to majority A seven-member clause, it is express pre-emption contains that common law claims then found necessary longer no consider $by of the 1965Act.8 were not particu are emption all.10 Two such cases analysis is instructive. The Court And its larly illustrative. provision and con at the looked Leonardo, In Hernandes-Gomez "precisely spoken had cluded in an automobile acci- plaintiff was involved face, pro their these narrowly. [O]n ... alleged paraplegic. that left her a She dent and federal merely prohibited state visions driving design was of the car she mandating particu rule-making bodies from adequately failed to the time of the accident cigarette on labels cautionary lar statements because, although automo- protect her (§ 5(a) cigarette advertisements or system complied with passive restraint bile's 5(by)." (§ on Supreme Court went Id. crashworthy be- the car was why finding its give additional reasons five lap a manual belt. cause did not include damages ac preemption of state law of no Supreme Court held The Arizona (1) must con appropriate: "[Wle tions was pre-empt claim. Her- Safety Act did not this pre light in of the provisions these strue nandez-Gomesz, 297, Ariz. 884 P.2d 183. 180 police pre-emption of state sumption against language Cipo!- The relied on Court (2) Id.;9 "[The warn regulations." power implied pre-emption hold that an lone to required [by the ing Act] label unnecessary, Safety Act was analysis of the obligations additional its own effect foreclose debating implied saying "courts should avoid Congress law. That under state imposed ad- if text of the statute warning does not auto requires particular a reliably thus identi- pre-emption and dresses Id.; regulatory field." matically pre-empt congressional intent." Id. at 884 fies (8) inherent conflict general, no is "[There P.2d at 188. of state warn between federal plaintiff con- Freuhauf, vitality Myrick and the continued ing requirements Id.; brak- of an antilock tended that absence damages actions." law of state common presumption against emphasis Cipollone on the pre-emptive 5 of the 1969 effect 8. As to the pre-emption. justices claims found some plurality of four not, justices found pre-empted three and some post-Cipollone cases There are also some justices pre-empted, and two claims none of the preemption implied to conduct an continued pre-empted. Because all the claims found pre claims were and held that no justices on the widely varying views Corp., No. empted. v. General Motors See Hill Act, we have of the 1969 emptive effect of 5 15, 1995); (N.D.Ala. Bee Nov. 94-AR-0088-S helpful. analyses of it not found their CIV 94-1956-A Lovelace, al., et No. man v. 2, 1995); (W.D.Okla. Dykema v. Volks Nov. See note (Wis.Ct.App.1994), supra. wagenwerk, 754 525 N.W.2d - --, 133 denied cert. Fridman, Hernandez-Gomez, (1995); 1516; 276 Miranda v. Myrick, L.Ed.2d 23 13 F.3d 10. See (1994); 167 Tebbetts, 665 A.2d 647 A.2d 183; Boyle Ariz. 884 P.2d N.J.Super. 207, 501 N.W.2d 865 177 Wis.2d Alvarado, 1066; 345; 666 A.2d Chrysler Heiple, Co., (1993); 852 S.W.2d 570 Marrs v. Ford Motor 221; and Lou Attocknie, 901 P.2d S.W.2d Montag (Tex.Ct.App.1993); v. Honda Motor los, in note As discussed 882 S.W.2d 149. (D.Colo.1994). F.Supp. into account supra, also took these courts warning preemption of state federal constituted a tween ing system in his tractor-trailer vitality of Myrick, requirements 18 F.3d and the continued negligent design defect. damages actions." 505 common law The defendant contended S.Ct., Safety Act at issue at 2618. Our subse provisions of the U.S. at same Cipollone have not read quent decisions our case Hernandes-Gomesz,the 11th claims.11 Like analysis of an individ the need for obviate See, eg., pre-emptive effects. ual statute's plaintiff for the on also ruled Cireuit Easterwood, proposition Cipollone for the Transportation, basis that stood Inc. v. CSX n. S.Ct. cannot exist when implied pre-emption (1993) ("We express 1742 n. 123 L.Ed.2d 387 an has included pre-emp tion clause in the statute. implied reject petitioner's claim of 'conflict' ... basis of the on the

C best, sup Cipolione ceding analysis.") At granted certiora- The U.S. Court express pre that an ports an inference Myrick and Hernandez-Gomez.12 ri both implied pre-emp emption clause forecloses Writing Myrick, the antilock for the Court tion; a rule. it does not establish case, braking system Thomas first Justice --- --, at 1488. U.S. at S.Ct. argument plaintiffs' addressed pre-emp "need not reach the conflict Court argument Having plaintiffs' thus dismissed as "without tion issue at all" and dismissed ap pre-emption analysis was implied that no that, holding merit" the 11th Cireuit's Safety Act propriate under the because "implied pre-emption cannot exist Cipollone, express pre-emption presence of an Congress has chosen to include when clause, nevertheless in a statute." express pre-emption clause summary plaintiffs agreed with the --, at 1487. U.S. at S.Ct. on judgment in favor of the defendants any categorical rule in Rather than establish pre-emption was grounds of conflict said, that case Cipollone, the court appropriate. indicated statutory con a familiar canon of turned "on finding two bases for there were any reason to and on the absence of struction "impossi pre-emption: where conflict pre-emption." Id. at any broader infer comply both private party to ble for a quoting After verbatim requirements," id. at state and quoted passage Cipollone English (quoting v. General IV-A-1, Myrick court said: supra, the 78-79, 496 U.S. Electric express of the an definition The fact that (2) (1990)); 2270,2274-75, or 110 L.Ed.2d 65 "implies"- a statute pre-emptive reach of an to the law "stands as obstacle where state i.e., inference-that supports a reasonable pur the full and execution of accomplishment pre-empt other Congress did not intend to at objectives Congress," id. of poses and express the not mean that matters does --, (quoting Hines v. at 1487 115 8.Ct any possibility of entirely forecloses clause Davidowitz, Indeed, just two pre-emption. implied (1941)). 404,85 L.Ed. 581 passage in quoted paragraphs after the pre- quick of the made work The Court engaged in a conflict Cipollone, we safety given that no federal emption Cigarette defense the Federal emption of regulated the in Act, effect which standards were Advertising 79 Stat. Labeling and systems on tractor amended, seq., use of anti-lock brake et and 15 U.S.C. such, impossible for it was not trailers. As be- general, inherent conflict found "no same, opinion in Hernan- did not write an 12. The Court statutory provisions are the 11. While the regulations protection in obviously the crash and remanded dez-Gomez, but vacated braking sys- apply to antilock 208 do not in Supreme reconsideration Court for Arizona dispositive when In a fact that would tems. light Myrick. of Court, no the the case reached Depart- regulations regarding an- Transportation ment of were in braking systems tractor-trailers for tilock Myrick occurred. when the accident effect reading pre-emption the clause comply row[ ]" "to with both federal the defendants 517-18, 112 at simply Cipollone at [was] there no itself.13 See and state law because Id. at comply with." federal standard to Furthermore, since, 115 S.Ct. at 1488. Second, something if we find that promulgated stan in the absence of a application precise and narrow more than a dard, the need the Act fails to address pre-emption the clause is language of the system devices at all on for anti-lock brake whether the required, we must determine

tractor-trailers, for the had no basis question in actual conflict with law in is 'the concluding "lawsuits frustrate that the law, Myrick at at federal pur the full accomplishment and execution of i.e., (1) impossible it is whether objectives Congress'" poses Id. at and and party comply with both state private Hines, ---, (quoting requirements, or whether 404). 61 S.Ct. at to the accom law stands as an obstacle purposes full plishment and execution of the D objectives Congress. Id. Summarizing current state of the law help cannot ob- implied pre-emption, we y Cipol- serving Myrick did not overrule Rather, held that today, lone. before us nei Unlike the case interpretations Cipollione "airbag" to the effect Cipollone Myrick was an ther nor principles from those But the derived pre-emption cannot exist when Con- case.14 IV-D, express pre- gress supra, help chosen to include has forth in us cases set interpreta- immediately incorrect clause were resolve the case. It is Cipollone, as elucidated 1892(d) tions. Based on obvious following steps alone, Myrick, we believe taken analyze properly a claim that required congres provide are a reliable indication of a state pre-emptive bars respect conflict to its sional intent with sav presence damages effect. claim. ings statute-providing, as it First, if the federal statute issue does, any reg [federal "compliance language, we determine contains statute] issued under does not ulation] [the provides a provision reli whether that alone exempt any person liability under com intent with congressional able indication clear, think, very we mon law"-makes We make respect pre-emptive effect. to its pre-emptive seope of the by employing canons of determination governed entirely by express lan examining statutory construction But, apply guage pre-emption clause. provisions stat other of the statute-and Cipollione ing principles enunciated any they if offer cause a whole-to see ute as do believe that pre-emption lan beyond express to look fogether fore emption and clauses indication If a reliable guage. we find such any possibility implied pre-emption close appli the congressional intent and neither respect law claims. with to state common nor an examination of cation of the canons Supreme looked at the suggests When the Court provisions of the statute the other 5(b) Ciga- pre-emption § clause of the 1965 any degree of any to infer different reason Act, "pre- Congress spoke only rette it found that then-is there no preemption, then-but narrowly," Cipollone, 505 at cisely and U.S. beyond "precise{ and nar- go ] need to the And, pre- a claim of Myrick, And while involved even as Justice Thomas notes the emption the federal statute as same Cipollone court concluded that after the case, the fact that no anti- analysis required one before us in this pre-emption under the was promul- braking system regulation had been lock cigarette advertising went ahead and statutes, it it gated tractor-trailers meant that implied pre-emption thereunder for effectively the conducted necessary to utilizing analysis was not for the analysis anyway, outlined in the - IV-A-2, pre-emption clause of on the consider effect supra. U.S. at 115 savings clause. S.Ct. at 1488.

385 provi of these Beyond precise words specified it when 112 S.Ct. at find, sions, as did the we smoking and relating to statement "Inlo reading appropriate for sev Cipollone,this is advertising of in the required be health shall First, must construe these reasons. "we eral there cigarettes" and any [properly labeled] against light presumption provisions in rule- "only prohibited state and federal power regula police of state mandating particular making bodies from at 112 S.Ct. Cipollone, 505 U.S. tion." pre-empt cautionary and did not statements Louisiana, 2618; 451 U.S. at Maryland v. at Id., at damages actions." 505 U.S. state law v. Santa Fe at Rice Similarly, 519-20, when S.Ct. at 67 S.Ct. at Corp., 331 U.S. Elevator 1892(d) clause § look at the in footnote length at 1152. As discussed Act, only prohibition we see and Easter- Cipollone's supra, we believe or motor vehicle motor vehicle on state point raises this emphasis on this wood's to not identical equipment standards importance fundamental principle to applicable to the safety standards federal Second, ree- analysis. courts have motor performance of the aspect of same 1897(k) § savings such as ognized clauses equipment. of motor vehicle vehicle or item in the face of law claims preserving common might exist as to whether any And doubt Cipollone, for exam regulations. In federal enough precise language narrow and this savings found that a ple, Supreme Court merely prohibits state conclude that to To Comprehensive Smokeless in the mandating particu rule-making bodies from 15pres Act of 1986 Health Education bacco is broad and wide safety standards or lar damages based on law actions state erved damage common law enough prohibit state 518, 112 at S.Ct. products." 505 U.S. those dispelled by presence well is claims as in the National savings clause at 2618. The 18397(k) "Compliance savings § clause: Housing Construction Manufactured safety stan any motor vehicle is identical language of which subchapter under this dard issued Safety Act at savings clause com any lability under exempt person from here, preserve also been held has issue language seems to us This mon law." 5409(c) law claims. U.S.C. common create "the reliable sufficiently precise to Builders, (1995); Champion Home v. Shorter respect congressional intent with indicium (N.D.Ohio 1991).16 F.Supp. 333 necessary im authority" to render to state Cip analysis inapplicable. plied pre-emption argument against strongest We believe language ollone, plain this view savings precludes 435 Corp., Motor Malone v. White (quoting 1185,1190, L.Ed.2d 98 was advanced Wood. U.S. case, majority a First Circuit (1978) Fed. Sav. & Loan In that California clear "lack[ed] Guerra, panel the statute found U.S. Assn. (opinion of subject" of 683, 690, 93 L.Ed.2d 613 express direction on design lawsuits were J.)). whether Marshall, preserves Deregulation Act "Nothing chapter clause in Airline in this U.S.C. 4406: 15. 15 Contra, claims). Carstensen liability common law any person from relieve shall Cir.1995) (8th 49 F.3d statutory any Brunswick law to other or under State (Federal pre-empts state tort law Boat person." Act), cert. de despite clause in claims L.Ed.2d Corp. Cityfed nied Fi Trust also Resolution 16. See (1995); Cir.1995) (sav Ameri (3d v. Beltman North Cleveland F.3d 1231 nancial Corp., Cir.1994) (Carmack (2nd Institutions, Reform, 30 F.3d 373 Re can ings Financial clause in Act of 1887 Interstate Commerce Amendment to Act of 1989 and Enforcement preserves covery, savings despite law claim pre-empts common claims); common law Cropwell and federal Amendment), denied (5th cert. in Cir. F.3d 899 Leasing NMS, Inc., 5 provision Co. (1995); and L.Ed.2d 785 S.Ct. 130 1993) 115 (savings Comprehensive Environ in clause Cir.1992) (1st Pittsfield, F.2d 1 980 Liability Mattoon Compensation Act Response and mental (Safe Drinking pre-empts common law claims, Act Water including general mari preserves other savings despite existence claim nuisance claims); v. Business Express, time and Dudley clause). (D.N.H.1994) (savings Inc., F.Supp. Safety But rare- after enactment of the Act. requiring implied pre-emp- empted-thereby Id., analysis. ly theory 865 F.2d at 402. The of action tion does a new of a cause panel language judge's the emerge appellate reason that the found ab initio from the 1397(k) about, rather, conceived, savings § to be unclear on pen; the clause it is written subject essentially Congress debated, many years litigated the was that for and at trial briefed, anticipate being argued, opined that there could ever 1966 did not before and thing a state tort action based the upon appellate be such a on And even review. design. "Congress relationship if negligent on And so Larsen court addressed the be- 1892(d) Safety § tween the Act's peculiar type envisage did not this of law- 1897(k) suit," panel Congress § that could savings found clause: clause to sanction what the court not have meant apparent It is that the National Traffic to as "the 'tension' between referred Safety supplementary Act is intended to be existing common law FMVSS and state of and in addition to the common law of the current situation." Id. We do negligence product liability. The com- slight the extensive treatment not mean to rigid mon law is not sterile or and serves given subject by majority this the Wood society by adapting the best interests of disagree. when we responsibility standards of conduct and fairly emerging develop- meet the foremost, emphasize First and we that the . ing needs of our time. The common majority presumption ignored the Wood duty care standard of a to use reasonable pre-emption. it visited this sub against Had light of all the can at least cireumstances ject following Cipollone's and Easterwood's society until serve the needs of our important principle, reaffirmation of this Ci legislature imposes higher standards or 517-18, pollone, at 505 U.S. at expand strict the courts the doctrine of Easterwood, 507 U.S. at liability salutary for tort. The Act is a not believe it would have em we do exemption step in this and not an direction effort to find that barked on its extensive lability. from common law Congress did not mean what it said. Larsen, Wood, (quoted 391 F.2d Second, agree simply cannot that de- we J., (Selya, dissenting)). F.2d at litigation unknown in 1966 sign defect was so Congress would not have considered reasons, For these we hold that 1397(k) law when it first to be of common Safety § savings clause of the general, adopted Safety Act. we explicit made an statement analysis of the agree with the Wood dissent's by common law claim made kind design tort law in 1966 and its state of defect plaintiff in this case is not promulgated "Congress specific there- or standards made no conclusion lability design for exception products fully subscribing-as we under. And while Act], and we disserve [in defects Myrick's teaching express must-to that an role carv- proper performance of our pre-emption clause does not as a rule fore- against grain ing exception such implied pre-emption, for the reasons set close Wood, J., (Selya, 1897(k) history." F.2d at above, § forth we hold that the dissenting). any possi- entirely forecloses bility implied pre-emption this case.

Furthermore, argument principal majority uses to establish that the Wood VI pre-dates the emer- recognize law not set litigation is that such We gence design defect area, however, recognized until the tled in this and so conduct an causes of action were implied pre-emption analysis despite holding in Larsen v. Eighth decision Gener- Circuit's (8th Cir.1968) required. And conclude it is not we Corp., 391 F.2d al Motors that, beyond reading of go even if a facial (allowing jury to decide whether a vehicle 1892(d) pre-emption Act's rigid steering linkage which caused with a 1397(k) savings clause and injuries in a front-end clause and the to the driver severe defectively designed), years apply traditional conflict collision was two Hines, 1487; at 312 U.S. at common plaintiff's find analysis, we do the full 67, To ascertain at 404. 61 S.Ct. pre-empted here. claim negligence law Congress, we ex objectives of purposes and policies of the purposes and the stated A amine statutory language at general, statute English v. General Myrick and Under where both elucidated particular, issue 2270, 72, 110 S.Ct. 496 U.S. Electric history. legislative by the statute's possible has L.Ed.2d 65 McClendon, 498 U.S. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. pre-emption implied conflict that indicated 112 L.Ed.2d 111 S.Ct. private for a impossible "it is exists where Holliday, 498 U.S. Corp. v. (citing FMC federal state and comply with both party to (1990)). 112L.Ed.2d 111S.Ct. - at Myrick U.S. requirements." implied pre- finding of that a We believe at English, 496 U.S. 115 S.Ct. pur- First, with be inconsistent we conclude would Safety underlying the policies state common pose between of and is no conflict there presented enacting and the choices Congress, in this case law clear Act. It is "reduce traffic intended to occurs when Implied pre-emption 208. persons injuries to and deaths accidents comply with impossible physically 15 U.S.C. Fed. accidents." relating law. from traffic and federal state both California Guerra, purpose, this Con- accomplish 479 U.S. To Loan Ass'n v. Sav. The Court regulation of auto L.Ed.2d 613. gress authorized law common impliedly preserving state safety while Appeals held that impetus claims, additional thereby providing in this case law common pre-empted state have the best judgment would to choose law manufacturers a common because they manu- are particular a de car comply system with for the foreing GM to the effect "mini- simply provides facturing. Rule 208. Rule 208 with that conflicts standard facto perfor- vehicle motor disagree. mum standard at 641. We 645 N.E.2d 1391(2). It would 15 U.S.C. mance...." cases, a acknowledge that some We do if manufac- purpose of statute defeat may be judgment law common utilizing a discouraged from were not turers law. Howev- a federal a conflictwith due to be con- otherwise would safety system that conflict, be a er, for there to we conclude law common negligent under state sidered com- regulatory, or law-statutory, tort theories. passive re- mandate a have to mon-would regula- by federal system prohibited straint of stat canons Applying standard Indiana arguendo, Assuming, construction, tion. find that we utory airbags, would be there requires law preserve com intention expressed a clear Rule 208 because Rule 208 through no conflict claims from mon law only permits airbags-it prohibit Act. 15 provision of 1397(k). there interpreting stat hold that We When alternatives. other U.S.C. some law state common conflict between lan plain is no utes, look to must first courts by Rule presented the choices case and this intent. United to divine guage of the statute Accord, Cir.1995). (7th v. General Heath F.3d 254 Wright, 48 v. States (finding F.Supp. at intent, presume legislative ascertaining grounds). on other a useless not enact legislature did Bd. Comm'rs Hinshaw provision. B constru (1993), Ind., 637. When N.E.2d portion statutes, to the Davidowitz, related ing clauses Myrick and Hines Under consid must be being construed L.Ed. statute aas whole. to be read are and statutes ered has indicated Fighters Fire Ass'n v. Int'l Evansville exists where conflict single as a (1987), Ind., "Just accomplishment N.E.2d 57. an obstacle "stands isolation, nor can read cannot be objec- word purposes and full execution Smith statute." of a single provision Congress." tives of States, 223, 232, implied pre-emption In find United order to (1995). 2050, 2056, Safety purpose, 124 L.Ed.2d 138 face of the Act's statement of clause, presence savings the of the and the 1892(d) repre- The legislative history, pre-Cipollone cases by Congress pre- sents a clear intention "underlying pur focussed instead on several empt regulation. non-identical state Howev- poses" Safety behind the Act and 1397(k) er, clause-"[clompli- savings industry, particularly advanced the auto any safety ance with Federal motor vehicle (i) safety establishing uniform national stan subchapter under this standard issued (ii) encouraging flexibility dards exempt any person liability from among passive choice manual and restraints. common law"-could not be more clear See, 1122; Heath, expressing Congress e.g., Pokorny, the intention 902 F.2d at serve state common law claims. Neither of F.Supp. While we find neither provisions standing can be read alone. these sufficiently persuasive of these to overcome together, Reading provisions these two foregoing implied pre-emption analysis, statutory regulatory that action conflicts we in turn. discuss each Safety pre-empted, with the Act is but all argument uniformity The as to was first preserved. state common law claims are To Corp. advanced in v. Motors Wood General any savings read the clause in other manner majority where the found that a successful nullify provision. would be to airbag claim "would stand as an obstacle to legislative history We also look to the ac Congress's increasing chosenmethod of auto companying passage of the Act to safety"-uniform safety mobile national stan Congress understand that did intend to Wood, (citing dards. 865 F.2d at Inter as the serve common law claims such one Ouellette, Paper national Co. Mag- asserted this case. Senator Warren 93 L.Ed.2d 883 Washington, sponsor nuson of (1987)). rejected But this was later 1966, stated, proposed Safety Act of "[clom- by Pokorny the Third Circuit Ford pliance with Federal Standards would not persuasively argued Motor which necessarily any person shield from broad uniformity primary goal was not a of Con liability Cong.Rec. at the common law." gress, given purpose Act's (1966). The Senate Committee Re and, uniformity clause does not mention port "[flederal also made clear that the course, presence safety minimum not be standards need inter preserves lability. clause which common law preted restricting common law stan State Pokorny, only 902 F.2d at 1122. We add Compliance dards of care. with such stan regulatory scheme which has any person dards would thus not shield from emerged anything from the NHTSA but product liability at common law. The com uniform, providing sepa manufacturers three liability product mon law on still remains as Indeed, suggested purpose rate choices. S§.Rep. Cong., it was." No. 89th 2d of uniform national standards seems to Cong. Sess. 12 & Ad U.S8.Code inherently contradictory pur us to be addition, pp. min.Code pose encouraging flexibility and choice Representative Dingell Michigan John among passive manual and restraints. stated, preserved every single "We have Pokorny court did find that a common remedy against that exists common-law conflict, however, claim would manufacturer for the benefit of a motor vehi flexibility "Congress with the and choice that (1966). purchaser." Cong.Rec. cle Department Transportation and the in- acknowledge arguments about While we give tended to to automobile manufacturers legislative history can be made to the Pokorny, in this area." 902 F.2d at 1123. contrary,17 we believe these statements analysis, establish, Its and that of the strongly support, Eleventh Circuit least if not Taylor was that wanted to save common law claims General being pre-empted by regulatory Act. scheme authorized panying text. 17. See 875 F.2d at 827 n. 19 and accom- Taylor, Con- that are convinced latory history, we op the manufacturers gives auto Safety Act on first and foremost gress was focussed airbags and or installing seat belts tion of injuries and and deaths "reducing traffic prohibit the "cannot rule law that a common resulting from injuries persons to Po deaths and option." federally granted aof exercise to strategy was its and that accidents" 1124-25; F.2d traffic Taylor, 875 F.2d at korny, 902 through federal both purposes those pursue Loan& Fidelity Fed. Sav. (quoting Because law. state common regulation and Cuesta, la v. de Assn. of recognition 208 and (1982)). Rule compliancewith 73 L.Ed.2d impos- "physically not here is claim plaintiff's dispute that a probably we would While claim of the recognition and because sible" exercise prohibit the cannot law rule common the to "as an obstacle stand does not here regulation by federal granted option anof pur- full of the execution accomplishment and underlying case, where, the in this as Congress"-indeed, objectives of and poses savings law explicit common contains statute find no basis them-we it furthers we believe unnecessary use,"18 to decide it we find cla claim. plaintiff's of implying Pokorny court here. Just that issue national establishing uniform not find did Conclusion purpose Congress's primary to be standards Appeals, of find the Court Act, reject, do we as did Safety neither enacting the We in airbag claim is plaintiff's be a argument choice to flexibility and encouraging GM's Af- Safety Act. above, by the Congress expressly As noted purpose. primary States study the United "to reduce purpose careful Act's ter a declared and Cipolione in injuries to and decisions deaths and accidents traffic 1397(k)pre-emp- § Myrick, wehold accidents." traffic relating persons pre- implied entirely forecloses preserving clause thought tion plaintiff's permits in and goal and case in this further claims would if we 1897(k) And even go in the forward. savings clause claim cluded provision principles of of that Excising apply the effect Act. conclude in providing manu as re-stated in the name Act from the imply improper in our view choice it would flexibility and facturers Act. purpose emption here. primary contradicts transfer, opinion vacate the grant We regard, we in this view our To reinforce court's the trial reverse Appeals, the Court any amend in without observe GM, in favor of judgment summary grant of Act, amend 208 was to the ment further court for trial and remand by phasing restraints require passive ed to opinion. with this consistent proceedings and 1990. gradually in between them appar 208 is of Rule version the 1984 While J., DeBRULER, SHEPARD, case,19 and it illus C.J. in this applicable ently not flexibility find not NHTSA did trates concur. purpose" "underlying important an be so concurs J., part and DICKSON, concurs not authorized it was Safety Act that opinion. separate in result with mandatory regime for a more to substitute concurs SELBY, J., concurs regulatory earlier flexibility of its follow. opinion to separate result with scheme. part and Justice, concurring in DICKSON, C result. concurring in purposes and examining the stated After major- V, I concur Part Except as to statutory lan- policies majority, I would opinion. ity Unlike regu- issue, legislative and the guage at Chevrolet Cuesta, was a 1986 car Mr. Wilson's la underlying in de statute 18. The applicable was of Rule version the 1984 12 U.S.C Loan Owners' Home year. through model the 1986 savings 1464(a), clause. contain did not preemption legislative "hold that saving ordinarily intent. A entirely any possibility forecloses anything must be construed as not to include preemption Opinion Moreover, this case." fairly within its terms. since The United States presumption against preemption, there is a was faced with the same statute-with the remedy is fair to consider this common law preemption same clause and clause- saving to be within the bounds of the clause. present that is before inus case. Rather Therefore, agree I that the common law rem- disposing than declaring of the issue im- edy preempted by is not this statute. plied foreclosed, preemption Myr- to be majority ick performed in fact an

preemption analysis, concluding compli-

ance with both federal and state law was not

impossible and that the lawsuit did not frus- congressional objectives.

trate Freightliner Corp. Myrick 1483,1487, 131 L.Ed.2d 385. That Myrick expressly court conducted such In the Matter of David T. WOODS. analysis leads me to conclude that we No. 07S00-9501-DI-00012. Thus, agree must do likewise. I while majority's implied preemption analysis Supreme Court of Indiana. VI, join Part I do introductory its Jan. analysis required." comment that such "is not Opinion at 336.

SELBY, Justice, concurring

concurring in result.

I concur in the result because to hold saving

otherwise would be to render meaningless. engage analy-

The Court did not 1897(k) actually

sis to determine whether analysis. preemption

forecloses Be-

cause the federal standard that case had suspended,

been no there was federal statute preempt

available to the state common law.

Thus, Myrick jumped immediately issue, implied preemption found that preemption, easily disposed

there was no

of that case. The same end result would regardless

have been reached of whether the analyzed §

Court had to determine if

implied preemption analysis appropriate is Thus, this statute. from is not implied preemption analysis

clear that is re-

quired. All that is clear is such permitted. majority hinged opinion its decision on express language saving A clause. law,

saving generally does not create preserves prior

but rather nullifica- saving

tion. A statute clause are and its together

be considered in order to ascertain

Case Details

Case Name: Wilson v. Pleasant

Court Name: Indiana Supreme Court

Date Published: Jan 11, 1996

Citation: 660 N.E.2d 327

Docket Number: 64S03-9506-CV-693

Court Abbreviation: Ind.