Wilson v. PattonWilson v. Patton
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Stephenson
This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the Hocking County Court of Common Pleas granting the motion of Jerry Patton, defendant below and appellee herein,
Appellants assign the following errors:
I. “Did the trial court err to [the] prejudice of plaintiffs when it granted defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted?”
II. “The trial court erred to [the] prejudice [of] the plaintiffs-appellants when it dismissed the action although it appears beyond doubt that complainants can prove [a] set of facts in support of their claims that would entitle them to the relief prayed for.”
On May 22, 1987, appellants, inmates at Hocking Correctional Facility, filed a
pro se
complaint which averred in pertinent part as follows. On or about March 16, 1987, appellee, a nurse and health care administrator at Hocking Correctional Facility, was induced to invade the privacy of appellants by Ohio Assistant Attorney General Frederick C. Schoch in violation of appellants’ constitutional right to privacy, R.C. Chapter 1347, and
On June 23, 1987, appellee filed a motion to dismiss appellants’ complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
On July 2, 1987, appellant Pearly L. Wilson filed an amendment to the previously filed complaint wherein he averred that appellee had again violated his constitutional right to privacy as well as his rights pursuant to R.C. Chapter 1347 and
On July 15, 1987, appellee filed a supplemental memorandum in support of his motion to dismiss. Attached to such memorandum was a copy of appellants’ motion to strike certain documents in
Pearly Wilson
v.
Richard P. Seiter
(S.D. Ohio 1987), No. C2-86-1046, unreported, wherein ap
On July 27,1987, appellants filed a motion for summary judgment, attaching several affidavits and exhibits. On August 6, 1987, the trial court entered judgment granting appellee’s motions to dismiss the complaint and the amendment to the complaint.
Appellants’ first assignment of error asserts that the trial court erred in granting appellee’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and appellants’ second assignment of error asserts that the trial court erred when it dismissed the action although it appeared beyond doubt that they could prove a set of facts in support of their claims that would entitle them to the relief prayed for. In that appellants’ assignments of error raise similar issues of law and fact, they will be considered jointly.
Appellee argues that the trial court correctly dismissed appellants’ complaint and amendment to the complaint in that the Court of Claims had exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether appellee was protected by the immunity statute, appellants failed to allege a claim under either state statutory or constitutional law, appellants waived their right to privacy when they filed prior federal lawsuits, and such prior federal lawsuits collaterally estopped appellants from raising the claims herein.
With respect to whether the trial court properly dismissed appellants’ complaint and amendment to the complaint on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it has been held that “[sjubject matter jurisdiction may not be conferred upon the court by agreement of the parties, may not be waived, and is the basis for mandatory sua sponte dismissal. * * *” State, ex rel. Lawrence Development Co., v. Weir (1983), 11 Ohio App. 3d 96, 11 OBR 148, 463 N.E. 2d 398, paragraph two of the syllabus.
“The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and consents to be sued, and have its liability determined, in the court of claims created in this chapter in accordance with the same rules of law applicable to suits between private parties, except that the determination of liability is subject to the limitations set forth in this chapter * * * ff
The sovereign immunity rule in Ohio is based upon the constitutional provision stating that suits may be brought against the state in such courts and in such manner as may be provided by law. Section 16, Article I, Ohio Constitution. In
Appellee argues that the court of common pleas was without jurisdiction to proceed in an action brought against a state employee absent a prior determination by the Court of Claims that the state official acted manifestly outside the scope of his employment, or acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless man
“A court of common pleas does not lack jurisdiction over an action against state officers or employees merely because the Court of Claims has not first determined that the act or omission, which is the subject of the action, was manifestly outside the scope of the officer’s or employee’s office or employment, or that the officer or employee acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner, unless the aggrieved party has filed a suit in the Court of Claims based on the same act or omission. * * *” See, also, Von Hoene v. State (1985), 20 Ohio App. 3d 363, 20 OBR 467, 486 N.E. 2d 868.
In that the record herein does not indicate that appellants have filed another suit in the Court of Claims, the trial court erred in its dismissal of appellants’ complaint and the amendment to the complaint based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to
With respect to appellee’s next argument that appellants failed to allege a claim under either state statutory or constitutional law, it has been held that in reviewing a dismissal under
Appellants’ complaint and the amendment to the complaint averred that appellee, by executing affidavits in other proceedings referring to appellants’ prison medical records, deprived appellants of their rights in violation of R.C. Chapter 1347,
“Records and files of prisoners are compiled pursuant to
“The department of rehabilitation and correction shall keep in its office, accessible only to its employees, except by the consent of the department or the order of the judge of a court of record, a record showing the name, residence, sex, age, nativity, occupation, condition, and date of entrance or commitment of every inmate in the several institutions governed by it, the date, cause, and terms of discharge and the condition of such person at the time ofleaving, and also a record of all transfers from one institution to another, and, if such inmate is dead, the date and cause of death. These and such other facts as the department requires shall be furnished by the managing officer of each institution within ten days after the commitment, entrance, death, or discharge of an inmate.
“In case of an accident or injury or peculiar death of an inmate, the managing officer shall make a special report to the department within twenty-four hours thereafter, giving the circumstances as fully as possible.” (Emphasis added.)
Medical records are not “public records” pursuant to
“(A)(1) Except as provided in division (A)(2) of this section, the following are exempt from the provisions of this chapter:
U* * *
“(d) Any state or local agency or part of any state or local agency that is a correction, probation, pardon, or parole authority[.]” (Emphasis added.)
“No present or former public official or employee shall disclose or use, without appropriate authorization, any information acquired by him in the course of his official duties which is confidential because of statutory provisions, or which has been clearly designated to him as confidential when such confidential designation is warranted because of the status of the proceedings or the circumstances under which the information was received and preserving its confidentiality is necessary to the proper conduct of government business.” (Emphasis added.)
Appellee argues that appellants failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to
Appellants’ civil rights claim was made pursuant to Section 1983, Title 42, U.S. Code, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. * * *”
Actions under Section 1983 can be brought in state court, in view of the fact that, in the absence of a grant of exclusive jurisdiction, state courts have concurrent authority to adjudicate federally created causes of action.
Logan
v.
Southern California Rapid Transit Dist.
(1982), 136 Cal. App. 3d 116, 124, 185 Cal. Rptr. 878, 883;
Duncan
v.
Peck
(C.A. 6, 1985),
In that appellants argue in part that appellee acted under color of state law, whether or not their complaint and amendments to the complaint stated a claim upon which relief can be granted for their civil rights claim is dependent upon their constitutional claim that appellee deprived them of their right to privacy. “While there is no ‘right of privacy’ found in any specific guarantee of the Constitution, [it has been] * * * recognized that ‘zones of privacy’ may be created by more specific constitutional guarantees and thereby impose limits upon government power. * * *” Paul v. Davis (1976), 424 U.S. 693, 712-713; Roe v. Wade (1973), 410 U.S. 113, 152-153. The rights found in the guarantee of personal privacy must be limited to those which are “fundamental” or “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” which most often involve matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education. Paul, supra, at 713; J.P. v. DeSanti (C.A. 6, 1981), 653 F. 2d 1080, 1090.
Appellee cites both
Paul
and
DeSanti,
in support of his proposition that appellants have failed to state a constitutional claim upon which relief can be granted. However, in
Paul, supra,
the Supreme Court of the United States held that the publication of an arrest on criminal charges was not subject to constitutional protection, and in
DeSanti, supra,
at 1090, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the claimed right of nondisclosure of juvenile court records was not protected by a privacy right of constitutional dimensions. Conversely, the case at bar involves disclosure, not of records or the fact of an arrest, but, rather, of confidential prison medical records without appropriate authorization. In that, pursuant to
With respect to appellee’s remaining arguments that appellants waived any right to privacy and that the prior federal proceedings collaterally es-topped appellants from asserting such right to privacy, appellee relies upon copies of motions filed in federal district court and attached to his motions to dismiss. In passing on a
In that appellants’ complaint and the amendment to the complaint stated claims upon which relief can be granted and the trial court was not divested of subject matter jurisdiction over the claims without a prior determination of the Court of Claims, appellants’ first and second assignments of error are sustained and the judgment of the trial court dismissing appellants’ complaint and the amendment to the complaint is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Judgment reversed and came remanded.
Grey, P.J., and Abele, J., concur.