Wilson v. PalmerWilson v. Palmer
OPINION OF THE COURT
Plaintiffs seek a permanent injunction directing the defendant to remove a "speed bump” which she had constructed across a right-of-way used by all pаrties and to restrain her from interfering with their free and unencumbered use of the right-of-way.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Plaintiffs and dеfendant are the owners of adjacent parcels of realty located in the Town of Oswegatchie, St. Lawrence County, New York, having frontage on the St. Lawrence River.
2. Access from State Route 37 is provided by a deeded easement common to both parcels of land.
3. In order for thе plaintiffs (and other property owners located west of plaintiffs) to gain access to their property they must cross defendant’s propеrty over the common easement.
4. For many years this easement was merely an unimproved path or right-of-way used primarily during the summer season from Memorial Day to Labor Day.
5. During the time that the parties have owned their respective parcels the easement has been improved by the placing of gravel, grading and repair of inevitable potholes. These repairs were made either by individual landowners, or through their pooled resоurces.
6. There have never been any gates or wires erected that would impede the free and full use of the right-of-way by the landowners or their tenants or guests.
7. In October of 1992, defendant, and her neighbor to the east, had the right-of-way on their respective properties paved with asphalt.
8. In additiоn to paving, two "speed bumps” were constructed in the right-of-way.
9. There is only one "speed bump” located on defendant’s land and no relief cаn be granted as to the other "speed bump” since that landowner is not a party to this action.
10. The "speed bump” was purposely erected by the defendant in an attempt to control the speed of vehicles.
11. In addition to the bumps, defendant has erected signs stating: "Slow — speed bump.”
12. The undisputеd testimony of plaintiff Robert E. Wilson is that the "speed bump” on defendant’s property is some 2 Vi inches in height and that the other "speed bump” is some 2 inches in height.
It is obvious to this court that when Ms. Palmer constructed her "speed bump” it had the immediate effect of lowering the speed of vehicles, but raising the ire of the Wilsons. The fact that this lawsuit was instituted, pursued and ultimately tried gives rise to suspicion that there is more than a philosophical disagreement about the efficacy of "speed bumps” which divides these summer neighbors. The courts are not well equipped to settle minor differences which inevitably arise between folks who find themselves living in close рroximity. Unfortunately, it is only when one neighbor does something, for whatever reason, that so irritates the other, that simple disputes must ultimately be the subject of expensive and time-consuming litigation. Although litigants can, and often do, reach some compromise, there can be no middle ground for the court. One рerson is usually found to have a legal basis for his or her actions and is vindicated in the eyes of the law. The "victor” will then return to take up residence beside the "loser” and any hope of restoring tranquility to the neighborhood will be severely diminished.
In this case there are no real factual issues. The solе legal issue to be decided is whether or not a person may lawfully construct a "speed bump” within a right-of-way over his or her land. After a review of relеvant precedent this court concludes that one may, provided the "speed bump” is "reasonable”.
It is a general rule in New York jurisprudence that one may not make substantial alterations to a right-of-way if it interferes with another’s right to use the easement. (2 Warren’s Weed, New York Real Property, Eаsements, § 22:09 [4th ed].) An owner of the dominant estate may, however, repair, maintain or improve the easement so long as it does not cause an unduе burden on those legally entitled to use it for the particular purposes for which it was created. (Missionary Socy. of Salesian Congregation v Evrotas,
It cannot be said that the law prohibits any alterаtion to an easement. However, such alterations must permit the holder of the easement to continue the reasonable use and enjoyment
It has been held to be a reasonable burden on a footpath easement to construct and maintain a locked gate to prevent trespassing (Messer v Leveson,
There is but one case reported in New York concerning the placement of "speed bumps” in an easement, but it is of little help in analyzing the situation here since the factors upon which Supreme Court relied in permitting an electronically operated gate and two of three "speed bumps” are not revealed. (Glennon v Mayo,
Other jurisdictions have been called upon to assess the reasonableness of "speed bumps.” Judge Langenbach of the Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford/New Britain, after personally inspecting the offending bump, stated: "The court concludes that the 'speed bump’ constitutes an inсonvenience to those using the easement. However, this inconvenience must be weighed against defendants’ need to slow traffic on a narrow unрaved roadway in a relatively congested area. The 'bump’ is not of a size which is likely to damage vehicles which are operated at а reasonable speed in light of all prevailing circumstances. Therefore, plaintiffs have failed to prove that they will be irreparably harmеd unless this obstruction is removed.” (Marsan v Pipeling,
An Oregon court, finding that "speed bumps” limited to a height of seven inches were a reasonable means of controlling speed, denied an injunction. (Marsh v Pullen, 50 Ore App 405,
This court is also aware of two Florida decisions that
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Defendant, as the owner of the dominant estate, had the right to improve it by paving and to place "speed bumps” in the right-of-way in order to control the speed оf vehicles.
2. Assessing the proof in light of all the surrounding circumstances, the "speed bump” constructed by the defendant was reasonable in height and width and did not unnecessarily or unreasonably interfere with the intended use of the easement by the plaintiffs.
3. Plaintiffs have failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the relief requested should be granted.
4. A verdict of "no cause for action” should be entered.