ISAAC AND SHAWN WILSON Plaintiffs-Appellants -vs- MERCY MEDICAL CENTER Defendant-Appellee
Case No. 2015CA00010
COURT OF APPEALS STARK COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
September 21, 2015
[Cite as Wilson v. Mercy Med. Ctr., 2015-Ohio-3928.]
Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2014CV00444 JUDGMENT: Affirmed
For Defendant-Appellee
STEPHEN E. MATASICH
Day Ketterer, Ltd.
Millennium Centre - Suite 300
200 Market Avenue, North
P.O. Box 24213
Canton, Ohio 44701-4213
For Plaintiffs-Appellants
STACIE L. ROTH
Allen Schulman & Associates
236 Third Street, SW
Canton, Ohio 44702
{¶1} Plaintiffs-appellants Isaac Wilson, et al. appeals the December 19, 2014 Judgment Entry entered by the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, which granted summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee Mercy Medical Center (“Mercy“).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} Appellant Isaac Wilson (“Mr. Wilson“) was admitted as a patient into Mercy in February, 2011, for medical care following a fall at his home. One week after his admission, Mr. Wilson was transferred to Mercy‘s rehabilitation unit. Mercy determined Mr. Wilson to be a fall risk which, pursuant to internal policy and records, required he be checked on an hourly basis. Mr. Wilson was advised not to attempt to get out of bed without calling for assistance. At 9:30 p.m. on February 24, 2011, Mr. Wilson was found on the floor of his room with a severe laceration to his head. The last notation documented on Mr. Wilson‘s medical chart indicated staff administered medication to him at 7:15 that evening.
{¶3} Appellants filed suit on August 20, 2012, alleging medical negligence, premises liability, and loss of consortium. Mercy filed a motion for summary judgment on April 5, 2013. Appellants dismissed the case without prejudice approximately two weeks later.
{¶4} On February 18, 2014, Appellants refiled the complaint, asserting two causes of action. The second cause of action, which is not at issue in the instant appeal, set forth a premises liability claim. The first cause of action alleges medical malpractice/negligence, and reads:
9. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate paragraphs one (1) through eight (8), inclusive, of this Complaint as though fully rewritten herein.
10. Plaintiffs state that said Defendant, as described hereinabove, were engaged to attend and treat Plaintiff Isaac Wilson in a properly skillful manner by the exercise of the degree of care and skill ordinarily employed by members of their profession in the same line of medical practice in this or similar communities.
11. Plaintiffs further state that said Defendant was negligent in their care and treatment of Plaintiff by, among other things, failing to properly monitor and care for Plaintiff Isaac Wilson notwithstanding his known risk for falls, and said failure resulted in his fall and severe and permanent physical injury.
12. Plaintiffs further state that said Defendant was negligent in their care and treatment of Plaintiff Isaac Wilson in that they failed to exercise or possess the degree of care, skill and learning ordinarily exercised by other medical personnel having regard to the existing state of knowledge and medicine.
{¶5} Upon conclusion of discovery, Mercy filed a motion for summary judgment on September 23, 2014. Therein, Mercy argued Appellants’ medical malpractice claim should be dismissed as such did not constitute a medical claim. Mercy further asserted the premises liability claim should be dismissed because Appellants failed to establish a duty of care was owed or breached. Mercy also maintained there was no evidence to
{¶6} Appellants filed their response on October 10, 2014. Appellants agreed the first cause of action was not a claim of medical malpractice, but rather a claim for ordinary negligence. In the alternative, Appellants stated “if this Complaint could possibly be construed to be solely a medical malpractice claim“, they “would respectfully request that this Honorable Court grant a motion to allow the evidence to conform to the pleadings” pursuant to
{¶7} Via Judgment Entry filed December 19, 2014, the trial court granted Mercy‘s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Appellants’ complaint. The trial court found, even construing Appellants’ first cause of action as a claim of ordinary negligence, or permitting Appellants to amend their complaint to assert a claim for ordinary negligence, Appellants failed to demonstrate Mercy owed Mr. Wilson a duty of care based upon Mercy‘s internal policy which required hospital staff to conduct hourly rounds to check on patients; or that Mercy breached such a duty. The trial court further found the deposition testimony of Michael Shaffer, a Patient Service Aide, sufficient to rebut Appellants’ allegation Mr. Wilson had not been seen between 7:15 p.m. and 9:30 p.m. on February 24, 2011. Additionally, the trial court found Appellants did not present evidence to establish Mercy‘s alleged failure to check on Mr. Wilson was the proximate cause of his fall.
{¶8} It is from this judgment entry Appellants appeal, assigning as error:
{¶10} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN ISSUES REMAINED AS TO WHETHER APPELLEE OWED A DUTY OF ORDINARY CARE TO MONITOR ITS PATIENTS.
{¶11} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN ISSUES OF FACT REMAINED AS TO WHETHER APPELLEE‘S FAILURE TO MONITOR APPELLANT WAS A DIRECT AND PROXIMATE RESULT OF HIS INJURIES.”
I
{¶12} In their first assignment of error, Appellants maintain the trial court erred in dismissing their first cause of action rather than granting leave to amend the complaint pursuant to
{¶13}
{¶14} Whether to grant or deny a
{¶15} We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant Appellants leave to amend their complaint. First, Appellants never filed a motion to amend pursuant to
{¶16} Additionally,
{¶17} We next consider whether
{¶19} An appellate court reviews a trial court‘s decision on a motion for leave to file an amended pleading under an abuse of discretion standard. Wilmington Steel Products, Inc. v. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co., 60 Ohio St.3d 120, 573 N.E.2d 622 (1991).
{¶20} “An attempt to amend a complaint following the filing of a motion for summary judgment raises the spectre of prejudice.” Brown v. FirstEnergy Corp., 9th Dist. No. 22123, 2005–Ohio–712, at ¶ 6, 159 Ohio App.3d 696. “A plaintiff must move to amend under
{¶21} Based upon the foregoing, we overrule Appellants’ first assignment of error.
{¶22} Despite the foregoing analysis of
{¶23} Because Appellants’ second and third assignments of error challenge the propriety of the trial court‘s granting summary judgment in favor of Mercy, we elect to address said assignments of error together. In their second assignment of error, Appellants contend the trial court erred in granting summary judgment when issues remained as to whether Mercy owed a duty to monitor its patients. In their third assignment of error, Appellants submit the trial court erred in granting summary judgment when issues of fact remained as to whether Mercy‘s failure to monitor Mr. Wilson was a direct and proximate result of his injuries.
{¶24} Summary judgment proceedings present the appellate court with the unique opportunity of reviewing the evidence in the same manner as the trial court. Smiddy v. The Wedding Party, Inc., 30 Ohio St.3d 35, 36, 506 N.E.2d 212 (1987). As such, this Court reviews an award of summary judgment de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996).
{¶25}
{¶26} It is well established the party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that no issues of material fact exist for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265(1986). The standard for granting summary judgment is delineated in Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280 at 293, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996): ” * * * a party seeking summary judgment, on the ground that the nonmoving party cannot prove its case, bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on the essential element(s) of the nonmoving party‘s claims. The moving party cannot discharge its initial burden under
{¶27} Appellants assert Mercy‘s internal policies and procedures established a duty of care owed to Mr. Wilson and the trial court erred in finding to the contrary. We disagree.
{¶28} We find, while hospital rules and regulations are, at the discretion of the trial court, admissible to provide evidence of the standard of care in a medical
{¶29} Appellants’ second and third assignments of error are overruled.
{¶30} The judgment of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
By: Hoffman, J.
Gwin, P.J. and
Delaney, J. concur
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HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
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W. SCOTT GWIN
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HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY