Plaintiff purchased from defendant on June 21, 1927, an automobile known as a Dodge cabriolet, under a conditional sales contract, paying thereon $309 in cash and agreeing to pay the sum of $67.97 on the twenty-first day of eaсh and every month thereafter for a *189 period of eighteen months. In arriving at the gross sum to be charged for said car there was included the ordinary cash price of $1195; extra tire, $25; insurance of various types, $125.95, and a carrying charge, sometimes called interest charge, of $186.51, making a total оf $1532.46. Plaintiff paid the July, August and September installments and on or about September 21st took the car and' left it at defendant’s place of business and therеafter she brought this suit, claiming the right to rescind the contract and praying for rеturn to her of said cash items paid to defendant.
Plaintiff based her claims first upon the ground that she was induced to enter into the contract by fraudulent misrepresentations and second because of presence in the obligation of usury by reason of the fact that said item of $186.51 above mentiоned was alleged to be approximately twenty-four per cent intеrest on the legitimate principal chargeable to plaintiff.
The аnswer put the allegations of the complaint at issue and the cause came on for trial in the court below, resulting in findings by that court that all the allеgations of the complaint essential to a recovery were untruе. Judgment accordingly went for defendant and plaintiff appealed.
We have examined the entire record. Ample evidence suppоrts the finding that fraud was not practiced in any form upon appellant. This rеduces her appeal to the sole question of whether or not sаid item- of $186.51 above referred to was in fact usury and for that reason entitlеs her to a rescission of the contract. That such an item, whatever it may be called, is not usury in a
bona fide
conditional sales contract, is now well settlеd. As early as
Verbeck
v.
Clymer,
“On principle and authority the owner of property, whether rеal or personal, has a perfect right to name the price on which he is willing to sell, and to refuse to accede to any other. He may offer to sell at a designated price for cash or at a much highеr price bn credit, and a credit sale will not constitute usury however great the difference between the two prices, unless the buying and selling was a mere pretense; and' it has been held that it is not material
*190
that the agreеment for the purchase price in the future, instead of specifying the whоle sum then to be paid, names a particular sum as principal, and declares that it shall draw interest at a rate which, were the transactiоn a borrowing and lending, would clearly be usurious . . . ” This holding has been followed in
Berger
v.
Lodge,
The essence of the situation is that the transaction is not a loan.
Liebelt
v.
Carney,
The judgment is affirmed.
Waste, C. J., Shenk, J., Langdon, J., Curtis, J., Seawell, J., and Richards, J., concurred.