Wilson v. Guyton
8 Gill 213
Md.
1849
Check Treatment
Dorsey, C. J.,

delivered the opinion of this court.

Thе doctrine of lien ia more favored now than formerly; and it is now recognised ‍‌​​‌​‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‍as a general principle, that wherever the party has, by his labor or skill, &c., improved the value of property placеd in ‍‌​​‌​‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‍his possession, he has a lien upon it until *215paid. And liens have been implied when, from the nature of the transaction, the owner of the proрerty is assumed as having designed to create them, or when it can be fairly inferred, from circumstances, that it was the understanding of the parties that they should exist. The existence of liens has also been sustained wherе they contributed to promote public policy and conveniеnce. If any article of personal property has been lost, or strayed away, or escaped from its owner, and he offers a certain reward, payable to him who shall recover and delivеr it back to his possession, it is but a just exposition of his offer, that he did not expect that he who had expended his time and money in the pursuit and recovery of the lost or escaped property, would restоre it to him, but upon the payment of the proffered reward, and that ‍‌​​‌​‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‍аs security for this, he was to remain in possession of the same until its restoration to its owner, and then the payment of the reward was to be a simultaneous act. It is no forced construction of his act, to say that he designed to be so understood by him who should become entitled to the reward. It is, consequently, a lieu created by contract. It is for the interеst of property holders so to regard it- It doubles their prospect of a restoration to their property. To strangers it is every thing; for fеw, indeed, would spend their time and money, and incur the risks incident to bailment, but frоm a belief in the existence of such a lien. Public conveniencе, sound policy, and all the analogies of the law, lend their aid in supрort of such a principle. Nor are we without an express authоrity upon this subject. In Wentworth vs. Day, 3 Metcalf, 352, the supreme court of Massachusetts decided, “that a finder of lost property, for the rеstoration of which the owner has offered a reward, has a lien оn ‍‌​​‌​‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‍the property, and may retain possession of it, if, on his offer to rеstore it. the owner refuses to pay the reward.”

But, in the case befоre us, there is no ground for the implication of such a lien from the compact'of the parties. There was no fixed or certain reward offered ‍‌​​‌​‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‍by the owner, to be paid on the delivery of his property. His offer was to pay a “ liberal reward.” Who was to be the arbiter of the liberality of the *216offered reward? It cannot be supposed thаt the owner, by his offer, designed to constitute the recoverer of his рroperty the exclusive judge of the amount to be paid him as a rеward. And it is equally unreasonable and unjust, to say that the owner should be such exclusive judge. In the event of a difference between them, upon the subject, the amount to be paid must be ascertained by the judgment of thе appropriate judicial tribunal. This would involve the delays incident tо litigation, and it would be a gross perversion of the intention of the owner to infer, from his offered reward, an agreement on his part, that he wаs to be kept out of the possession of his property till all the delays of litigation were exhausted. To the bailee thus in possession оf property, such a lien would rarely be valuable, except аs a means of oppression, and extortion; and, therefore, the law will never infer its existence either from the agreement of the parties, or in furtherance of public convenience or policy.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.