58 Minn. 149 | Minn. | 1894
The material allegations of the complaint are that plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract whereby the latter-
Conceding that, if in parol, such a contract passes no title to the timber while standing, and amounts to a mere revocable license to enter upon the vendor’s land for the purpose of severing and removing the timber, yet all the authorities agree that the timber severed under this license becomes the personal property of the vendee. This necessarily proceeds upon the theory that the contract is to be construed as being in the contemplation of the parties an executory one for the sale of chattels only, the title to which is to pass when the timber is severed; in other words, that when the timber is severed the contract becomes an executed one for the sale of personal property, with all the incidents of any other contract of sale of
Of course, what is said is predicated upon plaintiff’s claim as to the nature of the contract. If the contract was, as defendant alleges, merely one for a quitclaim deed of his interest.in the land, the plaintiff would have no claim, in the absence of fraud or deceit, for damages because of failure of title.
Order reversed.
(Opinion published 59 N. W. 988.)