499 A.2d 81 | Conn. Super. Ct. | 1985
The plaintiff has brought this action for damages against the defendant, who was his employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier at the time the plaintiff was injured in the course of his employment on May 22, 1981. *337
The first count of the complaint alleges that the defendant paid benefits to the plaintiff "in an envelope routinely used by the defendant in the course of its business, which envelope falsely purported to list the complete range of benefits available to the plaintiff, when in fact, there were other benefits available to the plaintiff." The plaintiff claims that "[t]he defendant's misrepresentation of available benefits misled and deceived the plaintiff" in violation of §
The defendant has moved to strike the first count on the ground that the plaintiff "has failed to demonstrate a `nexus' with the public interest as required in cases arising before June 8, 1984," the effective date of Public Acts 1984, No. 84-468. The defendant claims that § 2 of that act, which amended §
The plaintiff opposes the motion to strike on the ground that Public Acts 1984, No. 84-468, was intended by the legislature to apply retroactively. He argues in the alternative that the first count of the complaint sufficiently alleges a nexus between the public interest and the plaintiff's CUTPA claim as required under the rule stated in Ivey, Barnum O'Mara v. Indian HarborProperties, Inc.,
In response to the court's decision that CUTPA could not be used as a vehicle to redress wholly private wrongs, and because the General Assembly "was not content with this constricting interpretation of CUTPA by the court . . . it passed Public Act 84-468 . . . which in part negated the holding in Ivey, Barnum." Bartlett Romano, "Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act and Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act: Expanding Legal Horizons," 58 Conn. B.J. 302, 311 (1984). "In fact, therefore, the public interest requirement is non-existent and the Ivey, Barnum decision as it relates to the threshold, is repealed by legislative fiat." Id.
Section
A statutory enactment which does not create new rights or take away vested rights, but which only operates to promote the remedy or to confirm those rights, does not ordinarily come within the legal conception of a retrospective law or the general rule against the retrospective operation of statutes. 73 Am. Jur.2d, Statutes § 354. Where an amendment construes or clarifies an existing statute it must be accepted as the legislative declaration of the meaning of the original act.Hartford v. Suffield,
The legislative history of Public Acts 1984, No. 84-468, contains the following explanation of its purpose by Representative Maurice B. Mosley: "Mr. Speaker, this bill basically makes clear that there's no requirement for proving a public interest or injury . . . under the Unfair Trade Practices Act." (Emphasis added.) 27 H.R. Proc., Pt. 19, 1984 Sess., p. 6769. Where the statements made by the proponents of a bill show that the purpose of a proposed amendment is to clarify, rather than alter, the original legislative intent, it will be deemed to apply retroactively. Koskoff, Koskoff Bieder v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
Subsequent legislation declaring the intent of an earlier statute is entitled to great weight in statutory construction. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the plaintiff's first count allege a routine informational practice used by the defendant in the course of its business as a workers' compensation insurance carrier, which practice the plaintiff claims was deceptive and misleading. The defendant's brief refers to the material complained of as a "stuffer" designed to introduce the insurer to employee-beneficiaries as a "benefits provider" and to open up "a line of communication" between them.
In the Ivey, Barnum case, there was no allegation of any attempt to communicate with any persons other than the CUTPA complainants, nor was there any claim that the practices complained of were "abusive, coercive or in any way unfair." Ivey, Barnum O'Mara v. Indian Harbor Properties, Inc., supra, 538. As the court noted, the focus was exclusively on the professional *341 relation between the parties to the action, and allegedly deceptive acts or practices which arise out of such a private controversy "are actionable only if the acts or practices have a potential effect on the general consuming public." Id., 540. The plaintiff's complaint in this case alleges deceptive acts and practices which have a potential effect, at least, on other similarly situated workers' compensation claimants who become entitled to benefits from the defendant company.
Under federal standards, an unfair trade practice is one which "offends public policy as it has been established by statutes . . . [or which] is within at least the penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness . . . ." FTC v.Sperry Hutchison Co.,
Under §
Sections 38-60 and 38-61 of the General Statutes prohibit certain deceptive acts or practices in connection with the business of insurance. They include the misrepresentation of "the benefits, advantages, conditions or terms of any insurance policy"; General Statutes § 38-61 (1); and various unfair claim settlement practices. General Statutes § 38-61 (6). The plaintiff's pleading clearly alleges unfair trade practices which "have a potential effect on the general consuming public" within the meaning of the regulatory statute. McLaughlinFord, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 567.
If the plaintiff establishes that the deceptive acts or practices alleged in the complaint have a potential effect on the general consuming public he has established a sufficient "public interest" and he may recover "simply upon showing that the defendant engaged in a deceptive or unfair practice and that the plaintiff suffered an ascertainable loss of money or property thereby." Sportsmen's Boating Corporation v. Hensley,
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to strike the first count of the complaint is denied.