The opinion of the court was delivered by
This was an action to recover for personal injuries sustained as the result of an intersection collision. Judgment was
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for defendants, and plaintiff has appealed. The case was here-previously on a question of pleading
(Wilson v.
Cyrus,
On Sunday afternoon, Novеmber 1, 1953, plaintiff and her husband were out for a drive in the city of Parsons. He was driving. As they went north on 13th Street they came to its intersection with Main Street. The intersection was controlled by Raffle lights-Plaintiff’s car stopped for the red light.
Right at this time a Ruck, owned by defendant Cyrus and bеing driven by defendant Reddington, approached from the west on Main SReet. Just before Reddington proceeded into the intersection on the green light a car came from the east and made a left turn at the intersection which momentarily obstructed his viеw of plaintiff’s car. Reddington proceeded on into the intersection on the green light and, in the meantime, plaintiff’s car, which had been stopped, started up and drove into the intersection against the traffic light which was still red for northbound traffic. Reddington immediаtely applied his brakes but the vehicles collided in the northeast portion of the intersection. As a result plaintiff sustained injuries, inсluding the loss of an eye.
It is unnecessary to summarize in detail the allegations of the various pleadings, but it should be mentioned that in her rеply plaintiff admitted the negligence of her husband in driving into the intersection against the red traffic light, but denied that such negligence was thе proximate cause of the collision.
At the conclusion of the trial the jury answered special questions. We mention those which are considered pertinent to the basic issue in the case.
The jury found that the admitted negligence of plaintiff’s husband was the sole proximate cause of her injuries, and that defendant Reddington was not guilty of any act of negligence which was the proximate cause of the collision. It also found that Reddington was confronted with an emergency; that there was nothing he could hаve done that he did not do after observing plaintiff’s car to avoid the collision; that he did not see plaintiff’s car when it was stopped at the pedestrian lane south of the intersection, but that he could have seen it had he looked. It further found that Reddingtоn could not have seen plaintiff’s car at all times as it traveled from its stopped position north to the point of collision, and that he is, in the exercise of reasonable care and *838 diligence, after he saw or should have seen plaintiff’s car after it started up, could not have stopped his truck and thus avoided the collision.
Together with these special findings the jury returned its general verdict in favor of defendants.
Pier post-trial motions, including a motion for a new trial, being overruled, plaintiff has appealed.
To take up and discuss in detail the many arguments and contentions advanced by plaintiff would serve no purpose other than to extend this opinion unnecessarily. We have examined the evidence, the instructions given and those which were deniеd, and have given careful consideration to each complaint concerning rulings on post-trial motions. As we read the record, the questions involved are quite simple.
One of plaintiff’s principal arguments is that in view of the rule to the effect that a general finding in the nature of a conclusion must yield to contrary specific findings
(Krey v.
Schmidt,
It is true the general rule is that a person is not to be relieved fоr failure to see that which is in plain view to be seen, but the rule of course obtains only when the facts and circumstances warrаnt its application. Plaintiff’s husband had stopped for the red traffic light, which, under the law (G. S. 1949, 8-514), he was required to do. In the meantime, defendаnt Reddington, approaching from the west and observing that the traffic light applying to him was green, proceeded on into the intеrsection at a reasonable speed, as he had the right to do. The car which approached from the east and made a left turn to the south momentarily hid plaintiff’s car from his view. But even though the car making the left turn had not entered the picture, Reddington still was justified in assuming that plaintiff’s husband would obey the law and not start up again and enter the intersection against the red light. The law is well еstablished that the operator of an auto
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mobile may assume that others using the highway will observe the law of the road, and one is not guilty of negligence in acting upon such assumption unless and until he has knowledge to the contrary.
(Keir v. Trager,
Under the facts before us, even though defendant Reddington had seen plaintiff’s car stoрped south of the intersection, he still would have been justified in assuming that it would remain stopped as long as the traffic light controlling it was red. In finding 13 the jury found that in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, after he saw or should have seen plaintiff’s car after it started up against die red light, he could not have stopped his truck and thus avoided the collision. In the emergency which confronted him Reddington did the only thing he could do — he applied his brakes and skidded to a stop.
For all practical purposes, what has been said disposes of this lawsuit. It is clear the unfortunate injuries sustained by plaintiff were the result of her husband’s negligence in еntering the intersection against the red light, and the jury so found. After a careful examination of the entire record and consideration of all contentions urged by plaintiff, we are convinced that nothing approaching reversible error has been shown, and the judgment is therefore affirmed.