Wilson v. CRL Management, Inc.Wilson v. CRL Management, Inc.
OPINION OF THE COURT
For over 80 years, it has been clear in New York that a marshal has the right to remove a tenant’s property of value still left in an apartment more than 72 hours after the tenant has been served with a warrant of eviction.
The court has found that there were items of value which were removed by or at the direction of the landlord which were discarded by the side of the road. While obviously a landlord has no responsibility to store trash left behind by the evicted tenant, a landlord would be well advised to photograph with a digital camera any items left behind before disturbing or removing them. Then, should the need later arise for a court to determine whether the items removed were rubbish or things of value, the landlord would be in a position to assist a court in
Accordingly, consistent with the court’s responsibility “to do substantial justice between the parties according to the rules of substantive law”
Notes
. Ide v Finn,
. See Priester v R.F.H. Realty Corp.,
. This court agrees with this conclusion reached in Matter of Young v Warehouse No. 2,
“that warehouseman may, on notifying interested parties, require payment of his charges and removal of the stored goods by the end of the agreed storage period or, if no period was agreed, by the end of a period of 30 days after receipt of notification. If not removed, the section continues, the goods may be sold in accordance with section 7-210. In eviction cases, it would appear that the period would usually be 30 days and that the tenant, at any time during the period could go to the warehouse and claim hispossessions without having to pay any charges. If the tenant did so, the accumulation of warehouse charges would stop and the warehouseman might claim from the landlord all that was owed. If the tenant did not claim his furnishings, the warehouseman could, after the expiration of the 30-day period, serve the notification described in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of section 7-210 (2). The notification is to be served by personal delivery or by registered or certified mail. It would appear to be good practice to serve the landlord as well as the tenant. Among other things, the notification must contain a demand for payment within a specified time not less them 10 days after receipt and a statement that if the claim is not paid within that time, the goods will be advertised and sold at auction. At any time before the sale, the tenant may claim the goods and take possession of same without payment. If he fails to do so, the goods may be sold as provided in section 7-210 (2), but the proceeds must be held by the warehouseman for the benefit of the tenant. The warehouseman may look only to the landlord for the payment of the warehouse charges.” Young at 351-352.
. The custom in Rochester seems to be that marshals will not remove the property unless the landlord pays them for storage or executes a document accepting liability should any lawsuit arise from the property’s removal. Thus, in almost every case in Rochester, the marshal merely changes the locks to the leased premises. It is then the landlord, not the marshal, who removes any property remaining inside. Once a landlord takes that action, he or she may then be subject to a civil action based on a number of theories, including conversion or negligence. In addition, while the warrant does not give landlord “title” to the property and, thus, the landlord may not retain the property as security for an unpaid judgment without moving for postjudgment relief in the proper court, he or she is entitled to bring an action against the tenant for the cost of storage.
. Uniform City Court Act § 1804. In large part, proceedings in small claims “shall not be bound by statutory provisions or rules of practice, procedure, pleading or evidence.” Id. Importantly, while Supreme Court rules may apply in small claims “so far as the same can be made applicable and are not in conflict with the provisions of [the UCCA]; in case of conflict, the provisions of [the UCCA] shall control.” UCCA 1804; see Williams v Roper,
. Uniform City Court Act § 1805 (a); but see Cucinotta v Hanulak,