Wilson v. Commissioner of Transitional AssistanceWilson v. Commissioner of Transitional Assistance
Lead Opinion
The Commissioner of the Department of Transitional Assistance (department) appeals from an order that preliminarily enjoined him from reducing the level of monthly benefits paid to the elderly, disabled, and children under the emergency
Background. The EA program provides benefits to low income elderly and disabled residents and to children who are ineligible for Transitional Aid to Families with Dependent Children benefits. G. L. c. 117A, § 1. The EA program benefits include a monthly payment, emergency rent or mortgage payments, utility arrearage payments, home heating payments, and emergency shelter for individuals without alternative housing. G. L. c. 18, § 2 (D) (a)-(d). To qualify for EA, an individual’s monthly income must be less than $303.70. 106 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 321.260, 321.420, and 321.500 (2003). According to the regulations, eligible recipients may receive a monthly payment of up to $303.70, the “payment standard” in effect since 1991.
On June 20, 2003, the Legislature enacted the budget for FY 2004, appropriating $63,891,268 to the EA program, subject to fifteen provisos, including:
proviso 2: “the payment standard shall equal the payment standard in effect under the general relief program in fiscal year 1991”;
proviso 3: “the department may provide benefits to persons age 65 or older who have applied for benefits under chapter 118A of the General Laws, to persons suffering from a medically determinable impairment or combination of impediments which is expected to last for a period as determined by department regulations and which substantially reduces or eliminates the individual’s capacity to support himself and which have been verified
by a competent authority, to certain persons caring for a disabled person, to otherwise eligible participants in the vocational rehabilitation program of the Massachusetts rehabilitation commission, and to dependent children who are ineligible for benefits under both chapter 118 of the General Laws and the separate program created by [§ ] 210 of chapter 43 of the acts of 1997 and parents or other caretakers of dependent children who are ineligible under said chapter 118 and under the separate program”
proviso 8: “in initially implementing the program for this fiscal year, the department shall include all eligibility categories permitted herein at the payment standard in effect for the former general relief program in fiscal year 1991”
proviso 9: “in promulgating, amending or rescinding its regulations with respect to eligibility or benefits, including the payment standard, medical benefits and any other benefits under this program, the department shall take into account the amounts available to it for expenditure by this item so as not to exceed the amount appropriated herein”
proviso 14: “notwithstanding any general or special law to the contrary, the funds made available herein shall be the only funds available for the program, and the department shall not spend funds for the program in excess of the amount made available herein”
proviso 15: “notwithstanding any general or special law, or of this item to the contrary, 30 days before implementing any eligibility or benefit changes, or both, the commissioner shall file with the clerks of the house of representatives and the senate a determination by the secretary of health and human services that available áppropriations for the program will be insufficient to meet projected expenses and a report setting forth the proposed changes.” St. 2003, c. 26, § 2, item 4408-1000.
In July, 2003, based on an unexpected increase in the number of persons who became eligible for EA, the commissioner projected that spending for the EA program would exceed the
On August 15, 2003, David Wilson, a recipient of EA, filed an action for declaratory and injunctive relief, and moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the commissioner from implementing the benefit reduction. His primary contention was that proviso 2 mandates a minimum payment of benefits. A judge in the Superior Court agreed and entered an order on August 21, 2003, preliminarily enjoining the commissioner from reducing EA benefits and from notifying recipients of the benefit reduction. The order further provided that the commissioner “may move for reconsideration of this ORDER if the present funds approach exhaustion and if the Legislature does not furnish timely supplemental appropriations.” The commissioner appealed pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 118, second par., and we granted his application for direct appellate review.
In November, 2003, the Legislature approved, and the Governor did not veto, a supplemental budget for an additional $2.4 million in funding for the EA program in FY 2004. See St. 2003, c. 140, § 2, item 4408-1000. On March 5, 2004, the Legislature provided the supplemental money necessary to fund the EA program for the remainder of the fiscal year at the 1991 payment standard. St. 2004, c. 40.
However,' assuming the case is moot,
Discussion. The commissioner claims that the judge erred because proviso 2 does not preclude a reduction in the EA benefit standard and that the benefit reduction plan is a matter
When reviewing interlocutory injunctive orders, we examine the “same factors properly considered by the judge in the first instance,” Packaging Indus. Group, Inc. v. Cheney,
We first consider whether Wilson has shown a likelihood of success on the merits. See Healey v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare,
Wilson contends that proviso 2, which states “the payment standard shall equal the payment standard in effect under the general relief program in fiscal year 1991” (emphasis added), imposes a “categorical requirement” that the 1991 payment
The commissioner argues that the provisos can be reconciled by construing the word “shall” appearing in proviso 2 as a directive, rather than a mandatory provision.
Seemingly contradictory provisions of a statute must be harmonized so that the enactment as a whole can effectuate the presumed intent of the Legislature. See Risk Mgt. Found, of the Harvard Med. Insts., Inc. v. Commissioner of Ins.,
Contrary to the construction advanced by Wilson, a general appropriation bill, which is based on a budget recommended by the Governor, is intended to pay for “all proposed expenditures of the commonwealth for the fiscal year.” Article 63, § 2, of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, as amended by art. 107 of the Amendments. See art. 63, § 3, of the Amendments. See also Opinion of the Justices,
The construction of the provisos advanced by the commissioner is consistent with fundamental principles concerning the expenditure of appropriations based on executive discretion.
In addition, G. L. c. 29, § 9B, “requires the Governor to divide annual appropriations made to State agencies into periodic allotments which represent the total amount of money that the agency may spend during that period.” New England Div. of the Am. Cancer Soc’y v. Commissioner of Admin. & Fin.,
Wilson argues that the reference in proviso 9 to amendment of the payment standard concerns benefits other than the 1991 payment standard, such as the rent allowance. We disagree. The plain language of proviso 9 refers to the “payment standard” in effect in 1991, a component of benefits altogether different from the rent allowance. If the Legislature intended to limit the commissioner’s discretion to the rent allowance, it would have said so, and it has not.
Wilson insists that the commissioner should have applied the
In support of his theory, Wilson relies on the Legislature’s history of responding to the depletion of appropriated money by providing supplemental funding to maintain the EA program for the duration of the fiscal year. Although the Legislature has provided supplemental monies for programs with nearly depleted funds in the past, it is not required to do so. To force the commissioner to rely on past responses from the Legislature would only jeopardize the viability of a program that serves the Commonwealth’s neediest residents. The commissioner’s decision to provide continuity of benefits for all eligible residents for the duration of the year, albeit at a lower level, versus risking the depletion of funds and a total disruption of benefits absent a supplemental appropriation, is a decision that lies within his discretion. His exercise of that discretion is entitled to deference. See Dowell v. Commissioner of Transitional Assistance,
Wilson also contends that the Governor and the commissioner were required to seek a supplemental appropriation to get the EA program through the fiscal year. They were not so obliged. In the circumstances, neither the Governor nor the commissioner was required to seek a supplemental appropriation because neither had proposed spending an amount greater
Faced with an increase of almost 2,000 EA recipients in July, 2003 (see note 2, supra), the commissioner could have determined that in order to comply with his duty to operate within the appropriation, he would reduce the number of recipients under the EA program by changing the criteria for eligibility and leaving the payment standard at the 1991 level. See Dowell v. Commissioner of Transitional Assistance, supra at 615. Instead, he exercised his discretion to provide some assistance to all who were then eligible, but at a reduced level of benefits. His decision to administer the EA program within budgetary constraints in that manner fell squarely within the range of permissible discretion, and it should be left undisturbed.
The Legislature may limit the executive branch’s well-established spending power by attaching conditions to appropriation items and thereby narrow the purpose for which money is spent. See Opinion of the Justices, 375 . Mass. 827, 834-835 n.2 (1978). The payment standard set forth in proviso
The notification requirement in proviso 15 also serves as such a condition. In contrast to the provisions of G. L. c. 29, § 9B, which require notification to the Legislature whenever an agency proposes to spend at a rate faster than the rate determined by the statutory allotment formula, proviso 15 requires notification to the Legislature if the commissioner proposes to stay within the periodic allotment by either changing the eligibility criteria, the benefits (including the 1991 payment standards), or both. The advance notice requirement in proviso 15 presupposes that the commissioner has the authority to tighten eligibility criteria and reduce benefits. Its purpose is to alert the Legislature to any such changes, the slightest of which could have dire consequences for recipients. It allows the Legislature the opportunity to avert such consequences by making a supplemental appropriation that enables the commissioner to continue providing benefits at the 1991 level, as has already occurred twice since the commissioner proposed implementing a benefit reduction plan.
Although we sympathize with the recipients, who would bear a significant hardship due to a reduction in the EA payment standard (in the event the Legislature did not respond with a supplemental appropriation), Wilson has failed to show that the commissioner acted unlawfully, so we do not address the question of irreparable harm. See Healey v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare,
The order for the preliminary injunction is vacated.
So ordered.
Notes
Under the department’s regulations, the payment standard is referred to as the “Standard of Assistance.” 106 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 321.260, 321.420, and 321.500 (2003).
The Legislature’s appropriation for FY 2004 was sufficient to provide emergency aid (EA) benefits to an average of 15,757 cases a month at the existing benefit standard. However, based on the sharp increase in the July, 2003, caseload, the commissioner estimated that the average caseload for FY 2004 would be 17,335 cases a month. The average caseload over the prior two years had been 15,483.
We note that, although the commissioner has no present intention to reduce the payment standard, a final judgment has not entered, the fiscal year has not ended, and the preliminary injunction is therefore still in effect. See Matter of McKnight,
This proviso has been included in every general appropriation act since the program’s inception in 1991.
Wilson argues that the requirement in proviso 8 that the program “initially . . . include all eligibility categories ... at the payment standard in effect ... in [FY] 1991” serves only to allow the department to alter criteria for eligibility, not the payment standard. His argument fails because the two concepts are linked together by the wording of proviso 8. Moreover, the unambiguous language of proviso 9 identifies both the eligibility and the 1991 payment standard as susceptible to change by the commissioner.
There have been at least two years when the Governor struck the notice requirement and the Legislature did not override the line item veto. See St. 2002, c. 184, § 2, Une item 4408-1000; St. 1998, c. 194, § 2, line item 4408-1000; and at least one year when the Legislature did not include the notice requirement at all, St. 1999, c. 127, § 2, line item 4408-1000.
Wilson concedes that the commissioner is permitted to take steps to close a projected deficit.
Executive agencies are constitutionally forbidden from making expenditures that exceed legislative appropriation. See Part n, c. 2, § 1, art. 11, of the Massachusetts Constitution, and art. 63, of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution. By stating that the department is “not to exceed the amount appropriated herein” in proviso 9 and that “the funds made available herein shall be the only funds available for the program” in proviso 14, the Legislature clearly intended that the commissioner would manage the EA program within that constitutional framework.
Wilson also argues that the Legislature did not intend to allow for a reduction in the payment standard based on its use of the phrase “to the extent feasible within the appropriation” regarding benefits such as the rent allowance and the office hours of department workers. Proviso 9 of the current line
General Laws c. 29, § 9B, states in part: “The governor or commissioner may so allocate a greater amount than required by the formula provided, however, that no less than fifteen days prior to the initial allocation of such greater amount to any account for which a supplemental appropriation will become necessary if current rates of spending continue, the governor or commissioner shall file with the house and senate committees on ways and means a report containing the following information: (1) the amount of the appropriation which the commissioner proposes to allocate; and (2) a detailed corrective action plan to prevent a deficiency in the account or accounts involved; a request for a supplemental or deficiency appropriation, if such corrective action plan would violate the legislative objective of the appropriation; or a statement explaining why neither a corrective action plan nor a supplemental appropriation is necessary.”
Wilson also argues that the department’s reduction plan runs afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers because the plan violated the Legislature’s prerogative to condition appropriation money by requiring that the 1991 payment standard be maintained. See. Opinion of the Justices,
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting, with whom Greaney, J., joins). I respectfully dissent from the court’s opinion because, in my view, the motion judge did not abuse his discretion in enjoining the Commissioner of the Department of Transitional Assistance (department) from implementing a planned reduction in the amount of monthly benefits paid to the elderly, disabled, and children under the emergency aid (EA) program during fiscal year 2004.
“Appellate review of a trial court order disposing of a preliminary injunction application . . . focuses on whether the trial court abused its discretion — that is, whether the court applied proper legal standards and whether the record discloses reasonable support for its evaluation of factual questions.” Edwin R. Sage Co. v. Foley,
To obtain a preliminary injunction, the applicant must show a likelihood of success on the merits of the underlying claim; actual or threatened irreparable harm in the absence of injunction; and a lesser degree of irreparable harm to the opposing party from the imposition of an injunction. Packaging Indus. Group, Inc. v. Cheney,
The judge did not abuse his discretion in concluding that Wilson demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim. I conclude that the judge’s decision was well reasoned and had “supportable basis,” Lawless-Mawhinney Motors, Inc. v. Mawhinney, supra. Where, as here, a statute contains seemingly conflicting language, a court must “interpret . . . [it], if possible, so ‘as to make it an effectual piece of legislation in harmony with common sense and sound reason,’ ” Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
In accordance with the principles set forth above, and contrary to the commissioner’s assertion, the judge did not examine proviso 2 “in virtual isolation” from the other provisos and other relevant statutory language. The judge noted that proviso 2, unlike the other provisos cited by the commissioner in support of his authority to reduce the EA payment standard, was both cast in mandatory terms (“the payment standard shall equal the payment standard in effect ... in fiscal year 1991” [emphasis added]), see City Bank & Trust Co. v. Board of Bank Incorporation,
This interpretation can, in justice, be no other way, because
Additionally, I conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion in concluding that imminent and “irreparable harm” (an 11.5%, or approximately $35 a month, reduction in benefits)* *
If the merits are unclear, but the applicant’s irreparable harm great, the court may order an injunction on a showing of a “substantial possibility” rather than a “likelihood” of success on the merits. Packaging Indus. Group, Inc. v. Cheney,
The judge carefully examined the history of legislative action. He noted that the Legislature has maintained the 1991 payment standard for all thirteen annual appropriations since that date. The judge explained that every time the EA budget approached depletion, the Legislature supplemented it with additional funds. The judge interpreted these actions as an indicator that the Legislature viewed itself as “the primary regulator of the [EA] account.” As the court notes, ante at 849), after oral argument in this case, the Legislature provided the supplemental money necessary to fund the EA program for the remainder of fiscal year 2004. This supplemental appropriation by the Legislature lends further support to my conclusion that the judge did not abuse his discretion in enjoining the commissioner from reducing the level of
In addition, the judge acknowledged that an agency’s interpretation of its governing statutes is entitled to deference, but explained that in this case, (1) the language of the appropriation act did “not present a technical subject requiring special knowledge,” and (2) the pattern of legislative behavior indicated that in the then present “familiar” situation, “supplemental funding . . . rather than an administrative measure” would be a proper solution.
The proposed reduction would decrease the benefit payment of a typical EA recipient from $303 to $268. [RA 102] Because of budgetary constraints, EA recipients have already lost in fiscal year 2004 a rental subsidy of $35 a month. [RA 85, 87] Another benefit reduction would likely endanger a recipient’s capacity to pay for food, shelter, and medicine.
In Healey v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare,
Additionally, as the court notes, ante at 849, the judge’s order allowed the commissioner to move for reconsideration if “the present funds approach[ed] exhaustion and if the Legislature [did] not furnish timely supplemental appropriations.”