169 P. 90 | Or. | 1917
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court.
“It is a general rule that a court of equity will not interfere to restrain the collection of public revenue for mere illegality or irregularity in the proceedings, but its jurisdiction is confined to cases where the tax itself is not authorized by law, or is assessed on property not subject to taxation, or the persons exacting it are without authority in the premises, or have proceeded fraudulently, or some other ground of equitable interference is shown.”
The rule has been applied to assessments similar to those of the case here involved, in Lapp v. Marshfield, 72 Or. 573 (144 Pac. 83).
“No such assessment shall be held invalid by reason of failure to enter the name of the owner of any lot or part of a lot or parcel of land so assessed or by a mistake in the name of the owner, or the entry of a name*512 other than the name of the owner, in said assessment, or in any acts or proceedings connected therewith, and no delays, mistakes, errors, or irregularities in any act or proceeding in the improvement of a street or the construction of a sewer or drain shall prejudice or invalidate any final assessment, but the same may be remedied by subsequent and amended acts or proceedings.” •
Section 400 of the same Charter reads in part as follows :
“Whenever an assessment for the opening, altering or grading of any street, * * or for any local improvement which has been or may hereafter be made by the city, has been or shall, hereafter be set aside, annulled, declared or rendered void, * * or when the Council shall be in doubt as to the validity of such assessment or any part thereof, the Council may, by ordinance, make a new assessment or re-assessment upon the lots, blocks or parcels of land which have been benefited by such improvement to the extent of their respective and proportionment shares of the full value thereof. * * Such re-assessment shall be made and shall become a charge upon the property upon which the same is laid, notwithstanding the omission, failure or neglect of any officer, body or person to comply with the provisions of this Charter connected with or relating to such improvement and assessment and notwithstanding the proceedings of the Council, Executive Board, Board of Public Works, or any officer, contractor or other person connected with such work may have been irregular or defective, whether such irregularity be jurisdictional or otherwise. * * ”
Reverting to the single objection made by the plaintiff to the effect that the improvement already had been made, we note that within the terms of Section 400 this does not present an obstacle to the making of a new assessment, for that part of the charter refers to properties “which have been benefited by such improvement. ’ ’ This language clearly refers to a better
The complaint itself discloses that the improvement has been made. It indicates that the plaintiff would enjoy the same without paying for it even what is fair. This savors strongly of an attempt to get something for nothing, which is inequitable even as against a municipality. Judged by Ms own pleading, the plaintiff was not in a position to urge his motion for a decree in his favor. His complaint does not state a cause of suit commending itself to a court of conscience, in that he does not offer to do equity. Upon the whole record, the case is properly disposed-of by a decree dismissing the suit.' It is so ordered.
Reversed. Suit Dismissed.
Rehearing
Rehearing denied February 26, 1918.
On Petition for Rehearing. Denied. ■
Department 1.
delivered the opinion of the court.
In his petition for rehearing the plaintiff lays much stress upon the case of Murray v. La Grande, 76 Or.
After receiving the report and before making any levy of taxes on plaintiff for the improvement the council must cause notice to be given in terms prescribed by the charter, giving sundry details not necessary here to mention, after which follows this language:
“After a compliance with this subdivision the council shall be deemed to have acquired jurisdiction to order the making of such improvements.”
This is the only manner and time prescribed by the La Grande charter in which jurisdiction may be acquired. It is also said in the same section:
“If any assessment is set aside by order of any court the council may cause a new one to be made in like manner for the samé purpose for the collection of the amount so assessed.”
It will be noted that in the La Grande charter there is but one time and place in the process where the city may obtain jurisdiction; and the power of correction vested in the council does not include an amendment to cure the defect in the proceedings by which the acquisition of jurisdiction was attempted. It seems, therefore, that one effort to acquire jurisdiction would exhaust the prerogative of the council in that particular proceeding. It was conceded in that case that the City of La Grande had not done the things prescribed by its charter as the necessary foundation of jurisdiction.
So it is a possible event that acting either directly or through the agency of contractors the city may have laid down a pavement as stated in the complaint herein before discovering its mistake in supposing it had acquired authority to do so. Yet it is not powerless to escape the consequences of such a blunder although the effort to extricate itself may involve the exercise of the taxing power. The complaint does not differentiate the plaintiff’s grievance from such circumstances. He argues that a mere volunteer might pave a street and the city could pay for it, but his complaint does not state such a case. That question is not presented on the record before us and we make no intimation what the decision should be if the city, as an act of its sovereignty, should adopt some completed but unauthorized work of the kind which it deemed of real public benefit and as an exercise of its taxing prerogative should essay to lay a special impost with which to raise funds
Reversed. Rehearing Overruled.