192 Iowa 860 | Iowa | 1921
The question presented is whether Parks, as alleged custodian, or the marshal under whom he purported to act, or Wilson, the judgment plaintiff, whose interest he purported to subserve, had any lien upon or interest in the funds in question which was superior to the right of the bank to charge against this account the amount of the past-due note.
“Cylinder and platen presses, folder, wire stitcher, cutter, type, cabinets, furniture, stones, leads, and slugs, and all. other machinery and accessories not individually specified herein and belonging thereto.”
On September 24, 1919, Wilson filed the foreclosure petition, with acceptance of service and waiver of time. On September 25th, he obtained a foreclosure decree, awarding special execution against the above described property. On the 27th, special execution was issued, and on the 29th, it was levied upon the same property. On the same day, Parks was put in custody thereof. This property was used by Parks in continuing the business of the Bulletin Publishing Company. He also assumed to transact all the business of the company, including the col-’ lection of accounts, the proceeds of such collections being deposited to the general account of the Bulletin Publishing Company, as had been theretofore done by the company itself. These collections and .deposits continued until October 9th, on which date the bank charged against the account its past-due note. At the time of such appropriation by the bank, it had no notice of any change, if any, in the relation of the Bulletin Publishing-Company to such" account or to the operation of its business.
It is to be observed that Wilson had no lien, under his mortgage, upon any accounts nor upon moneys. The decree conformed to the mortgage. The marshal purported to levy upon no other property than that described in the decree and in the special execution. Whatever right Parks had to collect the accounts and to deposit the same was acquired, if at all, not under the levy of execution, nor under the appointment of the marshal, but by virtue ,of the consent, or perhaps the mere acquiescence, of the defendant Bulletin Publishing Company. His right, therefore, to the custody did not rise any higher than the right of the Bulletin Publishing Company itself. As between the Bulletin Publishing Company and the bank, the latter had the clear right to charge the note against the general account, not only under the general rule of law obtaining in such a case, but by virtue of the express provisions of the note itself. Therefore, miless there be merit in another contention for the appel
‘ ‘ * * * . and that, at the election of plaintiff, the clerk of this court is authorized to insert in said special execution a clause requiring the marshal or proper officer of said court to seize any property of the said defendant not exempt from execution, to satisfy any prospective balance on said judgment after exhausting the mortgaged premises, or that, after the return of said special execution, a general execution, if the plaintiff so elect, shall issue to make- any amount then remaining unpaid; * * *”
It will be noted that, by the terms of the decree, the plaintiff Wilson was given his election to take such a clause in his special execution, or to await levy and sale under the special execution, and thereafter to take general execution. It does not appear that he elected to take the first course. It does not appear from the marshal’s return that any other than the mortgaged property was seized by the marshal. Moreover, it was Parks who made the motion to correct the execution, and not Wilson. Parks had neither a right of election nor any interest in the correction of the record. His motion to correct was properly overruled.
The judgment entered below is, accordingly, — Affirmed.