46 Ga. App. 497 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1933
The only restriction upon the right of a married woman to contract is that she can not make herself liable to pay her husband’s debts, and “can not bind her separate estate by any contract of suretyship.” Civil Code (1910), §§ 2993, 3007. These restrictions should not be extended beyond their clear import. Since the law makes a distinction between a contract of suretyship and one of guaranty (Civil Code, § 3538), and this difference in the two contracts is often very material to a determination of the rights of the parties — as, for instance, whether two defendants are joint obligors, and whether one can be sued in a county other than his
The contract in the case now before the court is one whereby the defendant, Mrs. I. A. Heard, in consideration of $1 paid to her, and “the further consideration that Wilson Brothers of Chicago, Illinois, sell and deliver goods to Heard & Company Inc.,” guarantees to Wilson Brothers payment at maturity for all goods purchased of them from time to time, by Heard & Company Inc. This contract obligates Mrs. Heard to pay for goods actually sold and delivered to Heard & Company Inc. Her liability is by virtue of a separate and distinct contract to that of Heard & Company, and for a separate consideration, and for a consideration flowing to her. It appears from the evidence that she was the largest stockholder in Heard & Company Inc. This fact must have constituted a further consideration for her execution of the contract. The contract is
In Thompson v. Wilkinson, 9 Ga. App. 367 (71 S. E. 678), the court was dealing with a contract by a married woman to pay a debt of her husband. That case is not authority for the proposition that a married woman can not bind her separate estate by a contract of guaranty.
Judgment reversed.