259 F. 166 | 4th Cir. | 1919
In the port of Wilmington, N. C., the ' Cromwell, a British vessel, on her passage up the Cape Fear river to the dock where she was to unload her cargo of pyrites, struck and injured the railroad bridge. Separate actions for damages were brought in the state court by the appellants, owners of the bridge, and attachments were issued. Thereafter the issue of negligence and the liability of the ship was transferred to the District Court of the United States under a petition for the limitation of liability. Richardson v. Harmon, 222 U. S. 96, 32 Sup. Ct. 27, 56 L. Ed. 110. The negligence charged was (a) attempting to put the ship through the draw on an upflowing tidal current in the narrow channel, which made the control of a vessel as large
The owners of the Cromwell denied negligence; alleged, if there was negligence in the navigation of the ship, it was that of the Diamond Steamboat & Wrecking Company, owner of the tug Gladiator, employed as an independent contractor to take the ship up the river to its dock; and charged that the collision was due to negligence in constructing the bridge obliquely a.cross the channel arid with such a narrow draw that it was an unlawful obstruction to navigation.
The District Court held that no negligence in the navigation of the ship had been proved, and that, even if there was negligence, it was that of the Towing Company, of which the Wilmington Towing Company is successor, as an independent contractor.
A number of large vessels had been safely taken through the draw without striking the bridge; but on several occasions vessels in charge of experienced pilots had sheered and struck the bridge without material injury.
The care necessary in taking the Cromwell through was fully appreciated, and precautions had been taken for prompt action in controlling her movement. Sanders, who directed the actions to be taken on both vessels, was on the bridge of the Cromwell. Wicklen, master of the Cromwell, was by his side, conveying his orders to the engineer and helmsman of the Cromwell, both of whom were at their posts. Sellars, an experienced tug master, was on the tug, obeying the orders of Sanders. Knowing that due care required the movement to be made at high-water slack, Sanders and Sellars had the night before ascertained the time of high tide from the almanac used as authority, and timed the movement so as to reach the draw about an hour later, when the tide would be high-water slack — that is, at the flood, either stationary or flowing slightly seaward against the vessel. Tug and tow approached the draw, going at the cautious speed of a half mile to a mile an hour.
Thus the undisputed facts show due care at least to a point 700 feet from the draw. The charge of negligence then turns on the question whether at that critical point vigilance and apparent efficiency were relaxed into negligence and incompetency. In answering this inquiry, it must be borne in mind that, although the bridge was a lawful ob
The first charge of negligence in attempting to go- through the draw while the tide was running up, we think, was not established. The almanac generally relied on by navigators indicated that the tide would be high slack. The evidence is conflicting as to whether on the surface the tide was still running upward. Sellars, the tug master, testified that he saw by observation that the tide was dropping. But, even if it was still upward on the surface, the evidence and common experience show that this condition continues after the undertow has set outward against the incoming vessel.
The claimants alleged, and introduced testimony tending to prove, that the sheer occurred about 700 feet from the bridge, and that there was time and space enough to enable the navigators to correct it by the exercise of due care and skill. The testimony on behalf of the vessel was that the sheer occurred about 500 feet from the draw, and that in this emergency the navigators did all that they could to right the ship and prevent the collision. On this issue it appears clearly from the evidence that, in approaching the draw, a large vessel must necessarily go very near to the shoals on the west side of the river, and that sometimes, even with careful and skillful navigation, it will get into water shallow enough to make the ship sheer to starboard. This was what happened to the Cromwell, and we are unable to find any evidence that it was due to negligent navigation rather than the intrinsic peril of navigating in such conditions. With the occurrence of the sheer arises the difficulty of correcting it in time to avoid striking the bridge.
In this instance, when the sheer occurred, the tug was pulling with the hawser taut. The Cromwell had steam up, with her propeller either still or in very slow forward movement. To correct the sheer of the ship to starboard, Sanders ordered the tug to port and the wheel of the Cromwell hard to starboard. These orders would ordinarily result in porting the ship, thus correcting the sheer to starboard; but, on account of the slow movement of the vessel, these measures did not sufficiently correct the sheer. When this failure became evident, Sanders ordered the Cromwell full speed astern, the anchors dropped, and the tug to cease pulling. These orders were carried out promptly, except that only one of the four anchors was dropped. The headway of the ship was not sufficiently arrested to avoid striking the bridge.
While the question of negligence is not free from difficulty, we think the finding of the District Court that the tug and vessel were managed by a capable and experienced navigator with reasonable care and skill under the circumstances is well sustained by the evidence.
“paid tlie tugboat 840 to take it to tlie Seaboard terminals, and 8100 for taking it up to Swift’s factory and return from tlie factory to tlie terminals; total, $140.”
The money was paid to McGirt, the agent of Diamond Steamboat & Wrecking Company, who testified that he received it from Whyte as agent for the steamship for towing her to the Seaboard terminal and thence up the river and through the bridge to the Swift Eertilizer Factory and hack, and that he turned over to Sanders his portion of it as tlie representative of the Gladiator. The owners of the tug having thus entered into an independent contract of towing, the tug alone would be responsible for negligence in the undertaking, unless officers of the Cromwell retained some control of the ship and were guilty of some negligence. It is true her master and crew were on the Cromwell, carrying out the orders of Sanders, but they did nothing more, and in that relation they were mere instrumentalities or means used by Sanders to apply the wheel, engine, and other instruments of navigation — not participants in the navigation. Hence it seems evident that, if the injury to bridge was due to negligence, it was that of the towing company, owner of the tug, as an independent contractor, for which the Cromwell was not responsible. Sturgis v. Boyer et al., 24 How. 110, 16 L. Ed. 591; The Eugene P. Moran, 212 U. S. 466, 29 Sup. Ct. 339, 53 L. Ed. 600.
Affirmed.