50 Ind. App. 193 | Ind. Ct. App. | 1912
— Appellee, a corporation, brought this action against John B. Wills, Leslie A. Wills and Flora E. Wills. Leslie A. Wills is the son of John B. Wills, and Flora E. Wills, who does not join in this appeal, is the divorced wife of John B. Wills.
The action was on an account for goods and merchandise sold to John B. Wills and Flora E. Wills, doing business under the name and style of “F. E. Wills”, and to set aside as fraudulent a pretended sale of a stock of drugs and fixtures, fraudulently transferred by John B. Wills to Leslie A. Wills, in fraud of the creditors of said John B. Wills, including appellee.
The complaint is in two paragraphs. In the first it is averred that defendants John B. and Flora E. Wills are indebted to appellee in the sum of $1.11.55 as a balance due and unpaid on account of goods sold and delivered to said defendants, under the name and style of F. E. Wills, of which an itemized statement is filed with the complaint.
It is also averred that John B. Wills was the owner of a retail drug store at Cambridge City, Indiana, at and prior to the time of contracting the indebtedness to appellee; that in order to avoid the payment of his just debts, said John B. Wills operated said store in the name of F. E. Wills, who was the wife of John B. Wills, until August, 1908. The
The insolvency of John B. and P. E. Wills is averred, and the demand is for judgment against said parties for the balance due on account, as shown by the bill of particulars, together with interest, and that the pretended sale to Leslie A. Wills be adjudged fraudulent and void as to appellee, and that the goods remaining in the possession of said Leslie be adjudged to be the property of John B. Wills, and subject to the payment of appellee’s judgment; that the proceeds of the sale of said goods so sold by said Leslie be adjudged to have been received by him in trust for appellee as a creditor of John B. Wills, and that he be required to account for all such sales, and ordered to pay the money received therefrom, or so much thereof as may be necessary, on appellee’s claim and judgment.
The second paragraph is 'similar to the first, except the fraud charged is that John B. Wills, with the knowledge and consent of P. E. Wills, for the purpose and with intent to cheat, hinder, delay and defraud his creditors, including appellee, and for the fraudulent purpose of preventing the collection of appellee’s claim, without any adequate consideration therefor, made a pretended sale and transfer of said drug stock and fixtures to Leslie A. Wills, who at and before such pretended sale had knowledge and notice of the fraudulent purpose of said John B. Wills to hinder, delay and defraud his creditors, especially appellee; that at the time
To each paragraph of complaint appellants separately demurred for want of sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. The demurrers ■were overruled, and exceptions taken. Separate answers in general denial were filed by appellants to each paragraph of complaint.
On request, the court made a special finding of facts and
By the sixth finding, the court found that on July 21, 1908, John B. Wills, for the purpose and with the intention of cheating, hindering, delaying and defrauding his creditors, including plaintiff, sold and transferred said stock of drugs and fixtures to defendant Leslie A. Wills, at and for. the sum of $800; that at the time of said sale and transfer, defendant Leslie A. Wills knew that John B. Wills was making said sale to him for the purpose and with the intention of cheating, hindering, delaying and defrauding his creditors, and preventing the collection of the indebtedness then existing, and that said Leslie then and thereby aided and assisted said John B. Wills in defrauding, hindering and delaying his creditors in the collection of their claims against said John B. Wills.
The court further found that immediately after the sale
The first conclusion of law stated by the court is in favor of defendant Flora E. Wills. The second conclusion states that the plaintiff is entitled to recover from John B. Wills the sum of $121.94. The court by its third conclusion of law stated that the sale and transfer of the drug stock and fixtures by John B. Wills to Leslie A. Wills, and by Leslie removed to the city of Indianapolis, was and is fraudulent and void as to the creditors of John B. Wills, including plaintiff, and should be set aside and held void as against the plaintiff, and the property made subject to plaintiff’s claim. The fourth conclusion is that Leslie A. Wills is trustee for the creditors of John B. Wills, including plaintiff, in the sum of $150, the amount received by him as proceeds of sales made from the drug stock so sold and transferred to him by John B. Wills, and that plaintiff is entitled to recover from said Leslie the sum of $121.94 and costs, not exceeding $150, with relief.
Appellants separately excepted to each conclusion of law, and judgment was rendered against John B. Wills in the sum of $121.94. It was further adjudged that the sale and transfer of the property described in the complaint and finding, and its removal to Indianapolis, is set aside, vacated
Appellants filed separate motions for a new trial, which motions were overruled, and each appellant has separately assigned error on the overruling of the motion for a new trial, and on his separate exception to each conclusion of law.
In Armacost v. Lindley (1888), 116 Ind. 295, 297, 19 N. E. 138, the court said: “It has often been decided that every pleading must proceed upon some single, definite theory, and that a party must stand or fall upon the theory of his case as he presents it in his pleadings. A recovery will be upheld only when the evidence and the facts found sup
It was said in Boardman v. Griffith (1875), 52 Ind. 101, 106: “When the trial of a cause is by the court instead of a jury, whether the court is required to find the facts specially or not, it cannot, any more than a jury can, go outside of the case made by the pleadings. In such cases, as well as in others, the parties must recover upon the allegations of the pleadings. They must recover secuindum allegata et probata or not at all. It must be so in th^ nature of things, so 'long as our mode of administering justice prevails. It would be folly to require the plaintiff to state his cause of action, and the defendant to disclose his grounds of defense, if, on the trial, either or both might abandon such grounds and recover upon others which are substantially different from those alleged.” See, also, Town of Cicero v. Clifford (1876), 53 Ind. 191, 192; Brown v. Will (1885), 103 Ind. 71, 74, 2 N. E. 283; Stevens v. Reynolds (1896), 143 Ind. 467, 484, 41 N. E. 931, 52 Am. St. 422; Hasselman v. Carroll (1885), 102 Ind. 153, 155, 26 N. E. 202; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Godman (1885), 104 Ind. 490, 494, 4 N. E. 163.
As far back as the case of Davis v. Cox (1855), 6 Ind. 481, 484, Judge Stuart, made this admirable and succinct statement of the law: “It is not what the complainant alleges, simply without proving it, nor what he proves, without having alleged it, that is the measure of his remedy; but what he alleges and proves.”
Again in McAroy v. Wright (1865), 25 Ind. 22, Judge Fraser, speaking for the court, said: “No rule of law can possibly be better settled, and none is more necessary in the administration of justice, than that the plaintiff must recover upon his allegations, or not at all. If this were not so, it would be a mockery to require him to state a sufficient case in his complaint. Having thus stated his case, his proof ought to be confined to it, and if he has proved a different case, however meritorious, he should be defeated. ’ ’
Note. — Reported in 97 N. E. 449. See, also, under (1) 1 Cyc. 370; (2) 31 Cyc. 644; (3) 20 Cyc. 108; (4) 38 Cyc. 1992 (5) 38 Cyc. 1968; (6) 20 Cyc. 814. As to due proof to establish, fraud, see 11 Am. St. 757.