75 Md. 80 | Md. | 1891
delivered the opinion of the Court.
There is but a single question involved in this case, and that question is: was there a contract entered into between the plaintiff and defendant for the renting by the latter of the farm of the former? Whilst there are three counts in the declaration, no attempt was made to sustain either the second or third, but the controversy was narrowed down to the first; and under that the plaintiff claimed to recover for the breach of a contract which will be stated presently. At the close of the plaintiff’s case the Court ruled that there was no legally sufficient evidence to establish the contract relied on, and the judgment having been entered for the defendant, the plaintiff has appealed.
It appears by the bill of exception that the appellee wrote to the appellant the following letter:
This letter was given by the appellee to his brother who entrusted it to one Proctor for delivery to Miss Wills. Upon the same day Miss Wills received it and replied to it, handing her reply to Proctor, who gave it to a colored boy, who in turn subsequently, gave it to one of Frank A. Carpenter’s children. Some days after-wards Frank A. Carpenter admitted to a witness that he had received a letter from Miss Wills; but there was no proof that the letter had gone into the possession of, or had ever been seen by, J. Walter Carpenter. Notice was given to the appellee to produce Miss Wills’ letter, but he answered that he did not have it, whereupon its contents were proved by parol, subject to exception. According to the testimony of Miss Wills, and another witness who penned the letter at the dictation of the appellant, she acknowledged the receipt of J. Walter Carpenter’s letter, and said “I would agree to terms of one-third rent, Mr. Frank Carpenter to cultivate my farm, and that I would be at home to negotiate with Mr. Frank Carpenter to-morrow.” She further testified “the letter was written and directed to Mr. J. Walter Carpenter; Mr. Frank Carpenter did not come next day, but came on the twenty-eighth, late in the evening; I bargained with him in his brother’s name for a third crop rent.”
These two letters constitute all the evidence there is in the record as to the existence of a contract of renting between the appellant and the appellee. If these two letters, under the circumstances stated, form a contract, ■then one is proved — if they do not, then the ruling of the Baltimore City Court was correct.
Did these parties, then, make any contract at all? Was there an assent of two minds to one definite subject? This inquiry is one of law and must be answered by the letters before us. The subject-matter of the alleged contract was the renting of a farm. The appellee’s brother had some idea of renting it, and the appellee— because possibly more responsible financially — proposed to become the renter and to enter into a contract with Miss Wills, if she and Frank A. Carpenter could agree upon the proportion of the crops to be paid as rent, Frank A. Carpenter, however, to cultivate the farm. This was manifestly only a conditional offer. The appellee said, “I will become the renter and enter into contract with you” upon one condition, and that condition
The cases relied on in the very able arguments of the counsel for the appellant were decided on very different facts from those now before us. Thus in Gibbins vs. North Eastern Metropolitan Asylum District, 11 Bevan, 1, there was a direct offer to purchase certain premises at a fixed sum. The answer was, “we accept your offer. If you approve of the enclosed, sign the same, and we will on receipt of the deposit sign you a copy-” The enclosure was a more formal contract. Lord Langdale, Master of the Rolls, in speaking of the formal contract enclosed, asked, “Is it to contradict the first part of the letter ? Does it mean we accept the offer, but reject it unless you sign the enclosed memorandum; or, rather, is it not an acceptance, and a proposal of a more formal mode of carrying the acceptance into execution ? If the latter be the meaning, then, according to the authority produced, this would not destroy the contract.” The offer and acceptance made a complete contract, and the acceptance having been unconditional, could not be nullified by an independent request that a formal memorandum should be signed. And the same is true of the case of Bonnewell vs. Jenkins, L. R., 8 Ch. D., 70; and of the case of Cheney vs. The Eastern Transportation Line, 59 Md.. 557. And in Eadie vs. Addison, 31 Weekly Rep., 320, Pearson, J., observed, “Here I have the case of a letter written containing more plainly than most letters do all the terms of the lease,” and he refused toread the offer in such a way as to defeat that offer altogether.
For the reasons we have given and upon the adjudged cases cited, we are of opinion that the ruling of the Baltimore City Court was correct, and its judgment must be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed, with costs in this Court, and in the Court below.