Williston Highlands Development Corp. v. HogueWilliston Highlands Development Corp. v. Hogue
Charles R. Rowe, Homestead, for appellants.
Thomas A. Clark, Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, Tampa, for appellees.
ROBERTS, Justice.
This appeal has been transferred to us by the District Court of Appeal, First District, pursuant to Florida Appellate Rule 2.1, subd. a(5), 32 F.S.A. The decision of the Circuit Court of Levy County sought to be reviewed holds Florida Statute §
On January 18, 1972, appellants filed suit in Levy County Circuit Court against appellees alleging that appellants were seized and possessed of fee simple title to certain described property based upon a warranty deed from Frederick Hyman to Williston Highlands Development Corporation and Norservice, Inc., which deed was filed February 18, 1970, and that the original easements or rights-of-entry, for the purpose of mining, drilling, exploring, or developing the lands being the subject matter of this suit, through which the appellees claimed easements or rights-of-entry for the purpose of mining, drilling, exploring, or developing said lands, have been of record for a period of time exceeding but not less than twenty years prior to the filing of this complaint. Appellants by their complaint sought thе trial court to grant a decree of injunction as to each and every one of the appellees perpetually enjoining and restraining them, from ever in any way asserting or claiming any easements or rights-of-entry for the purpose of mining, drilling, exploring, or develоping said lands, adverse to the title of Plaintiffs, and that said appellees be perpetually enjoined and restrained from in any way disturbing the possession, enjoyment, use, title, or interest in said lands by Plaintiffs. By virtue of Florida Statutes,
To the cоmplaint, appellees filed their motion to dismiss alleging that
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and explicitly declared Section 704.05 to be unconstitutional because it impairs сontracts in existence, deprives property owners of their property without due process, and of their inalienable right to process and protect their property in violation of both the Federal and Florida Constitution.
This Court‘s very recent decision in Trustees of Tufts College v. Triple R. Ranch, Inc. et al., 275 So. 2d 521, filed March 21, 1973, whеrein this Court succinctly opined that Section 704.05 would not be given retroactive application is clearly dispositive of this causе presently before us.
It is a fundamental principle that Courts will not pass upon the validity of a statute where the case before thеm may be disposed of upon any other ground. Mounier v. State, 178 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 1965).2
In Lissenden, supra, regarding our retention of jurisdiction of the cause irrespective of the necessity to actually reach the constitutional question this Court said:
The Court has reached the conclusion that thе language of the Constitution confers upon a litigant in the trial courts of this state the right to appeal to the Supreme Court an advеrse final judgment or decree such as that here involved which on its face passes upon the validity of a state statute, and that when thаt right is exercised by the litigant then this Court, under the cited provision of the Constitution, has jurisdiction of and should determine the appeal even though in its consideration of the case it is decided that the action of the trial court, in passing upon or expressing an opinion upon the jurisdictional issue of statutory validity, was unnecessary to the disposition of the cause. The reasoning and practical analysis supporting this conclusion have been carefully examined in cases arising under similar constitutional requirements. The widely endorsed princiрle that the constitutional or statutory issue must be an essential element in the litigation, in order to support appellate review on this ground, is thus a prima facie test, the ultimate requirement being that there should exist a genuine issue, fairly and in good faith presented, as to the validity of the statute in controversy and its applicability in the case under consideration. Upon appeal from a judgment renderеd in this situation, an exercise of the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court is necessarily involved whether or not the view of the trial court on the point is sustained. Universally recognized principles of appellate review then require that a court, exercising jurisdiction over a cause to this extent, should proceed to dispose of all questions properly presented in the appeal. Moreоver, the efficient and speedy administration of justice is thereby promoted, and any part of the opinion in the Carroll case, suрra, which may be construed to be in conflict with these conclusions is receded from.
Since we have held that Florida Statute
Accordingly, that portion of the judgment of the trial court holding the act unconstitutional is expunged, and the portion dismissing the complaint is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
CARLTON, C.J., and ADKINS, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
ERVIN, J., dissents with Opinion.
BOYD, J., dissents.
ERVIN, Justice (dissenting).
I dissent for the reasons expressed in my dissent in Trustees of Tufts College v. Triple R. Ranch, Inc., Fla., 275 So. 2d 521, filed March 21, 1973.