Willis v. Balkcom, Warden
451 U.S. 926
SCOTUS
1981
Check Treatment

*1 imposed, must If a sentence ever be death applied. Be- carefully be the of correct procedures, result I here, I dissent. requirement lacking cause this believe Cal., Ct. App. No. Montano California. 80-6026. denied. Justice Brennan and 1st Dist. grant Justice Blackmun would certiorari. Super.

No. Ct. 80-6030. Willis Warden. County. Certiorari Ga., Tattnall joins, with whom Justice Brennan murder

Petitioner was convicted of returned appeal, Supreme sentence On direct Court affirmed the Adher- conviction death sentence. my view that under' all circum- penalty death is cruel unusual forbidden punishment stances Eighth and Fourteenth I Amendments, would peti- tion for a writ of certiorari and vacate the below insofar as it left the undisturbed. But even arguendo, there are circumstances in which assuming, constitutionally imposed, be believe those are present this case. Georgia law, responsible

Undér sentencing for in death cases. In imposing the death sentence found three statutory aggravating circum- stances: offense “outrageously of murder was or wan- tonly vile, horrible or inhuman torture, involved depravity mind, battery or an aggravated the victim”;1 (2) the “offense murder was against any committed peace officer . engaged performance . . while in the official his duties”;2 the “murder was committed for pur- pose interfering avoiding, with, or preventing a lawful custody place arrest or of lawful confinement, of himself 1 Ga. Code §27-2534.1

2 §2534.1 or another.” In seeking review of im the death sentence posed validity this challenge *2 of findings latter two cir concerning aggravating argue, cumstances. however, does that court’s the trial charge jury to the on first aggravating circumstance was constitutionally defective. provision,

This §27-2534.1 Ga. Code (1978) (here- (b)(7) after (b)(7)), § was the same one involved in de- this Court’s cision last Godfrey Term in Georgia, 446 S. 420 In that judge trial instructed the aggravating circumstance simply by reading of the text plurality statute. A of this practice Court found that uncon- stitutional. It reasoned that language (b)(7) of § does not “any arbitrary inherent restraint on capri- cious infliction of the death sentence” since person “[a] ordinary sensibility fairly could characterize every almost falling murder” as within the language (b)(7). § plurality 428-429. The explained that be constitutionally valid, capital a State’s punishment scheme channel the “must sentencer’s discretion 'clear objective standards’ that provide ‘specific and detailed guidance,’ and that ‘make ra- tionally process reviewable the for imposing a sentence of ” Id., death.’ at 428 (footnote omitted) (quoting Gregg 153, U. S. Stewart, and Stevens, Florida, JJ.); Powell, 242, Proffitt (1976) (opinion of Stewart, JJ.); Powell, Stevens; Woodson v. North 280, 428 U. S. (opin- ion of JJ.)). Because the trial court provide had failed to adequate guidance to the the death jury, imposed in that case was vacated. In the instant in Godfrey, as the trial instruc- tion to § consisted simply reciting statutory language. Although both the ap- trial and direct peal in this predated case Godfrey, petitioner challenged the 2534.1 corpus proceeding. adequacy charge of the in a state habeas held, however, “Godfrey Georgia habeas court germane controlling case,” not to or of Petitioner’s because petitioner’s only on § based also on aggravating but the other two circumstances. to Pet. for simply Cert. B-5. the court assumed Thus, the jury would still have sentenced to death even only if it unchallenged had found the two circum- stances. But under or more law, one permits, require but State, sentence of See Bowen v. Ga. E. 2d 322 Moreover, State,

the death must be unanimous. See Miller v. *3 237 Ga. 557, (1976). 229 S. E. 2d 376 Under this scheme, is evident that each play circumstance an may important role jury’s influencing verdict. Just what weight juror each attached to a particular cir- cumstance can by never be known a reviewing court, and if jury is a allowed to base its decision partly upon an improper finding of a § circumstance, impossible to deter- mine to what jury’s extent upon rested this cir- cumstance. This situation, which exists in the instant is sufficient to invoke any the rule that doubt as to whether a judgment criminal upon rests a constitutionally unsound requires basis its reversal. See Chicago, Terminiello v. (1949); Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 This defect is not reviewing a cured speculation what a faced with a finding of two aggravating circumstances would or might have done. Under Georgia law, only the trier of fact a death sentence. The reviewing court is neither privy to the jury’s deliberations nor endowed psychic with powers. Most important, such speculation is, my judgmént, inconsistent with the recog- nition that because “the of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment,” there is height- a ened “need for reliability in the determination that death is specific case.” Woodson appropriate punishment supra,

North Alabama, S. U. JJ.). See Beck such as to follow cases proper procedure remand the case for to the death sentence and this is vacate Cf. jury. instructed Westbrook resentencing properly dissent- Balkcom, (1980) (Stewart, J., S. 999, ante, p. 921 from Davis v. certiorari); denial denial Brennan, dissenting from (Marshall, joined by J., J., certiorari). improper an it cannot be said assurance with part no played of a circumstance in this jury's decision certiorari and vacate for a writ of petition would ground. this additional paragraphs first and last joins Stewart all but the petition for grant the opinion. dissenting would pen- imposing certiorari and vacate what instructed consider alty, so 449 U. See Westbrook v. impose. (dissent certiorari). from 4th C. Cir. United States. A. No. 80-6039. Green *4 Dinitz, (1976), Court 424 U. S. 600 In United States request for criminal defendant's successful that when a held “ judicial or over- ‘prosecutorial precipitated mistrial ” charges is barred trial on same subsequent reaching,' Amendment. of the Fifth Jeopardy Double Clause Jorn, 470, 485 United States (quoting at 607 Appeals the decision of the Court (1971)). concerning the questions raises present case substantial of certiorari. Dinitz dissent from scope rule, conspiracy to heroin. was tried for distribute Petitioner