Willis of New York, Inc. v. DeFeliceWillis of New York, Inc. v. DeFelice
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Richard Lowe, III, J.),
The individual defendants are former employees of the Willis plaintiffs who left plaintiffs’ employ to take positions at defendant Aon Risk Services, a long-standing, direct and intense competitor of Willis in the insurance brokerage business.
While paragraph 2 (a) of the IAS court’s order, which restrained individual defendants DeFelice, McCarthy and Andler from soliciting Willis clients, was ostensibly meant to prevent unfair competition, the IAS court was actually enforcing, in part, restrictive covenants entered into by DeFelice, McCarthy and Andler when they were employed by Willis. Since plaintiffs have not shown that McCarthy and Andler’s services were unique, these two employees should not be enjoined (see e.g. Reed, Roberts Assoc. v Strauman,
The antis olicitation branch of the IAS court’s order is otherwise justified as it applies to DeFelice. The necessary showing of irreparable damage to plaintiffs has been made out inasmuch as it appears that, in the absence of a restraint upon DeFelice’s solicitation of plaintiffs’ clients, plaintiffs would likely sustain a loss of business impossible, or very difficult, to quantify (see e.g. BDO Seidman,
Turning now to paragraph 2 (b) of the IAS court’s order, which restrained the individual defendants from divulging plaintiffs’ confidential or proprietary information, plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they would likely prevail in demonstrating that the individual defendants were, in fact, misappropriating and exploiting their confidential information, and thus the restraint imposed is not sustainable as to defendants Galiano, Berlingieri and Nowicki, who were not shown to be high-level employees upon whom such a restraint might be sustainable under the “inevitable disclosure” doctrine without a showing of actual misappropriation or exploitation (see Earth-Web, Inc. v Schlack,
The IAS court properly exercised its discretion in setting the amount of the undertaking (see Clover St. Assoc. v Nilsson,