Case Information
*1 STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A14-0906 Court of Appeals Gildea, C.J. Willie Edd Reynolds,
Respondent, vs. Filed: December 7, 2016
Office of Appellate Courts State of Minnesota,
Appellant.
________________________ Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Kathryn J. Lockwood, Assistant, State Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellant.
________________________
S Y L L A B U S
1. The imposition of a 10-year conditional-release term in violation of
Blakely v. Washington
,
2. Because applying the 2-year limitations period in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4 (2014), to a motion brought under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, violates the *2 separation of powers, an offender who contends under Rule 27.03, subdivision 9 that his sentence was not authorized by law is not required to bring such a challenge in a postconviction petition.
Affirmed.
O P I N I O N
GILDEA, Chief Justice.
The question presented in this case is whether an offender who contends that his
sentencе violates
Blakely v. Washington
,
On September 23, 2008, Reynolds pleaded guilty to failing to register as a predatory offender. The district court sentenced Reynolds to 1 year and 1 day in prison. On January 12, 2009, acting sua sponte, the district court modified Reynolds’s sentence to include a 10-year conditional-release term. The record does not reflect the basis for the conditional-release term, but Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5a (2014), mandates a 10-year conditional-release term for any person convicted of failing to register as a predatory offender if the person “was assigned to risk level III under seсtion 244.052” at the time of the offense.
More than 4 years later, Reynolds brought a motion under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03,
subd. 9, to correct his sentence. Reynolds argued that the conditional-release term was not
supported by a jury finding or his admission to being a risk-level-III offender at the time
of the offense, as required by
Blakely
,
The court of appeals reversed. The court held that Reynolds’s challenge to his
conditional-release term fell within the scope of Rule 27.03, subdivision 9, and therefore,
it could be brought at any time.
Reynolds v. State
, 874 N.W.2d 257, 264 (Minn. App.
2016). Applying
State v. Her
,
On appeal, the State makes two arguments. First, the State argues that Reynolds’s challenge is outside the scope of Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, because his sentence is “authorized by law.” Second, the State argues that even if Reynolds’s motion falls within the scope of Rule 27.03, subdivision 9, the exclusivity provision in the postconviction statute, Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 2, nevertheless requires Reynolds to challenge his sentence in a postconviction petition. As a result, Reynolds’s challenge would be subject to, and untimely filed under, the 2-year limitations period in the postconviction statute, Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4. [1] We address each argument in turn.
I.
We turn first to the State’s argument that Reynolds’s motion to correct his sentence
falls outside the scope of Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. Under this rule, “[t]he court
may at any time correсt a sentence not authorized by law.”
Id.
The interpretation of the
Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure is a question we review de novo.
[2]
Ford v. State
,
*5
The State contends that the phrase “not authorized by law” is a term of art that permits challenges only to facially invalid sentences that a court could never impose on the offender because they violate a statute or constitutional provision, such as a sentence that exceeds the statutory-maximum sentence for the offense. The State argues that Reynolds’s 10-year conditional-release term is not facially invalid because the district court could have imposed the cоnditional-release term if it had followed the proper procedures by either obtaining Reynolds’s admission that he was a risk-level-III offender at the time he failed to register or submitting the issue to a sentencing jury. For his part, Reynolds argues that his challenge falls within the scope of Rule 27.03, subdivision 9. We agree with Reynolds.
The imposition of a 10-year conditional-release term without a jury’s finding or a
defendаnt’s admission that he was a risk-level-III offender at the time of the offense is a
sentence that is not authorized by law. The Sixth Amendment, as incorporated by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, limits a state court’s authority to sentence a
defendant.
Her
,
authority when it “imposes a sentence ‘that the jury’s verdict alone does not allow.’ ”
Id.
(quoting
Blakely
,
In this case, a jury did not determine that Reynolds was a risk-level-III offender at the time he failed to register. And Reynolds did not admit at his guilty plea hearing that he was a risk-level-III offender at the time he committed the offense. Because the Sixth Amendment requires a jury finding or an admission by the defendant before a court may impose a 10-year conditional-release term, see Her , 862 N.W.2d at 695, and neither occurred here, Reynolds’s 10-year conditional-release term was not authorized by law. Accordingly, we hold that Reynolds properly brought his challenge under Rule 27.03, subd. 9. [3]
II.
Even though we have concluded that Reynolds’s challenge falls within the scope of
Rule 27.03, subdivision 9, the State still contends that the challenge is subject to the
limitations period in the postconviction statute. Reynolds argues that the limitations period
does not apply to motions brоught under Rule 27.03, subdivision 9. The parties’ arguments
*7
present an issue of statutory interpretation that we review de novo.
State v. Coles
,
In arguing that Reynolds’s challenge is subject to the postconviction statute, including its 2-year limitations period, the State relies on Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 2. This provision states that the postconviction “remedy takes the place of any other . . . remedies which may have been available for challenging [a] . . . sentence . . . and must be used exclusively in place of them unless it is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of the conviction, sentence or other disposition.” [4] Id. The State argues that this exclusivity provision prevents a defendant from using Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, to collaterally challenge a sentence and mandates that such a challenge be brought in a postconviction petitiоn. According to the State, a defendant’s collateral challenge to a sentence is therefore subject to the 2-year limitations period in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4.
Reynolds disagrees and maintains that the exclusivity provision does not preclude his Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9 motion. Specifically, Reynolds points out that Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 2, excludes only remedies that “may have been” available at the time the statute was enactеd. Because the term “may have been” is past tense, Reynolds argues *8 that Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 2, excludes only those remedies in existence at the time the Legislature enacted the statute. Rule 27.03, subdivision 9, Reynolds notes, was promulgated in 1975, after the Legislature enacted the postconviction statute in 1967. Accordingly, Reynolds argues that the postconviction statute is not his exclusive remedy.
Reynolds’s interpretation is contrary to the legislative directive in Minn. Stat. § 645.08(2) (2014), that “words used in the past or present tense include the future.” The future tense of the phrase “may have been” is “may be.” The exclusivity provision in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 2, therefore precludes the use of alternate remedies that were available at the time the Legislature enacted the statute and those that became available thereafter. Thus, the fact that we adopted Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, after the Legislature enacted section 590.01 does not, as Reynolds argues, render the exclusivity provision inapplicable. As the State suggests, the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 2, requires that a collateral challenge to a sentence be brought within the parameters of the postconviction statute, including the 2-year limitations period. See Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a).
Apрlying the 2-year limitations period to Reynolds’s challenge, however, leads to a conflict between the statute and the rule. Under the rule, the court may correct a sentence unauthorized by law at “any time,” see Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, but challenges to sentences brought under the postconviction statute must be brought within 2 years of a conviction or disposition of a direct appeal, see Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a). This conflict between the statute and the rule generates a possible separation of powers issue under the Minnesota Constitution. See Minn. Const. art. III, § 1 (“The powers of *9 government shall be divided into three distinct departments: legislative, executive and judicial. No person or persons belonging to or constituting one of these departments shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others . . . .”).
Whethеr a statute is unconstitutional under separation of powers principles is an
issue we review de novo.
State v. Losh
,
In order to “determin[e] whether a statute impermissibly infringes on a judicial
function, we examine the nature of the statute. The judicial branch governs procedural
matters, while the creation of substantive law is a legislative function.”
State v. Lemmer
,
A procedural rule “ ‘neither creates a new cause of аction nor deprives [a] defendant
of any defense on the merits.’ ”
Losh
, 721 N.W.2d at 891 (quoting
State v. Johnson
,
*10
In this case, Reynolds is not challenging his conviction; he is challenging his sentence. Although the Legislature has the power to fix the limits of punishment for a crime, “the imposition of a sentence in a particular case within those limits is a judicial function.” State v. Misquadace , 644 N.W.2d 65, 68 (Minn. 2002). Rule 27.03, subdivision 9, creates a procedure to be used within an existing criminal case for the district court to correct a sentence that is not authorized by law. See State v. Fields , 416 N.W.2d 734, 736 (Minn. 1987) (“We believe that Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, allows the *11 defendant to challenge the [sentencing] departure by a simple motion at the time of the revocation hearing.”). [5]
Rule 27.03, subdivision 9, does not create a new cause of action or deny a defendant
a defense on the merits. The rule is procedural, and the process it creates facilitates the
performance of a judicial function: sentencing. To the extent that the limitations period in
Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4, interferes with the process laid out in the rule, the statute
violates the separation of powers.
See Losh
,
This conclusion is consistent with our holding in
Losh
. There, we considered
whether statutory time limits on sentencing appeals violated the separation of powers when
the rules of criminal procedure allowed a longer appeal period than a statute. 721 N.W.2d
*12
at 890-91. We determined that the statute setting a time limit for filing an appeal was
procedural and violated the separation of powers.
Id.
at 892. Although the district court’s
correction of a sentence is not an appeal, both this case and
Losh
involve the timeframe
under which a court may exercise its authority to correct a sentence, without requiring the
filing of a new collateral proceeding.
Cf. Fields
,
Based on this analysis, interpreting the exclusivity provision in Minn. Stat. § 590.01,
subd. 2, to require application of the postconviction statute’s limitations period to
Reynolds’s claim unconstitutionally encroaches on the judicial sentencing power. Even
with these constitutional deficiencies, however, we may accept the limitations period in the
postconviction statute as a matter of comity.
See Losh
,
In urging us to reach the opposite conclusion, the State contends that refusing to
recognize the exclusivity provision of Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 2, and enforce the 2-year
limitations period, will overrule our retroactivity jurisprudence and lead to many more
motions for sentencing relief. Our holding, however, has no effect on our retroactivity
*13
jurisprudence. As we noted in
Schnagl
, for a sentence to be eligible for correction under
Rule 27.03, subdivision 9, the sentence must have been illegal at the time it was imposed.
859 N.W.2d at 301. Under our retroactivity jurisprudence, new rules of constitutional
criminal procedure generally do not apply to cases that became final before the rule was
announced.
See Campos v. State
,
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that applying the 2-year limitations period in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4, to a Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9 motion violates the separation of powers. As a result, Reynolds did not need to challenge his conditional- release term in a postconviction petition, and the 2-year limitations period in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4, does not apply to Reynolds’s claim. Reynolds was therefore entitled to relief under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9.
Affirmed.
Notes
[1] The State does not dispute the underlying merits of Reynolds’s challenge to his
conditional-release term. More specifically, the State has not contested the court of
appeals’ conclusion that based on
Her
,
[2] Even though Reynolds brought his challenge under Rule 27.03, the district court treated it as a petition for postconviction relief. The State asks us to decide the proper standard of review when examining a district court’s decision to treat a motion under Rule 27.03, subdivision 9, as a petition for postconviction relief under Minn. Stat.
[3] The parties discuss earlier versions of Rule 27.03, subdivision 9, and an advisory committee comment to the rule. Because there is no ambiguity in the rule, it is not necessary for us to look beyond the rule’s text.
[4] In urging us to hold that his motion is not subject to the postconviction statute,
Reynolds argues that the remedy under the postconviction statute is not adequate in this
case because the limitations period had expired by the time he brought his motion.
Reynolds raises this argument for the first time on appeal to our court. Accordingly, we
decline to address it.
State v. Williams
,
[5] Even before the adoption of Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, district courts had the
power to correct illegal sentеnces.
State v. Hockensmith
, 417 N.W.2d 630, 632 (Minn.
1988) (stating in a discussion of a district court’s authority prior to the promulgation of the
criminal rules that “[a]n illegal sentence could be corrected at any time but a lawful
sentence could be modified in the trial court’s discretion only during the duration of the
term of court”);
see also United States v. Bradford
,