153 Pa. 508 | Pa. | 1893
Lead Opinion
Opinion by
Three agencies may be employed in assessment of property for taxation. These are the assessors, the board of revision, and the court of common pleas. The assessor’s seek out the taxable property in their respective districts, ascertain the names and residence of the owners, and estimate its actual cash value. The results of their work are arranged in a schedule, or tabulated summary for each ward in the city, which is familiarly known as “ the assessment.” This assessment is returned bjr the assessors who make it to the board of revision. This board examines the work of the assessors, revises and equalizes it, corrects any mistakes that appear in it, and prepares it for examination by the taxables. A day for examination by them is then fixed and notice is given to them that they may appeal from the assessment, as revised, to the board of revision, upon any subject connected with the assessment on which they may desire to be heard. After these applications or ap
In the case in hand the assessor served a notice upon Mr. Williamson, requiring him to make return under oath of his personal estate subject to taxation. He disregarded the notice and made no return. The assessor then did just what the act of June 30, 1885, required him to do. He estimated the taxable personal estate of Mr. Williamson at $45,000, and assessed him with that amount. The board of revision, when they came to revise the assessment, added fifty per cent by way of penalty, in accordance with the direction of the act of 1885, and left the assessment as corrected and revised b3r them to stand at $67,500. The taxes were computed on this basis and placed in the hands of the receiver for collection. Two or three months after all this was done Mr. Williamson died. His executors filed an inventory of the personal estate that came into their hands, amounting to about two and a half millions. On the 12th day of April, 1888, the board of revision made an assessment, without the intervention of the assessor, fixing the amount of the personal estate of Williamson at the time when he should have made his return in the fall of ,1887 at the sum shown to be in the hands of his executors six months later. To this they added fifty per cent by way of penal ty, making the new assessment stand, after its revision, at about four millions of dollars. Upon this they have computed the taxes, and ask that the executors, who have already paid the sum originally demanded b3r the receiver, shall pay the balance now claimed to be due. Our question is, can this new assessment stand?
The statutes conferring and defining the powers to be exercised by the board give the power to make a valuation only where the assessors have omitted to make it. But the assessors
But it is urged that the new assessment is valid as the correction of a mistake. If so, who made the mistake ? It does not appear that the assessor did, but it is to be presumed that in view of the data within his reach he estimated the property of Mr. Williamson intelligently. It does not appear that the board made a mistake, for, believing as they must have done that the estimate of the assessor was correct, they added the penalty and finished the work of revision. The trouble was that neither the assessor nor the board had the means of knowing what Williamson’s personal estate was, and unless the fact that they were ignorant as to the extent of his property can be held to be a mistake in judgment as to its value, the new assessment cannot be sustained on this theory. They were not misled by Williamson. If he had made a false return and so misled the board, a very different question would be raised. He simply declined to give any information. He said, in effect, make your examination and estimate and I will abide by it. The assessors accordingly made a regular estimate upon their own knowledge. The board of revision were content to increase it by the addition of the penalty. Months afterward and when Williamson was in the grave, the board examine the inventory filed by his executors and conclude that the assessor should have made a more extensive examination and discovered in some way, what he was at the time unable to discover, the extent of taxable personal estate held by Mr. Williamson; and they accordingly proceed to punish his estate for the want of
But it is urged that the city should have been able to reach the vast estate disclosed by this inventory, and that this is now the only way in which it can be done. This majr be so. But at the proper time the taxing officers might, by the exercise of vigilance in the discharge of their duties, have obtained the information necessary to enable them to approximate the true amount of taxable property held by Williamson. The fault is not his, but theirs. He had a right to refuse to make the return. They had the right to make an assessment to take the place of it. They made it without waiting to secure sufficient knowledge to enable them to make it intelligently. If it be suggested that the city ought not to suffer for the neglect of its officers we assent to the correctness of the general rule, but in this case we are considering a proceeding that is regulated by a statute, and the question is what does it authorize ?
It may be said that the effect of such a holding will be to encourage other persons to decline to make the returns contemplated by the act of 1885. It is enough to say, in answer, that we do not make the law and that the right to refuse the return is given by the act of 1885 and not by us. So the penalty for exercising this right is fixed by the act, and is not under the control of the board of revision.
It follows from what has been said that the ruling of the court below in regard to the city taxes resting on the second and unauthorized assessment was error. The assessment made at the proper time and in the proper manner, having been revised
The orphans’ court was also in error in holding that our decision In re Williamson’s Estate, 143 Pa. 150, subjects the income for the first year to the collateral inheritance tax. This tax fastens upon so much of the estate as passes to collaterals as it stands at the death of the testator. It comes out of the corpus of the gift upon its descent or transmission, upon the -death of the former owner to the beneficiary. Income accruing subsequently comes not from the testator or intestate but from the property held by or for the use of the legatee or other beneficiary, and is not to be distinguished from income derived by the same persons from any other source.
Upon the remaining question we agree with the court below. The lands of the testator lying in other states which he directed his executors to sell, and the proceeds from which he gave to persons and objects in this state, are converted by the direction to sell. The fund being distributable here is subject to the collateral inheritance tax under the rule stated in Miller v. The Commonwealth, 111 Pa. 321.
The decree of the court below is reversed as to the allowance of the city taxes and the collateral inheritance tax on the income for the first year.
It is affirmed as to the residue.
Concurrence Opinion
I am unable to concur in that part of this judgment which holds that the real estate in other states was subject to collateral inheritance tax. I cannot see that a technical conversion gave this state any jurisdiction for taxing purposes, under a statute not taxing the legatee personally but the property passing from the testator.