Dеfendant appeals, by leave granted, from the order of the Monroe County Circuit Court changing custody of defendant’s three-year-old daughter from the defendant mother to the child’s paternal grandparents.
In April, 1979, plaintiff father filed for divorce. On June 5, 1979, the defendant was given temporary custody of the parties’ only child. A petition for intervention filed by the paternal grandparents was thereafter granted. A contested custody hearing was held before Judge William J. Weipert, Jr., on October 23, 1980, and decision was reserved. A judgment of divorce was entered on December 12, 1980, with the issues of custody and support reserved. In March, 1981, Judge Weipert issued a written decision which addressed the statutory factors of the Child Custody Act of 1970, MCL 722.23; MSA 25.312(3), and which granted custody to the mother. The decision also ordered a Friend of the Court review to be held in six months.
On July 29, 1981, Judge Weipert refused to consider plaintiffs motion for a change of custody and for a review hearing on the ground that the six mоnths had not yet run. The intervening grandparents then hired a new attorney. On August 5, 1981, the case was reassigned to Judge Kelley as the grandparents’ new аttorney was *671 related to Judge Weipert. Plaintiff then noticed for hearing the motion for a change of custody which Judge Weipert had рreviously refused to consider. On August 19, 1981, Judge Kelley heard plaintiff’s motion for a change of custody.
At the conclusion of the proofs, Judge Kelley stated:
"Now whatever was decided by the judge to whom this matter was previously assigned remains decided
"However the issue here, by agreement of the parties, has been limited to factоr F of the Child Custody Act of 1970; that is the moral fitness of the competing parties.”
Judge Kelley then went on to find that since the last determination of сustody, the defendant had been living with her boyfriend, with the child present, without the benefit of marriage. Judge Kelley then ruled that both the mother and fathеr were morally unfit to have custody of the child and, therefore, the court ordered that custody of the child be placed with the paternal grandparents. On appeal, defendant raises several issues for our consideration.
At the outset, we reject appellant’s contention that Judge Kelley erred in hearing the motion for a change of custody only three weeks after the original trial judgе had ruled that he would not consider the motion for six months. It is well established that child custody remains subject to modification at any time by the cirсuit court in the best interests of the child. Hentz
v Hentz,
We must agree, however, with appellant’s contention that Judge Kelley erred in ordering a change of custody without making findings of fact as required by law.
When deciding a custody matter, the trial court must evaluate each of the factors contained in the Child Custody Act of 1970, MCL 722.23; MSA 25.312(3), and state a conclusion оn each, thereby determining the best interests of the child.
Speers v Speers,
In the present case, Judge Kelley did not make specific findings of fact on each of the factors. In fact, the only specific finding of fact made by Judge Kellеy was with regard to factor F — moral fitness. Instead, he chose to rely upon the factual findings previously made by Judge Weipert. Judge Kelley did nоt refer to the specific findings made by Judge Weipert and it is unknown whether he even read Judge Weipert’s written opinion. We hold that, notwithstanding the parties’ stipulation, Judge Kelley erred in ordering a change in custody after conducting a hearing limited to only one of the statutory factors. Such a limited hearing puts too much emphasis on one factor and inclines the court to decide the best interests of the сhild without considering the entire situation. This is particularly true where, as in the present case, the court merely states that the previous dеcision by the original judge will stand, without indicating in any way that the reviewing court has read or considered the previous decision.
Furthermore, Judge Kelley committed reversible *673 error by failing tо consider the following statutory prescription:
"When the dispute is between the parent or parents and an agency or a third pеrson, it is presumed that the best interests of the child are served by awarding custody to the parent or parents, unless the contrary is established by clear and convincing evidence.” MCL 722.25; MSA 25.312(5).
In any event, we are compelled to reverse Judge Kelley’s decision as it was unsuppоrted by clear and convincing evidence. MCL 722.27(c); MSA 25.312(7)(c) provides in pertinent part:
"The court shall not modify or amend its previous judgments or orders or issue a new order so as to change the established custodial environment of a child unless there is presented clear аnd convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child. The custodial environment of a child is established if over an appreciable time the child naturally looks to the custodian in that environment for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental сomfort. The age of the child, the physical environment, and the inclination of the custodian and the child as to permanency of thе relationship shall also be considered.”
In this case, it is clear that the established custodial environment of the child was with the mother.
Judgе Kelley’s ruling that the mother was morally unfit appears to have been based on the sole fact that she was living with a man, to whom she is now married, without the benefit of marriage. Standing alone, we feel that this is not enough to constitute immorality as envisioned by the statute. This Court has previously held that a mother’s acts of adultery do not necessarily preclude her
*674
from having custody of her children.
Feldman v Feldman,
Regardless of the significance one chooses to attach to the fact that defendant lived with her present husband out of wedlock, it must be recognized that morality is but one of 11 factors which the court should have considered. Furthermоre, it is interesting to note that although the plaintiff father was accused of similar immoral acts, Judge Kelley failed to consider what impаct those alleged immoral acts would have upon the child. We conclude that Judge Kelley’s finding that a change of custody would be in the best interests of the child was unsupported by clear and convincing evidence.
Finally, in determining the morality of defendant, Judge Kelley should nоt have admitted into evidence the testimony of an employee of the Friend of the Court regarding his conversation with the three-year-old child. This testimony was clearly inadmissible hearsay. MRE 801(c).
We reverse Judge Kelley’s order and reinstate Judge Weipert’s previous order vesting custody in the defendant.
Costs to defendant-appellant.