Williamson v. WilliamsonWilliamson v. Williamson
Robert B. Staats, Panama City, for respondent.
SUNDBERG, Justice.
This cause is before us on a petition for writ of certiorari to review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, reported at 353 So.2d 880, which is alleged to be in conflict with the decisions of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, in Claughton v. Claughton, 344 So.2d 944 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), and Escobar v. Escobar, 300 So.2d 702 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). We have jurisdiction pursuant to
Petitioner, Ollie R. Williamson, filed for dissolution of his marriage to respondent, Veva C. Williamson, in the Circuit Court for Bay County, Florida, in January, 1976. The couple had been living apart since 1973. The trial court granted a dissolution on September 15, 1976, and after a supplemental final hearing on December 22, 1976, awarded to respondent $10,000 lump sum alimony and $100 per month permanent periodic alimony. At the time of the judgment of dissolution, petitioner possessed $16,000 in cash and bonds accumulated during the marriage and had an income of $354.77 per month from a disability pension. Respondent had only $155 in cash, no income, and required in excess of $400 per month for necessary expenses. In addition, the parties jointly owned a home in Bay County appraised at $36,000 and a home in Jackson, South Carolina. By stipulation, they agreed to sell the Florida home and divide the proceeds equally, and petitioner agreed to purchase for $4,500 his wife‘s interest in the South Carolina property. Both parties are afflicted with permanent physical disabilities which prevent them from holding full-time gainful employment.
In addition to the foregoing factors, the trial court partially based its alimony award on a finding that petitioner was responsible for his wife‘s strained economic condition because he abandoned her in 1973, taking with him a considerable portion of the family savings, and because he refused to attempt a reconciliation although respondent remained willing to do so. On this basis, the court concluded that, as a matter of equity, petitioner should bear the heaviest portion of the economic burden placed on both parties by the judgment of dissolution. On appeal, petitioner challenged the alimony award on the ground that the trial judge improperly considered evidence of his alleged marital misconduct in determining a proper alimony award. The district court rejected petitioner‘s argument by stating:
[T]he relative fault of the parties is an equitable circumstance and a factor concerning which evidence should be admitted, if offered, and which, together with the other circumstances revealed by the evidence, should be considered by the trial court in determining whether or not to award alimony, and if so the amount thereof.
Petitioner asserts, based on the decisions of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, in Escobar and Claughton, that the correct rule of law with respect to awarding alimony is that evidence of marital misconduct should never be considered except in cases of gross misconduct such as adultery or habitual intemperance toward one‘s spouse, and that no evidence of marital misconduct by the spouse not seeking alimony should ever be considered except in mitigation or defense of the conduct of the spouse seeking alimony. Although we agree that Escobar and Claughton state the proper rule of law with respect to evidence of alleged adultery, we cannot give these cases the expansive reading petitioner suggests.
In Escobar, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, affirmed a trial court‘s ruling refusing to hear testimony about the husband‘s alleged adultery from a wife
The court may consider the adultery of a spouse and the circumstances thereof in determining whether alimony shall be awarded to such spouse and the amount of alimony, if any, to be awarded to such spouse. [Emphasis supplied.]
The district court concluded that this statute permits a trial court to refuse to consider evidence of the adultery of a spouse not seeking alimony when such evidence is offered solely for the purpose of obtaining or increasing an alimony award to the spouse seeking alimony.
In Claughton, the same district court upheld a trial court‘s order requiring a husband to answer questions from his wife about his alleged adulterous activities. In that case, however, the husband had previously charged the wife with adultery in an attempt to defeat her request for alimony. The district court held that, under such circumstances,
We agree with the analysis of the District Court of Appeal, Third District. The legislature has expressly provided in
Although we construe
In no way should our decision today be read as lending support to any unbridled discovery into the sullied areas of adulterous activities. It is our hope that the learned chancellor would caution against “`an unlimited foray into the details’ of the alleged adultery” and “restrict the inquiry `within reasonable bounds‘“. It is enough that the chancellor “`simply get a broad picture and understanding of the relative equities and factors necessary to do justice.‘” Our primary concern is
of course the effect a detailed probe into the private lives of the parties might have on the innocent children involved, not to mention the disruptive effect such an inquiry might have upon the married lives of third persons involved in the illicit conduct and their children. We would only hope then, that the chancellor would make the necessary safeguards to protect the above mentioned individuals from any unnecessary embarrassment, ridicule or scorn.
344 So.2d at 947 (citations omitted).
Although we conclude that a trial court should consider evidence of adultery only within the limits expressed herein, in the instant case we cannot agree with petitioner‘s assertion that in determining a proper alimony award a trial judge must always be limited to consideration of only instances of extreme misconduct such as adultery. Nor can we agree, as a rule of universal application, that the conduct of the spouse not seeking alimony may be considered only in mitigation or defense of the conduct of the spouse seeking alimony. On the facts of the instant case we concur with the actions of the trial judge. Neither adultery nor any other extreme misconduct was charged. Here the trial court simply was faced, as it too frequently is in dissolution proceedings, with the extremely difficult task of providing for the welfare of both parties in a situation where there is not enough property or income to permit either party to live alone comfortably. The evidence shows that neither party was able to work for a living, nor is it likely either will ever be able to do so again. At the time of the dissolution, petitioner had only $16,000 in savings and only $354.77 per month in income, while respondent had no savings or income. Obviously, the trial judge could not divide these funds so that either party could ever again live comfortably, even considering the division of real property which the parties agreed upon. It is difficult to imagine a more desperate economic situation for two permanently disabled, middle-aged persons. Under such circumstances, we conclude that it is entirely proper, as a matter of equity, to base an alimony award partially on a finding that one spouse is more responsible than the other for the difficult economic circumstances facing both parties. This is not an assessment of fault but rather of economic reality.
Nonetheless, we cannot agree with the standard set forth by the District Court of Appeal, First District, in its opinion in this case. We unequivocally disapprove any suggestion that it is always proper for a trial court to consider the “relative fault” of both parties in determining a proper alimony award. To permit such a standard would be directly contrary to the spirit and intent of our system of no-fault dissolution. The legislature has expressly declared that the purpose of our no-fault system is “[t]o promote the amicable settlement” of marital disputes and “[t]o mitigate the potential harm to the spouses and their children caused by the process of legal dissolution of marriage.”
For a trial court to perform routinely a balancing act with testimony of alleged marital misconduct of the parties would be a step backward to the days of threats and insinuations which plagued our courts before our no-fault system was enacted and would be directly contrary to express legislative policy. Therefore, we hold that
It is so ordered.
ENGLAND, C.J., and OVERTON and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.
HATCHETT, J., dissents.