DOUGLAS BRITT WILLIAMSON v. BUTTS COUNTY GEORGIA, et al.
No. 5:18-cv-00202-MTT-CHW
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA MACON DIVISION
August 31, 2018
MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE
This case is currently before the Court for preliminary screening as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),
Thereafter, the United States Magistrate Judge granted Plaintiff‘s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and conducted a preliminary review of Plaintiff‘s complaint. Order, July 11, 2018, ECF No. 6. In that review, the Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff‘s complaint failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. Id. at 6-7. Because it appeared that a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim for relief, however, Plaintiff was given an opportunity to recast his complaint to include additional information.
I. Authority & Standard for Preliminary Screening
The Court is now obligated to conduct a preliminary review of Plaintiff‘s complaint. See
A claim is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court may dismiss claims that are based on indisputably meritless legal theories and claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not include sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The factual allegations in a complaint must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level and cannot merely create[] a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (first alteration in original). In other words, the
To state a claim for relief under
II. Plaintiff‘s Amended Complaint
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts that, when coming back from Augusta Medical Prison on September 13, 2017, he got off the Augusta bus and onto the Johnson State bus, where he was made to sit and wait for three and a half hours, without air conditioning or a fan. Am. Compl. 5, ECF No. 8. At some point, other inmates on the bus noticed that Plaintiff was pale and yelled to alert a nearby officer. Id. The officer had Plaintiff come to the front of the bus and sit on the first step, but Plaintiff then had a seizure and slid down the step. Id. The officers moved Plaintiff under a canopy, where medical staff then came and got Plaintiff. Id.
Plaintiff filed this action against Butts County, the Georgia Department of Corrections, and Jackson State Prison Warden Eric Sellers. Id. at 1, 5. Plaintiff asserts
A. Georgia Department of Corrections
As an initial matter, the Eleventh Amendment bars suit directly against a state or its agencies. Stevens v. Gay, 864 F.2d 113, 115 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978)). This bar applies regardless of whether the plaintiff seeks money damages or prospective injunctive relief. Id. (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984)). The Georgia Department of Corrections is a state agency and is thus protected by sovereign immunity. Id.; see also Will v. Mich. Dep‘t of State Police, 491 U.S. 98, 71 (1989) (explaining that the state and its agencies are not persons for the purposes of
B. Remaining Defendants
1. Due Process
To state a claim for denial of due process, a plaintiff must allege that he was deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (recognizing that prisoners may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law). None of Plaintiff‘s allegations suggest that any of the defendants deprived Plaintiff of life, liberty, or property. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not stated a due process claim against any named defendant.
2. Equal Protection
3. Deliberate Indifference
Although Plaintiff does not specifically state that he is asserting a deliberate indifference claim, broadly construing his complaint, it may be read as asserting such a claim. Thus, the Court now considers whether Plaintiff has stated a deliberate indifference claim under the Eighth Amendment.
A prisoner seeking to state an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need must allege facts to show that he had an objectively serious medical need and that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to that need. Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003). A serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor‘s attention. Hill v. Dekalb Reg‘l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1187 (11th Cir. 1994) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, the condition must be one that would pose a substantial risk of serious harm if left unattended. Farrow, 40 F.3d at 1243.
Similarly, a prisoner seeking to state an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to his health or safety must allege facts to show that he was exposed to an
Here, Plaintiff appears to assert that he has a seizure disorder, but he does not allege any facts suggesting that anyone knew about the disorder but failed to treat it. Thus, in the amended complaint, Plaintiff has not stated a deliberate indifference claim based on a failure to respond to his seizure disorder.
In his original complaint, Plaintiff seemed to be asserting a deliberate indifference to safety claim based on his having been assigned to a top bunk bed despite his seizure disorder, which led to him falling off the bed and injuring himself.1 See Compl. 6, ECF No. 1. Arguably, this allegation sufficiently identifies a condition that posed a significant risk of harm to Plaintiff insofar as Plaintiff asserts that his assignment to a top bunk was dangerous because of his seizure disorder. Thus, the question is whether any named defendant was deliberately indifferent to that risk of harm.
With regard to Butts County, in Monell v Dep‘t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the United States Supreme Court held that municipalities and other local bodies could be treated as persons for the purposes of a
b. Warden Eric Sellers
As to Defendant Warden Eric Sellers, Plaintiff does not include any specific allegations tying Sellers to his claim. [S]ection 1983 requires proof of an affirmative causal connection between the actions taken by a particular person under color of state law and the constitutional deprivation. LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1538 (11th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A district court properly dismisses a defendant where a prisoner, other than naming the defendant in the caption of the complaint, fails to state any allegations that connect the defendant with the alleged constitutional violation. Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Pamel Corp. v. P.R. Highway Auth., 621 F.2d 33, 36 (1st Cir. 1980)).
To the extent that Plaintiff names Sellers in his supervisory capacity, supervisory
Here, other than general allegations that prison officials must have known about Plaintiff‘s seizure condition because it was in his medical records, Plaintiff does not allege any facts to show that Sellers actually did know about Plaintiff‘s condition or of the potential harm of assigning Plaintiff to a top bunk. Moreover, Plaintiff does not assert any facts suggesting that Sellers was involved in the decision to place Plaintiff in a top bunk or that he was even aware that Plaintiff was assigned to a top bunk.
Thus, Plaintiff has not alleged facts demonstrating that Sellers personally
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that Plaintiff‘s complaint fails to state a claim against any named defendant. Accordingly, this complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to
SO ORDERED, this 31st day of August, 2018.
S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT