345 S.W.2d 80 | Mo. | 1961
This is a suit for specific performance of a contract for the sale of real estate. On the petition of Juanita Williamson the Circuit Court of Butler County decreed that Oliver Burnett, original owner of the land, and Archie Johnson and wife, subsequent grantees, convey the land to Juanita Williamson, failing in which title would vest by virtue of the decree. Co-defendants Johnson permitted the decree to become final as to them. Oliver Burnett appealed on the point that the evidence of what land was to be conveyed was too vague and indefinite to support the findings and decree of the circuit court.
In this equitable action involving the title to real estate this Court reviews the entire record and reaches its own conclusions as to the facts, determining the weight and value to be given the evidence, and deferring when proper to the findings of the trial court. Anderson v. Abernathy, Mo.Sup., 339 S.W.2d 817. On this review we have given p&tticular attention to seller’s contention, advanced in his argument, that “there was never an agreement or meeting of the minds between the Plaintiff and Defendant as to the exact acre of land to be conveyed to the Plaintiff, * * * »
It is undisputed that on December 27, 1958 Oliver Burnett (“seller”) and Juanita Williamson (“buyer”) orally agreed upon the sale and purchase of a certain square one-acre tract of land which the parties mistakenly assumed lay within the boundaries of a 12-acre tract recently set off to seller in a partition suit. The 12-acre tract was a part of the John Burnett farm located on the west side of U. S. Highway No. 67 in Butler County, near Neely ville. The consideration, $300, was paid to seller by a check carrying this notation: “For one acre of land on Hy 67 Neely ville from the John Burnett farm on 67 Highway front.” Seller cashed the check and received the proceeds. At the time the check was delivered seller gave buyer a receipt for $300 marked “for 1 acre of my land on highway 67 (from John Burnett farm).” Seller promised to give buyer a deed. When the parties discovered that the acre was part of an adjacent tract which had been set off to seller’s brother they readily agreed to ■abandon the contract.
The parties are in dispute as to subsequent events. According to buyer and her son, and several disinterested witnesses, the parties thereafter entered into a second contract for the sale of a different one-acre tract located within the boundaries of seller’s 12-acre tract. According to the uncorroborated testimony of seller, he offered buyer an alternate tract which she refused, and the parties were unable to agree upon any other piece of land.
On the 'disputed issue we find the facts to be as follows: After the parties' voluntarily abandoned the first contract and toward the latter part of January, 1959 there was a meeting of the minds of the parties resulting in a new contract, for the same consideration, as follows: Seller
In arriving at a finding that there was a meeting of the minds on the sale of the acre in question, on conflicting testimony, deference has been given to the finding of the trial judge who saw and heard the witnesses face to face, and we have considered the likelihood of the testimony adduced by buyer; the fact that she was corroborated in the essential details of her testimony; the improbability of seller’s testimony; the fact that his version of the facts was uncorroborated in its essential details, and the motives which actuated the parties.
To be specifically enforceable a contract for the sale of land must designate or describe the land with definiteness or certainty or afford the means by which the identification may be made perfect and certain by parol evidence. Herzog v. Ross, 355 Mo. 406, 196 S.W.2d 268, 167 A.L.R. 407; Ranch v. Wickwire, 255 Mo. 42, 164 S.W. 460; Keator v. Helfenstein Park Realty Co., 231 Mo. 676, 132 S.W. 1114; Smith v. Wilson, 160 Mo. 657, 61 S.W. 597; 81 C.J.S. Specific Performance § 33, pp. 488, 489. Seller contends that the evidence concerning the identity of the acre to be conveyed was not sufficiently definite and certain to support a decree of specific performance. (Seller does not contend that the contract was invalid or unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, and raises no question of the admissibility of evidence of the terms and provisions of the contract.)
On the question of the sufficiency of the evidence we find no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that the terms of the contract describing the acre in question, together with the parol evidence admitted without objection, are sufficiently definite
The judgment is affirmed.
PER CURIAM.
The foregoing opinion by HOUSER, C.,. is adopted as the opinion of the court.
All of the Judges concur.