delivered the opinion of the court.
In conformity with the views expressed in the opinion of the Court on the former appeal of this case, which is reported in
*431 Responding to this plea, the appellee denied the alleged agreement and plead the three year statute of limitations, section 2299' of the Code оf 1930, in bar of the asserted right of the appellant to recover a judgment for the excess so claimed. To this plea оf the statute of limitations, the appellant filed a replication alleging in substance that appellee had frauduеntly concealed from the appellant corporation the fact that she held its said note for $2,700 as an outstanding obligation in her favor; that she had been able to conceal the existence of this claim of indebtedness from December 1, 1925’, until the date of the filing of this suit, by reason of a confidential relationship which she had sustained toward R. J. Williams, the president of the corporation, and whom she married on March 5, 1929. The replication contains several averments of facts and сircumstances to support the principal averment of fraudulent concealment of the claim, during the lifetime of the said R. J. Williams, who died on February 27,1930, shortly prior to the filing of this suit, and some of which averments were stricken out by the court below on motiоn of the appellee on the theory that the proof in support thereof would only tend to prejudice the rights of thе appellee before the jury, and would not aid the jurors in reaching a proper decision of the issues involved. Moreover, the averments of the replication which were not stricken are sufficient in our opinion to present the issue оf the alleged fraudulent concealment of the claim; and hence we think that no reversible error was committed in that bеhalf.
On this issue the proof disclosed that audits of the books of the corporation, made at the instance of its presidеnt, covering each of the two years immediately following the execution of the note, carried an item showing the notе for $2,700, bearing date of July 16., 1925, as a liability in favor of the appellee; that the bookkeeper discussed these audits on diffеrent occasions with the president of the corporation in connection with its then outstanding liabilities, including the entry therein of the *432 note in question; and that thereafter these audits were treated as part of the records of the corporation. They were objected to by the appellant on the ground that the auditors who made them were not introduced to tеstify as to their correctness. However, we are of the opinion that testimony as to their correctness was not required as a condition precedent to their admissibility in evidence on the issue as to whether or not the officers of the corporation were advised of this claim, contrary to its plea of fraudulent concealment.
■ It is urged, however, that onе of the audits listed the note of $2,700 bearing* date of July IN, 1925', as being a note carrying interest at seven per cent per annum, wherеas the note sued on bears eight per cent per annum. This discrepancy was explained by the appellee on the ground that the auditor did not examine the note in her possession and ascertain its interest rate before making the incоrrect entry on the audit from the books. The appellant thereupon sought to contradict her in that regard by offering the tеstimony of the auditor taken on the former trial wherein he had stated that he did call for and examine the note when he madе the audit. The court ruled that the testimony of the auditor given on the former trial was not competent for that purpose. No reason was shown as to why the auditor was not introduced by the appellant on the second trial as a witness, if his testimony was dеsired. Moreover, the proof discloses without dispute that the appellee held only one note of the appellant for that amount and of that date. Under the circumstances, we do not think that it was error to exclude the testimony of а witness given on the former trial, when offered for the purpose of contradicting the appellee on the subsequent triаl without the absence of such witness being first accounted for.
The question was clearly presented to the jury under conflicting evidence and proper instructions as to whether or not there had been an agreement whereby the appellеe was. to refund, any part of the bonus paid to her and *433 cancel the note sued on. In that connection the appellant also made the contention that a $5,000' bonus was likewise paid to each of two other employees of thе corporation under the same alleged agreement that the same should be refunded, and we are of the opiniоn that the jury was warranted in finding from the evidence that these bonuses were not in fact refunded to the corporation, but that the two other employees mentioned actually received the full benefit thereof as a credit on their respeсtive indebtednesses owing to R. J. Williams individually.
After a careful consideration of the numerous errors assigned we have reachеd the conclusion that the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict, and that no reversible error was committed on the trial. The judgment is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.