151 Iowa 548 | Iowa | 1911
The nuisance complained of was the
The evidence plainly brings these plaintiffs within the category of those who are annoyed by defendant’s business. Plaintiff Williams occupies with his family a residence on the lot immediately west of defendants’ premises, and within sixty feet of defendants’ barn; and he has a tenement house on the rear of his lot which is still
While the 'breeding of animals is a lawful business, and one which may properly be carried on for public benefit and private gain, it may constitute a nuisance, if carried on under such circumstances as to be peculiarly annoying to others, as, for instance, in a residence district of a city. In this respect it is like many other lawful businesses,1 such as those of conducting a livery stable, a blacksmith shop, a rendering establishment, a noisy factory, or a manufacturing plant emitting smoke and noxious gases. All such businesses have been held, under various circumstances, to constitute nuisances in residence districts. Rhoades v. Cook, 122 Iowa, 336; Millhiser v. Willard, 96 Iowa, 327; Hughes v. Scheuerman, 134 Iowa, 742; McGill v. Pintsch Compressing Co., 140 Iowa, 429; Percival v. Yousling, 120 Iowa, 451; McMorran v. Fitzgerald, 106 Mich. 649 (64 N. W. 569, 58 Am. St. Rep. 511); Baltimore & Potomac R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U. S. 317 (2 Sup. Ct. 719, 27 L. Ed. 739). Pertinent to the case before us are those cases in which it has been held that the keeping of jacks and stallions, and standing them, for breeding purposes, in the view of those occupying residences, is a nuisance, because shocking to the ordinary sense of decency. Farrell v. Cook, 16 Neb. 483 (20 N.
The shock to the sense, of decency and the annoyance which must result to residents from the fact of breeding stallions to mares in the immediate vicinity is obviously as clear, where the knowledge of the acts which take place in carrying on such business are made known by the noises peculiar to such acts, as where such knowledge is conveyed by sight, and the evidence shows that the noises complained of indicate as unmistakably to an ordinary person the actions of the animals kept by defendant in his stables, and brought to the stables in the prosecution of his business, as would the direct sight of such acts of breeding. It seems perfectly plain, therefore, that the business carried on by the defendants necessarily constitutes such an annoyance to persons living in the vicinity as that it should not be permitted in a residence neighborhood.
The principal contention for appellants seems to be that the neighborhood where their stable is located is not such a residence neighborhood as to render their business properly objectionable in that locality, but it appears from the evidence that the residence district of the city of Marshalltown extends to and includes the block in which plaintiffs’ dwellings are situated. It is true that in the eastern portion of the block there is a small factory and also a building intended, but not now used, for manufacturing purposes, and that adjoining the block on the east side is a railroad spur leading to a packing plant four or five 'blocks distant, and further that east of this spur track is the manufacturing district of the city. , But the manifest line between the residence district and the manufacturing district is east of the premises of the plaintiffs, and defendants’ barn is on the rear of the lot occupied by them for residence purposes, and between the residence lot of Scheiding and that of Williams. We 'gee no merit, there
The decree of the trial court, enjoining defendants from maintaining their barn for the purpose of carrying .on therein the breeding of stallions to mares, is manifestly right, and the judgment is affirmed.