Williams v. Wilson

WILLIAMS, Appellant, Teri C. Lynn WILSON,

Patricia Appellee. Herald

No. 96-SC-1122-DG.

Supreme Kentucky. Court of

April

Rehearing Aug. Denied

Benjamin Hays, Linville, J. Elizabeth M. Matics, Hays Hays, Winchester, Mark A. & Hable, Snell, Virginia Kevin J. H. Jean W. Bird, Combs, Wyatt, Louisville, Tarrant & Appellant. Robinson, Booneville, Kendall C. Joe Sav- age, PSC, Savage, & Elliott Lexing- Garmer ton, Appellee. Jr., Reston,

Hugh Young, VA, F. E. Victor Schwartz, Behrens, A. Mark Crowell & Mor- LLP, DC, ing Washington, D. William Grubbs, Woodward, LLP, Hobson & Fulton Louisville, Curiae, for Amicus Liabil- Product Council, ity Inc. Cox, Reed, II, R.

James John S. Reed Vice, Louisville, Weitkamp Cox Schell & Curiae, Kentucky Amicus Chamber of Com- merce, Kentucky, Associated Industries of Association, Kentucky Bankers and Ken- tucky Coal Association.

LAMBERT, Justice. granted discretionary review (CR 76.20) to consider whether 411.184 provisions violates one or more Consti- Kentucky, thereby rendering tution statute To invalid and unenforceable. re- law, question solve this of constitutional it is necessary whether, to first determine in ma- respects, impairs terial the com- statute mon law of this Commonwealth as it existed Constitution, employment as a school teacher. present place of her of our jural of Man- thereby implicating approached the of the intersection doctrine As she rights. In the event we that the Lexington, determine she was and Palumbo O-War change well common law by statute does settled by being appel- driven struck the vehicle respect recovery punitive damages, with of lant, the person who was intoxicated. At a proceed we to re-examine doctrine of will the scene, appellant charged arrested and was jural rights it has been attacked in this subsequently pled guilty to with DUI. She forum as erroneous and unsound. Fayette District Court. DUI Kentucky Assembly In 1988 the General Fay- litigation in the Appellee commenced legislation tort em- considered broad reform claiming compensatory ette Circuit Court propos- 551. the among bodied HB From not punitive damages. Appellant did als, Legislature the enacted a statute codified litigation al- personally participate the Kentucky modify at KRS 411.184intended to though she was before the court was respect punitive damages. law with Appellee was un- represented by counsel. Survey Sparks, Reform, A Tort of appellant’s deposition appel- take able to gener- L.Rev. In Northern in- appear at trial or make an lant did al, Legislature of was to the intent the rede- person defense. fine the in which circumstances of the At trial after the close all evi- recoverable, were toward dence, an appellant objected giving of legal end a new standard was established. punitive damages. assert- instruction She Departing from law the traditional common support did such an ed that evidence permitted jury impose a standard which instruction due to the absence evidence punitive damages upon finding gross a subjective her awareness that her conduct negligence objective as measured stan- bodily harm. In result in death would dard, standard, statutory the new here under response the trial to this contention court review, requires a determination appellee’s fail- agreed appellant, and for “flagrant defendant acted with indifference present proof required ure to plaintiff and with a 411.184, punitive damages to give refused subjective awareness that such conduct will Appellee posi- then modified her instruction. bodily result in human harm.” punitive damages stat- asserting tion that the requires proof by convincing also clear and sought puni- ute was unconstitutional and Fayette evidence. The Circuit Court and tive instruction based on Appeals Court of decided constitutional negligence. Upon law review gross question and invalidated the statute on the that such an evidence the trial court held view that it offends Sections 54 and 241 of instruction was warranted and submitted Kentucky.1 the Constitution of Both courts puni- case to the for a determination effectively below held the statute de- damages upon an from Hor- tive instruction stroyed the common law of action for Co., Ky., Light, ton v. Heat & Power Union punitive damages preclud- and that such was requires rights. ed proof disregard for of “wanton or reckless give litigation The facts rise lives, safety property others.”2 unimportant. are unremarkable but not On a.m., findings In fact and conclusions May appellee, Patricia its 7:00 Wilson, judgment hold- Lynn support en law Herald route to rendered such, Appeals’ principal holding, reversal for a new addition to its the Court Appeals found trial reversible error not before this trial on jury upon com- decision to instruct the court's Court. prac- principles law after the case had been mon statutory ticed in reliance on the standard. As trial withheld It should be noted that the court result, Appeals the Court vacated the Attorney entry judgment General had until damages judgment and directed retrial of challenge and notified of the constitutional decision, appellee this adverse did issue. From briefing determination that until after by means of a cross- not seek further review statute was unconstitutional. discretionary As motion for review. CR 76.21. unconstitutional, standard, mg person” KRS 411.184 the trial “reasonable fixed that analyzed statutory requirements “jural right.” court avenue aas Conse- requirements plaintiff and the common law quently, denying deter- a common actually changed gross negligence mine whether statute fur- instruction and imposing subjective the common law. While be- the trial court ther a awareness stan- “malice,” of appellant’s lieved the fact intoxication in dard the definition of we find finding a legislature would authorize that she punitive damage acted with the has limited indifference, flagrant evi- recovery the court found no in circumstances otherwise allow- appellant’s subjective dence of ing damages prior awareness adoption these to the of that her in- conduct would result death or our Constitution. hand,

bodily harm. On the other the court op. Slip at 13. found satisfy the evidence sufficient to THE STATUTE VERSUS COMMON LAW gross negligence standard of “wanton rights reckless indifference of others.” Appellant contends that KRS 411.184 Unmistakably, Id. trial court believed departure not a from the common law statutory beyond standard went far the com- standard there no as was “well-established” standard, gross negligence particu- mon law prior standard of our Constitu larly with respect knowledge of the inevit- argues merely tion. She that the statute ability of harm. existing in clarified the confusion existing law and an [T]he found that the evidence did codified standard which support jury a finding applicable punitive not of “malice” as would be to all claims for Appellant damages. argues pre- defined statutes sufficient to war- also that jury century rant a on the No 1891 case law and in this instruction issue. decisions malice, expressed evidence was introduced at trial that the reveal that various forms, specifically subjective Defendant intended to cause is no different than aware statute; tangible intangible injury under the to the Plain- ness malice necessar addition, In although ily presumes Appellee tiff. this Court be- actual re awareness. sponds in- right lieves the evidence of the Defendant’s to recover gross damages negligence toxication the time of the accident was was well estab statutory support jury finding lished to 1891 sufficient to that the and that flagrant subjective requirement Defendant acted with indifference awareness Plaintiff, bodily represents no harm evidence the effective abol- negligence-based recovery pu regarding was introduced the Defendant’s ishment of added) “subjective of a (underlining require awareness nitive and substitution knowledge that such result human ment of or intent. [would] conduct Therefore, bodily death or harm.” The decisions of this Court which bear an support evidence did not instruction legal question under consideration under KRS over have been rendered the course of 411.184. century half. While the numbers op. Slip Appeals agreed at 3. The Court of vast, they such decisions are not neither are with the trial court. that in the observed process analysis In insubstantial. pre-1891 gross negligence cases which was leading will on a cases we focus few the defined, wrong that neither intentional nor express trusting they sufficiently implication belonged faith bad the major concepts development of the and the definition. law. Despite pre-1891 its view that the cases cases, Going pre-1891 en- first one authority,” represented “[divergent lines of (2 Met.) Drake, Ky. counters Chiles Johnstone, writing Judge for the Court vindic- which the recover

Appeals’ majority, stated: damages was allowed on the basis tive killing was “not Kentucky’s highest although recklessness court allowed

[W]hen R.R. plaintiff intentional.” Louisville & Nashville recover objective, McCoy, gross gross negligence using neglect ordi- degrees negligence, slight, punitive dam- three was the basis — nary, gross. between the definition distinction ages, and the court held that proof a de- re- negligence required negligence has been gross degrees of these show harm or of com- intention cause in the courts peatedly recognized fendant’s upheld faith. definition law; ‘negligence’ bad includ- ... the term mon Sheets, 11 R.R. Nashville Co. Louisville & grades.” “This is common-law ing all its Other Rptr. L. 18 S.W. 248 per- damages for a proceeding to recover period are inconsistent. from this cases resulting sonal Hollenkemp, Ky. Sample Fleet and if recoverable punitive damages were (1852) Am.Rep. (punitive dam- company failed to proof showed gross neg- ages allowed for inexcusable were keeping railroad diligence use such by design, ignorantly or ligence “whether repair and inattentive in as careless bridge knowledge of the with or without whether prosecution in the persons usually exercise (16 Brown, defendants.”); Kountz v. The absence of like character. of business Mon.) (allowed (1856) recovery of B. management of a slight care “recklessly exemplary damages injuries for gross negligence.” railroad train is committed”); Riley, 56 and v. Hawkins Co. omitted). (citations Id. at 854 Mon.) (1856) (17 (punitive B. was damages were allowed where collision years of Louis- four after rendition Just “wantonness, Adm’x, reck- caused the defendant’s Kelly’s R.R. v. su- ville Nashville & lessness, true gross negligence.”). It is R. Illinois Central pra, this Court decided period gross this define that some cases from Stewart, supra, reaffirmed our v. Co. to in- negligence or wantonness or malice negligence gross reliance on definition knowing approach clude elements approved generation Louisville & earlier & e.g., intentional conduct. See Louisville McCoy, supra. The R.R. Nashville Co. Robinson, Ky. Nashville R.R. Co. v. gross negligence that “where Court stated R.R. Co. and Louisville & Nashville shown, be al- punitive damages might was (1898). Nevertheless, Chism, 47 S.W. 251 so followed lowed. This rule has been often cases, is little from our review of the there subsequent approved this court 1891, Kentucky prior was doubt that open question.” it is Stew- cases that punitive could damages well established art, law reaf- 599. Recent case 63 S.W. at negligent for be recovered conduct viability of venera- firms continued these ordinary negligence whether such exceeded ble decisions. expressed gross negligence, conduct was as cases, pre-date of which a number Older recklessness, wantonness, or some other such recognize approve our constitution term. punitive addition to damages award immediately period In the after corpora- damages against compensatory Constitution, Louis- this decided gross on employers based tions and other Adm’x, Kelly’s ville & Nashville R.R. employees. negligence of their Illinois R. Co. S.W. Central Light, & Power Heat Horton Union Stewart, only Not 63 S.W. 596 (citations (1985) Ky., 690 S.W.2d comprehen- these cases well-reasoned and omitted). insightful also contains Horton rendition, sive, time their due theory underlying discussion insight they provide timely as the state in which such damages, the circumstances Kentucky law when our 1891 Constitution awarded, may and re-states the damages be powerful adopted. passage A from Kel- was jurisdiction: prevailing rule in this worthy of directly point ly’s Adm’x is justify punitive damages there repetition: order failure to exer- finding that, must be first state is well settled this care, addition- and then an cise reasonable exemplary resulting in accom- finding negligence was al could recovered where be disregard panied by a or reckless gross. “wanton negligence causing was fives, safety property of others.” law affirms the existence “The civil not distinguishable tively bears an element subjective no different than ‘a aware- implied malice from facts. ness that such will conduct result human ” bodily injury.’ death or With this we vehe- Id. at 389-90. disagree. mently negligence, Gross however Appellant asserts that “the Court will find may qualified, lacking is conduct intent statement,’ ‘point recognition’ no ‘definitive Moreover, knowledge or actual of the result. liability or ‘well-established’ regarding rule recognizing point and while that at some at common law.” We along negligent the continuum between con- disagree. As shown the decisions dis- duct hereinabove, and intentional conduct there cussed the well established convergence concepts, must law standard for this Court awarding gross negligence. While the remain mindful appli- that where statutes are concept expressed in was not lan- cable, same statutory trial courts must instruct every guage opinion rendered language. “It that an in- fundamental Constitution, adoption of our while struction based on a statute should encom- language has not perfectly remained constant pass wording statute so far century, there is doubt that unin- Purvis, possible.” Sorg amounting tentional gross negli- conduct speaks “Where the statute gence, concept as that is well defined terms, in no it hardly uncertain can be said Horton, recovery was sufficient to authorize that in an the use instruction of other terms punitive damages. of As the new statute meaning substantially not thing is the same proof requires subjective of a awareness that prejudicial not Adm’r error.” McCullouch’s result, vastly harm will it amounts to a ele- Adm’r, Abell’s punitive recovery vated standard for the of damages departure a clear and from the common law. The facts of this case well authorities, Under these whatever change brought illustrate the fundamental merger gross negligence theoretical and about the statute. subjective might of harm per awareness be By language proof literal the statute counsel, ceived the court and “subjective awareness that such conduct only legal would be informed standard will result in human or bodily harm” is by any contained statute and reason Ordinarily, proof required. only such could reckoning, statutory able standard far party be obtained from the who inflicted the unim gross negligence. exceeds We are harm, but in the instant case the defendant pressed by argument that the statute participate testimony did and her could “loosely interpreted” could be so as to avoid such, way As not be taken. there was no limiting destroying the right common law prove essential elements of the statute. From recovery punitive damages. It would litigation strategy a might new well height duplicity uphold be the to at once emerge. gross negligence, cases of constitutionality of a statute and declare compensatory damages wrongful where for literally that it not observed. personal injury death or would otherwise be modest, forego a might defendant elect to assertion, Contrary appellant’s it is un- any participation, relying on the court necessary precise, that infalli- we discover prevent compensatory an excessive award of prior application ble common law rule damages, knowledge despite safe in the that jural rights. Ludwig the doctrine of v. John- gross negligence, his no award of son, S.W.2d 347 uses damages could made. phrases as such “well-established constitution,” “long-estab- of our enactment on

Relying Maysville Lexington & “safeguarded rights” lished common law Turnpike Kniffen, Ky. Op. Co. v. G.C. sufficiently rights.” We these are believe predicate and other cases ex support conduct, flexible the conclusion emplary ap standards damages on malicious “ recovery grossly pellant gross that argues ‘[njegligenee so qualita- presumption negligent recognized to raise a malice’ conduct is was amount of place upon a limit predated the was to right which 1891 Constitu- recovery. tion. Adm’x, at 854.

Kelly’s 38 S.W. JURAL RIGHTS Johnson, Ludwig supra, concerned the Appellant at makes a multi-faceted guest an stat constitutionality of automobile jural rights relying tack whereby non-paying passenger ute Lewis, extensively Rights Jural under prohibited bringing from automobile was Kentucky’s Constitution: Realities Ground damages for in civil action for (1991-92). _Ky. Myth, L.Rev. ed in jures negligently Ap host. inflicted She contends that constitutional text does pellant virtue Sections asserted law; support any such doctrine of Kentucky, 241 of the Constitution of of the Constitutional Convention duly noting the Debates void. After statute was provide support, effectively and she constitu presumption favor strong agrees with Professor Lewis’ view Assembly, the tionality of acts of the General from illegitimate “evolve[d] meticulously considered the constitu pen judiciary.” Id. at 973.3 Predict- provisions at For its central tional issue. ably, appellee relies on this Court’s decision when Sec holding, the Court concluded that Johnson, and the virtual- conjunction with Sections tion 54 was read ly following unbroken line of inescapable decisions “the conclusion years. applying sixty for more than She the Con that the intention the framers of history relies on the also tradition Legislature inhibit the stitution protecting Commonwealth of of re- abolishing rights of action covery injured persons. With the conflict by negligence.” Id. death or caused joined, weigh will in. thus we Analyzing 49 at similar statutes S.W.2d 350. jurisdictions, from the and decisions other jural rights of first The doctrine artic- quoted approval from a decision in this in ulated as such Court’s 1932 decision Houk, high Oregon, of of v. the court Stewart Johnson, However, Ludwig v. supra. lan- 893, 127 P. 272 P. 61 A.L.R. Or. Adm’x, case, guage Kelly’s in an 1897 provision analyzing a constitutional placing the of suggests idea certain in Section “The similar the one found recovery rights damages of for death or provision is to save from purpose of this personal injury legislative off-limits to abol- rights legislative jural those abolishment recognized ishment had much earlier. had become well established which words, opinion In other we are Ludwig, our enactment of Constitution.” convention intended to extend com- Stewart, 271 P. (quoting 347 at 350 S.W.2d right mon-law of action recover both 999). at exemplary damages compensatory and for Ludwig paragraph final The substantive injuries resulting in death to cases philosophical principles Johnson states ensued; very death and a forcible which repeated by has so which this Court often argument in favor of this is construction legislative protected infringement from constitution, of the found section 54 rights recovery of citizens general it provided where is that “the as- injuries personal and death: sembly power have to limit the shall [guest under consider- injuries statute] result- The statute amount to be recovered spirit injuries person of our constitution ing in or for ation violates well as its letter as found sections property.” It seems evident that de- purpose It was the manifest power legislature to limit the and 241. nial of pre- hardly of that instrument recovery would have framers amount of perpetuate common-law if intent of section 241 serve been inserted view, Any legislative preme infallible. aboli- strongly Court is of his held Professor Illustrative right of or restriction of a common law has court is that tion Lewis written "no infallible rights jural recovery scope development Under the within the common law. doctrine, however, Kentucky is jural rights Su- invalid." right injured of a negligent citizen ed.” Id. at 224. Other in this cases line and relying act of another to sue Carney to recover are Johnson (1982), injury. imperative Moody, for his The Ky., 646 mandate of S.W.2d 40 Gould v. O’Bannon, Ky., (1989), every person, section 14 is that for an S.W.2d Charity, Ky., him in McCollum v. Sisters person, done his shall have (1990), remedy If due course of law. Perkins Northeast- alle- Homes, ern gations true, Log Ky., appellant’s petition 808 S.W.2d 809 he has suffered serious occasioned doctrine, The rights has also been the negligent appellee acts of the Darwin inapplicable examined and found to be where guarantees Johnson. The constitution did statute not eliminate or restrict him day his to a court for the claims recognized common law. Kir purpose establishing alleged wrong schner v. Louisville Electric Ky., Gas & perpetrated on him and of his 743 S.W.2d 840 Fireman’s Fund Ins. damages. resultant Government, (1982), Ky., 635 S.W.2d 475 Ludwig, expressed principle 49 S.W.2d 347 at 351. as follows: upon ground There is still another which rendition, Since its Ludwig v. Johnson has Const. applica- Secs. and 54 cannot be many been followed times. ofOne the more ble. Aside from the mention defamation significant adhering principles cases to its provisions in Sec. these constitutional Erwin, Happy (1959), 330 S.W.2d expressly apply only to actions for city invalidated a statute personal injuries, property damage. employees exempted liability. were from Cinotti, Cf. Hotel v. Court held that Sections 54 as and Zurich Fire interpreted Ludwig protected the common Weil, Ky., Ins. Co. New York v. law right of bring citizens to for recovery suit of which it both of damages municipal employees. from Ex- recognized that Sec. 54 refers actions in pressing appropriate a view to the instant suit, course, subrogation tort. In a ease, the Legislature Court said that if the plaintiff subrogor, asserts the of his public could certain immunize classes offi- indemnity but in an action for he sues cers, exempt public could all officers and his own right, and even basis more employees liability, logically and if ex- implied tenuous than an contract. tended, private groups could immunize the Legislature to Fund, determined be entitled to im- Id. at In 477-478. Fireman’s Chief munity. by Palmore, Court saying, scholar, concluded being Justice ever cor- “[tjhat exactly is pro- what the constitutional overly-broad phrase an in Happy rected v. quoted designed Erwin, visions pre- above were to supra, which had been attributed to Erwin, Happy vent.” v. at 414. Ludwig v. He Johnson. restated the actual holding “The actual follows: In Kentucky Utilities Co. Jackson holding Ludwig of is that the intention of the County Cooperative, Ky., Rural Electric Legislature Constitution was ‘to inhibit (1968), right S.W.2d 788 this Court held the from abolishing rights of for damages action indemnity jural be a right to which existed ’ negligence.” caused for the Constitution and thus added.) (Emphasis at 49 S.W.2d 350. Fire- right protected from elimination Fund, man’s 635 S.W.2d at n. Hall, Assembly. Saylor Ky., General By long frequent virtue of duration (1973), 497 S.W.2d 218 we invalidated a stat jural repetition, rights has be- against ute which required actions home Moreover, virtually come axiomatic. dic- brought years builders to be within five after Jones, tum Ky., S.W.2d 885 Wittmer completion substantial of the home. As (1993), the statute here under review has grounds for decision that our we stated broadly been circumscribed. tanto, pro statute “destroys, a common-law negligence proximate litigation Farm Throughout action for State has ly personal presented against causes arguments various sub- mitting punitive damages existed at the times the were enact- statutes the issue component law interpretation based on its of stat- Some discern substantive utory language depend new found in Section on Johnson v. Met.) (3 Higgins, statute enacted in now codi- and its say predecessor fied as 411.184. It KRS suffices construction interpret this Court could not language, to safe- which contained identical destroy 411.184 to of action only procedural process. cause Not- guard due appropriate otherwise withstanding expressed the view in Johnson fatally impaling upon jural rights without prevailing Higgins, political climate at Constitution, guaranteed by Kentucky adoption of the time of Constitution 14, 54, and 241. Perkins v. Sections permits an inference language and the used Homes, Log Ky., Northeastern 808 S.W.2d Constitutional Convention desired 809, 817 As we when ad- stated impose upon legislative authority limitations dressing problem in In Bev- similar Re: contemporaneously or and cases decided erly Litigation, Ky., Hills Fire 672 S.W.2d appear persuasive close in time would to be (1984): interpret shall not so “We Delegates’ intent. See Perkins v. North- it.” Homes, Log eastern at 812. Elementary Kentucky Board State Id. at 890. Rudasill, ., Secondary Ky Education foregoing As the authorities dem S.W.2d 877 observed that: onstrate, exclusion reasonable [Tjhese delegates the 1890 [to Constitu- opinion contrary, jural doctrine of guaran- Convention] tional examined the deeply rights ingrained tees afforded the citizens of sister states it abandon now would amount to along constitutions with the tradi- them extraordinary change. Principles predict protections given expected by tional to and ability against major counsel such shifts in Kentucky. guided by Then citizens course, the law. Of constitutional doctrine consciences, they a com- (Harmelin their own drafted not immune from reconsideration prehensive rights bill consti- new Michigan, 501 U.S. 111 S.Ct. generally recognized It is that the tution. (1991)) 115 L.Ed.2d 836 and indeed this comprised of com- convention has declared that we will refrain from petent delegates were and educated who fallacy.” “sanctification of ancient Hilen v. sincerely liber- concerned with individual Hays, ties. Therefore, we will the central reconsider premise doctrine to deter Court has endorsed the Id. 880. This

mine whether is fallacious. principle contemporaneous construction as special insight Delegates’ providing Sections 54 and 241 have judges recognizing intent: “The tradi interpreted to work tandem and to estab direct, opinions tion in their wrote with a power lish limitation of Gener knowledge of the mind set of the firsthand Assembly al to limit to rights common law fathers,....” Commonwealth constitutional injury personal for or death. The recover Wasson, Ky., provisions might fact that these not have Accordingly, our decisions Louisville & package” “conceived as some sort of been Adm’x, Kelly’s supra, and Nashville R.R. v. 972) (Lewis, Rights prevent at not Jural does Stewart, supra, R. Co. are Illinois Central being together from construed to arrive them weight our greater entitled to constitution separate principle. at a Section analysis. al provides “every person injury for an lands, explicit. provides goods, person repu him or 54 is more It done in his Section tation, Assembly “shall have no remedy by shall have course of the General due law,” prevent power of limit the amount to recovered has been held to abolishment to injuries jural rights resulting well for those which were estab for person Despite this forth- prior adoption property.” to lished to the Constitution. construction, has con- right, compelling language, it been disagree One with such a Assembly it. while the General language but the used does not exclude tended that power impose would have no to rights impervious limitations on legislative dilution or inju- amount recoverable in action for rights destruction. Such are therefore sub- person or property, ries it could abolish an ject to respect the same restrictions injuries. action for such is at Such odds with Assembly modification the General as are the tenor of Section 54. With their extraor- provisions. constitutional dinary powerful distrust economic inter- With respect puni- to the contention that ests, particularly corporations and railroads tive fall scope rights outside the (Lewis, Rights, 968), Jural it is inconceiva- protected by Sections 14 54 of the Con- ble that Delegates have would forbidden stitution of view that such imposition damage limitations but allowed damages compensate injuries, do not Chi- underlying abolishment cause of ac- Drake, supra, les v. Louisville & Nashville tion, thereby facilitating ultimate limita- Adm’x, Kelly’s R.R. Co. v. supra, and Horton damages. tion on Sections 14 and 54 have Power, Light, supra, Union Heat & together prohibit read Legisla- dispositive. limiting ture from recovery by the amount of Perhaps aspect the most controversial destroying right. jural rights our decisions been the has “con- unconstitutional, In holding such act it was newly stitutionalization” of rights. discovered pointed objective out that the of section 14 This heavily concept criticized is best exem- preserve jural was to rights those plified in Perkins v. Log Northeastern had become well established Homes, supra, as follows: Constitution. was also our drafting protections constitutional prohibited

decided that section 54 leg- §§ founding our islature fathers limiting from the amount of recov- ery protecting jural rights were by destroying of the right. Kentucky against individual citizens of Erwin, Happy v. S.W.2d at power government abridge of the such apply While Section 241 expressly does not rights, speaking rights they to their cases, injury component it is a of the commonly would be understood those power constitutional limitation on the any year, just citizens in Assembly destroy General to limit or actions Id. at the foregoing theory, Carney 816. On damages arising negli- Moody, supra, and Fireman’s Fund Ins. v. gence prevent legislative and serves to en- Government, supra, which taken a more proper had croachment in cases. scope rights, restrictive view the Appellant previous jural contends our were overruled. cases, Johnson, rights Whatever the wisdom of the extension of progeny, its fails take account jural rights point doctrine from 233 of Kentucky. the Constitution of i.e., origin, preservation of well established section day declares that on Ken- rights to statehood, negligently recover tucky’s 1,1792, June all laws recognized inflicted death as Virginia, force in the State of and which 1891, the does not outcome this case de- general are of a nature and local to pend validity on the such extension. State, repugnant and not to this Con- at issue here were well estab- stitution, nor the laws which have been lished in below the courts have Assembly enacted General of this properly applied jural the rights doctrine to Commonwealth, shall be in force within prevent legislative erosion or abolishment. they this State until shall be altered or repealed by Assembly. the General Kentucky decision in Court’s State Appellant interprets give Elementary Secondary section the Board Edu- Rudasill, Assembly plenary power General to abrogate supra, provides proper cation v. a or modify The fallacy methodology analysis. the law. for constitutional her argument apparent. is requires beginning point This Court has that text be the held that then Sections of our shifts to the Debates of the 1890 Consti- Thereafter, Constitution render certain common tutional Convention. focus aegis, beyond original far its rights our doctrine high of the court and decisions becomes Assembly the General so as to restrict even foregoing history and When traditions. changing precedents, from jural rights and this Court applied to the doc- factors adoption of the though after the trine, even created required. no is Such abolishment present theory constitution. crept arise have into flaws improper application not from fun- care- I this Court should Although, believe misconception. damental arguments set fully powerful consider dissent, Cooper’s reliance forth in Justice CONCLUSION of our common strong tenet precedent is over- Ap- lightly be court and the Court law. should Both trial Precedent 411.184(l)(c) to be viola- ruled. held peals jural rights doctrine and unconsti-

tion of the judicial decisis is a stare The doctrine hereinabove, agree we stated tutional. As stability and maintain policy implemented to below. The affirm courts and therefore jurisprudence. It is based continuity in our Appeals court the Court of differed trial (and similar cases should the belief that 411.184(2) properly be- on whether KRS court manner. When a in a similar decided court, Appeals with Court fore principle review announces institutional af- having determined that it was not. We facts, set apply general to a law to Appeals in its conclusion firm the Court of court, in requires the doctrine of stare decisis express opinion as to con- herein legal of “sound reasons the absence 411.184(2). stitutionality KRS principle that same contrary” to adhere to hereby Fay- remanded to This cause is is a similar factual where there future cases proceedings Circuit for further ette Hays, Ky., S.W.2d pattern. Hilen not inconsistent herewith. ordinarily a “Stare decisis universal, But it is not a wise rule of action. LAMBERT, GRAVES, STUMBO Washington v. W.C. inexorable command.” WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., P. 219, 238, and RONALD 44 S.Ct. 264 U.S. Dawson & HILLERICH, Justice, Special (1924) J., concur. (Brandeis, 302, 309, 68 L.Ed. 646 dissenting). C.J., STEPHENS, by separate concurs not re- decisis does principle stare opinion. blindly previous deci- quire to adhere us J., COOPER, opinion. by separate dissents sions we determine those decisions when Supply v. D Auto were in error. & W STEPHENS, Justice, concurring. Chief Revenue, Department S.W.2d reluctantly majority I concur (1980) Hoofnel, (citing Adm’r v. Daniel’s opinion. (1941)). I However, time, begun I have for some there should only because I believe concur validity doubt doctrine changes this Court debate before extensive “popped” into our law 1932. hope law. I rule of such an established Johnson, 533, 49 beginning be the of the dissent will logic process. such out, points and as the Law As the dissent COOPER, Justice, dissenting. Thomas Lewis Article Professor Journal little, any, very if emphasizes, basis there peculiar in a arrives in this Court This case routinely accepted for this now scenar- procedural posture. factual Under in the Constitu- Constitution or to an entitling plaintifffAppellee clearly io Ken- Rights Jural Under tional Debates. damages, the trial instruction on tucky’s Constitution: Realities Grounded language of KRS first that court ruled (1991-92). Myth, 80 K.L.J. 953 instruction, 411.184(l)(c) precluded such an unconstitutional KRS 411.184 was re- then that Perhaps importantly, more even right to common law it abolished the because years, in Court has moved the cent this punitive damages. Having question.” thus in discarded statute Clark’s Adm’x v. 411.184, Co., KRS the trial court instructed Louisville & N.R. 39 S.W. jury (1897); in accordance with the common law Wright see also v. Woods’ Adm’r, (1894). standard in established Horton v. Union 27 S.W. 979 Even Co., Light, Heat Ky., & Power 690 S.W.2d though majority finds fault with the fact (1985), : exhibiting 389-90 viz conduct a that the statute to malice than refers rather disregard wanton or reckless for the lives gross negligence, held in we Horton Union safety persons, of other Co., or a willful or Light, supra, Heat & Power that “wan- malicious act. From this set circum- lives, disregard safety ton or reckless for the great has unnecessary stances arisen the or property of is indistinguishable others” (1) debate to whether KRS 411.184 is implied from “malice from the Id. facts.” at (Remember unconstitutional as violative of the so-called that phrase.) 389-90. last (2) doctrine, “jural rights” whether the only possible argument propo for the “jural rights” has valid constitu- that right sition KRS 411.184 “abolished” the tional basis. punitive damages rejected to is the one Jones, accepted Wittmer but I. case, i.e., trial court in this element that the “jural There was no to need address the “subjective awareness” set forth ease, rights” doctrine in this KRS 411.184 malice, 411.184(l)(c), definition of can does not abolish to proven only by testimony be direct punitive damages. argument Faced an person against punitive damages whom are accepted similar the trial court sought. defendant/Appellant Since the case, specifically this we so held Wittmer unavailable to testify, trial court reasoned Jones, Ky., S.W.2d Justice Appellee prove not Appellant’s could Leibson wrote that case: awareness,” “subjective thus was not entitled Throughout Farm litigation State punitive to an instruction damages. How presented arguments against has various ever, as Justice Leibson also wrote in Fowler submitting damages the issue Mantooth, (1984), Ky., 683 S.W.2d 250 jury interpretation based on addressing requirement proof case statutory language puni- found the new precedent malice as condition to an award now tive statute enacted punitive damages, may implied “Malice be say codified as KRS 411.184. It suffices conduct, outrageous not be need interpret not Court could KRS express so long as the conduct is sufficient to destroy cause 411.184 of action wrongdoing.” evidence conscious Id. appropriate otherwise obviously is what Court meant fatally impaling upon jural rights without phrase implied “malice from the facts” in Constitution, guaranteed by Co., Light, Horton Heat and Union Power 14, 54, Sections 241.... “We shall supra, at 390. This also conformance interpret so it.” principle plaintiff “a with the is entitled (citations omitted). Id. at 890 prove through state of defendant’s mind destroy KRS 411.184 and did not circumstantial .186 evidence.” Ball v. E.W. Ky., punitive damages, Scripps cause of action for denied, 1622, 113 merely guide established standards to cert. S.Ct. U.S. quoting from, in its such Harte- determination whether L.Ed.2d Communications, Connaugh appropriate and the Inc. v. amount Hanks ton, 2678, 2686, ques- be awarded. Never before have we 491 U.S. S.Ct. authority Assembly tioned the General 105 L.Ed.2d 562 Even a criminal ease, establishing to enact statutes must degree where the elements offense doubt, culpability necessary proven beyond entitle a mens litigant a reasonable damages. recover ‘We do think rea inferred from act itself and/or any longer open question Tungate surrounding as to the the circumstances it. Commonwealth, (1995); authority general assembly pass

271 denied, Commonwealth, cert. 498 Ky., Ky., 789 758 754 S.W.2d Anastasi v. 1047, 754, Commonwealth, 774 112 (1988); 111 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d Lambert v. U.S. 860 (1992). (1991). quasi- recognizes the App., 299 The standard 885 S.W.2d damages punitive by tak criminal nature of arguable day age in this longer It is no ing ground between standard middle proof driving the act intoxi- while proof by a ordinarily in civil used cases “subjective cated an inference creates evidence,” and the “preponderance of the part of the of the awareness” on actor a proof “beyond criminal law standard of If that potential consequences of the act. holding that Due reasonable doubt.” While satisfy “beyond a reason- inference would require higher a standard Process does proof in criminal able doubt” standard of a evidence,” if “preponderance of the than ease, satisfy is sufficient to “clear procedural by other and substan buttressed convincing forth evidence” standard set protections, Supreme the United States tive 411.184(2). to be has that “There much stated many requiring, said favor of State’s opinion umbrage majority also takes do, convincing ... a of clear and standard con with the use of the “clear and statute’s even, or, “beyond reasonable evidence” vincing “vastly as a ele evidence” standard Ins. v. Has Mutual Co. punitive doubt.” vated standard Pacific Life 23, 11, 1032, 1046, lip, 499 n. 111 S.Ct. departure from the U.S. clear (1991). 264.) The “clear and con (Op., if that 113 L.Ed.2d 1 p. common law.” Even true, punitive implicate “jur vincing dam were such would not evidence” standard doctrine, rights” adopted by legislative has enact ages al since the establishment judicial twenty-nine heightened proof other standard of would ment decision Columbia,1 and has “abolish” the collect dam states and the District of ages, only proof principal establish the standard of been recommended each puni applied determining groups analyze to be the law of academic i.e., fact, the American whether to award them. malice tive since both Association,2 always required College the American proof and fraud have Bar Institute,4 Law convincing Lawyers,3 clear E.g., evidence. Hardin Trial American (1995); of Commission Savageau, v. 906 S.W.2d 356 National Conference Co., Lexington v. Herald-Leader ers on Uniform State Laws.5 Warford (1989); (1993); Corp., § 1.ALA. STAT. 71 780 P.2d 566 Travelers CODE 6-11-20 ALASKA Haw. (Ind. (1994); 3294(a) Armstrong, § § 442 N.E.2d 349 09-17-020 CIV. Indent. Co. CAL. CODE (Me. 1982); Raymond, (West 494 A.2d 1353 Supp.1995); Tuttle & GA. CODE ANN. 1970 Zenobia, 1985); 325 Md. Owens-Illinois (Supp.1995); § ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51-12-5.1 Co., (1992); Hodges A.2d v. S.C. & 5/2-1115.05(b) (1995); para. CODE IOWA Toof (Tenn.1992); Wangen v. Ford (West 1987); § ANN. ANN. 668A.1 KAN. STAT. Co., Wis.2d 294 N.W.2d Motor 60-3701(c) (1994); § ANN. MINN. STAT. (1980); Corp., Rodriguez v. Motor Suzuki (West Supp.1995); § 549.20 & MISS. state, banc). 1996) (en (Mo. One S.W.2d 104 Colorado, ll-l-65(l)(a) (Supp.1995); § CODE ANN. proof beyond requires a reasonable 27-1-221(5) (1995); § CODE MONT. ANN. COLO. doubt cases. See (1991); 42.005(1) § NEV. STAT. N.J. REV. ANN. 13-25-127(2) (1987). § REV. STAT. (1995); § 2A: GEN STAT. ANN. 15-5.12 N.C. 1D-I5(b) (1996); § STAT. N.D. CODE CENT. Association, Special Bar Committee American (Supp.1995); § 32-03.2-11 OHIO REV. CODE Damages American Bar Asso- on Punitive ciation, 2307.80(A) (Anderson 1991); § ANN. OKLA. Damages: Litigation, on Punitive (West § Supp.1995); STAT. tit. OR. ANN. 9.1 (1986). Analysis A Constructive (1995); § ANN. REV. STAT. 18.537 S.C. CODE (Law.Co-op.Supp.1995); § S.D. CO 15-33-135 Lawyers, Report (1987); College of Trial American § TEX. DIFIED LAWS ANN. 21-1-4.1 Special Damages (West the Committee on § CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 41.003 Ap- 1997); (1992); Problems in the Administration Justice: § CODE ANN. 78-18-1 UTAH Regents. proved Board 15-16 Ariz. Ins. Linthicum Nationwide Life Woodner, (1986); 723 P.2d Jonathan Breeden, (D.C.1995), Institute, Enterprise Responsi- cert. Co. A.2d 929 Law 4. American — denied, —, Study bility Injury: Reporters' 248- U.S. 117 S.Ct. Personal (1997); L.Ed.2d 215 Masaki General Motors 272 “abolish,” in right, should a common law is also ease have 260.) p. (Op.,

instructed accordance unconstitutional. As Professor foresaw, initially with KRS re- 411.184 and .186 as Lewis Court has now assumed quested plaintiff/Appellee. power any the If trial the mean- the for itself sole make so, ingful changes in area of court had done there would have been no the tort law. Lew- is, “jural rights” supra, at 980. need to address the whether any doctrine has basis our Constitution. If that had been the intent of the framers Constitution, only 1891 one can wonder the why they included Section 233 and the First II. paragraph accompanying the Schedule In well his reasoned and well documented Constitution, legis- both which vest the article, Rights Kentucky’s Jural Under Con power repeal any lature the or laws alter stitution: Realities 80 Myth, Grounded in adoption and effect at the force time the (1991-92), Ky. 953 L.J. Professor Thomas P. v. of the Constitution. Aetna Ins. Co. Com- Lewis, preeminent scholar monwealth, 864, (1899). Ky. 106 51 624 S.W. law, compelling constitutional makes a case In Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Government proposition “jural rights” the Co., Ky., Employees 635 475 Ins. S.W.2d nothing is doctrine more nor less than (1982),we and the reiterated that Section 233 judicial usurpation legislative of a traditional paragraph explicitly First of the Schedule prerogative. Id. at 976. first 964 and As subject recognize that law the common is Johnson, Ludwig enunciated the case of legislature. or Id. repeal alteration at 533, 243 49 347 doc S.W.2d 476; Ruby see also Lumber Co. v. John- K.V. per trine appears to have been intended to 811, 449, 299 187 son S.W.2d 453 jurisprudence petually tether of this (1945). Commonwealth, recently And as as tort century Commonwealth to nineteenth Wilkinson, Ky., Cowan ex rel. 828 S.W.2d i.e., principles, any of ac right common law “Judicially 610 we held that created existing prior adoption tion always yield superi- law must Constitution is be sacrosanct cannot policy legislative enactment and Id., 351; at Car abolished. S.W.2d 614. There not one cf. Constitution.” Id. at (1983). Moody, ney Ky., In (double 6,023 pages typewritten word in the coining arriving at conclusion and columns, type) reported Proceed- elite phrase “jural rights,” Ludwig re court ings Constitutional Con- and Debates principally upon Oregon lied case of (hereinafter “Debates") vention Houk, Stewart 271 P. Or. contrary supports a conclusion. As (1928). Johnson, supra, out, points is no factu- Professor Lewis there Oregon subsequently at 350. aban al for a ever basis belief the framers “jural rights” concept. Josephs v. doned the entertained the notion the common Burns, Or. 491 P.2d Lewis, repeal or alteration. is immune We, hand, expanded have it to on the other Certainly, at can supra, no such intent action, any right include common law provi- in the three constitutional discerned right not that whether or existed Ludwig, supra, and in sions relied the 1891 Constitution. Perkins majority opinion in this case. Homes, Log Northeastern 14 as Section follows: (1991), overruling, Carney v. 815-18 open person every All shall courts supra. any legisla Moody, Ergo, act of the lands, goods, done him his abolishing any right by judicial ture created remedy by person reputation, shall have rights” “jural decision violates the law, justice due course of (!) is, therefore, ifAs unconstitutional. sale, delay. administered without denial expansive enough, majority that were adopted provision first as Article today declares that act of was this Court XII, “impairs,” though does of our Constitution. legislature Section § PUNITIVE ACT MODEL DAMAGES Debates, readopting this X, at 439. readopted Section verbatim Article debate, Id. and without provision verbatim as Article Constitution have presumed to delegates XII, of 1850. of the Constitution it in given to adopted construction also roots explains, it has its As Professor Lewis Barkley v. Glover. Higgins v. and Charta, Johnson fact Magna Chapter in XXIX of Commerce, v. Chamber Hodgkin recognized delegate Robert Rodes (1952); 1014, 1016-17 Ky., 246 S.W.2d County, of the Committee Warren chairman cf. (1994); Groce, Ky., 880 S.W.2d 547 Butler Rights, his during Bill of Preamble and on Coleman, 858, Ky. 172 294 S.W.2d Cawood provision delegates report of this to other (1943); Ky. 136 Ray Spiers, 281 548 Lewis, supra, at 1890 at the Convention. (1940) (same applies presumption 750 S.W.2d Debates, 965; than 1 at 444. More judicial construc after to statutes reenacted years adoption of ten after the the Constitu tion). Higgins holdings The Johnson thirty years 1850 to tion of and having been in- Barkley thus and v. Glover 1891, our adoption of the Constitution of of its into 14 at the time grafted Section upon was predecessor Court called adoption, subsequent characterization Higgins, 3 60 case of Johnson v. Metc. Johnson, supra, holdings Ludwig v. those (1861) meaning of Ky. interpret to 566 irrele “clearly legally unsound” is as provision. vant. provision found the bill of This is 54 follows: general is as rights^ prescribes certain Section State, also duties for the courts of the and Assembly power shall have The General general lays down rules the manner limit to be recovered to the amount business, conducting their the effect injuries resulting in or for may They thus stated: are to which be or person property. to manner, open public in an be held face, is purpose of this Section On its proceedings are not or their to be secret legislature placing dollar prevent to public They view. 2. are concealed from injuries.” limits on “for awards is, justice administer without sale—that punitive damages, nothing It has to do accept compensation from they are not to “for compensation are awarded deny any They are litigants; and 3. not to wrongdo punish but injuries,” deter same, trial, fair delay one a nor to Inc., Ford, Ky., Hensley Miller ing. v. Paul except upon legal grounds for sufficient (1974); Dry Ashland S.W.2d 762-63 508 continuance. 577, 195 Ky. Wages, Co. Goods import provision The of this terms (1946). In became reporting what judi- altogether it relates show convention, delegate Section 54 government, which department cial County, chair Spalding A. Union Ignatius justice “by to administer due course is Legislative Depart man of the Committee law,” department, legislative and not to the ment, explained it as follows: pre- such course” “due re- committee thirty-nine [of the scribed. section, forbidding the Gen- port] is a new Any make it other construction would limiting recov- Assembly from amount eral the con- inconsistent with other clauses of person property. damage ered stitution, fact, and, practically render it has, some Legislature perhaps, absurd. cases, upon to be put limit the amount Id., damages by acci- Ky. interpretation railroad at 570-71. recovered for Glover, persons resulting Barkley 4 Metc. death reaffirmed in dents (1862). person property. This section Ky. putting Assembly from forbids the General report to 1890 conven rendering his limit the amount of tion, language delegate first Rodes read recovered, leaving jury. it to the reported: then of what now Section Debates, Following the to, supra, at unobjected equivalent “That is to strike rejection of an amendment present 15 of the Constitution.” of section provision, adopted it was without Lexington Co., (14 further de- & R.R. Frankfort Mon.) bate. Id. at 3916. maxim, B. “The ‘Actio personalis persona,’ moritur cum was the If the words contained in a constitutional law, uniform prevails rule of the common provision ambiguous, the debates of the (sic), in Kentucky to-day except where it has constitutional adopted convention which express modified language of the may be resorted to in ascertaining pur- Constitution Gregory and statute.” v. Illi- pose sought accomplished to be or the mis- Co., nois Cent. R. 80 S.W. 795 designed chief to be provi- remedied wrongful There were statutes exis- sion. Barker v. Steams Coal & Lumber tence at convention, the time of the 1890 (1941); there was substantial uncertainty only as Club, Commonwealth v. Kentucky Jockey to whom the cause of belonged, action but 739, Ky. 987, (1931); 238 38 S.W.2d Hig- when might maintained, the action if at Prater, gins Ky. 14 S.W. Hunter, all. Howard’s Ky, Adm’r v. (1890) (interpreting provision of the Consti- (1907); 104 S.W. see Henderson’s 1850). fact, tution of there is nothing Co., Kentucky Adm’r v. Ry. Ky. C. ambiguous were, about Section 54. If there S.W. Just to the conven- explanation by delegate Spalding clarifies tion, judge of the Jefferson Circuit Court purpose that its preclude was to legislation had declared a wrongful section of the death placing dollar limits on awards of act unconstitutional purportedly because it persons for property. or Nothing against Debates, discriminated railroads.6 language history suggests or an intent delegates at 4687. obviously The strip legislature of its pre- historical were concerned about viability the future rogative reiterated Section 233 and the tort wrongful death and trusted paragraph First of the Schedule to enact legislature neither the pro- nor the courts to legislation derogation of the common law. statutory tect that cause of action. Just as Section 241 is as follows: obviously, of Section 241 had Whenever the person death of a shall re- nothing to do protecting with common law injury, sult from an inflicted negligence rights. act, then, wrongful case, or every If, posited as v. Johnson and damages may be recovered for such Homes, Perkins v. Log Northeastern com corporations persons so causing mon law causes of action in tort are cloaked the same. provided Until otherwise protection, protection constitutional law, the action to recover such damages is not limited to legislature, acts shall in all prosecuted cases be by the apply must judiciary. also to acts of the personal representative of the deceased Surely, majority of this Court does not person. Assembly The General may pro- believe that applies only the Constitution vide how the recovery go shall and to legislature and not to us.7 We would be belong; whom provision and until such logic forced to conclude perpetuat under the made, part the same shall form of the majority opinion ed in this case that personal person. estate of the deceased Court, itself, unconstitutionally acted be incongruous suggest would when we abolished the common law tort of designed section was protect pre- alienation of affections unanimous vote in action; serve common law right of Hoye Hoye, Ky., 824 S.W.2d 422 there is not and never has been a common wrongful action for death. recently Court has reiterated the Co., Smith’s Adm’r v. National public Coal & Iron maxim policy is within the consti- (1909); 117 S.W. 280 Eden v. legislature. tutional domain of the Guiler, ruling The Jefferson Circuit Court's was re- 7. But see Giuliani v. appeal, Safety-Vault versed on Louisville (1997) & Trust (dissenting opinion). v.Co. Louisville & N.R. 17 S.W. but not until after the convention had concluded its work. If a needs further policy point is not information. public new establishmént of [T]he elaboration, The recalled. a witness can be authority Section of the courts. within in for- legislative preeminence provides rationale 27 of the Constitution public mulating policy is reflective broad divided powers government strengths legislative in the inherent Executive, these Legis- distinct units: into three process. and Judicial. The establishment lative legislature

public policy granted provides 28 of Constitution Section alone.... follows: Wilkinson, Commonwealth, ex being rel. Cowan person persons, No collection supra, at 614. departments [legislative, those one judicial] exercise executive shall adjudicate are well indi- Courts suited to power properly belonging to either disputes concerning discrete issues vidual others, except hereinafter instances recog- parties. Founding Fathers (Empha- permitted. expressly directed they when the United nized this drafted added.) sis jur- judiciary give States Constitution to to decide controversies.” isdiction “cases and or 241 nothing There is Const, 1; § art. Ill 2 cl. Flast U.S. power to for- expressly transfers the 1949, 83, 1942, Cohen, 392 U.S. 88 S.Ct. policy in area of tort law public mulate (1968); Industries 20 L.Ed.2d Associated judi- legislative to the department from the Commonwealth, Ky., Kentucky v. an of such department. cial the absence hand, 947, 951 the other On its and express provision, Ludwig v. Johnson judicial process suited to well and simply ignored progeny have public Professor policy. formulation As support transfer of implied for this discerned notes, individuals, lobbies, other Lewis interpretation in a combined of Sec- power collectives cannot talk to a court. course, premising 241. tions 54 and Of filed, amicus but the Briefs curiae impli- “jural upon mere rights” doctrine judicial system is that its virtue 28. itself a direct violation of Section cation is primary focus record must be on the trial Nevertheless, analysis of the the historical it; parties gen- judges before are not 14, 54 and origins purposes of Sections erally equipped expected textu- to make Lewis’s article as set forth Professor ally generalized, rule-type de- interrelated dissenting opinion, reveals and in this “legislative cisions based on facts.” are implication that those sections even law, court are decisions of a that the intended for interrelated or framers system no better devised them, has been togeth- separately read or all of technique, prin- general than this er, policy with power public transfer over to emerge real ciples of law from small bits of respect legislature tort law from the experience. technique has life But We, Bonaparte, placed like judiciary. have have a judges worked so well not because upon our that crown own head. monopoly peo- wisdom but because proposition I subscribe to the Nor do always ple power have reserved years perpetuated sixty-six of error must be modify principles light in the 267.) p. “predictability.” (Op., for the sake of mounting experience have faded to work all, has although Ludwig v. Johnson After their satisfaction. years, sixty-six on the books for

Lewis, supra, at 983. seventy years of purported to overrule over hand, Hig- unique- represented by legislatures precedent other Johnson

On the Glover, Barkley supra; and it ly equipped fully gins informed deci- well reach effectively have reversed 800 public policy progeny sions about the need for broad Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. years law. more com- of settled changes They have Lewis, Justice information, agree at 964. I including access plete decisis persons doctrine of stare ability Leibson that “[t]he to receive comments us to perspectives not commit the sanctification representing multiplicity does Hays, Ky., 673 fallacy.” to obtain Hilen legislative process to use the ancient “predictabili- As for ty,” predicted who could have that after six- Kentucky, COMMONWEALTH of NATU- ty-six years applying “jural rights” RAL AND RESOURCES ENVIRON- legislative enactments CABINET; MENTAL PROTECTION action, “abolish” common law Phillip Secretary Appel- Shepherd, J. scope Court would now extend its enact- lants, merely “impair” rights? ments which those III. KENTUCKY GUARANTY INSURANCE together, Read KRS 411.184 and KRS ASSOCIATION, Appellee. adequate 411.186 establish standards guide e.g., properly jury, instructed Pal- No. 95-CA-0746-MR. more, Instructions to Juries Appeals Kentucky. Court of (Civil), § in assessing 39.15 particular in a case. See Honda May 415, 443, Oberg, Motor Ltd. 512 U.S. 2331, 2345, n. n. S.Ct. 129 L.Ed.2d Rehearing Aug. Denied (1994) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). A Discretionary Review Denied growing plurality on the United Su States 8,1998. Supreme April Court

preme now believes that damage by inadequately verdicts rendered juries pro violate due

instructed substantive requirements. cess Amer BMW North Gore,

ica, 585-99, Inc. U.S. 1589, 1604-10, (1996);

S.Ct. 134 L.Ed.2d 809 Corp. TXO Production Re Alliance cf. 443, 462-64, Corp.,

sources U.S. 2723-24, (1993);

S.Ct. 125 L.Ed.2d 366 Haslip, Ins. Co. v. su Mutual Pacific Life 18-20,

pra, 499 1043-44. U.S. at S.Ct. at reading opinions

A suggests of these awarding puni

the common law standard for damages approved

tive in Horton v. Union

Light, Heat & Power and reaf majority opinion (Op.,

firmed herein 263),

p. jury used to instruct ease, may longer pass con federal Thus, discarding

stitutional muster.

411.184, left with a law stan we are punitive damage

dard for which is verdicts

protected rights” perpetuum “jural

doctrine, pro well violate process requirements

cedural due

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments

United States Constitution.

I Appeals would reverse Court of Fayette Circuit and remand

case for a new trial the issue of

damages with directions to instruct .186. accordance KRS 411.184 and

Case Details

Case Name: Williams v. Wilson

Court Name: Kentucky Supreme Court

Date Published: Apr 16, 1998

Citation: 972 S.W.2d 260

Docket Number: 96-SC-1122-DG

Court Abbreviation: Ky.