delivered the opinion of the court.
This аction was instituted by the plaintiff against the defendant to secure a decree of separate maintenance on the grounds of wilful neglect, extreme cruelty and desertion. The defendant filed an answer denying all the material allegations of plaintiff’s complaint, and together therewith a cross-complaint asking a divorce absolute by reason of the plaintiff’s extreme cruelty to the defendant persisted in and continued for more than one year, causing the defendant such grievous mental suffering as to entirely destroy the legitimate objects of marriage. Upon issue joined by replication filed by the plаintiff, the cause was tried to the court without a jury on May 17, 1928. After the conclusion of all of the evidence introduced by both pаrties the court, on September 10, 1928, made findings of fact and conclusions of law in favor of the defendant and against the plаintiff, upon which judgment was thereupon duly entered adjudging that the plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed, and that the bonds of matrimony existing betweеn the parties be dissolved by reason of the fault of the plaintiff, from which judgment the plaintiff has appealed.
Plaintiff’s severаl assignments of error present but one question necessary to be considered in disposition of this appeal, *448 viz.: Is the evidence sufficient to sustain the findings and judgment?
It appears that the plaintiff and defendant were married at Lewistown, Montana, on the first day of June, 1921. The defendant had never before been married, but the plaintiff at the time had been a widow for about a year. Her first husband, a Mr. Olsen, died leaving no estate. There are no children. The defendant is an industrious and successful rancher and stock-raiser, and is possessed of considerable property, though, like many men in his business on a large scale, is not free from dеbt. Domestic troubles in the family commenced in the summer of 1924 and continued until the plaintiff left the defendant’s habitation on February 2', 1927. This action was by the plaintiff instituted on June 28, 1927. At the time of the trial the plaintiff was thirty-eight years of age and the defendant fifty-two.
The allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint set forth in separate counts are not sustained by the evidence, although as to the charge of extreme cruelty there is conflict in the testimony. The district court found that the allegations of plaintiff’s complaint are' not supported by the evidence, and that they are not true; that the defendant was fully justified in refusing to cohabit with the plаintiff by reason of her misconduct, and ordered that her complaint be dismissed. As to the averments of extreme cruelty made thе basis of the defendant’s cross-complaint, the court found them to be established* by the evidence. We have carefully rеviewed all of the testimony and find that the fact findings are amply supported by competent evidence, with no proof suffiсient to establish con-donation. No useful purpose will be subserved by setting forth the court’s findings at length, or by a review of the evidence. Suffice it to say that extreme cruelty on the part of the plaintiff towards the defendant was by the court found., and conclusively established by the evidence; and with propriety it may be observed that the testimony is such as to warrant a decree оf divorce on grounds of adultery, had the defendant elected so to plead. Consistent with the law, the court prop *449 erly found, upon the facts proven, that the plaintiff’s conduct was such as to utterly destroy the defendant’s peace of mind and hаppiness, and was of such nature and character as to defeat, and that it did defeat, the legitimate objects of thе marriage and rendered a continuance of the marital relation perpetually unreasonable and impossiblе, without fault on the defendant’s part.
The statute provides, so far as applicable here, that extreme cruelty is “the infliction of grievous mental suffering upon the other by one party to the marriage, by a course of conduct towards or treаtment of one party to the marriage by the other, existing and persisted in for a period of one year immediately befоre the commencement of the action for divorce, which justly and reasonably is of such a nature and charactеr as so to destroy the peace of mind and happiness of the injured party, or entirely to defeat the proper and legitimate objects of marriage, or to render the continuance of the married relation between the parties perpetually unreasonable or intolerable to the injured party.” (Rev. Codes 1921, see. 5738.)
Bach ease must be determined upon its own peculiar facts, and it is well recognized by the authorities that an inclusive and exclusive definition of legal cruelty cannot be given. The courts have not attempted so to do, but generally are content with a determination as tо whether the facts in the case considered constitute extreme cruelty. Whether the defending spouse has been guilty of еxtreme cruelty as defined by the statute is purely a question of fact to be determined from all the testimony presented. The рarticular acts of cruelty of which complaint is made are not in themselves determining factors, but the question is whether the аcts of cruelty are of such a nature and character as to destroy the peace of mind and happiness of the injured party.
(Donaldson
v.
Donaldson,
We have considered all of the other questions presented by plaintiff’s specifications of error, and, finding no merit in them, the judgment is affirmed. Remittitur will issue forthwith.