Williams v. Whitfield CountyWilliams v. Whitfield County
Aftеr becoming involved in a motorcycle accident at the intersection of two Whitfield County roads, Paul Williams sued the county and employees of its public works department for negligence in failing to properly place road signs warning of the closure of one of the roads. Whitfield County moved for summary judgment, arguing that signs warning of the road closure were properly placed at the time of the accident and that, in any event, it had not waived its sovereign immunity from suit. Williams opposed the county’s motion, arguing that the county had waived its sovereign immunity by use of a parked motor vehicle to prevent motorists from running off thе roadway.
The trial court granted summary judgment to Whitfield County. The court ruled that although there are issues of fact as to whether signs warning of the road closure were properly placed, the county did not wаive its sovereign immunity as it appears without dispute that there was no motor vehicle in use at the time of, or involved in, the motorcycle accident. Williams appeals. We affirm.
On appeal from thе denial or grant of summary judgment, the appellate court “conducts a de novo review of the evidence to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.” 1 The facts here, unless otherwise noted, are undisputed.
On May 7, 2004, at approximately 7:40 p.m., Williams was operating a motorcycle in a westerly direction along Chattanooga Road approaching its intersection with Old Tunnel Hill Road. Chattanooga Road’s westbound approach to that intersection is a blind leftward curve on a downgrade. At the time in question, Williams was follоwing two other motorcycles operated by friends. Unbeknownst to Williams and his friends, the part of Chattanooga Road lying west of its intersection with Old Tunnel Hill Road had been closed, and a barricade with a “road closed” sign had been placed in the westbound lane of travel. The operator of the first motorcycle went around the barricade and stopped further down the road. The operator of thе second motorcycle stopped in the intersection. But when he applied the brakes of his motorcycle, Williams slid along the paved edge of the roadway for some distance and onto thе graveled, right-hand shoulder of the road. He then hit a hole in the gravel and slid off a steep embankment. As a result, he sustained injuries requiring hospitalization and surgery and damaged his motorcycle.
In his complaint, Williams сharged the county with negligence for not properly placing road signs warning motorists of the road closure at distances prescribed by the Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD). According to Williams and an operator of one of the other motorcycles, there was only one “road closed” sign posted along Chattanooga Road for westbound travelers and it was within the curve of the roаd approximately 500 feet from the barricade. According to personnel of the public works department, “road closed ahead” signs were
The closing of Chattanooga Road was necessitated by a project undertaken by the Whitfield County Public Works Department to replace storm water drainage piping at various locations in the county. To perform the construction work, the county hired a private contractor, Greenstar, LLC. Greenstar owned and operated a tracked Caterpillar excavator that it used in working on the road. As part of its agreement with the county, Greenstar maintained a policy of general commercial and automobile liability insurаnce that listed the excavator.
At the time of Williams’s accident, the excavator was parked partially in the westbound lane of Chattanooga Road approximately 300 feet west of the “road closed” barricade. According to Williams, the excavator had been parked there to prevent motorists from running off the road as part of an overall safety plan for the project for which the county had assumed partial responsibility.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity protects governments from legal action unless they have waived their immunity from suit. The immunity, at least for counties, may only be waived by a legislative act which specifically provides that sovereign immunity is waived and the extent of such waiver. 2
In accordance with
Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co.,
8
the trial court concluded that the tracked Caterpillar excavator in this cаse is a “motor vehicle” within the meaning of
As argued by Williams, under
As noted in Harry v. Glynn County, 12 “[w]hether an event arises from the ‘use’ of a motor vehicle depends largely on the circumstances, and a bright-line definition is elusive.” 13 As further held in Saylor v. Troup County, 14 “[t]he question to be answered is whether the injury ‘originated from,’ ‘had its origin in,’ ‘grew out of,’ or ‘flowed from’ the use оf the motor vehicle as a vehicle.” 15
In Saylor, the plaintiff was injured while working as an inmate on a prison work detail. At the time of the incident, he was sharpening a swing blade on a vise attached to the bumper of a van. As he was doing sо, he was bumped by a tractor being operated by another inmate. As a result, he allegedly lost his balance and fell across the swing blade. The van and tractor were owned by Troup County. The county had рurchased liability insurance for the van but not the tractor. The question on appeal was whether the plaintiffs injuries arose out of the “ownership, use or maintenance” of the van so as to trigger the liаbility insurance coverage for the van and a waiver of the county’s sovereign immunity. We answered this question in the negative, because “the van was inoperative, parked off the roadway with its engine not engaged” 16 when the plaintiff was injured. “[The plaintiff] was merely using the bumper of the van for placement of the vise, and the van itself was only remotely related to the accident.” 17 We, therefore, concludеd that the plaintiff s injury did not “ ‘originate in’ ” or “ ‘flow from’ the use of the van as a motor vehicle.” 18
Mitchell v. City of St. Marys, 19 relied on by Williams, held that where a truck was being used for mosquito eradication, damages resulting from the spraying of insectiсide from the truck were injuries arisingby reason of the “use” of the truck. 20 Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co. 21 also relied on by Williams, held that the plaintiff s injuries arose from use of the motor vehicle where he fell or was thrown from the bucket of a backhoe in which he was being transported on a public roadway. McElmurray v. Augusta-Richmond County, 22 another case on which Williams relies, held that under Mitchell the county waived sovereign immunity by purchasing liability insurance for motor vehicles used to apply sewage sludge as fertilizer allegedly damaging plaintiffs’ land. 23
Clearly, this case is more akin to
Saylor
than to
Mitchell, Crider,
and
McElmurray.
Unquestionably, as in
Saylor
and unlike the other cases, the excavator was not being used as a motor vehicle at the time of Williams’s accident. Instead, as recognized by the trial court, “the vehicle was merely prеsent as a static physical mass.” As further
For these reasons, the trial court did not err in granting the county’s motion for summary judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
Home Builders Assn, of Savannah v. Chatham County,
Smith v. Chatham County,
See
Chamlee v. Henry County Bd. of Ed.,
Id. at 185, n. 1 (emphasis omitted).
Ga. L. 1960, p. 289, § 1; Chamlee, supra at 184-185 (2).
Ga. L. 2002, p. 579, § 1; see
Scott v. City of Valdosta,
See
(Emphasis supplied.)
Id. at 504 (1) (citation omitted).
Id. at 490 (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 645 (2).
Supra.
Id. at 611-613 (2) (b).