1 Colo. App. 191 | Colo. Ct. App. | 1891
Williams, the plaintiff in error, having been taken into custody by the sheriff under a warrant issued by a peace officer, sued out a writ of habeas corpus to secure his release, because, as he claimed, the detention was illegal.
A complaint charging him with obtaining money under false pretenses was filed before a justice of the peace in Ara
The chief support of the opposing rule is drawn from the supposed analogy between proceedings for the extradition of criminals from foreign countries under treaty stipulations with their governments, and those taken under our own organic law. The analogy does not exist, the circumstances are totally different, and the reasons adduced in support of the one do not even tend to maintain the other. Whenever a treaty is entered into between nations which provides for the surrender of fugitives from justice, it attempts at least to define the crimes, determine the circumstances and specify the proceedings and proofs essential to a recognition of the right to demand the surrender of the accused person. The limitations to be deduced from the terms of treaties between foreign powers cannot be found in a constitutional requirement which amounts to an agreement between the states to surrender, on proper demand, all persons accused of crime. It is wholly unimportant what the crime is. The only inquiry at all essential is as to whether he is accused of that which the law of the demanding state has made a crime. The act may neither be a common law offense, nor yet one under the laws of the state of his refuge. The regularity of the demand is the sole matter for the consideration of the executive, and the inquiry as to the commission of the offense and the guilt of the accused is to be answered by the courts of the state demanding his return. The fugitive is not guilty, or innocent, as he may happen to be on one side or the other of the line which marks the limits of sovereignty of the different states. Territorial lines neither affect the question of guilt or innocence, nor do they operate to grant rights or immunities. Under our national system and compact, a fugitive from justice obtains no right to protection against the
The right of the court to try the plaintiff in error on a sufficient complaint, for an offense other than that on which by requisition he was brought from Kansas, must be upheld. If this case had come into the court by proceedings initiated subsequent to its creation, and counsel had raised and discussed the question, it might be that we would feel compelled to express an opinion as to the right of review in this class of cases. But the inquiry was not suggested by either side, and the parties unite in the statement that the only real question is as to the right to bring a fugitive into a state for one offense, and try him for another, and concur in the request for its settlement. It is a matter of such grave and present importance to the criminal jurisprudence of this state, that the matter was taken up, considered and determined without reference to any doubt which might arise as to the right of review in such cases. The judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.