{¶ 2} Since this case was adjudicated below on a mоtion to dismiss, the only underlying facts that can be gleaned from the record are those alleged in Williams' complaint and they are few. Williams was employed by WRTA. (Complaint, ¶ 2.) Williams had a contract with WRTA (i.e., a collective bargaining agreement negotiated by his union) and WRTA allegedly breached that contraсt on November 19, 2002. (Complaint, ¶ 3, 4, 5.) Also, WRTA allegedly "dismissed" Williams in violation of public policy based on the "First Amendment to the Federal Constitution, and similar portions of the Ohio State Constitution." (Complaint, ¶ 8, 9, 10.) Williams added in later filings that his termination stemmed from a dispute between himself and a security guard at WRTA "in which the words alleged to be used by the plaintiff were the subject of his termination."
{¶ 3} Williams originally sued WRTA on May 19, 2003, and later dismissed it without prejudice on January 14, 2005. Williams re-filed his complaint on January 6, 2006, within the one-year savings statute, adding new claims against additional party defendants.1
{¶ 4} On February 23, 2006, WRTA responded with a motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failing to state a сlaim upon which relief can be granted and Civ.R. 12(H)(3) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over Williams' breach of contract claim. WRTA argued that Williams could not sustain his wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim because he was not an employee at will. Concerning his breach of contract claim, WRTA argued that Williams' exclusive remedy was to file an unfair labor practice with the State Employment Relations Board (SERB). After obtaining leave and without really addressing WRTA's *3 arguments, Williams filed a response to WRTA's motion to dismiss arguing that his complaint set forth a "civil rights theory of relief" which did not have to be pursued with SERB and could be properly heard in common pleas court. Williams' response also included a motion for leave to file an amended complaint "to clarify his civil rights theory of relief."
{¶ 5} Following a hearing, a magistrate sustained WRTA's motion to dismiss Williams' complaint and overruled Williams' motion to amend his cоmplaint on April 27, 2006. After observing that Williams had failed to directly address WRTA's arguments, the magistrate determined that Williams' complaint had failed to sufficiently set forth a civil rights claim pursuant to
{¶ 6} Williams filed objections to the magistrate's decision and WRTA filed a response. On August 7, 2006, the trial court adopted the magistrate's decision. Following a motion to reconsider filed by Williams, the trial court filed another entry on September 6, 2006, to correct some minor clerical errors. This appeal followed.
{¶ 7} Williams raises two assignments of error, both of which are directed only to his purported
{¶ 8} "The trial court erred in upholding the magistrates ruling in as much as *4 the Complaint herein sufficiently spelled out a civil rights claim under both State and Federal Statutes."
{¶ 9} The standard of review for a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss requires the apрellate court to independently review the complaint to determine if the dismissal was appropriate. Ferreri v. The Plain DealerPublishing Co. (2001),
{¶ 10} Under this assignment of error, Williams sets forth the identical argument he made below in response to WRTA's motion to dismiss. He contends that his complaint set forth a "civil rights theory of relief" pursuant to
{¶ 11} WRTA first construes Williams' complaint as one stating a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, not a 42 U.S.C. 1983 civil rights cause of action. WRTA avers that Williams cannot sustain his wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim because he was not an at will employee. Even if Williams intended to assert a
{¶ 12} After incorporating the allegations contained in the first count for breach of contract, the second count of Williams' complaint, upon which he now bases his civil rights claim, states, in its entirety: *5
{¶ 13} "8. A clear public policy existed and was manifested in state or federal constitution, statute or administrative regulation, or in common law, to-wit: The First Amendment to the Federal Constitution, and similar portions of the Ohio State Constitution[.]
{¶ 14} "9. Dismissing employees under circumstances like those involved in Plaintiffs, RICKY D. WILLIAMS dismissal would jeopardize said public policy.
{¶ 15} "10. Plaintiffs, RICKY D. WILLIAMS, dismissal was motivated by conduct related to the public policy.
{¶ 16} "11. Defendant, WESTERN RESERVE TRANSIT AUTHORITY, dba WRTA, lacked overriding legitimate business justification for dismissal."
{¶ 17} Pursuant to Civ.R. 8(A), a pleading that sets forth a claim for relief shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the party is entitled to relief, and (2) a demand for judgmеnt for the relief to which the party claims to be entitled. Such Ohio rule encompasses what is known as notice pleading.
{¶ 18} The second count of Williams' complaint clearly parallels the elements of a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim, not a
{¶ 19} When addressing whether a complaint has sufficiently alleged a
{¶ 20} "* * * Ohio courts also consistently hold that a complaint alleging an action under
{¶ 21} "Thus, a plaintiff who is asserting a federal civil rights action under
{¶ 22} In this case, Williams' complaint makes no mention of 42 U.S.C.1983. The complaint does not allege that the conduct in question was performed by a person acting under color of state law or that the conduct deprived Williams of a federal right. Rather, according to Williams, this incident involved a dispute between him and a security guard at WRTA in which he said something that resulted in his termination. There is no mention of due process or сonstitutional procedural failings. While the complaint does making passing reference to the "First Amendment," that reference identifies the source of the public policy that underlies Williams' wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim.
{¶ 23} As a result, the complaint did not place WRTA on notice of the сlaim showing entitlement to relief as required by Civ.R. 8(A). The complaint only placed WRTA on notice that there was a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim against it. Consequently, Williams cannot avoid dismissal by belatedly raising potential liability under the federal statute of
{¶ 24} Returning to Williams' wrongful discharge in violаtion of public policy claim, in Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors,Inc. (1990),
{¶ 25} "1. Public policy warrants an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine when an employee is discharged or disciplined for a reason which is prohibited by statute.
{¶ 26} "2. Henceforth, the right of employers to terminate employment at will for `any cause' no longer includes the discharge of an employee where the discharge is in violation of a statute and thereby contravenes public policy.
{¶ 27} "3. In Ohio, a cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy may be brought in tort." Id. at paragraphs one, two, and three of the syllabus.
{¶ 28} In a subsequent case, construing and followingGreeley, the Cоurt held that in order for an employee to bring a cause of action pursuant to Greeley the employee must have been an employee at will. Haynes v. Zoological Soc. of Cincinnati (1995),
{¶ 29} "Greeley provides an exception to the employment-at-willdoctrine. Thus, as stated above, in order for an employee to bring a cause of action pursuant to Greeley, supra, that emplоyee must have been an employee at will. The identifying characteristic of an employment-at-will relationship is that either the employer or the employee may terminate the employment relationship for any reason which is not contrary to law. Haynes clearly does not qualify as аn employee at will. As a member of a union, the terms of her employment relationship were governed by a collective bargaining agreement. That agreement specifically limited the power of the zoo to terminate Haynes and, as a result, took her outside the context of emplоyment at will. Because she was not an employee at will, she is outside the *8
class of employees for whom Greeley provides protection." (Internal citations omitted; Emphasis sic.) Id. at 258,
{¶ 30} Here, Williams, like Haynes, was subject to a collective bargaining agreement. The agreement, entered into between Williams' union and WRTA, was attached to Williаms' complaint as Exhibit A. Therefore, the trial court did not err in dismissing Williams' claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim. Haynes,
{¶ 31} Accordingly, Williams' first assignment of error is without merit.
{¶ 32} Williams' second assignment of error states:
{¶ 33} "The trial court erred in up holding [sic] the magistrates ruling in as much as the Appellant should have been allowed to file an amended comрlaint clarifying his position."
{¶ 34} In this case, Williams argues that leave to amend his complaint was "denied in a circumstance where even if the Complaint was unclear it could have been easily amended to cure any supposed defect without adding additional parties or undue delay." (Williams Brief, p. 4.)
{¶ 35} WRTA arguеs that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Williams' motion for leave to amend his complaint.
{¶ 36} Civ.R. 15(A) addresses the issue of amended pleadings. Civ.R. 15(A) provides in pertinent part:
{¶ 37} "A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served * * * Otherwise a party may amend his pleadings only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party. Leave of court shall be freely given when justice so requires."
{¶ 38} It is well established that a trial court's decision whether to grant a motion for leave to amend a complaint will not be reversеd on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. Wilmington SteelProducts, Inc. v. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. (1991),
{¶ 39} "The language of Civ.R. 15(A) favors a liberal policy when the trial judge is confronted with a motion to amend the pleadings beyond the time limit when such amendments are automatically allowed." Id. at 121-122,
{¶ 40} In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Williams' motion to amend the pleadings. Despite the liberal amendment policy that governs the amendment proceedings, Williams failed to comply with the minimal amendment requirements as set forth inSolowitch. Williams failed to introduce any evidence to the trial court of the new matters sought to be pleaded. Williаms' motion to amend the pleadings is barren of such evidence. Williams' motion for leave to file an amended complaint stated simply that he wanted "to clarify his civil rights theory of relief." The only "facts" Williams set forth anywhere in the case filings is that he was involved in a dispute with a security guard at WRTA in which he said something that resulted in his termination. In other words, Williams offered no argument whatsoever to show that he could support his new claim. Wilmington Steel Products,Inc.,
{¶ 41} As indicated above, Williams' failure to establish the first of the Solowitch factors (i.e., make a prima facie showing of support for the new matters sought to be pleaded) was enough justification for the trial court's denial of his motion to amend the pleadings.Wilmington Steel Products, Inc., *10
{¶ 42} Accordingly, Williams' second assignment of error is without merit.
{¶ 43} The judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed.
Waite, J., concurs. Degenaro, P.J., concurs.