14 N.Y.S. 728 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1891
Lead Opinion
It is insisted by the learned counsel for the appellant that there is no evidence in the ease that the insured came to his death by accidental means, within the intent and meaning of the policy; but that the uncontroverted proof is that the injury from which he died was occasioned by
But it is urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that it was shown that the insured was, at the time of the injury, under mental depression from overwhelming financial embarrassment. On the other hand, it is shown that he had just completed, or was in negotiation for, an advantageous business engagement. These considerations were urged to the jury on either side to establish the theories of the respective parties, and were proper subjects for their consideration, as bearing upon the question of the probability of accident or suicide, and furnish evidence of the fact that the question of accident and intent were in dispute on the trial. In Goldschmidt v, Insurance Co., 12 N. Y. Supp. 866, the deceased was found dead in bed, and there was proof of odor of hydrocenie acid, and some appearance of poison in the stomach of the deceased at the autopsy. Held, that the question of suicide should have been submitted to the jury. We think the question in this case was properly submitted to the jury. The conduct of the insured was capable of the construction given it by the jury, and, while they might have found for the defendant upon this issue, yet, having found for the plaintiff upon a question which was properly submitted to them, and upon evidence sufficient to sustain their verdict, the judge was right in refusing to set it aside. But
From the evidence, the jury may have adopted the theory urged by the-learned counsel for the respondent, that the insured was, at the time of the injury, humanely directing his efforts to rescue from supposed danger the-persons whom he had just met, and cautioned against the danger of the approaching train. If that were so, it would not be exposing himself to-unnecessary danger, within the case of Tucker v. Insurance Co., 4 N. Y. Supp. 505, 121 N. Y. 718, 24 N. E. Rep. 1102. We think this was also a question of fact for the jury.
The appellant insists that the trial court erred in his charge, and his refusal to charge, and that the judgment should, for that reason, be reversed.. We have carefully read the charge of the learned judge, and find no error or-misdirection in the main charge, and ño exception to the same for which the judgment should be interfered with. Some exceptions were taken to the charge, and refusals to charge, as requested. But we think that no error was committed by the judge in charging, or refusing to charge, as requested. On the whole, we think the judgment should be affirmed. Judgment affirmed, with costs.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting.) The railroad running about north and south-crosses Church street on grade. There is an electric light at the crossing. The railroad train was moving northward about four miles per hour. Deceased was on Church street, west of the track. He .crossed over, and about 100 feet east of the track met two men going westward, to whom he saidr. “Look out, boys; the engine will catch you. ” They continued to walk westward, and he went eastward. But he must soon have turned, and walked' westward, towards the crossing; for half way between the corner of the-fence and the tracks he was seen. There he stopped, looking in the direction of the approaching engine. The bell was ringing and whistle was blown* When the train was about 20 feet from the crossing, he started, and walked westward upon the track. As he got between the rails, he sank down in a stooping position or squatted. In that position he was struck by the engine, and he died as the result. On these undisputed facts I cannot think that this verdict should stand, when the certificate of insurance excepts suicide and voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger. There is no evidence-that the two men, who had crossed the track and were some 30 feet west of it, had any intention of coming back, or that there was any necessity for the deceased to go on the track for their protection; and nothing is shown to excuse the deceased for putting himself into the place of imminent danger. If the deceased did not commit suicide, then I think he voluntarily exposed him
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring.) I doubt as to this verdict. But it was reached' as the sequence of methods which the law prescribes. If a new trial was granted, I suppose the only way in which a different verdict could be obtained, would be for the court to encroach upon the functions of the jury. I cannot, advise such a method, and therefore concur.