WILLIAMS v. THE STATE.
A17A0740
Court of Appeals of Georgia
AUGUST 11, 2017
804 SE2d 668
DOYLE, Judge.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict,7 the evidence shows that on April 5, 2010, Darren Daniel was in front of his home in Clayton County, Georgia, unloading groceries from his roommate‘s Mitsubishi Galant when two men unknown to him, Williams and Tecorey Thrasher, arrived in a Honda. Williams and Thrasher demanded money from Daniel while holding him at gunpoint, but when Daniel had none, they forced him to drive to an ATM at a nearby gas station. Daniel went inside the store and borrowed a phone to dial 911, and the attackers soon drove off in the Mitsubishi, which contained his house and car keys. Police arrived, took Daniel‘s statement, and drove him home, where he discovered that his Jeep had been stolen along with other items in his home. The Mitsubishi was later discovered abandoned and burned in a wooded lot. Officers found a Honda parked down the street from where Daniel had seen Williams and Thrasher park before he was approached with a gun. The Honda was later determined to be stolen from Kenya Clement one or two days earlier.8 Daniel was able to identify both Williams and Thrasher in separate photographic lineups.9
Two days after the Daniel robbery, on April 7, 2010, in Newton County, Luis Fonseca was approached by a group of four men at
Approximately two or three hours later, just after midnight on April 8, 2010, Ruth Blanton was in her car in a CVS parking lot when two men approached her with a gun and demanded her car keys. After she handed her keys to one man, the other struck her in the head with a gun. The men then entered Blanton‘s Nissan Sentra and drove away. Thirty-five minutes later, a state trooper spotted Blanton‘s car traveling 110 mph on I-20. The trooper pursued the car until it crashed. At the time of the crash, Williams and Thrasher fled into the woods leaving Benton and Mitchell in the back seat. Daniel‘s keys along with Fonseca‘s hats were found inside Blanton‘s stolen Sentra. No weapons were located inside of the vehicle.
Hours later, Devona Giles, Thrasher‘s mother, called the police to inform them that Thrasher was injured and had been threatened by Williams at gunpoint. Police found Williams with Giles in the Newton County Medical Center parking lot, and Williams was detained. Williams later admitted to being in the stolen vehicle that had crashed during the police chase.
Williams was charged with multiple offenses stemming from these events in an 18-count indictment in Clayton County. He was indicted, tried, and found guilty in Newton County of the carjacking against Fonseca prior to the trial in this case. Following a jury trial in Clayton County as to the crimes against Blanton and Daniel, Williams was acquitted of one offense of theft, the trial court directed a verdict as to two counts, and he was convicted of the remaining counts. Williams moved for a new trial, which motion was denied, giving rise to this appeal.
We review the admission of such evidence for a “clear abuse of discretion.”11
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts shall not be admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. . . .
Nevertheless, the trial court ruled that the evidence of the Newton County offense, i.e., stealing Fonseca‘s Mazda, was intrinsic factual evidence “inextricably intertwined” with the crimes charged in this case.
Under longstanding Georgia law, all the acts and circumstances surrounding and constituting the res gestae are admissible, despite the fact that they may reflect poorly on a defendant‘s character. This rule [was] carried forward to the new Evidence Code under the concept of “intrinsic facts” evidence, as compared to evidence of “extrinsic acts” which are generally inadmissible pursuant to
OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) . Under relevant federal authority, evidence is intrinsic to the charged offense, and thus does not fall within Rule 404 (b)‘s ambit, if it (1) arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense; (2) is necessary to complete the story of the crime; or (3) is inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense. Moreover, evidence, not part of the crime charged but pertaining to the chain of events explaining the context, motive, and set-up of the crime, is properly admitted if linked in time and circumstances with the charged crime, or forms an integral and natural part of an account of the crime, or is necessary to complete the story of the crime for the jury.12
To the extent that Williams argues that the evidence was unduly prejudicial under
in cases where [courts have] found other acts evidence inextricably intertwined with the crimes charged, the [c]ourt has refused to find that the evidence should nonetheless be excluded as unduly prejudicial. The test [for undue prejudice] under [
OCGA § 24-4-403 ] is whether the other acts evidence was “dragged in by the heels” solely for prejudicial impact. Because the other acts evidence was inextricably intertwined with the charged crimes, it was not excludable under [OCGA § 24-4-403 ].14
Based on this record, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court‘s admission of the Newton County evidence as inextricably intertwined with the indicted offenses.15
2. Williams argues that the evidence of his identity was insufficient to support the jury‘s finding of guilt. Specifically, he challenges the testimony by Mitchell, who testified against Williams in exchange for leniency by the State for Mitchell‘s involvement in the Newton County carjacking. This argument is without merit.
When an appellate court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence,
the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly
Here, there was evidence from the first carjacking victim, Daniel, identifying Williams as a perpetrator. Also, as noted in Division 1, stolen items from the first two carjackings were found in the vehicle recovered from the third, in which vehicle Williams admitted riding when it crashed during a police chase. And the Jeep stolen as part of the first carjacking was later connected via separate eyewitness testimony to the second (Newton County) carjacking. Finally, “[t]he jury[, not this Court,] is to determine the credibility of witnesses, so the truthfulness of those witnesses, including that of possible accomplices, was for the jury to decide.”17 Likewise, “[i]t was for the jury to decide . . . whether the accomplice‘s testimony was sufficiently corroborated” by the other evidence in the case, including Williams‘s own statements and the evidence linking him to the three carjackings.18 Therefore, based on the record before us, the evidence authorized the jury‘s finding of guilt.
Judgment affirmed. Ellington, P. J., and Andrews, J., concur.
DECIDED AUGUST 11, 2017.
The Leslie Group, Deborah L. Leslie, for appellant.
Tracy Graham Lawson, District Attorney, Jeffery M. Gore, Elizabeth A. Baker, Elizabeth C. Rosenwasser, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.