Williams v. The City of New YorkWilliams v. The City of New York
VALERIE CAPRONI, United States District Judge:
On February 2, 2024, Steven Williams (“Plaintiff“) sued the City of New York (the “City“) and New York Police Department (“NYPD“) officers Jose Rodriguez, Neon Chowdhury, Alex Almontepichardo, Joseph Rinaldo, Daniel Liberatore, Jose Gomera, Michael Marrone, and Anthony Rivera (collectively, the “Individual Defendants,” and with the City, “Defendants“) alleging various civil rights violations related to his 2022 arrest and prosecution. See generally Compl., Dkt. 1. Fact discovery concluded in August 2025. See Dkt. 75. On January 6, 2026, Defendants moved for summary judgment on all counts. Dkt. 83. Plaintiff opposed the motion on February 20, 2026. Dkt. 89. For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
This lawsuit stems from an incident that occurred near Plaintiff‘s residence on East 169th Street in the Bronx, New York, on November 6, 2022. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 1–2.2 At some point before 7:50 P.M., Plaintiff and his girlfriend, Lashonda Simmons, were involved in a verbal dispute3 outside of their apartment with various of their East 169th Street neighbors, including Vincent
Shortly after Ms. Simmons spoke to Rodriguez and Chowdhury what had started as a verbal dispute between Ms. Simmons and her neighbors became physical. See id. ¶¶ 3, 41.6 Video evidence shows Plaintiff, now out of the apartment building, being flanked by his neighbors; someone grabbed his shirt and Heyliger and others assaulted him. Id. ¶¶ 4–6, 40–41.7 Eventually, Plaintiff found himself pinned against the front gate of the apartment building; his assailants punched him while he fought back. Id. ¶ 42; see also Ex. 1, Dkt. 90-1 at 7:50–8:14; Ex. B, Dkt. 84-2 at 0:40–1:08. At this point, having “observed the physical struggle involving [P]laintiff,” Defendants Rodriguez and Chowdhury crossed the street to intervene. See id. ¶¶ 7–
The parties dispute the details of what occurred next. See id. ¶¶ 13, 50–52. At some point, Heyliger caught up to Plaintiff; Plaintiff pulled out a small pink knife and stabbed Heyliger in the abdomen before retreating into a convenience store. Id. ¶¶ 13, 50–51. Defendant Rodriguez, still lagging behind Plaintiff and Heyliger, did not witness the stabbing. Id. ¶¶ 50–51. Eventually, however, Rodriguez reached Heyliger and the other men who had chased
Rodriguez continued toward the convenience store where Plaintiff had taken shelter. As he approached, Plaintiff exited the store, his shirt in tatters, exclaiming that “[Heyliger and the others] just tried to kill me.” Id. ¶ 55. Rodriguez responded by telling Plaintiff to “shut the fuck up.” Id. ¶ 55. Other NYPD officers, including Defendants Almontepichardo and Rinaldo, began to gather outside the storefront. Id. ¶¶ 15, 55. The officers’ BWC footage shows that, moments later, Rodriguez and the others turned towards the street, where Heyliger was approaching with his shirt pulled up, exposing a stab wound. Id. ¶ 16. Rodriguez then turned back to Plaintiff and demanded that he “step down” from the store‘s front stairs. See Ex. E at 19:53:51–19:54:11. As Heyliger reached the officers on the sidewalk, Defendant Almontepichardo removed his handcuffs from his belt and placed them on Plaintiff. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 18, 56.14 Almontepichardo then recovered a knife from Plaintiff‘s pant pocket. Id. ¶ 17.
After the on-scene investigation, only Plaintiff was placed under arrest and transported to the 42nd Precinct for processing. Id. ¶¶ 18, 97. As the arresting officer, “Almontepichardo was responsible for preparing the arrest-related paperwork, including the arrest reports, complaint reports, and other documentation required to be sent to the Bronx District Attorney‘s office, as well as meeting with an assistant district attorney to convey the facts of the case.” Id. ¶ 99. Other than what was captured on the Individual Defendants’ BWCs, none of the arrest documents forwarded to the district attorney‘s office mentioned Plaintiff being chased with a bat prior to the stabbing. Id. ¶ 103; see also Ex. 21, Dkt. 90-21 (Bronx district attorney file); Ex. 24, Dkt. 90-24 (same); Ex. 23 (activity logs). It also appears that Defendant Almontepichardo failed to inform the assistant district attorney of (i) Plaintiff‘s self-defense claim, and (ii) the witnesses who said they had viewed the initial altercation. See 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 105.
The following day, on November 7, 2022, Defendant Almontepichardo signed a criminal complaint that initiated criminal proceedings against Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 106; see also Ex. I, Dkt. 84-9 (criminal complaint). The complaint included charges for: (i) assault in the second degree; (ii) assault in the third degree; (iii) criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree; and (iv) harassment in the second degree. See 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 106; see also Ex I. Plaintiff was arraigned in
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Although the Court must construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, “a party may not rely on mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment.” Fed. Trade Comm‘n v. Moses, 913 F.3d 297, 305 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must produce specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial; a “scintilla of evidence” is not enough. Fincher v. Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp., 604 F.3d 712, 726 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Sista v. CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 169 (2d Cir. 2006); D‘Amico v. City of N.Y., 132 F.3d 145, 149 (2d Cir. 1998) (a party “must offer some hard evidence showing that its version of the events is not wholly fanciful“); Baity v. Kralik, 51
DISCUSSION
The Complaint includes claims for: (i) false arrest in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and New York law (against the Individual Defendants); (ii) malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and New York law (against the Individual Defendants); (iii) deprivation of liberty without due process and denial of a fair trial, in violation of
I. False Arrest Claims (Counts I, V)
a. Legal Standard
An arrest undertaken without a warrant “must be supported by probable cause or else it violates the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Valentine, 539 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 2008). “A [Section] 1983 claim for false arrest, resting on the Fourth Amendment right of an individual to be free from unreasonable seizures, including arrest without probable cause, is substantially the same as a claim for false arrest under New York law.” Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted); accord Jenkins v. City of N.Y., 478 F.3d 76, 84 (2d Cir. 2007). Under New York law, a plaintiff claiming false arrest must show that “(1) the defendant intended
Probable cause for an arrest “is a complete defense to any action for false arrest . . . in New York.” Dickerson v. Napolitano, 604 F.3d 732, 751 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Broughton, 37 N.Y.2d at 456–57. If, as in this case, the arrest “is not made pursuant to a judicial warrant, the defendant . . . bears the burden of proving probable cause as an affirmative defense.” Napolitano, 604 F.3d at 751 (citing Broughton, 37 N.Y.2d at 458). Probable cause “may be determinable” at summary judgment as a matter of law, however, “if there is no dispute as to the pertinent events and the knowledge of the officers[.]” Weyant, 101 F.3d at 852 (citing Singer, 63 F.3d at 673); see also Jenkins, 478 F.3d at 88 (“[S]ummary judgment dismissing a plaintiff‘s false arrest claim is appropriate if the undisputed facts indicate that the arresting officer‘s probable cause determination was objectively reasonable.“); Niles v. O‘Donnell, No. 17-CV-1437 (LTS) (BCM), 2019 WL 1411068, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2019) (granting summary judgment after finding defendant-officers had probable cause to make arrest).
“An officer has probable cause to arrest when he or she has ‘knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of
b. Application
As to Plaintiff‘s false arrest claim, the key question for the Court is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is a question of fact as to whether any Individual Defendant who participated in the arrest had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. Defendants argue that they did, as Plaintiff stabbed Heyliger with a knife, which was, “in and of itself, [] enough to establish probable cause.” Def. Br. at 8. Plaintiff disagrees, contending that “Defendants were aware” that, “[w]hen the stabbing occurred, Plaintiff was [being] pursued by three men[,] including Heyliger, one of whom had a deadly weapon.” Pl. Opp. at 8. In other words, because the Individual Defendants should have known that Plaintiff was acting in self-defense when he stabbed Heyliger, “a jury could reasonably infer” that the officers knew Plaintiff‘s stabbing of Heyliger was “not criminal” under New York law, thus eliminating probable cause for his arrest. Id. at 9.
Plaintiff‘s argument that the later-arriving officers lacked probable cause because they ignored “readily available exculpatory evidence at the scene,” Pl. Opp. at 12, is unavailing. While the Court‘s review of the available records suggests that the investigation lacked the rigor that New Yorkers deserve from the NYPD, the Court cannot say, and no jury could conclude, that it was unreasonable as a matter of law for the officers to rely, as they did, on Heyliger‘s allegations and the leads of Rodriguez and Chowdhury. It is well established that “[o]nce a police officer has a reasonable basis for believing there is probable cause, he is not required to explore and eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence before making an arrest.” Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145–46 (1979)). Because there is no evidence that other officers had any first-hand20
In sum, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff‘s false arrest claims (Count I, V) is DENIED as to Defendants Almontepichardo, Rodriguez, and Chowdhury, and GRANTED as to Defendants Rinaldo, Liberatore, Gomera, Marrone, and Rivera.
II. Malicious Prosecution Claims (Counts II, VI)
a. Legal Standard
To prevail on a malicious prosecution claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must establish the elements of a state law malicious prosecution claim and also show a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment. See Roberts v. Babkiewicz, 582 F.3d 418, 420 (2d Cir. 2009). To
b. Application
For all the reasons discussed in the previous section, evidence tending to show that probable cause did not exist for Plaintiff‘s arrest also tends to show that probable cause did not exist for his prosecution. And in the context of a malicious prosecution claim, “[a] lack of probable cause generally creates an inference of malice.” Manganiello, 612 F.3d at 163 (alteration in original) (quoting Boyd v. City of N.Y., 336 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 2003)); see also Ricciuti, 124 F.3d at 131 (“[L]ack of probable cause generally raises an inference of malice sufficient to withstand summary judgment.“). Thus, Plaintiff has made a sufficient showing that he will be able to satisfy the third and fourth elements of his malicious prosecution claim at trial.
There remains the question of who maliciously prosecuted Plaintiff. Defendants argue, in a footnote, that only Almontepichardo can be liable, as he was Plaintiff‘s arresting officer and signed off on Plaintiff‘s charges, and “Plaintiff has no evidence that any officer besides [Almontepichardo] did anything to ‘commence or continue’ [Plaintiff‘s] prosecution.” Def. Br. at 9 n.6; see also 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 99–106. Plaintiff asserts that all of the Individual Defendants are
Neither position is completely correct. While it is true that liability for malicious prosecution can extend beyond the single officer whose signature adorns a charging instrument, see, e.g., Baker v. City of N.Y., 551 F. Supp. 3d 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2021), the Court has not seen, and Plaintiff has not identified, a single case in which individual liability for malicious prosecution arose merely from an officer‘s presence at a crime scene. To the contrary: for an individual officer to be held liable, it must be shown that he played “an active role in the prosecution, such as giving advice and encouragement or importuning the authorities to act.” Manganiello, 612 F.3d at 163 (quoting Rohman v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 215 F.3d 208, 217 (2d Cir. 2000)). The “initiation” element can be satisfied by evidence demonstrating that an officer processed a plaintiff‘s paperwork or had some interaction with the prosecuting authority. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 414. But the link need not be so direct. This Court has found the “initiation” prong of a malicious prosecution claim satisfied by evidence that an officer reported information to the officer who signed the criminal complaint, see Bryant v. Crowe, 697 F. Supp. 2d 482, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), or made statements to the arresting officer that contributed to a criminal charge, see Phelps v. City of N.Y., No. 04 Civ. 8570 (DLC), 2006 WL 1749528, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2006).
Still, in every case of which the Court is aware, the officer‘s liability is predicated on a more active role instigating the prosecution than merely responding to the scene after a report of criminal conduct.23 Here, there is no evidence that certain of the Individual Defendants
That leaves Defendants Rodriguez and Chowdhury, both of whom are differently situated than their colleagues. A reasonable jury could conclude that, because Rodriguez and Chowdhury witnessed the initial altercation, yet failed adequately to relay that information to the arresting officer or otherwise note the circumstances that gave rise to Plaintiff‘s self-defense claims (either to the arresting officer or in their activity logs, which were ultimately transmitted to the district attorney), a fact finder could conclude that both had a role in “initiating” Plaintiff‘s prosecution.
Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot establish the second element of his New York State malicious prosecution claim as to any Defendant because he “cannot demonstrate a favorable termination of the prosecution.” Def. Br. at 11; see also Def. Reply at 7. Plaintiff concedes that three of the four charges were dismissed by an adjournment in contemplation of
III. Denial of Right to Fair Trial Claim (Count III)
a. Legal Standard
To prove a claim of denial of the right to a fair trial, Plaintiff must prove that the investigating officers provided the prosecutor “fabricated evidence [] that [was] likely to influence a jury‘s decision,” and the plaintiff “suffered a deprivation of liberty as a result.” Perez v. Duran, 962 F. Supp. 2d 533, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (cleaned up) (quoting Jovanovic v. City of N.Y., 486 F. App‘x 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2012)). “[F]raudulent omissions . . . can serve as fabricated evidence for the purposes of a claim for denial of a fair trial.” Jackson v. Nassau Cnty., 552 F. Supp. 3d 350, 374 (E.D.N.Y. 2021); see also Hutchins v. Solomon, No. 16-CV-10029 (KMK), 2018 WL 4757970, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2018) (“[I]n the context of a fabrication of evidence claim, the Second Circuit equates ‘the fraudulent
b. Application
Plaintiff’s denial of fair trial claim against Defendants Rinaldo, Liberatore, Gomera, Marrone, and Rivera fails, largely for the reasons already discussed: there is no evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could conclude that these officers were “personally involved” in Plaintiff’s prosecution, either by fabricating evidence or fraudulently omitting facts that were known to them. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 415. By contrast, there is sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Defendants Rodriguez and Chowdhury fabricated evidence by failing to report or document relevant details about the basis of Plaintiff’s self-defense claim of which they were (or should have been) aware by virtue of their involvement in the initial altercation. Likewise, the Court concludes that there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendant Almontepichardo, as Plaintiff’s arresting officer, “was in a position to know the full exculpatory picture,” yet “omit[ted] key details and evidence” from the reports that were ultimately forwarded to the District Attorney. Pl. Opp. at 21. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s denial of right to a fair trial claim (Count III) is DENIED as to Defendants Almontepichardo, Rodriguez, and Chowdhury and GRANTED as to Defendants Rinaldo, Liberatore, Gomera, Marrone, and Rivera.
IV. Failure to Intervene Claim (Count IV)
Law enforcement officers have an affirmative duty to intervene to prevent their fellow officers from infringing a citizen’s constitutional rights. E.g., Guerrero v. City of N.Y., No. 16-CV-516 (JPO), 2017 WL 2271467, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2017). An officer can be liable under
As previously discussed, there is insufficient evidence in the record for a jury to find that a reasonable person in the position of Defendants Rinaldo, Liberatore, Gomera, Marrone, and Rivera would have known that Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were being violated. As such, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s failure to intervene claim (Count IV) is GRANTED as to Defendants Rinaldo, Liberatore, Gomera, Marrone, and Rivera. Because a jury could conclude that Defendants Almontepichardo, Rodriguez, and Chowdhury directly participated in the allegedly unlawful conduct, see supra Sections I–III, Plaintiff’s alternative theory of liability may be moot. If a jury were to find that Defendants Almontepichardo, Rodriguez, or Chowdhury were not direct participants in the constitutional violations, the Court concludes that there is nonetheless sufficient evidence in the record from which a jury could conclude that one or each of Almontepichardo, Rodriguez, or Chowdhury failed to intervene to prevent the allegedly unlawful conduct. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary
V. New York City Administrative Code Claims (Count VII)
Plaintiff also asserts claims against the Individual Defendants and the City arising under Chapter 8, Title 8 of New York City’s Administrative code. See Compl. ¶¶ 148–153. Both parties agree that “the substantive rights protected by the Administrative Code are defined by reference to their state and federal counterparts, so these claims rise and fall with Plaintiff’s underlying” claims under the Constitution. Pl. Opp. at 24; Def. Br. at 14; see also
Because Plaintiff has not established a question of fact on any of his underlying constitutional claims as to Defendants Rinaldo, Liberatore, Gomera, Marrone, and Rivera, see supra Sections I–IV, his parallel claim under the City’s Administrative Code necessarily fails. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s New York City Administrative Code claim (Count VII) is GRANTED as to Defendants Rinaldo, Liberatore, Gomera, Marrone, and Rivera. Plaintiff has viable constitutional claims against Defendants Almontepichardo, Rodriguez, and Chowdhury; as such, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s New York City Administrative Code claim is DENIED as to these officers. Likewise, Plaintiff’s New York City Administrative Code claim against the City survives.
VI. New York State Tort Claims (Counts VIII, IX)
Plaintiff’s remaining claims are for the state law torts of assault and battery (against the City and Individual Defendants), see Compl. ¶¶ 154–55, and negligent hiring, screening, training, supervision, and retention (against the City), see id. ¶¶ 156–158. Plaintiff concedes that there is insufficient evidence in the record to raise a genuine dispute of fact as to whether the
As for Plaintiff’s assault and battery claim, Plaintiff is correct that, under New York law, “[i]f an arrest is determined to be unlawful, any use of force against a plaintiff may constitute an assault and battery, regardless of whether the force would be deemed reasonable if applied during a lawful arrest.” Sulkowska v. City of N.Y., 129 F. Supp. 2d 274, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (collecting cases); see also Pl. Opp. at 24–25. Because genuine disputes of material fact preclude summary judgment on Plaintiff’s false arrest claim as to Defendants Almontepichardo (Plaintiff’s arresting officer) and Rodriguez, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s assault and battery claim (Count VIII) is DENIED as to Defendant Almontepichardo, Rodriguez, and the City (under a vicarious liability theory, see Compl. ¶ 155).27 Defendants’ summary judgment motion on Plaintiff’s assault and battery claim is GRANTED as to Defendants Rinaldo, Liberatore, Gomera, Marrone, and Rivera, and Chowdhury,28 none of whom appears to have made physical contact with Plaintiff during his arrest.
Finally, the Court must consider whether Defendants Almontepichardo, Rodriguez, and Chowdhury, although potentially liable for violating Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, are nonetheless qualifiedly immune from suit.29
a. Legal Standard
Qualified immunity shields a government official from money damages when his conduct did “not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” City of Escondido v. Emmons, 586 U.S. 38, 42 (2019) (per curiam) (quoting Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018) (per curiam)); see also, e.g., Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 197 (1984) (“A plaintiff who seeks damages for violation of constitutional or statutory rights may overcome the defendant official’s qualified immunity only by showing that those rights were clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue.”). Qualified immunity is a “demanding” doctrine protecting “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986)).
Qualified immunity analysis in the Second Circuit involves two core inquiries: (1) whether the plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated, and (2) whether those rights were clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. The second prong—objective reasonableness—asks whether a reasonable officer could have believed the conduct at issue was lawful in light of clearly established law. See, e.g., Sacaza v. City of N.Y., 169 F.4th 363, 369–70 (2d Cir. 2026) (collecting cases). “In the context of an arresting officer, qualified immunity applies where it was objectively reasonable to believe there was probable cause to
While a plaintiff need not identify “a case directly on point” to demonstrate that an asserted federal right was clearly established at the time a defendant acted, the Supreme Court has instructed time and again that “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)); see also, e.g., Emmons, 586 U.S. at 43–44; Wesby, 583 U.S. at 61–65 (“The rule must be settled law, . . . which means it is dictated by controlling authority or a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 77–81 (2017) (per curiam) (“[G]eneral statements of the law are not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear warning to officers, . . . but in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Courts may not “define clearly established law at too high a level of generality,” and “[i]t is not enough that a rule be suggested by then-existing precedent; the rule’s contours must be so well defined that it is clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 595 U.S. 9, 12 (2021) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198–99 (2004) (per curiam); Soukaneh v. Andrzejewski, 112 F.4th 107, 116, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2024) (“[F]or a right to be clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity, it is sufficient if decisions of the Supreme Court or of the appropriate circuit have defined the contours of the right with reasonable specificity.”).
In their briefing, Defendants conflate two related but conceptually distinct qualified immunity arguments. First, Defendants contest whether Plaintiff has identified any clearly established rights at issue. See Def. Br. at 16–20; Def. Reply at 9–10. Second, Defendants seem to argue that even if Plaintiff has identified clearly established rights, the record does not clearly establish that the Individual Defendants violated those rights. See Def. Br. at 16–20; Def. Reply at 9–10. Separately, Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity “because there was at least ‘arguable probable cause’ to arrest and prosecute [P]laintiff”—i.e., that it was objectively reasonable to arrest Plaintiff, or that police officers of reasonable competence could have disagreed as to whether probable cause for Plaintiff’s arrest existed. Def. Br. at 17; see also Def. Reply at 9. Plaintiff disagrees, asserting that the constitutional rights at issue were clearly established and the Individual Defendants clearly violated them, and that Defendants cannot establish that even arguable probable cause existed. See Pl. Opp. at 26–27.
Plaintiff’s “most on point” argument is that, at least since the Second Circuit decided Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2003), it has been clearly established that “officers are not permitted to ‘disregard facts known to them which establish justification’” for otherwise criminal conduct (e.g., a stabbing, if in self-defense). Pl. Opp. at 26 (quoting Jocks, 316 F.3d at 135). Even if Jocks does establish some constitutional right, the Court is not persuaded that Plaintiff’s broad articulation of that right is warranted, nor that the right is implicated here. There are significant differences between the facts in Jocks and the facts of this case that render the two situations materially distinguishable. For example, Jocks involves a plaintiff claiming that he was acting in self-defense against the very officer who was arresting him. See Jocks, 316 F.3d at 136. The case suggests that an officer cannot disregard evidence of self-defense when he
The Court also finds, based on the undisputed facts in the record, that reasonable police officers in the positions of Defendants Almontepichardo, Rodriguez, and Chowdhury could have found that probable cause warranted Plaintiff’s arrest (i.e., that “arguable probable cause” existed). On this point, Plaintiff’s primary argument is that “[t]he Individual Defendants [] ignored” “credible exculpatory evidence,” as well as “every corroborating piece of evidence presented to them”—information that, if properly recovered, documented, and considered, would have served to exculpate Plaintiff. Pl. Opp. at 28. This argument is unavailing. The allegedly “exculpatory evidence” (i.e., security camera footage and witness statements tending to suggest Plaintiff was acting in self-defense) to which Plaintiff points neither definitively proves nor
It is Plaintiff’s position that “a jury must pass judgment on” the Individual Defendants’ choices—namely, their failure to review, in real time, the existing video footage or to obtain pedigree information from witnesses. See Pl. Opp. at 28. Plaintiff’s position is simply not the law. If, based on the evidence in the record,32 the Court determines that a reasonable jury could
The Court also finds that the Individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s New York State law claims because “the record, even construed in [Plaintiff’s] favor, does not establish bad faith.” Triolo v. Nassau Cnty., 24 F.4th 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2022).33
“[Q]ualified immunity is an individual affirmative defense that does not protect municipalities,” however, and a “municipal employer is vicariously liable for the wrongs of its employee, even when the employee is individually immune, so long as the wrong was committed within the scope of employment.” Id. at 110. The Court’s qualified immunity holding as to the Individual
* * *
The Court “recognize[s] the apparent anomaly of holding that summary judgment is appropriate when a trier of fact would find that reasonable officers could disagree.” Lennon, 66 F.3d at 421. “But in the context of arguable probable cause, law enforcement officers must be granted qualified immunity if a reasonable jury could find that there was probable cause.” Sacaza, 169 F.4th at 373 (citing Lennon, 66 F.3d at 424–25). Because a reasonable jury could find that probable cause existed to support Plaintiff’s arrest and prosecution, Defendants Almontepichardo, Rodriguez, and Chowdhury are entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff’s claims brought pursuant to federal law. So too for Plaintiff’s claims under New York State law.35 Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s remaining state and federal claims against Almontepichardo, Rodriguez, and Chowdhury is, therefore, GRANTED.36
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to all claims against Defendants Rinaldo, Liberatore, Gomera, Marrone, and Rivera. Summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims under
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the open motion at Dkt. 83. The Clerk of Court is also directed to terminate Defendants Rinaldo, Liberatore, Gomera, Marrone, and Rivera as parties to this action.
Not later than Tuesday, August 25, 2026, the parties are directed to meet and confer and submit a joint letter, not to exceed three (3) pages, (i) providing four mutually acceptable Mondays (or Tuesday if Monday is a holiday) between November 2, 2026, and February 26, 2027, to begin trial on Plaintiff’s surviving claims and (ii) stating whether both parties seek a settlement conference with the assigned Magistrate Judge.
SO ORDERED.
VALERIE CAPRONI
United States District Judge
Date: August 4, 2026
New York, New York
Notes
Despite Plaintiff‘s failure to submit an appropriate response to Defendants’ 56.1 Statement, the Court will parse the record to resolve Defendants’ summary judgment motion appropriately. The Court has sifted through the parties’ submissions and reviewed the evidentiary record in this case, including the relevant video exhibits and NYPD body-worn camera (“BWC“) footage. For purposes of this motion, the Court deems “undisputed” those facts about which the parties substantively agree and those facts that are otherwise incontrovertible based on the video and documentary evidence the parties submitted.
The BWC footage does little to clarify. As Heyliger approaches the officers from across the street, he is holding his shirt up and motioning toward Plaintiff, but his words are inaudible. See, e.g., Ex. E at 19:54:04–19:54:13. From the Court‘s point of view, it is plausible that Heyliger was attempting to inform the officers that Plaintiff had stabbed him, which prompted Almontepichardo and Rodriguez to place Plaintiff in handcuffs. But it is unclear. As such, whether the officers knew of the stabbing before detaining Plaintiff remains a disputed question of fact.
To put it more finely: “A story is never a single chapter, it is the experience of the entire tale; the same is true of probable cause.” Stansbury v. Wertman, 721 F.3d 84, 93 (2d Cir. 2013). Here, the record confirms that Defendants Rodriguez and Chowdhury alone were uniquely positioned to substantiate the basis of Plaintiff‘s self-defense claim. Disputes of fact regarding their actual knowledge and subsequent failure adequately to consider the initial altercation, which they witnessed and were a part of, renders summary judgment inappropriate.