16 Tex. 1 | Tex. | 1856
There was, it is true, a great lapse of time after the making of the contract, and its maturity according to its terms, before the bringing of this suit to enforce its performance. The petition, however, sufficiently explains the delay ; and, as there is no statement of facts, we must presume, in favor of the judgment, its averments were supported by evidence.
The bund is, substantially, a contract for the conveyance of land. In such cases “ Courts of Equity look to the substance “ of the transaction, and the primary object of the parties ; “ and where that requires a specific performance, they will treat “ the penalty as a mere security for its due performance and “ attainment,” (2 Story Eq. Sec. 715.) Such a contract cannot be discharged at the pleasure of the obligor, by the payment of the penalty, or damages ; but entitles the obligee to demand a conveyance of the land at all events. (Hemming v. Zimmerschitte, 4 Tex. R. 159.)
The contract was substantially a sale of land. It bound the defendant’s intestate to convey, and entitled the plaintiffs to
The Court therefore did not err in adjudging that the suit was not barred by limitation, or the lapse of time ; and the judgment is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.