| ¡Appellant Roderick Williams appeals an order of the Desha County Circuit Court convicting him of capital murder, first-degree domestic battering, endangering the welfare of a minor, and possession of a firearm by a felon. For those convictions, appellant was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without parole plus a term of seventy-two years. For reversal, appellant argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motions for directed verdict on the capital-murder and child-endangerment charges and by denying his motion for mistrial. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 1 — 2(a)(2) (2011), as the jury imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. We affirm.
Appellant had a turbulеnt relationship with Kerman Harris, who testified that appellant was the father of her nine-month-old daughter. The couple ended their relationship, and Harris filed an order of protection against him. Nevertheless, on the afternoon of April 26, 2007, appellant attempted to contact Harris at her cousin’s residence in McGehee when 12appellant approached the home and demanded entry. Harris called 911 for police assistance, but appellant left the premises before the police arrived.
At approximately 10:30 that evening, appellant went to Harris’s home where she lived with her baby and her parents. Harris’s mother, Clara Cobb, came onto the front рorch to speak to appellant while Harris was on the phone inside the home. After her phone conversation, Harris, while holding the baby, went toward the porch to see who was there. At that time, she saw appellant loading a shotgun while talking to Cobb. Cobb threw up her hands, and appellant shot her in the stomach. Harris stood within a foot of hеr mother behind a screen door. Still armed, appellant took Harris and her baby, dragging Harris by her hair to a car where his uncle, Alonzo Williams, was waiting. Appellant drove away with Harris and the baby. During the car ride, appellant hit Harris, and she and Williams attempted to shield the baby from appellant’s blows. Appellant pulled over and left his uncle and the bаby on the side of the road. Appellant then forced Harris to remain with him. After getting the car stuck, appellant and Harris caught a ride to a trailer where they stayed until a SWAT team apprehended him the following day. As a result of appellant’s beating, Harris suffered a broken arm and wrist and injuries to her face.
Police discovered three unspent shotgun shells on the porch near Cobb’s body. A medical examiner performed an autopsy and stated that Cobb suffered a gunshot wound to the upper part of her stomach.
Appellant was subsequently tried by a jury and was convicted of capital murder, kidnapping, first-degree domestic battering, endangering the welfare of a minor, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. For those convictions, appellant received a sentence of life imprisonment plus seventy-two years. Appellant appealed to our court, and we reversed and remanded in Williams v. State,
Upon remand, prior to trial, the State and defense counsel agreed to an order prohibiting the officers of the court or the witnesses from using the word, “trial,” to prevent the jurors from learning that the ease had already been tried. During Harris’s testimony, she alluded to “the last trial.” Appеllant moved for mistrial, which the circuit court denied. After deliberations, the jury convicted appellant of capital murder, first-degree domestic battering, endangering the welfare of a minor, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Appellant again received a sentence of life imprisonment without parole plus a term of seventy-two years. The circuit court entered an order reflecting the jury’s conviction and sentence. From this order, appellant brings his appeal.
On appeal, appellant argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motions for directed verdict for the offenses of capital murder and endangering the welfare of a minor. Although aрpellant raises his challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence in his first and third points, double-jeopardy concerns require that this court review these arguments first. Morgan v. State,
We have held that a motion for a directed verdict is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Arnett v. State,
With regard to the capital-murder conviction, appellant argues that the State provided insufficient evidence that appellant acted with premeditation and deliberation to commit the murder. Appellant admits to shooting and killing the victim, but he maintains that he did not do so with
[A defendant commits capital murder, if, with the premeditated and deliberated purpose of causing the death of another person, he causes the death of any person. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-101(a)(4) (Supp. 2011). Premeditated and deliberated murder occurs when the killer’s cоnscious object is to cause death, and he forms that intention before he acts and as a result of a weighing of the consequences of his course of conduct. Evans v. State,
Here, Harris testifiеd that she had filed an order of protection against appellant for harassing her; however, appellant appeared at her cousin’s house and left after she called 911. Later that night, Harris heard her mother talking to someone on the porch, and when she got off the phone, she went to the door and saw appellant loading a shotgun. Harris stated that she saw her mother throw up her hands as if to say, “I give up,” and she witnessed appellant shoot her mother with the shotgun at close range. According to Harris, she stood near her mother on the inside of a screen door, about one foot away, while she held her child in her Larins.
Dr. Daniel J. Konzleman, an associate medical examiner at the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory, testified about the nature, extent, and location of Cobb’s wounds. The doctor testified that he performed the autopsy on the victim and discovered that she suffered a shotgun wound to her abdomen. Dr. Konzleman further testified that a shot cup will enter a wound if the shot is fired within approximately eight feet. He stated that he recovered small birdshot-type pellets and a shot cup from the victim’s body. Based upon his findings, Dr. Konzleman estimated that the shooting could have taken place within a range of one to two feet.
Appellant testified on his behalf. According to appellant, he was intoxicated as he approached the Cobb rеsidence carrying a shotgun and laid the shotgun down. Appellant testified that Cobb saw the gun and grabbed it. Appellant stated that he took the gun from her and that it “went off.” Appellant testified that he told Harris it was an accident. However, we have often stated that the jury weighs the credibility of the witnesses and resolves any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidеnce. Matthews v. State,
17With regard to the child-endangerment conviction, appellant argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict because the evidence showed that appellant simply left the child on the side of the road with another family member and that the child was not harmed in any manner.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-27-205 (Repl.2006) provides in pertinent part:
(a) A person commits the offense of endangering the welfare of a minor in the first degree if, being a parent, guardian, person legally charged with care or custody of a minor, or a person charged with supervision of a minor, he or she purposely:
(1) Engages in conduct creating a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to a minor[.]
Here, the testimony revealed that appellant fired a shotgun at the child’s grandmother as Harris and the child stood approximately one foot away from the victim behind a screen door on the front porch. According to Harris’s testimony, appellant dragged her by the hair to the car while she held the infant. He then beat Harris in the car while she and Williams tried to shield the baby from appellant’s blows. Harris also testified that appellant knocked Williams unconscious and left him with the baby in the dark on the side of the road. Harris stated that the baby wore оnly a onesie in what Officer Jonathan Byrd described as “long-sleeve weather.” According to Williams, who testified for the defense, appellant left the baby with him when he felt lightheaded and slumped over. Williams denied that appellant struck him; however, on cross-examination, he admitted that it “felt like a blow to my back.” Thus, based upon this testimony, we conclude that appellant engaged in behavior that created a substantial risk of death or serious injury to his minor child. For these reasons, we hold that substantial evidence supports appellant’s child-endangerment conviction.
|sFor the final point on appeal, appellant argues that the circuit court erred in denying appellant’s motion for mistrial when the State’s witness referred to appellant’s previous trial during her testimony. In response, the State contends initially that appellant’s argument is barred by the doctrine of invited error. The State also asserts that appellant failed to request an admonition when the circuit court denied appellant’s mistrial motion.
A mistrial is an extremе and drastic remedy when an error has been made that is so prejudicial that justice cannot be served by continuing the trial. King v. State,
In the present case, during Harris’s cross-examination, defense counsel asked Harris a series of questions about whether she recalled a time riding with appellant, who was pulled over by Officеr Edgerson of the Dumas Police Department. Harris replied, “No, I don’t.” [ ^Defense counsel responded, “Do you think he made that up?” The prosecutor objected on the grounds of speculation. Defense counsel responded that she was attempting to impeach the witness. The following colloquy then occurred:
Defense Counsel: You know there’s an individual, Officer Edgerson out of Dumas, that’s going to testify that after January 2007 he pulled you and Mr. Roderick Williams over, right?
HARRIS: I remember him from the last trial.
Defense Counsel: Your Honor, may we approach?
At that time, the circuit court held a bench conference during which defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the basis that Harris referred to appellant’s prior trial and tainted the jury. The prosecution argued that defense counsel “pushed” Harris into her statement. After the parties presented argument to the court, the court noticed it was 4:15 p.m., recessed, and asked the jury to return the following day. After hearing extensive argument from the parties, defense counsel stated, ‘Tour Honor, you can consider [a mistrial]. If you think you can rehabilitate the jury, think about it, that’s fine.” The circuit сourt held its ruling in abeyance until the next morning. The following morning, the court stated in part:
The COURT: Good morning. I need to address my motion [for mistrial] that’s under advisement. After due consideration, the court’s of the opinion that the gravamen of the issue does not rise to that of a mistrial. Specifically the court acknowledges the existence of an order in limine that a particular word, “trial,” is not to be mentioned during the course of this trial, in as much as this is a retrial.
Secondly, the court recognizes that the witness was on cross-examination and was strenuously being and zealously being cross-examined by defense counsel over, you know, repeated objections by the State. But it was cross-examination and under those сircumstances, whereas the court does not find that counsel invited the response, but things like this do happen under those circumstances.
The court does not, is just not of the opinion that that sentence that concluded with the word “trial” is of significant, drastic enough to warrant a mistrial. And for that reason, I’ll deny the motion for mistrial.
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Iml’m going to continue to admonish thе lawyers to admonish their clients or their witnesses not to use the word “trial.”
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The Court: Okay. I’m not of the opinion that that’s — A lot of times you bring things like that to the attention of the jury.
Defense Counsel: Sure. Sure.
The Court: I’m amenable to a suggestion from—
Defense Counsel: I agree. I think maybe just leave it be and not bring the attention to the jury.
The Court: That’s my sense of it.
Pursuant to Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4 — 3(i) (2011), the record has been examined for all objections, motions, and requests made by either party that were decided adversely to appellant, and no prejudicial errors have been found.
Affirmed.
Notes
. We note that the jury was instructed on two alternate theories of capital murder: capital-felony murder involving kidnapping and capital murder committed by premeditation and deliberation. On appeal, bоth parties argued the sufficiency of the evidence under these theories. However, in Williams v. State,
. In its brief, the State contends that appellant's argument is barred by the doctrine of invited error. Because we dispose of appellant’s argument on a different basis, we decline to address this specific argument.