Case Information
*1 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS .
No. CR-14-1088
Opinion Delivered April 20, 2017 FRED L. WILLIAMS PETITIONER PRO SE PETITION TO REINVEST JURISDICTION IN THE TRIAL V.
COURT TO CONSIDER A PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR STATE OF ARKANSAS CORAM NOBIS RESPONDENT [DREW COUNTY CIRCUIT
COURT, NO. 22CR-13-43] PETITION DENIED.
PE R CURIAM
In 2014, petitioner Fred L. Williams was found guilty of murder in the first degree
and abuse of a corpse for which an aggregate sentence of life imprisonment was imposed.
Williams was sentenced as a habitual offender. We affirmed.
Williams v. State
, 2015 Ark.
316,
Now before us is Williams ’s pro se petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court
to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis in the case. The petition for leave to
proceed in the trial court is necessary because the trial court can entertain a petition for writ
of error coram nobis after a judgment has been affirmed on appeal only after we grant
permission.
Newman v. State
,
The function of the writ is to secure relief from a judgment rendered while there
existed some fact that would have prevented its rendition had it been known to the trial
court and which, through no negligence or fault of the defendant, was not brought forward
before rendition of the judgment.
Newman
,
As grounds for the writ, Williams asserts that the State suppressed exculpatory
evidence. The wrongful withholding of material exculpatory evidence from the defense is
a violation of
Brady v. Maryland
,
To assess Williams’s assertion of a violation, it is necessary to summarize the evidence adduced at trial that resulted in conviction for first-degree murder and abuse of a corpse. On April 5, 2013, Tangela Walton was observed in what appeared to be an argument with someone on her cell phone. Walton was subsequently reported missing, and police questioned Williams, her sometimes boyfriend, who denied any knowledge of her whereabouts. After having obtained Walton’s cell -phone records, the police again questioned Williams, who denied that he had argued with Walton. On April 14, 2013, Williams appeared with counsel at the police station to give another statement. When the investigating officer arrived to question Williams, Williams was on the floor; he was transported to the hospital because it was reported that he had experienced a seizure. While in the emergency room, Williams admitted that he knew where Walton’s body was buried. In an interview the next day, Williams stated that Walton had called him on the morning of April 5, 2013, to ask if he would like to have sex. He agreed, picked her up, and the two went to Williams’s home where they engaged in “kinky” sex that included tying Walton up and placing a plastic bag over her head. Williams stated further that the two were engaging in sex for the second time when he had a seizure and “fell out” on Walton *4 and smothered her to death. When he was unable to revive her, Williams threw away the plastic bag and the necktie that had been used to bind her hands and buried her in a shallow grave. There was evidence presented at trial that Walton had died of asphyxia by undetermined means.
On direct appeal, Williams contended that the trial court erred by not granting his
motion for directed verdict because, while the evidence was sufficient to show that Walton
died in his home, the evidence was not sufficient to show that Williams purposely caused
her death. He argued that the evidence adduced was circumstantial and forced the jury to
resort to speculation when it found the requisite intent to convict him of first-degree
murder. He also asserted that his actions when he disposed of Walton’s body did not fall
within the offense of abuse of a corpse. This court concluded that there was evidence
adduced at trial that satisfied the elements of both first-degree murder and abuse of a corpse.
We also noted that it was the jury’s task to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to
resolve any inconsistent evidence.
Williams
,
Williams has offered no support for the claim that any of the information contained
in State’s Exhibit 3 could not have been known to the defense prior to trial or that it was
somehow concealed from the defense. Moreover, he has offered no factual substantiation
that the State had hidden any specific, particular evidence from the defense at the time of
trial. Conclusory claims concerning evidence omitted from the record are deficient as a
basis for coram nobis relief and do not establish that there is a reasonable probability that the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different if the State had disclosed any
particular evidence to the defense.
Carter v. State
,
It appears that allegations concerning rest primarily on
the contention that the information contained in the exhibit was not utilized in the way
most favorable to the defense. Also, even if the information in the exhibit was not known
*6
to the defense prior to trial, Williams has not established that there is a reasonable probability
that any of the information he cites in his petition would have resulted in a different
outcome of the trial had it been known. When the petitioner does not demonstrate that
there was information that would somehow have created an issue sufficient to affect the
outcome of the trial and preclude the entry of the judgment, the petitioner has not
established a ground to issue a writ of error coram nobis.
Wallace v. State
,
Williams also argues that the writ should issue on the following grounds: that a S tate’s witness, Varetta Butcher, reported to the police that she overheard a heated argument between Walton and a party on the telephone, but the State never produced Butcher ’s statement, which would have aided the defense in pointing out errors in the “af fidavit pretrial ” ; that Butcher contradicted the police officer ’ s statement in an affidavit, but Butcher’s statement never surfaced at trial , and thus her contradictory statements were not revealed to the jury; that Butcher’s testimony was belied by the in formation contained in , and the police officers embellished their statements to prejudice Williams; that DNA taken from material under Walton’s fingernails belong ed to a second individual and did not come from Williams; that the autopsy report provided that Walton’s injuries showed signs of healing, but the point was suppressed at trial even though it could have provided an alibi for Williams; that the defense story of intimacy was unfairly disclaimed, and the jury’s verdict was derived fr om perjury, fabrication, and prosecutorial misconduct.
The assertions do not demonstrate a violation; rather, they amount to claims
of trial error and seek to question the sufficiency of the evidence. To the extent that
*7
Williams intended the claims to call into question the sufficiency of the evidence, we have
repeatedly held that such a claim is a direct attack on the judgment and is not cognizable in
coram nobis proceedings.
Rice v. State
, 2016 Ark. 27, at 4, 479 S.W.3d 555, 558 (per
curiam). The question of the sufficiency of the evidence is to be settled at trial and on the
record on direct appeal.
Id.
;
Sims v. State
,
Finally, Williams makes several references to the failure of his attorney to investigate
evidence and counsel’s failure to bring out information that would have been favorable to
the defense. He has not stated a ground for the writ because a coram nobis proceeding does
not provide a means to challenge the effectiveness of counsel. Ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claims are outside the purview of error coram nobis proceedings and such
proceedings are not a substitute for raising ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims under our
postconviction rule, Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1.
White v. State
, 2015 Ark.
151, at 4 – 5,
Petition denied.