Gregory Williams was charged with an armed robbery that occurred on April 15, 2007. He moved to suppress evidence, contending that an inculpatory statement he made to law enforcement officers was involuntary and that various evidence, including his statement, was the fruit of an illegal stop of his car. The trial court denied Williams’s motions to suppress, finding that the statement was voluntary and that the stop of Williams’s car was not illegal, and Williams was convicted after a jury trial. He argues on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, that the court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict, that the court erred in allowing hearsay testimony, that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
As detailed below, the evidence was sufficient to support Williams’s conviction, so the trial court did not err in denying his motion for directed verdict. Williams has failed to demonstrate the merits of his hearsay claim because he has not cited to the place in the record where the alleged hearsay occurred.
As to the motion to suppress, the court properly ruled that Williams’s inculpatory statement was not subject to suppression as involuntary. But the trial court erred in ruling that the stop of Williams’s car was constitutional, because the state failed to meet its burden on that point. Because of that erroneous ruling, the trial court did not consider whether the challenged evidence should have been suppressed as fruit of the illegal stop. Williams has waived his appeal of one of these pieces of evidence (a handgun found in his car) by affirmatively stating that he had no objection to its admission at trial. As to the other pieces of challenged evidence, however, we *841 vacate the order denying the motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Given this disposition, we do not reach Williams’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The following evidence was presented at trial. A store clerk testified that on April 15, 2007, a person came into the store, pointed a silver gun at her, and took money from the store’s cash register. Similar transaction witnesses testified about other armed robberies in the area that had occurred in April 2007. A police officer investigating the series of robberies testified that he suspected that a man known as Harry Wright was involved and that the weapon used in the robberies was a nine-millimeter silver and black gun. The investigator further testified that on April 18 he received information that Wright had been seen riding as a passenger in a car, and he issued a “be on the lookout” to other officers. Another officer stopped a car driven by Williams in which Wright was a passenger. The investigator arrived on the scene immediately afterward.
During the stop, Williams told the investigator that there was a gun in the car’s center console. Williams consented to a search of the car, which yielded a nine-millimeter pistol that was admitted into evidence at trial. Similar transaction witnesses testified that the gun looked like that used in some of the other robberies.
The investigator testified that Williams voluntarily accompanied him to the sheriffs office and, after being read his Miranda rights, was interviewed. He was not under arrest at that time. During the interview, Williams stated that he had participated in the series of armed robberies by driving Wright to the locations that were robbed, described what Wright was wearing during the robberies, and stated that the gun found in the console of the car was his and had been used in the armed robberies. The state also introduced evidence that Williams had bought a nine-millimeter gun from a pawn shop in 2000.
Wright testified at trial that he had committed the series of armed robberies, including the armed robbery on April 15, 2007, and that Williams had participated by selecting the stores to rob, supplying the gun, acting as the getaway driver, and receiving part of the stolen money. Law enforcement officers testified that Wright also implicated Williams during an interrogation. Evidence was presented that Wright consented to a search of his hotel room, in which law enforcement officers found items of clothing matching those worn by the armed robber; the clothing was admitted into evidence.
A person who had shared a cell block with Wright testified that Wright told him Williams was not involved in the armed robberies. Williams also testified. He denied participating in the armed robberies and explained that he had said otherwise in his police interview *842 because he had felt scared and nervous. He admitted purchasing a gun from the pawn shop. He testified that he had kept the gun in his car and suggested that Wright had obtained it on an occasion when he had borrowed the car.
1. The evidence presented at trial is sufficient to support Williams’s conviction for armed robbery under the standard set forth in
Jackson v. Virginia,
2. Williams contends that the trial court “erred in allowing testimony that a bullet found at the scene of one of the similar transaction cases was a match for the 9 millimeter gun found in Williams’[s] car,” on the ground that this testimony was hearsay. He does not, however, provide any citation to the place in the record where this allegedly objectionable testimony occurred. It is not the appellate court’s job to cull the record on behalf of a party to find error.
Watson v. State,
3. Williams argues that the trial court should have suppressed the inculpatory statement he made at the sheriffs office because it was not made freely and voluntarily. In ruling on the statement’s admissibility, the trial court was required to determine whether, based on the totality of the circumstances, a preponderance of the evidence demonstrated that the statement was made freely and voluntarily.
Pineda v. State,
Williams argues that his statement was involuntary because it was induced by both hope of benefit and fear of injury. See OCGA §
*843
24-3-50 (an admissible confession must have been made voluntarily, without being induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury); see also
Wilson v. State,
The trial court ruled that Williams’s statement was not the result of “coercion, undue promises, or threats,” and that it was admissible. Based on the totality of the circumstances, this decision was not clearly erroneous. See
Milinavicius,
4. Williams argues that the officers had no basis to stop his car and detain him and thus the trial court should have suppressed as fruits of the illegal stop the gun found during the search of his car, other evidence of his ownership of the gun (including statements that he made during the stop), evidence found in Wright’s hotel room, and the inculpatory statement he made at the sheriffs office. See
Dupree v. State,
On reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, evidence is construed most favorably to uphold the findings and judgment, and the trial court’s findings on disputed facts and credibility should not be disturbed if there is any evidence to support them.
Tate v. State,
(a) As an initial matter, Williams has not preserved for appellate review his objection to the admission of the gun, because at trial his counsel affirmatively stated that he had no objection to its admission. “In so doing, counsel waived any objection, including those raised in his motion to suppress.” (Citation omitted.)
Monroe v. State,
(b) In reviewing the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress as to the remaining evidence challenged by Williams, we must consider whether the state met its burden of proving that Williams was not stopped illegally. See
State v. Massa,
Although an officer may conduct a brief investigative stop of a vehicle, such a stop must be justified by specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. The totality of the circumstances is taken into account in determining whether the detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal conduct. The legality of the stop depends upon what information police officers had prior to making the stop.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Kazeem v. State,
The trial court found that the stop of Williams’s car was supported by reasonable articulable suspicion. But the sheriffs deputy who made the stop did not testify at either the hearing on the motion to suppress or trial. See generally
White v. State,
(c) Consequently, in ruling on the motion to suppress, the trial court was required to determine whether the challenged evidence was the product of the illegal stop or was sufficiently distinguishable so as to be purged of the taint from the initial illegality, see
State v. Brown,
Accordingly, we vacate in part the order denying the motion to suppress and remand this case to the trial court for further findings of fact and conclusions of law pertaining to the application of the exclusionary rule in this case. See
Brown,
supra. See generally
Agnew v. State,
5. Given our remand of this case for further proceedings on Williams’s motion to suppress, we do not reach his claims that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part, and case ¡ remanded with direction.
On Motion for Reconsideration.
In a motion for reconsideration of our decision, Williams, among other things, expresses a concern that our ruling in Division 1 “ create [s] a law of the case principle that makes the whole exercise of remand pointless.” Certainly, if on remand the tried court determines that the evidence challenged by Williams properly was admitted at trial, then our ruling that “[t]he evidence
presented at trial
is sufficient to support Williams’s conviction” (emphasis supplied) will be dispositive of any further claims of insufficiency regarding that evidence. OCGA § 9-11-60 (h). But if on remand the trial court determines that some of that evidence should have been suppressed as the product of the illegal stop, and if the court determines that the failure to suppress that evidence necessitates a new trial in which the evidence is not admitted, then our ruling as to the sufficiency of the evidence presented at the first trial will have no relevance to the question of the sufficiency of different evidence presented at the new trial. See generally
Bruce v. Garges,
Williams also expresses a concern that, on remand, the state might attempt to introduce new evidence in opposition to his motion to suppress, which he asserts would run afoul of principles of double jeopardy and collateral estoppel. But
see Atkins v. State,
Motion for reconsideration denied.