Thе trial court convicted Clifton Edward Williams of unauthorized use of a vehicle and, because of two enhancement paragraphs, sentenced him to twenty-five years’ confinement. Because we find appellаnt’s three points of error without merit, we affirm.
In his first point, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to convict him for the offense charged. According to the evidence, Richard Allen Flatt stopped at а 7-Eleven to buy cigarettes and coffee. He left his keys in his 1986 pickup truck with the doors unlocked. While he was in the store, the cashier told Flatt that his truck was being driven away by someone else. Flatt ran out of the store to prеvent the person from escaping in the truck but was unable to stop him even though he chased the truck for several blocks. He then called the police and reported the pickup stolen and described it.
Later in the afternoon of the same day, Dallas Police Officer Willie Cunningham was on patrol. Cunningham had received information to look for a blue Chevrolet pickup truck that had been involved in a robbery earlier that dаy. Officer Cunningham testified that he' saw a blue Chevrolet pickup truck pass in front of him down an adjacent street, and he followed the pickup into an alley behind an apartment complex. Appellant was the driver оf the pickup. Appellant was unable to tell Cunningham if he knew the owner. Cunningham confirmed that the pickup was stolen and arrested the appellant.
Appellant testified in his own behalf and denied that he had stolen Richard Flatt’s truck from the 7-Eleven. Appellant testified that a man driving the blue pickup in which he was arrested had hired him to move some boxes. Appellant said he helped the man move the boxes and then agreed to go to a store with the man. On the way to the store, the man said he needed to make one stop to take care of *870 some business. The man then drove the pickup to an apartment complex where he stoppеd and went inside. Appellant stated that he was left alone, sitting in the passenger seat of the pickup. He further testified that he was driving the pickup only because he wanted to keep it from blocking traffic behind the aрartment and that he moved it only three or four car lengths to a nearby parking lot. He further testified that he thought the man who went into the apartment owned the truck.
In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, the standard of review is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Beardsley v. State,
A person is guilty of the offense of unauthorized use of a vehicle if he intentionally or knowingly operates another’s boat, airplane, or motor-propelled vehicle without the effectivе consent of the owner.
See
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.07(a) (Vernon 1974);
Musgrave v. State,
As stated, the elements of the offense under section 31.07 are: (1) a person (2) intentionally or knowingly (3) operates an airplane, boat, or motor-propelled vehicle (4) without the effective сonsent of the owner. A defense offered by appellant that someone else stole the pickup and that he, not knowing such fact, used the pickup thinking he had the consent of the one authorized to give such сonsent, does not create an additional element to the offense of which he was convicted.
Musgrave,
The trial court, as trier of the facts, is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the witnesses and may believe or disbelieve all or any part of any witness’ testimony.
Williams v. State,
In his second point of error, appellant contends that the conviction alleged in the first enhancement paragraph in his indictment is void. This prior conviction was likewise for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. Appellant’s argument is that the indictment in this prior conviction described
*871
the motor vehicle as a pickup truck, and therefоre the State was bound to prove the allegation.
See Weaver v. State,
A close reading of
Laflore
reveals that its import is not as far reaching as appellant wоuld lead us to believe. First, the general rule is that sufficiency of the evidence may not be collaterally attacked, which is contrary to appellant’s position before this Court.
See Wolfe v. State,
In
Wolfe,
as in this case, the appellant asserted that there was nо evidence to support his conviction or the offense charged. In
Wolfe,
as here, the judicial confession was at variance with the indictment. In
Wolfe,
the record before the court did not contain a transcription of thе court reporter’s notes from the trial on Wolfe’s plea of guilty to the offense. The Court of Criminal Appeals held in
Wolfe
that without that transcription, they were unable to ascertain whether other evidence was introduсed to support Wolfe’s conviction. They held that Wolfe’s contention did not fall within the
Moffett
exception but was merely an impermissible attempt to collaterally attack the sufficiency of the evidence.
Wolfe,
In
Laflore,
the record reflected that Laf-lore was indicted for theft of services, but she judicially confessed to theft of property. In
Laflore,
it was not shown that she had read the indictment, and she did not take the stand and affirm that the indictment was true and correct, nor did she confirm that she was pleading guilty to such indictment. In
Laflore,
it was held that the
Moffett
exception controlled.
Laf-lore,
This case is controlled by the general rule in
Wolfe
and not the exception in
Mof-fett.
The record does not contain any transcription of the court reporter’s notes from the trial on appellant’s guilty plea that led to the unauthоrized use of motor vehicle conviction used in the first enhancement paragraph.
Wolfe,
Appellant’s third point of error is another attack on the validity of the conviction alleged in the first enhancement parаgraph. Appellant contends that the conviction is void because there is no information on file to support the conviction. Appellant argues that although there is an information in the court’s file, the lack of a file mark on the information voids the conviction. It is true that the information must be filed in a felony case to confer jurisdiction on the court.
See Diez v. State,
Included in the record is the trial court’s file on the conviction alleged in the first enhancement paragraph. The trial court’s docket reflects that the clerk of the court entered on the docket the date of July 31, 1987, as the date of filing of the affidavit and information charging the offense of unauthorized use of a vehicle. In addition to this document, the record contains the complaint, which is dated July 31, 1987, and appellant’s waiver of indictment which he signed consenting to prosecution by information and acknowledging that he stands accused by information. This instrument bears a filing date of July 31, 1987. Also included were the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the magistrate reflecting that appellant pleaded guilty to the unauthorizеd use of a vehicle, a third degree felony, as charged in the affidavit and information. This document is dated July 31, 1987. Finally, the judgment which is likewise dated July 31, 1987, reflects that the charging instrument consisting of an information was part of the papers in the cause. We hold that the evidence supports the conclusion that the information was “filed” before the conviction was obtained and that the lack of a file mark on the information itself does not void the conviction. We overrule appellant’s third point.
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.