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Williams v. State
273 S.W.3d 200
Tex. Crim. App.
2008
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*1 common sense “direct remand rule” WILLIAMS, Perry Eugene Appellant, “grounded guilt is on the fact that of which is implicitly true lesser included offense guilt in the of July’s found verdict Texas. STATE of greater offense.” No. AP-74391. concerning jury The law instructions game and lesser-included offenses is not a of Texas. Appeals Court of Criminal of acquittal in which conviction or a crimi- depends upon nal offense June 2008. Machiavellian strategy. depend upon trial It should 29, 2008. Rehearing Denied Oct. Here, and the it is not disputed facts law. legally the evidence sufficient to is simple for support conviction

assault, regardless of whether Anissa was not a member of his household on day has appellant of assault. Nor process rights

made claim that his due prejudiced by entry be

would convic- for the

tion lesser-included offense jury necessarily him found

which

guilty.11 We do a disservice common citizens ordering

sense Texas

acquittal charges of all when legally support a sufficient to conviction assault, jury necessarily simple and the guilty him simple

found assault. retrial, subject of a remand" that the LIO should "direct unless so instruct- ed). modification.”). Shellenberger generally, A. & See James not an automatic Strazella, James A. The Lesser Included Of- Shields, 722 So.2d at 585. Doctrine the Constitution: The De- fense Jeopardy velopment and Double Due Process 746; Hunt, 129 F.3d also Stevens See see Remedies, (Fall L.R. 183-189 Marq. (Ind.Ct.App. 422 N.E.2d 1995) (noting appellate courts can avoid 1981) (reviewing if modi record to determine potential double-jeopardy problem retrial defendant; prejudice "Where fication by "modifying on lesser-included offense not been it is evident that defendant has mis necessarily judgment to an that was offense charging joined lead the issues under included the offense for the defen- determined, convicted,” been modifica information have noting had first dant been tion, appropri may than reversal is more rather that “there be situations which the ate"). particular suggest dynamics of a trial record *5 Morrow, Spring, Appellant. Janet Houston, D.A., Jef- McCrory, Dan Asst. Horn, Aus- frey Attorney, L. State’s Van tin, for the State. P.J.,

KELLER, opinion delivered WOMACK, the Court in which HERVEY, HOLCOMB, KEASLER, and COCHRAN, JJ., joined. appellant was convicted June to death.1

capital murder and sentenced automatic.2 to this Court is appeal Direct of error. Appellant points raises eleven error, affirm no we Finding reversible and sentence. conviction 37.071, 2(h). 19.03; § § 1. Tex. Pen.Code Art. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. indicated, all art. 37.071. Unless otherwise to articles refer to the Code future references Criminal Procedure. cаr and driving

I. around BACKGROUND Corey Phillips. Butler had picked up in- appellant’s points One of of error group and the again brought handgun, her sufficiency challenge of the volves proceeded carry out four robberies jury’s determina- support First, they approached Anthony evening. dangerousness, tion of future anoth- while Appel- lot. Kroger parking Gonzales in a error, relating er to the admission point at Gonzales’s pointed handgun lant evidence, impact and character victim said, your me car.” Be- face and “Give perform an require will us extensive shift, ap- had a stick cause Gonzales’s car analysis. Consequently, engage harm gun pellant point could not drive in a comprehensive discussion evi- time, he or- at Gonzales at the same so appellant’s punishment. dence relevant dered Gonzales to drive the car while Spree The A. Crime gun Appellant held the to Gonzales’s ribs. yanked took two Gonzales’s wallet appellant The offense for con- took Appellant chains from his neck. also during occurred of a victed middle Gonzales’s ATM card and demanded The spree. presented crime State no evi- kept PIN number. Gonzales’s Appellant appellant engaged dence that had driver’s license in case Gonzales ever re- spree violent conduct before the crime be- robbery they needed ported the gan. “somebody” Appellant of it.” to “take care 9, 2000, September On appellant was Phillips’s done at testified this was driving Mend, car with a female to an ATM group instruction. drove Butler, Kinita handgun. Starr who had a machine, appellant tried use Upon seeing Cherry Lolita and Nicole money, ATM card to withdraw street, walking Green down Appellant PIN tes- number did not work. *6 parked drove and a short distance in urged try again, Dunn him to tified that Appellant got front of them. out of his appellant’s but efforts not successful. were car, grabbed Cherry, placed handgun head, to her and her purse. demanded group approached The next Matthew getting purse, After Butler searched Carter, the in this case. Carter had victim through appellant, it and told “This bitch his and medical girlfriend visited fellow got money.” Appellant don’t no turned student, Saifi, Maryam help to her with a Cherry around to face him and shot her project. class left Saifi’s home Carter Appеllant jumped the breast. then into p.m. around 11:00 to return a rented video away. his ear and Cherry drove was tak- group to into the Blockbuster. drove en to hospital, where the wound was lot parking Blockbuster and saw Carter “superficial.” determined to be The bullet returning returning to his car after had entered and exited her breast and was videotape. According appellant’s to testi- Cherry permitted not recovered. was mony trial, take supposed at Dunn was hospital morning. leave the the next Dur- part and as of an handgun rob Carter ing testimony punishment phase his at the Crips an of the initiation into affiliate trial, appellant shooting claimed that his gang, up.” Phillips but Dunn “froze then only Cherry, not to was intended scare him to appellant gun handed and told her, hit and that he did not realize at the “go get According testimony em.” to his actually time that she had been shot. trial, appellant gun at “took the and took 17, 2000, gun- at September appellant, Appellant On his over.” forced Carter Dunn, Jr., point passenger cousin James and Butler were into the seat Carter’s by appellant made and other ear, got into the driver’s statements appellant and Phillips, who inmates involved. They seat. then followed driving appellant’s vehicle. Carter was The first incident occurred October that he had told numerous times appellant jail 2000. The officer determined could “max appellant an ATM card that appellant and another inmate were en- out,” not to pleaded appellant and statement, gaged fight. in a mutual his Nevertheless, parking the him. after hurt inmate, the other appellant claimed car, in the head from appellant shot Carter insulting King, called him various Charles con- range. According close Ap- away newspaper. names and took his fession, gun appellant hit Carter further claimed that this was not pellant Forty taken out of Car- fired. dollars was him only Bong time that had insulted among evenly ter’s and distributed wallet only you can and there was “so much group. of the the four members comments, making ap- these take.” After said, sorry for pellant say “All I can is I’m later, group an hour commit- About by fighting.” breaking rules In the ted more robberies. first two robberies, Tomas Kooh and Ricardo these King appellant claimed that he asked gas appellant Rubio at a station when were of the nеwspaper, the comics section Phillips companions up. and his drove Seeing reading said he it. appellant was both men and de- pointed handgun at reading only the metro appellant was Phillips After took their wallets. manded section, appellant act- King why asked wallets, got “burned off and appellant them replied, ing way. Appellant then robbery, freeway.” In the other on the appellant that he you.” King “Fuck told Jackson, Franklin Phillips approached who appellant him to curse at did open motel room had left the door hit going King. if up stood as he was As Jackson unloading after his truck. appellant to hit back King threatened door, Phillips pointed a him, turned to close the him, swung hit appellant back. get him and told him to gun at told they began fight. Appellant Phillips at- Jackson slammed the door fighting King that he not care about did a shot way to force his tempted to be moved out because he wanted result, a minor causing fired as a wound anyway. tank *7 also the Appellant Jackson’s hand. was and inmate appellant On March robbery. in driver of the car this fighting. The Floyd caught Barnes were from either no statements record contains Appellant’s Incarceration B. of the inmates about this incident. 22, 2001, found arrest, appellant was appellant April was incarcerated On Upon tank,” According fighting Wiley the section Williams. county jail’s in the “kid they fighting by appellant, inmates who are started when jail occupied neighbor- twenty-two. During his insulted age under the Williams tank, appellant Appellant was disci- hood. claimed Williams time in the kid fighting, punch appellant for once for the first and that four times threw plined tattoos, Appellant himself. only defending unauthorized once was himself giving wrong I destroying by saying, an assault and concluded “I know was committing for I myself. stealing. fighting for but I had defend and once for county property, coming I am you in- to understand where contained ask jail disciplinary reports incidents, including from.” formation about these complained he in did to him. that he sitting Appellant

Williams claimed that was friendly why group engaging getting conversation did not he was understand appellant this, “took the conversation to a something when written like but he up for “continuously different and whole level” by saying, “I concluded his statement fight” told appellant tried him. He I wrong say it but all can is I know was fight, appеllant kept he did not want to but get was I need to into being a kid. don’t advancing toward him. The other inmates anymore I did so I don’t trouble but know they because get left did not want to into my I’m say sorry what else to Williams, trouble. hit Appellant then who forgive me childish actions. Please and defended himself. concluded Williams give me a chance.” second saying, “I feel had no this inmate reason to 12, 2001, Finally, appellant on August his I put hands on me and want to press caught stealing property was from another charges.” statement, appel- inmate. In his written 17, 2001, On jail June authorities lant indicated that other inmates in- were appellant tattooing discovered that had he volved the theft but did not want equipment in possession his and that he get whole tank to in trouble. He also recently given had tattoos. In himself his asked for forgiveness. statement regarding written the matter said, “I’ll appellant by saying like to start I incarcerated, appellant While wrote two sorry for county am rules. But disobeying letters to Butler. One those letters was I felt I paying my respect by was cousin 11, 2001, February dated and the other his getting my name tattooed arm since letter was not Both contained dated. com- passed it away. I know wrong was but ments suggesting gang at the end affilia- say I can I again sorry. all once am But I tion, forever,” including: “crip for “crip didn’t mean to so much cause trouble.” life,” gray day every and “blue all over 23, 2001, day.”

On During testimony punish- June his at the appellant engaged in a inmates fight trial, phase appellant involved David Brad- ment contended ford, Jones, Brown, Willie Quen- Hari and just responding that he to similar statement, tin Rubin. In appellant his letters, statements made in Butler’s and he claimed that he fighting was not but “was doing characterized so as “a his actions trying to break All up.” of the other youngster mistake.” disciplinary allegations against appellant January 2002, appellant was moved during jail stay a plea ended with punishment the adult tank. At the agreement, but appellant contested this trial, phase of occurred in June of particular allegation guilty. found 2002, a testified that deputy prob- sheriff August On appellant up walked unusual, lems kid tanks were grabbed to inmate Curtis Vandver problem had not been since he tore Vandver’s shirt. Vandver appeared *8 tank. placed was in the adult be afraid appellant and said that Martin, prisons,3 on appellant exрert did this for reason at all. Steve an tes- no statement, tified about the of a maxi- appellant his written claimed environment just that he mum playing security prison, appellant was with Vandver and where imprison- him to life getting something stay back for Vandver would if sentenced officer, tually consulting Martin was a later ob- started a correctional busi- correctional degree legal tained a law worked and ness. system, prison counsel in the and Texas even- Appellant also on he had appellant’s ment. He commented crowd.” claimed been record, using testifying marijuana.” “PCP laced jail disciplinary that with punishments imposition relatively mild appellant’s When mother was asked in each case that the infractions suggest actions, for his responsible whether he was not he serious. He also testified that were was, she that he but she agreed also fights to see in expected minor more often agreed “hanging wrong that with youthful a tank of than tank of offenders a not crowd” mattered he is like “[b]ecause cross-examination, older offenders. On this.” acknowledged that there are Martin incarcerated, jail appellant After was violence, gangs, drugs prison. and chaplain appellant ap- referred to was Dunn, pellant’s cousin who was concerned Appellant’s Mitigating C. Evidence spiritual appellant’s about condition. The Changes in Regarding His appel- chaplain he met testified when Character pleasantly surprised lant he to find a was person “repentant” “broken” and who was mother, Appellant’s Clay Roberta peace “made his God.” The had with Williams, testified about various events chaplain he found “a believed had real childhood, appellant’s good about what a life, change” appellant’s cross- was, his some person father about he that he did examination conceded not background on other mem- general family really life was like know what explained appellant bers. She meeting him. before family born in Houston and the there lived testimony During punishment phase his they Mississip- until when moved affirmatively appellant responded when pi. Appellant back Houston moved whether, he re- defense counsel asked sister, Di- stayed 2000 and Roberta’s sentence, a life he would follow the ceived Di- Clay Morgan. Morgan, nah Clifton рrison responded rules. He also he husband, appellant nah’s testified that for fellow inmates problem would not be “respectful” and “not violent” and Sandra prison staff. Miller, friend, testified to appellant’s also “respectful” nature. Seeking Testimony Appellant’s D. Roberta, and But Dinah told later testi- Convey Acceptance of trial, appellant began at fied Responsibility change. hanging He around the started punish- During in the direct examination crowd,” “wrong people ap- Dinah did phase, appellant ment made numerous sister, Clay, appellant’s of. prove Detra accepted indicating that he re- statements appellant changed. also testified that She during his sponsibility for actions a lot drinking stated started whether spree. crime When asked smoking marijuana, and she saw him for what drugs hap- he used were fault he pop pill once. came her When “No fault pened, replied, he sir.” “Whose home, “constantly” up threw “ev- Appel- attorney is it?” the defense asked. erywhere.” lant “It’s mine.” When asked responded, death, for his whether at fault Carter was

During testimony, appellant said own appellant explained: disregarding his reasons advice fault that he stay It meant to or his family “[m]e out of trouble were wasn’t *9 died, a bunch of I and mine. It was being saying grown drug abuse was was I on that cannot wrong things going that was hanging around with the explain. really responsi- Don’t to explain accepting how whether he know was bility them. for his conduct: Q. today right have here What we now * * n in you jury saying is front of sitting this I just Is not explain, that won’t it’s my fault, right? it’s night everything happened we had been Yes, A. ma’am. smoking marijuana. POP laced with Q. my responsibility, right? It’s That’s no excuse for I did. I what didn’t Yes, A. ma’am. intentionally kill Carter. Matthew Q. verdict, I accept your right? appellant intentionally When denied killing Carter, questioned defense counsel him A. Yes ma’am. about the he night, actions did intend that Q. Okay. But that’s not reality participating

which included the rob- you’re saying, what is it Mr. Williams? bery, holding gun, cocking saying. A. I’m That’s what gun. Appellant loading denied the gun— Q. you keep saying Corey What told claiming Phillips had done so—and he Corey me to do this. told me do this. also that he stated did not that the know A. May speak freely? I gun until gun was loaded fired. When asked whether knew a bullet in the Q. my question. you Just Are answer gun’s Cherry chamber when was shot the telling you say me—have we not heard before, responded, appellant week “Not it, Corey to do you right? told speaking.” necessarily Yes, A. ma’am. When asked how the shot was fired that Q. big Corey So is the Corey bad that’s Carter, said, appellant killed “In pro- terror, charge reign of this whole getting cess of him out of the car he right? shall say, car,

walked trying around I’m to see Technically speaking, A. yes. coming had, where he is from. I I had the Phillips After further questions about be- gun, something I happened. don’t ing the group night, leader of the happened. Something know what physical he, prosecutor appellant Butler, asked I happened and tensed I up pulled originally and Dunn planned had rob trigger.” asked, When defense counsel Phillips they recognized before him and he responsible “Who happened for what joined Appellant responded, the group. appellant replied, Carter?” Matthew “I my recollection. been “[N]ot It’s so am.” long I don’t remember. I don’t remember Later, defense ques- counsel asked some biggest part this whole situation.” regarding tions appellant say what had to When the prosecutor appellant asked to his mother and to the own victim’s whether the had group abducted Gonzales family. mother, respect With to his own during robbery on Sep- first incident appellant “Really too I replied, ain’t much answered, “Yes, 2000, appellant tember Only say. thing say can I can I’mis ma’am. I it abducting.” don’t call “What sorry.” respect to the victim’s fami- With you call prosecutor like to it?” the ly, responded, “Only appellant thing I can replied, being asked. Appellant “Not sorry I say is I’m for the pain caused you.” where no one can see your by taking your heart life.” son’s During cross-examination, prosecu- The prosecutor challenged appellant’s began question tor Phil- just following about contention that he was *10 practice” little robbery pro- kind had a bit

lips’s orders the Gonzales Appel- Cherry. week before when he shot gressed: every- “I replied, lant don’t Corey following remember — Q. fact is So then really thing so fast. I don’t happened you? that.” did acknowl- Appellant remember time, point yes. A. this At edge investigating that he never told the Q. you’re calling the right. All So Cherry shooting. detective about here, right? going we’re shots where ap- prosecutor ‍​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‍insinuated that When put A. I don’t it like that. be- pellant kept quiet about incident Q. Well, telling Anthony where you’re cause did not indicate he the detective go, right? knew, honest, responded, “To appellant Technically yes. speaking, A. my getting mind from me slipped high.” prosecutor questioned appellant The about robbery— his actions after the Gonzales prosecutor appel- The questioned also money from an

when he tried withdraw high lant contention that about his he was explained ATM machine. Appellant during Appellant after the murders. money Phillips’s withdrawing the was idea sleep night not go said that he did appellant the one who though even He conceded murder occurred. After had the PIN number. two obtained workplace at his up he showed at 8:00 a.m. card, ap- to use the attempts unsuccessful (a center) morning after the U-Haul try him to pellant claimed that Dunn told entire murder and that he worked the really he Appellant one time. said more eight-hour Appellant shift. contended to use the ATM machine did not want high he was the entire time. PIN he knew the number would because Apparently displeased with asked, prosecutor be incorrect. The cross-examination, defense during answers wherewithal, “You're the one that had counsel, redirect, about appellant asked well, what good Anthony, sense ask issue: “taking responsibility” along this is the number. Go with so pin Q. mean, you I the witness stand took me, right? this is useless to You asked not fault, today, you your here said it was answered, that, Appellant right?” him fault, then Corey Phillip’s [sic] wasn’t speaking, yes.” “Technically telling us it you cross spent whole questioned subsequently The prosecutor Corey Phillips. role Car- appellant about his dominant ter’s murder. The testimony about Dunn mit a Crips robbery gang. order “So prosecutor being Corey to become a asked is elicited the here,” to com- part A. Q. I’m Sure you saying are. *1» [*] it’s n You said it’s anyone’s fault. my fault. said, get in order to prosecutor “and A. It fault. you my do it. James don’t want to gang putting up it. Instead of with the

do spent No, say that. You Q. you didn’t I’ll tomfoolery, give gun, me the take care telling people these the last 30 minutes responded, Appellant of business?” Phillip’s just fault. I Corey it’s [sic] “Technically speaking.” know, know, Corey Phil- you want to you jump bridge, off a lips you tells if, asked prosecutor later jumping bridge? off a pulled he on the trigger the time murder, A. no. “actually necessarily, Not in the Carter gun *11 you the truth. A. I told * * * I Q. Okay. mean— Why Q. you get say did it’s up and fault, your say turned it’s around and truth, though A. I her the told even your not fault? I’m just, sоund like it. I’m doesn’t here, I’m just speaking. up nervous say. didn’t A. I own, being to being my in the fate of Yes, you Q. did. fate. keep my own say A. I didn’t didn’t it say wasn’t —I before, Q. You never testified my fault. What I took re- said was—I you? life, sponsibility taking the man’s

shooting you Lolita if Cherry, that’s how A. No sir. name, not pronounce pro- I am Finally, questioned appel- defense counsel nouncing right. I responsibility take following lant about someone bad else’s biggest things changed my for the judgment: changed the life and Carters’ lives forev- Q. Corey Phillips just you Is this —can er. along to anyone march what tells else you to do?

n n n A. I don’t know how to answer Q. you talking do mean you’re What question. technically speaking? does that What Q. Well, free you know how exercise mean, technically does speaking? What say yes, you know will. You how that mean? say no? know how A. That yes just stronger means in a Yes, A. sir. way I way put it. conduct, Q. engage You know how to Q. Okay. Well, you know, you can see you engage, right? how know that technically how does not speaking Yes, A. sir. right? sound Q. say You know how to no? just— A. I Yes, A. Q. you just sir. Can see that doesn’t how right? sound Corey Q. Right. Phillips you to tells Yes, no, A. sir. something, you do say know how to you? don’t Q. case, This isn’t a technical it? Yes, A. sir. really,

A. Not sir. defense Subsequently, queried ap- counsel Victim-Impact E. State’s Victim- pellant performance about his wit- Evidence Character ness stand: judge Q. you asked take the 1. Guilt Phase stand, right? witness Saifi, the State Through introduced Yes, A. sir. about life. personal some Carter’s Q. And he did tell the you swear Saifi that she and met as testified Carter truth, right? counselors in- camp summer and became Yes, A. sir. dating relationship. in a serious volved Q. graduated And then she he prosecutor] college, asked After [the Carter you Bay- to tell the truth. she medical Remember chose to attend school just truth, tell me the right? College said lor of Medicine because Saifi was know, I So, you my I lost husband that attending there. Because Carter already student, and, life applied spend my under was an excellent rest family uhm, ac- had dreamed about. early-decision program *12 discussed, apparently, Saifi cepted scholarship. already on a full further We how uhm, family, that father was the chair- to raise our testified Carter’s we wanted Department man the at be to his Neurology of where live so we’d close we’d Uhm, and family. they Medical School that his to family, my Southwestern close All plans interrupt- mother a soсial of this that was worker. were definite were destroyed. testimony objection. was admitted without ed and dreams that were presented testimony from The State also explained position that her She also Bassett, the President Pub- Claire Vice for jeopardized and medical school became College Baylor lic at the of Medi- Affairs coun- that took off and received she time cine. testified that she knew She Carter seling. first-year as a medical student “because he father, Carter, also Gregory Carter’s Dr. top Defense

was one of our ten students.” he explained Dr. testified. Carter testimony. objected to this At a counsel and from Dallas to Houston his drove wife conference, judge bench trial the sustained evening they of their son’s learned disregard No to objection. instruction “painful He described it as a murder. given. Bassett then tes- requested was of “a certain amount disbelief drive” with of her tified that Carter was one medical real, really ... could this could that this his picture. students and she identified himself, Dr. happen.” Carter described objected to Bassett identi- Defense counsel wife, son, his their and the students other objection fying picture, but that was “very upset.” the medical school overruled. son’s impact his When asked about the him, said it was upon death had Dr. Carter Phase 2. Punishment a “considerable “devastating.” lost He rested, the State After defense difficulty keep- “had of work” and amount victim-relat- give called three witnesses ing subsequent that.” up that, testimony. ed testified be- Bassett explained also that his wife Dr. Carter many cause medical students were making really good progress had been death, upset by Carter’s the medical school death, her before their son’s career taking permit delay students to decided afterwards, full she unable work also they if so chose. school exams “markedly disabled time and had become psychiatric its at the placed faculty all of did suffer depression.” only with Not she disposal counseling, of the students for however, but “depression grief,” and needed. developed an at- months later “she few that, death, Saifi testified with Carter’s multiple tack sclerosis.” of friend, loss her best and this she lost grief said Dr. Carter testified daily her life on a basis. She changed by mitigated destroyed losing future Carter was somewhat “really his death their other son’s new planned happy I each event of and had Matt birthday ap- marriage. But when Carter’s explained that she and Carter other.” She His proached, the memories came back. had to be married the end planned or hole in the “major rip his absence year school first medical and the family, their fabric” of the victim’s destroyed plans their death had felt “like hunk particular brother dreams: support jury’s been taken out his heart.” Dr. Carter sufficient affirmative good victim person also extolled the as a spe dangerousness” “future answer parents very “You proud: whom his were reviewing legal suf cial issue.4 When know, you a child up right raise to be with support ficiency of evidence to God, your right family right with issue, jury’s answer this we view community, their a shin- and Matthew was light in the most favorable to all ing example proud that. We were so and determine whether verdict himof and so of all that he had done proud of fact have believed rational trier could accomplished and all that had what he prob reasonable there is a beyond a doubt person kind of was.” Dr. testi- Carter *13 commit ability that defendant would fied that the also painful memories were acts of violence that would consti criminal brought August his back 2001 when continuing society.5 tute threat to (the grandfather) father died of victim’s natural and then again Septem- causes on claim, appellant’s In ob- response again ber 18 we saw on the “when news appellant just per- one serve that shot not again and the families that those suffered son, two, shootings and but those occurred sudden and violent losses their loved on occasions. participated different He ones” during Sep- the terrorist attacks on robberies, at least five of which were two tember 2001. regard after murder. Carter’s With The day, sought next defense counsel Cherry, jury could rational- shooting of “bystander’s introduce a bill” to Dr. reflect ly appellant that intended to kill believe testimony. Carter’s demeanor during his her, Defense counsel contended that Dr. Carter least whether she or at did care stop “had to he crying was several while jury The had lived died. also evidence talking times in about his his wife and intentionally that killed appellant Carter son.” the prosecutors One of expressed despite pleas despite his for mercy and disagreement char- with defense counsel’s appеllant money offer to allow to withdraw acterization of Dr. Carter’s demeanor. with his ATM card. stated, Carter, prosecutor The “Doctor paused he very at all was in nature. brief jury The was also entitled disbelieve couple There guess were times I I Phillips appellant’s claim that was the would refer to it as his voice broke he believe, instead, group leader of and did not The judge sob.” trial did not appellant Appellant that was the leader. comment on contrasting these views Cherry Phillips, had robbed without testimony. jury rationally could have believed that appellant Phillips intended to rob before II. ANALYSIS recognizing him. The could consider Sufficiency A. of the Evidence— appellant personally the fact that abducted Dangerousness Future robbery two different victims and robbed Legal Sufficiency them in them was alone their while In point eight, appellant error

contends in legally evidence was (Tex. 4. The probabili- "whether there asks is a Russeau ty that the defendant would commit criminal Crim.App.2005). acts of violence that would a con- constitute 37.071, tinuing society." threat Art. 2(b)(1). § dangerous, and there was cars.6 evidence own drugs prison.8 can be found addition, In there was evidence The legally evidence was sufficient to ap- gang-related, murder Carter’s was support jury’s affirmative answer to Crips gang, pellant was associated with the dangerousness special the future issue.9 indeed, still associ- eight Point error is overruled. gang he was Crips ated with the while capital murder incarcerated Sufficiency 2. Factual that he charges. could believe gang to be a member in continue nine, point appellant argues of error pose danger to other prison thus factually that the is insufficient to staff. prison inmates affirmative answer to support jury’s dangerousness” special the “future issue. Moreover, rationally jury could have consistently conduct declined to We gang believed that continued factual-sufficiency context.10 review this not in membership that he showed Point of error nine overruled. about his criminal activities. repentant fact *14 Likewise, ap- could jury the have viewed B. Indictment’s Failure as evidence pellant’s disciplinary record Allege Special Issues getting he not reformed after that had Indeed, be- jury the could have caught.7 eleven, con point apрellant In of error instigated all or most appellant that lieved that not authorize tends the indictment did disciplined. fights of the for which was be imposition penalty of death of trial Finally, aspects appellant’s various con allegation cause it not include an did was testimony Phillips claim spe forming dangerousness future —his “technically leader, his use of words upon cial issue. relies Apprendi He his or involve- speaking” describe blame previously Jersey.11 New decid We ment, that the crime commit- his claim was adversely posit to appellant’s ed this claim of drugs, under influence and his ted ion.12 Point of error eleven is overruled. severity of attempts to minimize his be viewed as Mitigation Special

motives and actions—could C. Waiver of indicating acceptance of appellant’s Impact Issue/Victim genuine. not responsibility was Evidence Character three jury through Points of error one ad- also could We observe made him drug victim-impact use dress victim-character appellant’s believe State, 766, 577, State, See 119 S.W.3d 781 758 S.W.2d 593 9. Jones v. 6. See Cockrum v. 1988)(defendant's (Tex.Crim.App.2003)(“even without two (Tex.Crim.App. dominant murders, the evidence of a brutal extraneous capital of future murder is evidence role murder, assaults, multiple gang of of dangerousness). supports jury’s membership conclusion appellant danger”). a future State, (Tex. 247 7. Reese v. 33 S.W.3d Cf. Crim.App.2000)(it capital inwas defendant’s (Tex. State, 521, 526 10. Roberts v. 220 S.W.3d jail awaiting best to behave well in interest Crim.App.2007). trial). 120 S.Ct. 147 L.Ed.2d U.S. 11. 8. Wilkerson v. (2000). 1994)(habitual drug abuse is (Tex.Crim.App. Roberts, dangerousness). 535. evidence of future Statutory Principles such of Construction relationship evidence13 and the of special Relying evidence to the issues. Resolution of first upon Mosley Ripkowski v. State14 and part points depends upon three of error State,15 appellant complains point of er- construing construction. statutory When ror one about the trial court’s refusal to statute, give plain effect to the mean we him the mitigation allow to waive ambiguous text is ing of the unless the text order to avoid the introduction meaning or the lead to absurd plain error type point this In evidence.16 could not Legislature pos results that the two, appellant contends that this kind sibly have intended.19 court When victim-related evidence is inadmissible plain mean upon called deviate from mitigation even with the In his issue.17 examine, ing analysis, among it can other error, point complains third object attained; to be sought matters: that the trial in denying court erred the circumstances under the statute request limiting instructions that would enacted; history; the legislative com admonish the compare statutory provisions, mon former law worth victim worth of others on the or similar including laws same sub and that not to would admonish the jects; consequences particular of a consider victim-related evidence in answer- conducting inquiry, our construction.20 ing the future Be- dangerousness issue.18 writing in mind that are not keep we cause the legal relating factual and issues slate; into account clean we must take points intertwined, these of error are we prior namely Mosley proge and its cases— *15 together. ny making discuss them our determination.21 —in readability 13. To opinion, judge request. following facilitate the of this denied this The then we will refer types sometimes to these of two occurred: general evidence under the more ''vic- term you, Judge. Thank [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: tim-related” evidence. separately submit it We would for "do not 1, not consider” Issue "do consider” for 14. 983 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). S.W.2d 249 2. Issue charge requested Second on victim im- 61 (Tex.Crim.App.2001). 15. S.W.3d 378 pact: testimony You have heard certain re- garding the character the victim in of this Appellant request 16. made this the before upon case the effect of his death and punishment phase began, of trial it was and you're You survivors. are instructed denied at that time. compare not to use this evidence to the of the life of to that of value the victim other Appellant might complaint 17. raised this in writ- victims whose deaths not result in trial, reurged great ten motion before and he the loss to their survivors or to the community. complaint before the State its vic- introduced testimony during Denied. punishment [TRIALJUDGE]: tim-related its rebuttal case. The trial court on denied relief State, (Tex. Boykin 19. v. 818 S.W.2d 785 complaint the on both occasions. Crim.App.1991). Appellant any limiting did ask for in- not Torres, (Tex. parte 20. Ex 473 structions at the time the evi- victim-related Crim.App.1997); § 311.023. Code, During charge Tex Gov’t dence was admitted. the appellant requested conference that the Moore, charge be instructed in the S.W.3d 566 not to consider 21. See State 225 type determining (Tex.Crim.App.2007); Pettigrew this "in an- 48 evidence (Tex.Crim.App.2001); Busby Special swers 1 trial Issues No. оr 2." The 771 216 Mosley availability testimony relating and Related the other

Legal Developments impact character” and the to victim and “mitigating introduced de- evidence Mosley, jurisprudence Before our fendant.” respect victim-related evidence had and confus- been “somewhat inconsistent holding applied only noted that We our prior conflicting plurality two ing,” with “unaware, at to defendants who' were Mosley specifical- decision opinions.23 crime, time of the of the victims’ character consistent, if “to ly set out announce a impact deaths or of victims’ always clear-cut rule to followed on will have others.”30 When evidence “[b]oth future cases.”24 The rule was that aware of shows defendant was character impact victim evi- victim things at the crime those the time admissible, context of dence are in the committed, then the victim-related evi- issue, mitigation special to show the “necessarily” dence would be “relevant to victim, uniqueness of the the harm caused dangerousness culpa- and moral his future defendant, rebuttal by the and as bility.” But when the defendant was not mitigating We defendant’s evidence.”25 things, of those the victim-related aware admissibility recognized that this rule of “patently would be irrelevant” to evidence subject to limitation under Rule dangerousness” “a of future determination the Texas Rules “when the Evidence26 only instead relate miti- and would com- encourages predominantly evidence said, Finally, we gation special issue.32 and lesser parisons upon greater based rele- victim-related evidence where morality of the victim.”27 We worth issue, only to the mitigation vant “[tjrial exer- judges should explained upon reliance the defendant could “waive their sound in permitting cise discretion issue, of mitigation submission about character some evidence the victim’s does, impact if he victim and character limit- impact lives while others’ and hence would be irrelevant the testimo- ing scope the amount and inadmissible.”33 to be taken into ny.” Considerations expounded upon Subsequent cases have na- under Rule 403 included “the account *16 up- Mosley’s pronouncements. be- We relationship of the testimony, ture victim, photographic held the introduction of evi- the witnesses and tween to the victim.34 testimony designed ... amount of to be introduced dence “humanize” State, delay, presentation of (Tex.Crim.App. or cu- 990 S.W.2d 267 undue needless v. 1999). mulative evidence.” Mosley, 27. 983 at 262. S.W.2d 262; Mosley, at 261- 22. 983 S.W.2d at see id. cases). (discussing prior 28. Id.

23. Id. 29. Id. Id. at 261 n. 30. 16.

24. Id. at 262. 31. Id.

25. Id. Id. at 263. 32. relevant, provides: "Although ev- 26. Rule 403 may probative idence be excluded if its value at 264. 33. Id. danger substantially outweighed by the issues, State, 365-66 prejudice, of the or 34. Solomon unfair confusion misleading jury, (Tex.Crim.App.2001). by considerations of Mosley’s Based on recognition aggra- to permitted have been effect such a waiv- vating circumstances are er, relevant that he estopped we held was jury’s of the mitigation special evaluation challenging of his waiver virtue own issue, we have held that a defendant is not request.40 Declining to address whether limiting entitled to an instruction the jury’s to right defendant has insist on such a consideration extraneous to offenses the waiver, explained further that the ques- we dangerousness.35 issue of future Relying ripe only tion be in case in “would which in non-capital case on Mosley’s Rule 403 the requested trial court refused a waiv- discussion, found that a we seventeen-min- concurring opinion, er.” In a Judge montage life, ute video of the victim’s set opined, Mosley’s Cochran in line dic- with music, unfairly prejudicial was ta, mitigation that the belongs issue should not have been admitted its en- defendant, and he should be allowed tirety.36 In cases in which the defendant “strategic forego exercise the decision” to victim, found, knew his we accordance it, if that is his desire.42 the dicta in Mosley’s footnote the victim-related evidence those cases Relationship between Victim- necessarily relevant to the defendants’ Related Evidence and the dangerousness future culpabili- and moral Special Issues ty.37 The only aspect of Mosley that has not Relying specifically statutory upon yet adopted been reaffirmed or as a hold- language mitigation issue, of the special ing is part suggesting discussion “[vjictim-related Mosley explained that ev that a defendant can mitigation waive the idence is mitigat relevant show avoid introduction of ing circumstances are not ‘sufficient’ to victim-related altogether. In imposing a life warrant sentence.”43 This State, Tong v. recognized part reading of the comports entirely statute the discussion being dicta and declined with the Supreme United States Court’s question address the because the defen- Tennessee,44 Payne discussion in upon dant attempted had not to waive the miti- relied,45 Mosley also of the relation gation issue and had thus forfeited error.38 ship between victim-related evidence and In Ripkowski, the defendant request did the mitigating aspects punishment to be that he permitted mitiga- waive the penalty considered a death case. issue, tion and that request granted.39 response to the claim that he should not In repudiating prior its decision in Booth (Tex. 35. Jackson v. Id. at 388-90. *17 Crim.App.1999). 41. Id. at 390 n. 48. State, 330,

36. 90 S.W.3d 336-38 Salazar (Tex.Crim.App.2002). J., (Cochran, concurring). 42. Id. at 395 Roberts, 532; 37. 220 S.W.3d at Jackson v. (quoting 43. 983 S.W.2d at 263 from the miti- 828, 830, (Tex.Crim. 33 37.071, 833-34 gation special issue found in Art. App.2000). 2(e)). § 707, 2597, 38. (Tex.Crim.App. 711 n. 5 44. 501 U.S. 111 S.Ct. 115 L.Ed.2d (1991). 2000). 39. 61 S.W.3d at 388. 45. 983 S.W.2d at 261. victim, ex Supreme may subjected the ‍​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‍Court he be to the death Maryland',46

plained weighted had in “unfairly penalty, robbery Booth but if the the which trial,” the in a capital imposing scales “vir second defendant participates does tually limits” “the rele respect victim, no to result in the death of a the death a defen mitigating capital vant evidence penalty may not be imposed.49 may concerning dant introduce own purposes, Most for our the importantly barring the State circumstances” while link be- Supreme specific Court drew offering quick glimpse “from either tween victim-related a mean- evidence and the the to extin life defendant chose which ingful assessment of moral blameworthi- guish or dem evidence] [victim-character ness: family the to the victim’s onstrating loss may that a We are now State view society which has from the to resulted properly conclude that for the [victim-impact defendant’s homicide evid meaningfully assess the defendant’s Supreme The Court decided ence].”47 blameworthiness, moral culpability and types prosecution these evidence sentencing it it at the should have before “simply are another form or method phase specific harm evidence of the sentencing authority informing the about caused by defendant. “The State by crime specific harm caused in has a in legitimate interest counteract- question, general type long of a evidence ing mitigating evidence which by sentencing authori considered in, is re- put defendant entitled ties.” further explained The Court just minding the sentencer such harm is allowed specific evidence should as an murderer be considered in though may punishing even result individual, is so too the victim an individ- possessed the differently defendants who unique ual death loss represents whose culpable same mental state: in society particular his fami- Thus, blameworthy criminal equally two ly.” turning “face- By the victim into a may guilty defendants be of different phase of a stranger penalty less at the solely offenses because their acts cause trial,” capital deprives Booth the State differing harm. “If a bank amounts of of its full moral force guard, gun pulls aims his at a robber having may prevent target, may he trigger, kills his necessary before it all the information gun put unexpectedly to death. If the for a proper punishment determine the misfires, guilt not. His may moral first-degree murder.50 identical, responsi- both cases is but his Further, indicated that Supreme Court greater.” in the bility former “the latitude giving the defendant broadest defen- respect same is true with to two evidence,” mitigating relevant dants, introduce participates each of whom Supreme as has done under Court been robbery, and of whom acts with each life; precedent, justly permitting entails disregard for human reckless costs prosecutor defendant “the human robbery first introduce of a of the crime of which the defendant stands participated results the death Id. 46. 482 U.S. 107 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d S.Ct. *18 (1987). 440 819, 49. Id. 111 2597. at S.Ct. 822, Payne, 501 at 111 S.Ct. 2597 U.S. (citation quotation marks omit- internal 825, Id. at 111 S.Ct. 2597. ted, added). bracketed material

219 convicted.”51 “It affront to such used to is an the civi- evidence could be show that lized human say mitigating upon members of the race to circumstances relied sentencing capital case, that at in a a not sufficient to defendant were parade may praise justify witnesses back- life sentence. ground, good character deeds of De- dangerousness” special But the “future (as case), fendant in this done without special issue is different. issue That asks: relevancy, nothing limitation as to but probability “whether there is a

may upon be said that bears the character defendant would commit criminal acts of of, or the imposed, upon harm the vic- violence that a continuing would constitute 52 tims.” society.”54 danger- threat The future statutory ousness mitigation special special all-encompass- issue issue is ing; was submitted in case con- focus in a jury’s partic- narrows formed to the ular Supreme require- way. Court’s Not all of mitigating evidence ment of according special defendant value is relevant to that issue.55 “broadest latitude” to introduce Most State mitigating evidence that the or the defen- evidence. It asked: dant might present “aggrava- wish to ting” or “mitigating” given can be effect

Whether, taking into consideration all of through dangerousness the future special evidence, including the circum- issue56 only special for the issue’s nar- offense, stances of the the defendant’s purpose: showing row whether or not the character and background, per- and the continuing defendant constitutes threat sonal moral culpability defendant, of the society. dangerousness The future is- there is a mitigating sufficient circum- sue does not present State stance or with circumstances warrant that situation pres- in the defendant can imprisonment sentence of life rather any ent types mitigating and all than evi- a death be imposed.53 sentence dence types mitigating and all Thus, the special placed virtually issue no purposes. Just as some evidence of miti- limits on types mitigating evidence gating may value be irrelevant to the fu- might particular introduced determination, ture dangerousness some mitigating purpose for which the evidence aggravating may evidence of value likewise might be considered. Under the logic of be immaterial. Payne, this all-encompassing mitigation is- sue included scope effect, within its victim-impact practical dangerous- the future and victim-character special evidence because ness on the jury’s issue turns as- 827, 302, 51. Id. Penry 111 Lynaugh, S.Ct. 2597. 55. See 492 U.S. 109 2934, (1989). S.Ct. 256 L.Ed.2d 826, (quoting 52. Id. at 111 S.Ct. 2597 State v. Payne, (Tenn.1990), Texas, Supreme 56. While the Court Jurek v. added). approval) (emphasis U.S. 96 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 929 (1976), optimistic concluding 37.071, was too 2(e)(l)(1999). § 53. Art. The current dangerousness swept mitigation special types the future all version of the issue differs reach, applicable appellant's mitigating the issue case circumstances within its only respect: 272-74, one pa- the words "without Supreme see id. at S.Ct. immediately imprison- role” follow "life accurately Court's least conclusion at re- 37.071, 2(e)(1). § ment." See Art. special scope flected issue’s that the was in- very respect deed broad with to the kinds of 37.071, 2(b)(1). § 54. Art. The current version to its that are relevant resolution. issue does not differ from the applicable appellant. version *19 220 ignorant specific of the facts person of the defen- dant was

sessment of what kind dant Is the defendant someone is or rela regarding is: who the victim’s character of iikely to commit criminal acts violence specific not tionships, then those facts are the the defendant knows future? When dangerousness to the future det relevant (it inferred) victim, may the and thus be the ar ermination.58 That is conclusion the character or of the is aware of victim’s find it to be Mosley, rived at and we others, the victim has with relationships that, if correct. the entirely And follows relationships the victim’s character of special part not a mitigation issue were become to the future necessarily relevant case, is the victim-related evidence determination dangerousness such because only mitigation special is the relevant defendant is the evidence shows the sue be inadmissible. would of kind of who kill someone person would net- particular that character or with that Mitigation 4. Nature of the relationships. to the extent work of And Special Issue the knowledge the defendant’s victim’s ability relationships give to the rise question then becomes wheth the reasonably foresee the harmful effects the right er had the to remove others, on the victim’s death would have case. special issue from the mitigation jury can consider that information likewise long Generally, a matter can be so waived dan- respect to defendant’s future with requirement or as it is not an “absolute gerousness. prohibition,” designed implemented to be By regardless parties’ wishes.59 hand, other when the defen On statute, permitted a is to “waive defendant victim, stranger dant is a to the and thus any by except that rights secured him law” character or does not know victim’s to a may right a defendant waive relating those relationships, evidence case.60 jury penalty trial a death help jury topics does not determine To person what kind of the defendant is. present Because case involves sure, stranger kills a be a defendant who initially examine penalty, death could realize that the victim is and should mitiga waiving whether submission or unique being, human her own with be tantamount tion would dreams, hopes and defendant Obviously, a defen waiving jury. trial peo anticipate could and should other is mitigation special dant who waives the mourn ple may passing. the victim’s jury sue have still received a trial things Those are a matter common dangerousness spe guilt and on the future prosecutor argue knowledge, could most, issue, only partial inter cial so at support without requirement trial if, But ference evidence in the record.57 committed, accomplished.61 waiving But time offense was the defen would State, (Tex. the defendant’s actual ousness to the extent of 57. v. 17 S.W.3d Martinez State, awareness. Crim.App.2000); v. 970 S.W.2d Nenno 1998). (Tex.Crim.App. (Tex. State, 59. Marin Crim.App.1993). course, stranger might 58. Of even crime been at the time of the of some aware 1.13(b). 1.14(a). Art. See also Art. (e.g. relating a victim who facts victim visibly Prystash pregnant), one See is famous or who (Tex.Crim.App.1999)("It danger- said that a waiver rendering to future evidence relevant

221 No one would jury classically a the defendant’s interests. foregoing trial involves statutory pro- argue that the shifting seriously determination of the matter to the from trial re- judge, withdrawing against waiving jury the matter a scription altogether. example, For instruction be quires consideration self-defense a Gaudin, a States v. defendant was the defendant’s against United submitted wishes.64 deprived right jury by of his to a trial course, remains to be determined Of what practice submitting prior federal is a mitigation special is issue whether “materiality” perjury element of a offense or an element of the State’s defensive issue jury.62 rather than In judge question. to that case. We turn next Texas, when a defendant’s of a even waiver mitigation special Whether by jury accompanied plea trial prosecution’s an issue is element trial the au- guilty, judge still retains im critically issue is case a defensive thority as the factfinder to find the defen- sub portant. A defendant cannot waive guilty dant of a lesser-included offense or prosecution’s of an element of the mission case, an In acquittal.63 even to render this But case to the finder fact.65 submis judge not seek to appellant did have strategic sion of a defensive issue is a issue, mitigation special decide the decision to be made the defendant and of it possibility being resolved in his attorney.66 only Not is a defendant favor; rather, appellant sought to waive permitted forego submission of a defen altogether. determination on that issue issue, sive he is also entitled to insist addition, no say one would If that a issue not be submitted. defensive forego defendant’s choice to a defensive mitigation special properly issue is issue amоunts to a of a trial. waiver issue, then it characterized as a defensive example, suppose capital For in a that the defendant have follows prosecution murder raises the of self- upon waiving its submission. right insist defense, but the defendant and his counsel reasons, decided that hold that submission of self-de- For several we would, balance, mitigation special fense be detrimental to issue is a defensive by jury, capital trial which is forbidden in a dants unwanted defensive issues in the sought case in which the State the death charge”). penalty, occurred when the verdict did not special required by include issue which was 868, State, 65. 74 S.W.3d 874 See Smith v. applicable statute. There are several fatal (Tex.Crim.App.2002)(submission of "deliber- with, reasoning. begin flaws in this To if this waived). ateness” issue cannot be See waiver, improper were an doctrine of State, 635, also Martin v. 200 S.W.3d 638-39 estops invited error from com stipu- (Tex.Crim.App.2006)(even if defendant Second, plaining face; of it. it is untrue on its felony jurisdictional priors in a DWI lates to jury. the case was tried to a The worst that prosecution, jury must be instructed on the can that the returned a verdict be said is elements). may estopped But a defendant "Xemphasis which did not answer one issue. challenging the failure to submit an ele- added). requested ment when he the lack of submis- 874; 2310, Smith, 506, Ripkowski, 74 S.W.3d at 62. 515 U.S. 115 S.Ct. 132 L.Ed.2d sion. State, (1995). 388-89; Prystash v. 61 S.W.3d at (Tex.Crim.App.1999). 531-32 State, (Tex. 63. Aldrich v. 104 S.W.3d Crim.App.2003). State, Delgado 235 S.W.3d 249-50 Posey, (Tex.Crim.App.2007); 966 S.W.2d at Posey 64. See against legal (Tex.Crim.App.1998)(warning “impose requirements that would on defen First, in Mosley, issue. observed both the older and newer versions of the *21 proof statute,74 burden of on the aggravated the State has no kidnapping and men- issue.67 are of no other situa- We aware penalty tal retardation in a death case.75 exempted in tion which the State Third, mitigation special issue is proving an element of its burden structured to make the defendant benefit case, guilt punish- or at own whether Ordinarily, from an affirmative answer.76 are more varied: ment. Defensive issues party “yes” that benefits from a an- sometimes the burden is on the State party to an issue is the swer whom on the sometimes the burden is defen- belongs. question guilt issue When a dant.68 But a hallmark of “States’s is- answer, “yes” is submitted for a or “no” a prove sue” is the State’s burden “yes” invariably signifies answer a vote issue. Likewise, guilty. finding” an “affirmative Second, mitigating spe- nature of the deadly оf a weapon benefits State.77 a suggests cial issue that it is defensive course, dangerousness” And of the “future mitigating factor can issue. Sometimes “anti-parties” special issues are offense, the elements of an be found within “yes” supports framed so that a answer voluntary as was the case with the old death, sought by being sentence statute,69 manslaughter “excep- or as an contrast, State.78 In codified various of an offense.70 application tion” to being issues lend themselves to defensive mitigation special But the issue for death “yes” submitted to elicit a answer cases is neither embedded penalty within benefit79 defendant’s nor is it prove elements the State must set Fourth, the miti- the defensive nature of Instead, mitiga- up exception. as an by gation special issue is indicated its special tion issue is framed as a stand- (e) placement in subsection of the statute. issue, punishment mitigation alone a char- The traditional- State’s issues have pun- acteristic it shares with a number of (b) ly been found subsection mitigating clearly ishment factors that are statute, capital sentencing where one can issues, in- including temporary defensive currently dangerousness locate the future intoxication,71 sanity by unsuccess- caused anti-parties special issues. Had the offense,72 of an inchoate ful renunciation Legislature mitigation special intended the passion the current sudden a mur- issue, case,73 it could place der release in a safe under issue to be another State’s Id., 20.04(d); parte § Ex 74. 67. 983 S.W.2d at 264. See also Tex. Pen.Code State, 20.04(b)(1992); (Tex.Crim.App. § Staley, n. 6 See Williams 160 S.W.3d 2005). 285-86 1993)(construing place" (Tex.Crim.App. "safe mitigating be a factor under the old law to ("De- Compare §§ 68. 2.03 Tex. Pen.Code issue). Defense”). defensive fense”), ("Affirmative 2.04 (Tex.Crim. (1992)("sudden 75. Hall § 69. See Tex. Pen.Code 19.04 App.2004). passion"). 37.071, 2(e), (g). § 76. Art. § 70. Tex Pen.Code 2.02. 42.12, Id., 8.04(b), e.g. 3g(b). § (c). See Art. 77. §

71. 37.071, (2), 2(b)(1) Id., (g). 15.04(d). § 78. Art. & § Id., e.g. 19.02(d). 79. See 71-74. footnotes § (b). simply added it to subsection the evidence. But there is at least one not, But it choosing did example instead to craft a other of a defensive matter that separate designed subsection. At point applicable every one time—indeed at penalty parole instruction, time of death case: the (e) only trial —subsection which needed contained another written defense re- provision quest involved to warrant its inclusion in clearly what was death рenalty defensive matter: case covered parole submission of a version of the instruction.80 statute that authorized the parole instruction. instruction was *22 Given some of the unusual only aspects submitted “on of death request written of the cases,82 penalty it is not attorney unreasonable to representing the defendant.”81 think that Legislature might the craft a Finally, mitigation the special issue was defensive issue that appear every would a legislative response Supreme to the by case default. Court’s decision in Penry Lynaugh. It that, This to the designed point, leads second to fix a constitutional defi- provision while the ciency authorizing parole the old Texas capital sentencing scheme, instruction contained give language giving not to advantage State an option it defendant the would not decide whether to have had under that scheme. instruction, submit the Allowing the subsection a defendant “opt out” of the “Penry” portion mitigation special authorizes the issue con- falling scheme— tains no language. back on such But what the we should Texas scheme would be that, remember under Penry like had not Almanza v. been decided —seems jury charge more in error is completely accordance never for- legislative with the feited; request intent the lack of a saddling objection than the defendant with an merely issue the harm supposedly analysis.83 that is affects Under his benefit but Posey, a party he does not in can forfeit the right fact want. complain about the omission of a defensive We see points three of distinction that issue because the defensive issue must be could be made the mitigation spe- between requested before the trial duty court has a cial issue and other issues that are tradi- place it in charge, and so no “error” tionally defensive, but, characterized as for occurs request.84 absent a below, the reasons discussed those distinc- tions do not dissuade us from our conclu- happens But what Leg when the sion that mitigation special issue is in islature enacts a defensive issue or instruc fact a First, defensive issue. one could tion that apply every will case of a point out that the mitigation special issue certain type, regardless of If the facts? is designed to be applicable every case. Legislature simply designates that the Typicаlly, a ap- defensive issue does not submitted, instruction or issue be pear in every case but by must be raised would construe the failure to submit as 37.071, 2(e)(2)(1999). fact, § 80. Art. ry upon finding maximum based a requiring jury Ap- thus a determination under 81. Id. prendi Jersey, v. New 530 U.S. 120 S.Ct. (2000)). 147 L.Ed.2d 435 See, Arizona, example, Ring for 536 U.S. 584, 597-609, 122 S.Ct. 153 L.Ed.2d (2002) 83. 686 (viewing penalty sentencing death 36.19). procedure (Tex.Crim.App.1985)(construing in which Art. aggravating at least one justify circumstance must be found to penalty constitutionally death required] [as is 84. 966 S.W.2d at 63. increasing punishment beyond the statuto- determination,

error, sentencing mitiga- tal benefit regardless who would issue, from To allow the omis- special special the submission.85 tion issue is a complete- issue, to be parole thus, sion a instruction a it is also unlike discrete forfeitable, then, Legislature ly had general punishment in non- assessment of a provision requiring include a defense capital Every other discrete issue cases. Likewise, request. the absence of a “re- belongs by jury be that could considered quest” mitigation special for the provision the State or the defendant. either mitigation special issue means issues, Moreover, by we think discrete But issue cannot be forfeited inaction. nature, belong to one of the their must not prevent does defendant Almanza parties. part Either issue is a rate, issue,86 an waiving case or a defensive issue. State’s provision already can permitting waiver in a general punishment assessment So, Legislature found in Article 1.14. “neutral” in the noncapital only case is specific not to attach a waiver all. that it is a discrete issue at sense provision mitigation Legislature intended to enact Had the *23 it to be waivable. neutral, mechanism con- non-waivable evidence, could that Finally, argue one the broad sidering mitigating could have scope mitigation special issue makes upon jury chosen confer simply sentencing noncapital (after it similar to the de- authority finding the de- to decide termination, an that which is not issue answering the future guilty fendant belongs There is no bur- party. to either issue) impose a dangerousness whether to respect of proof party den on either with punishment of “life” or “death.” But years might to the number did. Legislature is not what case,87 virtually in a noncapital assessed mitiga We conclude can be considered mitigating evidence tion issue is a defensive ‍​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‍issue special determinаtion, is in that the determination inaction but can be cannot be forfeited respect it is to the miti- normative as with issue, waived, and it is a defensive because issue,88 gation impact and victim special has its right upon the defendant a insist under and character evidence is admissible in this case erred judge The trial waiver. By guidelines.89 analogy, the same basic in to waive refusing allow attempt to miti- might one characterize the jury, of the to the and as “neutral,” submission gation special belonging issue as result, admitting victim-impact a party. noncapi- unlike erred neither But However, (In general by defense 85. Delgado, n. 34 86. a statement 235 S.W.3d at 252 Hui zar, Posey distinguished objection Court and ex this that he no counsel has instructing plained the difference between charge a waiv is not sufficient to effect such instructing on "defensive” issues (Tex. State, v. 137 S.W.3d er. Bluitt applicable them law is to all on the Crim.App.2004). State, cases)(quoting Huizar (Tex.Crim.App.2000)("In 484 n. 7 contrast State, 892, 896 Miller-El 782 S.W.2d See depends on the defendant's ‘defense’ (Tex.Crim.App.1990). n. 1 presented, theory case and the 3(a) applicability § is con of article 37.07 88. McFarland v. tingent party's theory either of the case. 1996). (Tex.Crim.App. Rather, 3(a) legislatively § article 37.07 is prescribed proof applicable ex burden of Salazar, 90 S.W.3d at 336-38. See offense and bad act evidence admit traneous cases.”)) non-capital punishment ted at in all original). (emphasis in and victim-character evidence that jury charge Preserved error is have otherwise been excluded. evaluated under harm” Almanza’s “some

standard the er unless we determine that 5. Harm nature, ror is constitutional in which “beyond case the harm reasonable doubt Appellant argues that the error this apply.92 Evidentiary less” standard would harmless, case should not be held contend- error is under the Texas Rule of evaluated ing that he “strong had a defense to the 44.2, Appellate Procedure constitu continuing threat issue” and that there is “beyond tional error evaluated under the “no jurors] assurance that [the would have 44.2(a) reasonable doubt standard” of Rule reached the same “if answer” that issue and nonconstitutional error evaluated un they had not impact/char- heard the victim der rights” the “substantial standard of testimony.” acter It not entirely clear 44.2(b). Rule argument from his whether thinks the error is immune from a harmless errоr In erroneously submitting the analysis or he merely whether thinks the mitigation issue, the trial court es error not harmless in his case. Nor sentially interpreted the issue as an ele appellant attempt does to explain whether ment of the State’s case rather than a the error issue is constitutional or non- defensive matter that could be waived. nature, constitutional or whether we simply That error is a misconstruction of apply should harm standards for jury Likewise, the statute. the erroneous ad charge error or for error in improperly mission of evidence constituted a mere *24 admitting evidence. statutory because, violation without the issue, mitigation special the victim-related State, said, v. “Except Cain we In evidence was not relevant under the statu for certain federal constitutional errors la tory scheme. As Payne abundantly makes by beled the United Supreme States Court clear, there is no impedi constitutional ‘structural,’ error, as no whether it relates ment to the consideration of victim-related jurisdiction, plea, voluntariness or evidence. The trial court’s errors in this any other mandatory requirement, is cate case statutory were rather than constitu analy gorically immune to a harmless error nature, thus, tional in apply we the The erroneous submission of an sis.”90 harm standards for nonconstitutional er unwanted defensive issue has not been la rors. by beled the United States Supreme Court as structural.91 We therefore conclude In conducting analysis, our harm we find that the error in this case is not “structur a number of factors that are relevant al,” subject and thus is to some sort of determining harm for the type of error harm analysis. First, before us.93 we must assess the State, (Tex.Crim.App.1997). 90. 947 S.W.2d 92. See 32 S.W.3d 236- Jimenez (Tex.Crim.App.2000). 91. See Johnson 235- Although are these the main factors to be (Tex.Crim.App.2005)(discussing Supreme analysis type assessed in a harm for the cases, including Court Johnson v. United us, preclude possi- error before we do not the States, 461, 468-69, 520 U.S. 117 S.Ct. bility particular relevant in a other factors (1997), containing 137 L.Ed.2d 718 the Su- Also, case. the discussion below assumes that preme Court's "most recent list of structural penalty the death was assessed. A trial errors"). court’s failure to allow a defendant to waive Third, prejudicial anti-mitigating effect of the evi- we must assess the relative positions on the strength parties’ dence admittеd but that that was issues, special particularly other the issue mitigation the is- have been excluded had dangerousness. of future dan- future given. sue not been Victim-related evi- gerousness determination is the one most range very dence can from the mild94 to susceptible to being by influenced inadmis- strong.95 especially that which is As we sible victim-related evidence because above, prosecutor may discussed ar- dangerousness special future issue is gue, respect to the issue of future (other only mitigation spe- issue than the dangerousness, general inference that issue) generally cial more on focuses person stranger kills a who knows person what kind of is rath- defendant unique should is a know the victim er exclusively during than on did what being, hopes human with his or her own prosecution incident from which dreams, people may and that other general arose.97 This more focus on what passing. assessing mourn the victim’s is person kind of defendant means that harm, consider, among things, other we called make upon is determina- arising the extent to the prejudice degree subjective, tions that are some general by this inference is exceeded resolving matters opposed of histori- generated prejudice by specific cal fact.98 If the on future State’s evidence victim-related evidence.96 overwhelming, error dangerousness then in refusing permit a waiver of the miti- Second, ap- must we determine whether gation special likely issue is more to be pellant any mitigating had evidence that appellate may harmless because the court significant impact mitigation had under the conclude that the defendant would have special apart impact from its under issue lost dangerousness future issues, and we as- special other must any event.99 sess of such strength the relative mitigating pro- and of the inference Fourth, parties’ should look arguments duced this evidence. to determine the error whether *25 37.0711, 3(b)(l)(deliberateness) special obviously mitigation (3)(prov- § would & ocation). imposed. be if a life were harmless sentence Solomon, (a 94. 49 few See S.W.3d 366 161, State, Compare 98. 961 McGinn v. S.W.2d family). photographs of the and his victim (Tex.Crim.App.l998)(no 169 factual sufficien- cy highly subjective 282, review due to the nature State, 95. v. 983 S.W.2d 289 See Griffith issue) dangerousness special of the future planned (Tex.Crim.App.1998)(victim fami all cеlebrations, State, ly Wardrip holiday v. 590-91 cared cancer-rid with father, quit fighting den and father the disease (Tex.Crim.App.2001)(holding that a factual died). after victim spe- sufficiency review the of deliberateness cial issue could conducted because that 445-46 See 63 Schutz issue, dangerousness, requires “unlike future jury legit (Tex.Crim.App.2001)(Wherethe can fact”). finding of historical imately infer from evidence a con admissible expert witness not al clusion that was States, 17- 99. See Neder United U.S. to, testify permitting error in lowed 18, 119 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d expert testify to conclusion is more that (1999)(omission “materiality” of element harmless). likely to be harmless verdict would offense because 37.071, 2(b)(1)(future Compare § dan Art. same). been the have gerousness) (e)(mitigation) & Art. with 37.071, 2(b)(2)(anti-parties) § Art. emphasized has been top ameliorated.100 Carter was one of the students at finally, And should examine in- any we Baylor Medical School. The would given by structions the trial court also have known Carter and Saifi might tend to cure or ameliorate the effect dating relationship were a serious anti-mitigating evidence that was likely marriage. was headed for And the improperly before the jury.101 grief by evidence of suffered the victim’s father, brother, bride-to-be, and even We turn to the first factor: mother, degree by to some consis- was prejudicial effect of the anti-mitigating evi tent reasonably gen- foreseeable dence that been otherwise eral inference that a murdered victim If appellant attempted admitted. had not grieving would leave relatives behind. issue, the mitigation special waive State’s evidence would not have exceeded point We also out that the victim-related (un permissible what was under Rule 403 appellant complains evidence of which guidelines der the in Mosley), articulated spans only pages ten of nearly pages recognize that some of this evi punishment phase testimony. And dence moderately was strong. Carter was much testimony of the victim-related individual, an excellent parents whose general. example, although For Dr. Car- deservedly proud him, good were and a ter did characterize his son as a “shining student with a promising career medical example,” he did not describe the victim’s ahead of him. He had a serious relation good qualities in any detail. ship heading toward marriage that was shattered аppellant’s actions. The evi Next, appel we address whether suggested dence that Carter’s mother suf presented any lant evidence that had miti just fered more than grief foreseeable gating impact peculiar mitigation associated with the death of a loved one: prosecutor issue. The suggested she disabling suffered a depression, which there was no evidence favorable to accompanied was later by multiple sclero the mitigation special under is sis. sue, except possibly youth, he ar But much testimony of this heard at gued mitigating: was not guilt phase trial, where came [Special encompasses any] issue two evi- objection either without or without a re- you mitigates, dence find that quest for an that re- instruction to disregard. Re- gardless blameworthiness, of the trial duces his moral I ruling court’s ap- pellant’s request mitigation suggest you waive the there is not any. The *26 issue, special jury only thing really they have known argue age. can State, 510, Haley State, 774, v. 173 S.W.3d 519 101. Ovalle v. 13 S.W.3d 786 (Tex.Crim.App.2005)(appropriate to consider (Tex.Crim.App.2000)(other portions of emphasized whether State the error in admit jury charge analysis jury relevant to harm of a ting victim-impact extraneous offense evi error); State, charge Waldo v. 746 S.W.2d dence); State, 180, LaPoint v. 750 S.W.2d 192 750, (Tex.Crim.App.1988)(curative 752-57 in (Tex.Crim.App.1988)(appropriate to consider flowing struction can eliminate harm from prosecutor exploited whether in erroneous evidence); improper Phillips admission of v. closing argument); struction in v. Hawkins State, 904, 911 n. 40 72, 135 (Tex.Crim.App.2006)(limiting instruction can (Tex.Crim.App.2004)(prosecutor's corrective harmless). sometimes render an error determining action can be considered in harm).

[*] [**] gation special issue—a point prosecu- argument. tor made in his age, suggest And I to is not a you turn We next to the relative factor, mitigating you but that is for on strength parties’ positions decide. issues, special particularly other future a, well, family. He is good from ease, dangerousness. In this future dan been, know, many you There so has only gerousness other is was people been for him all that have here recognize sue submitted. We father, his life. and all Mother Among State’s evidence was substantial. uncles, people. aunts and all kinds of things, the State submitted other People willing to He’s not always help. robberies, multiple shootings of аnd violent sexual, any subject physical, membership, in jail, gang behavior and abuse, type emotional but from lov- jury evidence that could construe as ing family, he a con- but does not have indicating of true and a lack remorse one, give science can’t him but I you and part truly on appellant’s accept failure you ask these questions answer based responsibility for his actions.

upon nothing and evidence and law just every issue, appellant On about had your else and we abide will verdict. answer, par- an the answers were Appellant ticularly credible. wished point intelli- Appellant could not to low that he mere believe was a follow- family, an other gence, or some abusive er, by that he dominated three differ- was be- bad circumstance his life that was people by ent at three different times: why yond explain control order Cherry robbery, by Phillips Butler in the capable of commit- person was kind of night occurring for various crimes ting point heinous crimes. He could to his killed, and Dunn at the time Carter was parent ... youth, “as knows ‘[a] money from an appellant tried to withdraw maturity underdeveloped lack of and an appellant ATM But it who machine. youth are found in responsibility sense appellant was alone people, shot two who more often than in adults and are more victims, in the car with two different among the These young. understandable Dunn froze appellant who took over after ill- result in qualities impetuous often ”102 up. considered actions decisions.’ But Moreover, youth precisely appellant produced known are aspects these while mitigat- testimony chaplain say he give of a had permit what would evidence, in “changed,” concrete ing youth effect to within the context of more prison disciplinary reports, issue.103 form of showed dangerousness special the future in the involved numerous So there was no evidence record one incarcerated —at least mitigating impact peculiar fights to the miti- while Simmons, 551, Roper deemed themselves foreclosed from consider- 543 U.S. (2005)(quoting evaluating ing petitioner’s S.Ct. 161 L.Ed.2d 1 dan- that in future Texas, Johnson 509 U.S. 113 S.Ct. Although might gerousness .... Texas (1993)). L.Ed.2d provided vehicles consideration of *27 other for petitioner’s youth, no instruction additional Johnson, 509 U.S. at 113 S.Ct. 2658 beyond given dangerousness as to future ("If any jurors transient believed thаt the required for to be able was order the qualities youth of him petitioner’s made less mitigating youth qualities to consider the of murder, culpable for the there is no reason- it.”). presented to jurors would have able likelihood that those matter, Ap- drug was a dealer. So any provocation. was without he what? letters to that he life pellant’s argue every Butler indicated that because We’d never a member of a had not gang still and life, was it’s a not because has because value And even in fact reformed his behavior. of are. you who expressed counsel defense dissatisfaction degree, the prosecutor At least to some appellant’s testimony with at trial. with defense coun- expressed agreement could regard argument, it With argument: sel’s prosecutor “exploited” said says one of agree, questions I not these mitigation improper spe- submission of the sorry for doctor and Mrs. you do feel by pointing absence of cial questions says one of Not these Carter. significant given that could be evidence sorry for you do feel Justin and Mar- issue, mitigating impact under that but it yam, their and Mrs. in-laws Carter’s of “exploi- is difficult to see that type how brother and his roommate and any spillover tation” could have effect on know, mean, you not friends. I does jury’s danger- determination of future Okay. say sorry feel for them. you do importantly, prosecu- More ousness. asking you I am to consider that. exploit tor did not introduction say you sorry do feel Does not impact and character but victim family. not in It’s there. defendant’s mini- joined defense counsel’s efforts to in fact the passage only part That any prejudicial flowing mize effect argument any that made prosecutor’s empha- that evidence. Defense counsel reference to victim-related evidence. ap- that the punish sized should not severely more pellant simply because his Indeed, argu- entire prosecutorial society: was a valuable victim member ment role in focused Uhm, nothing hope during that I I said relating to his offense and other evidence trial, now, certainly be taken should future The State charac- dangerousness. any sign disrespect as for Mr. Car- playing as terized dominant Uhm, family. put your- ter’s it’s hard role in murder and two of Carter’s position. their self It’s hard know Appellant depicted other robberies. you thing how would deal such a with accept- as not a conscience and not having you a jury expressing as are all of ing prosecutors One of the responsibility. feelings you society our as a make when appellant variously “unpre- described judgment And, in a case like this. dictable,” “cold-blooded,” “trigger- Carters, again, with no disrespect to the thirsty.” prosecutor The also character- life, think about we value that person’s attempt ized murder as “an Carter’s Carter, think Matthew about if we value eliminate witnesses.” whole thrust life, Carter, person’s Matthew argument was on the future State’s say because he was a fine we’re person issue, dangerousness special only with of Per- going punishment increase the issue, mitigation brief comment on the ry Inevitably Williams. what attempt impact no use the victim causes, imagine person at the Block- and character evidence. just drug buster was a dealer. That Finally, we observe that selling come from a club cocaine. That no judge limiting trial instruction gave place. he was Matthew Carter’s type other remedial instruction something that be that we as Would flowing any prejudice lawyers argue you might as a lessened defense It didn’t evidence. We guy good. This was no from the victim-related jury? *28 not a out no instruction to request objection out that did where point appellant (and time re- limiting disregard given instruction at the the evi none was was request A failure presented. dence was to quested). dangerous- State’s future limiting at the time a instruction evidence multi- strong, including ness evidence was the evidence admissi presented renders robberies, multiple shootings, violent ple the trial purposes ble for all relieves murder jail capital incidents in while the to a limit judge obligation of include prosecution pending, appellant’s own jury charge.104 It is ing instruction in the indicating gang his continued writings that failed a appellant also true to obtain membership, and disastrous to ruling request on his to instruct the performance during cross-examination consider victim-related evidence under not in conveyed that he was issue. re dangerousness the future With fact his crimi- accepting responsibility for to his third of error —the fail spect point nal And finally, prosecutor conduct. give limiting of the trial court to ure impact did and charac- not use victim on appellant’s instruction —these failures closing argument ter in his evidence fatal claim. But the first part are to his its joined minimizing counsel in defense logically of error an issue point deals with jury. of relevance front Consider- limiting prior question of whether a discussed, con- ing everything have we we given instruction should be —whether harmed appellant clude that was not should been victim-related evidence have of the trial court's erroneous submission Although party at has a admitted all. and the result- mitigation special issue duty judge the trial attempt prevent ing impact of and charac- admission victim error, falling duty once that has into ter evidence. judge trial been fulfilled and the neverthe error, really commits the onus is less an summary, respect point remedial judge the trial to take measures mitigation special error of the one—waiver may the harmfulness of the mitigate resulting issue of victim- admission error.105 tri- conclude that the related evidence—we al erred but the error was court did Although appellant not have point of error respect harmless. With other youth than could evidence two, evi- the admission victim-related mitigation under the been used his favor question, irrespective dence of the waiver the trial court took no not err. we that the trial court did find limit the of the remedial action to effect three, point respect With of error evidence, the other factors victim-related instruction, limiting submission of finding weigh strongly in the error favor not err find that the trial court did harmless. The victim-related evidence limiting instruction failing to submit only up part took a brief the record. failed jury charge because elicited was of Most evidence request at the time the one reasonably foreseen as type could be through one admitted. Points error arising from a murder. Much of the evi phase three guilt at the with- are overruled. dence was elicited given question not of 892- instruction is a of error 46 S.W.3d 104. Hammock v. only ruling (Tex.Crim.App.2001). harm because adverse ‘‘[t]he —and making only thus a mistake— occasion for Hawkins, (explain 105. Cf. motion for was the trial court's denial of the ing grant a after an that the failure to mistrial mistrial.”). objection has a curative been sustained *29 Impact Testimony audiotaped portion D. Execution of co-defendant Dunn’s not at- police. statement to the He did four, point appellant In of error claims Dunn himself because Dunn’s tempt to call refusing the trial court erred in to Dunn parties informed the attorney present testimony him to from his allow right his Fifth Amendment would invoke impact execution mother about his defense not to incriminate himself family. on would have his He asserts that According at trial. called him as witness and Eighth this violated his Amendment to of the state- transcription audiotaped rights. previously Due Process We have ment, [appel- “pushing Dunn Carter saw “a decided that trial court does not abuse heard away whatever” then lant] excluding its discretion ‘execution-im- appellant’s gun discharge. Dunn did not pact’ testimony.” Point of four is error actually appellant shoot Carter. see overruled. Appellant argued at trial that this cor- E. “Residual Doubt” Instruction roborating evidence relevant was six, In point appellant of error contends mitigation because constituted question refusing request trial court erred in his “a of offense” that miti- circumstance that a residual doubt instruction be includ- gated culpability Appel- his crime. punishment charge. ed in We lant further claimed that this evidence was appel- have decided this to adversely vital case its to his exclusion would position.107 lant’s Point error six is preclude presenting him from defense. his overruled. argued The State evidence was any to of the issues relevant F. Hearsay Statement/Right merely appellant’s to re- attempt to Present Defense litigate issue of or innocence. guilt five, In point error com- appellant noting After United Su- several States plains that the trial court him denied his cases, trial found preme judge Court Sixth present Amendment right de- “arguably that the inher- statement was fense Eighth right and his Amendment “to ent[ly] trustworth[y.]” The then judge jury’s obtain the effective consideration of to testi- appellant confirmed that intended his mitigation pun- defensive on evidence fy substantially the same facts stated ishment” when hearsay it excluded the the complained-of judge evidence. accomplices statement one of his be ex- concluded that the should purportedly supported his “factual and merely cluded because a statement state-of-mind defense.” testimony corroborated Appellant expressed his intention to tes- crucially important “not the determina- tify punishment at stage of trial that punishment tion of thе issues he kill Appel- had not intended to Carter. phase Appellant reurges of trial.” his holding lant maintained that he had been complaints appeal.

the gun to Carter’s head when Carter appellant sought to pushed him and caused To the extent appellant up’ pull gun’s testimony support prop use Dunn’s trigger. ‘tens[e] intend kill an effort to osition that he did not Car corroborate version events, ter, relitigate attempted sought to introduce a the issue (Tex. Roberts, at 532. Gallo Crim.App.2007). *30 1)

guilt, not to do state entitled so.108 constitutional violation: when a however, Assuming, that the evidence evidentiary categorically arbi- rule ap- support proposition could also the that trarily prohibits the defendant from offer- impulsive pellant’s decision to shoot was relevant, ing otherwise reliable evidence premeditated, than ad- rather we further 2) defense; which is vital to his and when dress claim. clearly ruling ex- trial court’s erroneous relevant, cluding reliable otherwise evi- instances, In the exclu some portion dence forms such a of vital can sion of a defendant’s evidence amount the effectively precludes case the defen- right compel to the a violation of to presenting dant from defense.114 In the in the attendance witnesses defendant’s scenario, infirmity first “the constitutional Amendment, ap favor.109 Sixth made arbitrary is in the rule of evidence it- to plicable through the states Four 115 scenario, In rule self.” the second “the Amendment, guarantor teenth is a firm appropriate, but the trial court itself compulsory constitutional assurance of erroneously to applies the rule exclude to process obtain favorable witnesses.110 to admissible evidence such an extent application an of the local rules When effectively it “fundamentally prevents be unfair” or consti defendant 116 rights directly affecting the presenting theory.” tutional ascer defensive his guilt implicated, tainment are the rules princi Even if the constitutional mechanistically

“may applied not be to de punishment In justice.”111 ples apply feat other set out to the ends above words, case, rules, in an local appropriate phase of a case—an issue we do not capital prohibiting hearsay, yield like those should not err in ex decide—the trial court did to protections. constitutional But this case, In this cluding evidence. every not mean that erroneous exclu does judge trial had the discretion exclude sion of a defendant’s evidence amounts police Dunn’s out-of-court statement a constitutional violation.112 hearsay and because it did because was qualify exception general an Potier,

In this Court noted “eviden- hearsay.117 Although prohibition against rulings rise tiary rarely level state some discussion was had denying fundamental constitutional against as a might qualify ment statement rights present meaningful defense.”113 interest, of the statement portion there explained The Court are two into contained rulings appellant offered evidence distinct scenarios which exclud- Rather, ing might self-inculpatory rise to the of a no assertions.118 level State, 659-62; Wiley 74 114. Id. at S.W.3d 108. Id. 399, (Tex.Crim.App.2002). 405 State, 657, (Tex. Potier v. 68 109. S.W.3d 659 Crim.App.2002). Wiley, 74 at 405. 115. S.W.3d Texas, 14, Washington U.S. 87 110. 388 116. Id. 1920, (1967). S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 1019 284, Mississippi,

111. Chambers v. 410 U.S. 117. Tex.R. ‍​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‍ Evid. 802-04. (1973); 93 S.Ct. 35 L.Ed.2d 297 State, (Tex. Fuller v. 803(24); Woods v. 118. See Tex.R. Evid. Crim.App.1992). S.W.3d must (Tex.Crim.App.2004)(statement be self- Potier, 68 112. 659. inculpatory be admissible under state against exception). Id. at ment interest portion Argument this of the statement related H. Parole Instruction what happen appellant Dunn saw between ten, point of error gun the victim before he heard the dis- judge contends that the trial erred over charge. ruling objections prosecutor’s And constitutional considerations do not punishment phase argument regarding pa require against hearsay that the rule eligibility dangerous role and the future judge’s overridden in this case. The trial *31 Appellant that ness issue. claims comment that Dunn’s statement was “ar- prosecutor the the misstated law invit guably inherently] trustworthy]” is not a ing jurors 40-year to the disregard holding that the statement in fact parole ineligibility in answering instruction reliable. We have found no facts in the dangerousness question. the future He appellant record and has directed us to improperly prevented claims that this none regarding the circumstances sur- jury effectively considering his “cru rounding taking of the statement. mitigating remorse, cial good evidence” of Furthermore, judge provided no basis behavior, jail prison classification con and for the designation “trustworthiness” ex- violence, trol of “aging-out phe and the cept to note that the statement was elicited nomenon.” Specifically, appellant com by police during officer interrogation. an plains argument about the following This is not sufficient to show objections made thereto: statement in fact reliable.119 As the [PROSECUTOR]: defendant sits Appellant has also failed to show day you’re in the courtroom this asked the evidence was vital to his defense. The to question. you answer this Do find trial judge clarified that would beyond from the evidence a reasonable testify to his version of the events and that probability doubt there’s a that the de- portion of Dunn’s statement that he fendant commit criminal acts to merely wanted introduce would corrobo- violence— Thus, rate that testimony. appellant was present able to his version of the to events me, [DEFENSE Excuse COUNSEL]: albeit not to the extent [prosecutor]. object. Mr. I He asks the form he Appellant desired. has failed to charge to read the and isolate it judge’s show that the trial ruling was erro- ignore parole provisions. neous. Point of error five is overruled. THE COURT: Denied. Request Argue G. to Last parole provision, [PROSECUTOR]: Mitigation you’re supposed because to consider seven, parole your decision, point reaching you’re of error appellant asserts question today. the trial asked to this by refusing court erred answer allow argue suggest him to last I regard [defense counsel] to the miti- Now what gation saying you put issue. We have decided is he into this issue wants this adversely appellant’s position.120 question going Point that he is serve of error seven is years day-for-day. overruled. Chambers, surrounding "provid[e]

119. See U.S. 93 S.Ct. stances the statements reliability”). (holding that the Due considerable assurance of their Process Clause right affords criminal defendants the intro- parties' duce into evidence third declarations 120. Masterson v. 174- against penal (Tex.Crim.App.2005). interest ... when the circum- closing argument prosecutor’s Judge, that’s own COUNSEL]: [DEFENSE striking to him comments: object I law. shoulder. defendant over counsel’s Judge you tells about page On argument This is the we parole law. THE Overruled. COURT: have, imag- I have and we’ll continue And I ask don’t re- [PROSECUTOR]: ine, doing as both this. long we’re Don’t let him re- question. this write I’m you why me tell I think what Let As the defendant question. write something you rely can on. saying is day, that’s courtroom this sits this you page Judge you 4 the tells On question are. This is before where get or to a life sen- sentence someone day you have to you. Today is the they’re murder ease capital tence it, to answer it you answer years 40 calendar without going serve question. today, this That any good time. consideration Judge, may I COUNSEL]: [DEFENSE *32 Now, reality tells day-for-day. means misrep- running objection a have here, goes if Mr. us that Williams leaves that counsel is resentation law Depart- in the Texas prison to a unit telling jury? capital a mur- ment of Corrections with Yes, sir. THE COURT: he is going life sentence that’s where der a years. for the next 40 That’s to be you. Thank COUNSEL]: [DEFENSE does they, prosecutor], fact. [the Now running that ob- Will [PROSECUTOR]: to a fact. He wants not that want jection be overruled? something on the argue grafting I’m Yes. THE COURT: there, you see it. that is not but statute to decide is You’re the law is. Judge’s [PROSECUTOR]: It’s the words what probability there a you’re looking Special the defendant —is Issue So when reasonable beyond society defendant a in you got that the to consider No. threat continuing be a to be for going doubt would is Perry Williams violence, of a con- commit criminal acts years.121 the next 40 society, and that’s the tinuing threat for a Legislature provided Before gets it put Not into after question. cap- in parole eligibility on jury instruction after 40 years, gets if he out out after in cases, of this Court plurality ital got in he a life years. put You cannot State that such Smith v. rejected the claim in because question, into the sentence constitutionally re- an instruction was says, very part, first it charge holding reasoning quired.122 The mandatory for the says punishment adopted binding later opinion was you capital murder of which offense in nu- has been followed precedent123 and guilty is death found the defendant not need merous later decisions we Department in the Texas or confinement Smith, rejected expressly cite here. we life. for Corrections rele- parole eligibility the notion of future jury’s to a determination completeness, point vant In the interest of dangerousness: in his responded counsel out that defense prosecu- 123. Broxton objection was made 121. No 1995). argument. (Tex.Crim.App. this tion to (Tex.Crim.App.1995)(plu 122. 898 S.W.2d rality op.). MEYERS, J., subject dissenting. proper is not in even context of be- special the second issue agree majority’s analy- I do not with cause jury considering when a wheth- of error. Appellant’s point sis first represents continuing

er a defendant surely the issue has Slowly mitigation society, ‘society’ threat the term in- been on its head and has become turned prison non-prison cludes both the than a tool to insure the nothing more populations.124 The issue implementation death. provide society a mechanism meant to with We subse- reasoning have echoed this declining to sentence a defendant quent cases.125 attorney The elected district has death. pa- Legislature When the inserted the penalty death prerogative seek the eligibility requirement role instruction require- in any case which meets the basic statute, specify it did not whether Penal Sec. 19.03. But the ments of Code instruction should have effect on the say mitigation jury allows the jury’s deliberation issues.126 give penalty it does not want to the death circumstances, Under those find we cannot of that case. As a the circumstances prosecutor fault arguing as an advo- result, society’s right it is as much as it is cate to the that the should defendant’s, and no defendant should eli- parole consider defendant’s minimum it. be able to waive determining gibility he consti- whether *33 that agree Appellant I with the the issue jury tutes a future to The danger society. so the hearing has become muddied that had the about mini- information on is often more detrimental mitigation parole eligibility, mum heard they also time By jury than the is to beneficial. the argument why defense counsel’s it on issue, mitigation they the consider have should be ex- judge considered. The trial agreed already that the defendant is a hibited no to either inter- partiality party’s danger and to sen- future have decided pretation played of the by parole role the or her See- tence him to death. Texas jury law instruction. The in a was thus Art. Code of Criminal Procedure 37.071 position give to to parole effect the law 2(b). Mitigation Sec. is the defendant’s instruction to the extent it was deemed try to to their opportunity change minds. appropriate. Point error ten is over- that By presenting may evidence of issues ruled. culpable defendant for his make the less actions, issues, horrible such as childhood The af- judgment of the trial court is abuse, addiction, drug mental problems, firmed. etc., consider that jury the has chance to been some situations that may there MEYERS, J., dissenting filed a opinion. of the defendant’s control that were out Therefore, to his contributed actions. PRICE, J., a concurring opinion. filed to rather than allow a defendant waive the JOHNSON, J., issue, give greater should structure and concurring filed we dissenting opinion. guidance on the issue so that is useable 37.071, 2(e)(2)(1999). § 124. 898 S.W.2d at 846. 126. See Art. State, 610, (Tex.

125. Morris v. 940 S.W.2d State, Crim.App.1997); Collier v. (Tex. 1997). Crim.App. ever, something and not that a defendant the held ultimately Court that the my dissenting want to opinion pres- waive. See Amendment did not bar Eighth the in Mosley v. impact Payne entation victim evidence. (Tex.Crim.App.1998). thus hold if says, “We that the State permit chooses to admission victim The Texas legislature promulgated prosecutorial impact argu- evidence and mitigation issue because United subject, Eighth ment Amend- Supreme jury States Court stated that the per may erects no se bar. A State ment give be able to consider must effect legitimately conclude that evidence about any mitigating evidence relevant a de impact the victim and about the background fendant’s and character or the family on the is murder victim’s relevant Penry Ly circumstances of the crime. jury’s decision to whether or not 302, 328, naugh, 492 U.S. 109 S.Ct. penalty imposed. the death should be (1989); 106 L.Ed.2d 256 Texas Code of no There is reason treat such evidence 2(e)(1). 37.071, Criminal Procedure Sec. differently other than relevant evidence point give was to to the method treated.” Id. at 111 S.Ct. 2597. voting against penalty death While specifically our legislature stated mitigating there are circumstances. The Procedure Article Texas Code of Criminal jury, has been representing society, given 37.071, 2(e)(1), that the section defendant’s give option a defendant background should con- character and penalty. disagree death I the majori say by jury, sidered does it nowhere ty given choice can be background victim’s character and waived defendant. legislature be. has should Because our do, however, why I understand defen- about the vic- not concluded the mitigation dant would want waive murder impact tim and the on the special issue allow State now be admitted for the family victim’s should present totally irrelevant victim-related deciding jury to consider when whether *34 Allowing evidence. such evidence turns imposed, penalty the death should be the mitigation special issue into a value-of- not read upon should take ourselves to life weighing test where the value of the I to legislate that into the statute. decline life victim’s that was is on one side taken from the bench. life is whether defendant’s valu- Therefore, respеctfully I dissent. enough spared able to be is on the other. type balancing This value-of-life test PRICE, J., concurring. specifically rejected by Supreme Tennessee, 808, Payne majority in result that the Court v. U.S. I concur in the 720, I do 111 S.Ct. 115 L.Ed.2d stat- in because not be- reaches this case refusing to ing impact that “victim not evidence is lieve trial court erred mitigation encourage comparative judg- appellant offered to to waive allow instance, issue, special notwithstanding of this our ments kind—for that the dicta my view, the hardworking, Mosley Legisla- a parent killer of devoted State.1 of the miti- penalty, deserves death but that ture has the submission made 37.071, gation issue, a Article reprobate murderer of not.” under does How- necessary (Tex.Crim.App. not 263-64 announced waiver choice’ was 1998); Tong See also holding in that and is case therefore ("The (Tex.Crim.App.2000) statement in dicta."). Mosley ‘newly a created claims 2(e)(1) Section of the Code of Criminal According plain blameworthiness. Procedure, mandatory, systemic a feature statute, operation of the the trial court is any capital punishment phase, op- not permitted not to assess penalty the death tional the parties.2 capital A defen- unless and jury until the has addressed dant cannot it. “waive” this question. That normative the defen- dant benefits from an finding affirmative statutory scheme,

Under our a trial (or may hung jury) court not a on the mitigation special authorize a death sentence unless and until jury issue has made an does not mean that the only assessment of the defendant’s relative play comes into if the evidence “raises” it. moral culpability in order to determine A capital defendant under Texas law does deserving whether he is of that ultimate not the option subject himself to punishment.3 plain language Under the penalty death a jury without resolution statute, penalty the death is not au- (or resolve) inability jury thorized finding without question the normative of his overall mitigating not, circumstances offered do Legislature death-worthiness. The in- has light non-statutory aggravating circum- simply dicated it not will tolerate a death stances, warrant life sentence. The de- sentence otherwise. fendant can neither forfeit the submission It is Legislature true has else- instruction, of the mitigation by a failure to provided where that a criminal defendant request by it or some other inaction or “may any rights by waive secured him omission, nor even affirmatively it. waive law-”5 But Article 37.071 does not The issue does not “belong” to either the “right” create a on the part defendant’s State or to the defendant. It is not a present mitigating It evidence. is the “defense” to the death penalty. We have Eighth guarantees Amendment said that party neither has a burden with right. Legislature respect implemented has to the issue of mitigation.4 It is a that guarantee, by judgment codifying normative the consti- for the jury to make se, “right,” based tutional upon -per mitigating whatever instead may either side present, that, formulating requirement combination before a with evidence of whatever trial non-statutory may impose sentence, court a death aggravating may circumstances against offered must find the defendant on relevant the defendant’s moral the issue of his moral blameworthiness.6 37.071, 2(e)(1) (b) § Crim. Proc. art. finding of this article or an affirmative *35 2. Tex.Code (trial that, jury (e) court "shall” instruct the in an issued submitted under Subsection of the event it applicable special answers the any this article or is unable to answer issue (b) affirmative, (b) (e) issues under Subsection in the submitted under Subsection or of this article, issue). mitigation it "shall” special answer the the court shall sentence the defendant to confinement in the institutional division of Department the Texas of Criminal 37.071, Justice for 3. See former Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. life.") 2(g), § prior as it read to its revision to ac- 2005, parole commodate life without at Acts State, 102, 787, 9, 2707, E.g., Leg., 1, 4. p. § 79th Howard v. 941 S.W.2d Sept. ch. 119— eff. ("If (Tex.Crim.App.1996). jury the an returns affirmative find- ing on each issue under submitted Subsection (b) negative 1.14(a). of finding this article and a on an 5. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. (e) issue submitted under Subsection of this article, the court shall sentence the defendant provide, example, 6. The statute not does jury to negative death. If the returns a find- "right” present that the defendant has the to ing evidence, does, issue mitigating submitted under Subsection and that the trial) conditions, to qualifications, There no or that the trial court was correct are It in the of refuse the case to prerequisites. is nature to allow this systemic requirement,7 “right” special not a mere the issue. “waive” submission of it, the he can under the legitimately of defendant that waive Without State cannot 1.14(a). sentence, plain obtain a the Article death under I con- operation of the statute. cannot grant I the Legislature that could have clude the trial that court erred in this case designed statutory the scheme in such a reject attempted the waiver way capital that defendants would have the plainly of con- statutory what the scheme option affirmatively mitigation waive the templates cannot be waived. special Legislature issue. Had the fact I trial agree Because do not that the scheme, likely enacted such a it would not erred, proceed, court I the would not Supreme have run afoul of the Court’s does, majority analysis. a harm conduct Eighth re- jurisprudence Amendment with the I given, For reasons concur spect necessity capital authorize judgment of the judgment Court’s that the juries give full effect whatever evi- affirmed, join trial not court’s do might capital proffer dence defendants opinion. the Court’s justification of a sentence less than death.8 my eye, way Legislature But to JOHNSON, J., concurring and statutory did does not design scheme dissenting. mitigation special optional make the way The parties. with the our statute articles of the Texas Code of Crimi works, of moral blame- nal are assessment Procedure deal with trials worthiness, non, indispensable very specific partic vel is an as to the duties step, ipants parties. in the absence of which the trial rights Many may impose mandatory court a death sentence. contains lan articles reason, guage, For the State entitled to Article this is followed a condition. (and insist entitled to insist on 33.03 must be would be commands that a defendant trial, object appeal, though personally present even it did not at at but allows respect trial that it must client and the court shall instruct to that evidence mitigating foregoing advantages disadvantages evidence its determine whether Instead, presentation punishment phase warrants a life sentence. it man- at the of his mitigation regard- capital giving dates instruction murder But see v. Lan- trial. Schriro -, mitigating may drigan, less whatever evidence U.S. S.Ct. (2007) (state presented guilt either court been 167 L.Ed.2d 836 punishment phase post-conviction holding capital court of trial. The trial defendant impose simply presentation mitigating not authorized to a death sen- waived applica- objectively tence this unless until issue is not an unreasonable givеn Supreme precedent tion of addressed. Court required a Supreme “never Court has specific colloquy defendant 279-80 to ensure Marin present (Tex.Crim.App.1993). knowingly intelligently refused to evidence”). mitigating nothing But about *36 Moreover, capital capital practical practical a a choice absolves as matter defendant's may present simply responsibility choose to the of submit- defendant not trial court the mitigating ting mitigation jury, man- evidence. a choice to the available Such the presupposes fully by Article that his trial counsel has dated 37.071. See also Tex.Code evidence, (trial mitigating ... investigated all art. 36.14 court "shall available Crim. Proc Smith, Wiggins jury charge dis- v. U.S. 123 S.Ct. deliver to the ... a written 539 (at (2003), tinctly setting applicable the least law 156 L.Ed.2d 471 and forth the case”). my way thinking) adequately advised their defendant to be payment, choose to absent after the advance a defendant cannot for commencement of See prosecutor trial. also Garcia a present bid evidence to a State, (Tex.Crim.App. S.W.2d 370 grand jury, can and neither dictate to the 1996). Likewise, the defendant must be trial court the contents of the court’s present offense, on a sentencing felony charge. voluntarily unless the defendant absents rights While some and duties are condi himself. TexCode PROC. art. 37.06. Crim. waivable, tional and others some statutes

Article 36.15 the requires trial court duty. create an unavoidable The state allow counsel for the state and the defen produce guilt. must Tex.Code dant present a reasonable time to written CRIM.Proc. art. Writ “counsel 1.15. shall instructions to jury be included within the investigate ... factual legal charge. The opportuni statute mandates grounds for of an filing application for ty, but require request does not a a corpus.” writ of habeas Tex.Code Crim. either require counsel or the trial court to 3(a). 11.071, § Proc. art. The state shall grant any request. such Article 20.03 application answer the defendant’s for writ says that an attorney representing the corpus. habeas Tex.Code Crim. Proc. state is appear entitled to before the 11.071, § art. capital 7. A in a defendant grand jury evidence, and present but does may case not waive indictment favor of presence mandate the of state’s coun information, an if the state is not even sel and during bars it grand-jury dеlibera seeking penalty. the death Tex.Code Crim. says tions. Article 26.052(g) that the trial trial, a capital art. 1.141. Proc. court shall grant request a for advance a jury defendant cannot trial if the waive payment expenses, certain if the trial state is seeking death. Tex.Code Crim. court deems request is reasonable. 1.13(a). Proc. art. case permits Our law a The United States guaran Constitution capital guilt defendant to phase waive right counsel, tees the but even that plead guilty jury, to the is may constitutional right by be waived always and only jury to decide defendant if prerequisites certain are met. punishment what will assessed. See Faretta California, 422 U.S. (Tex. Williams v. 674 S.W.2d 315 (1975). S.Ct. L.Ed.2d The Crim.App.1984). may defendant introduce evidence in his Many govern provisions silent, may defense or just sit as a capital trial of capital place upon murder the trial may defendant mitigating introduce evi duty; court an unconditional trial court dence or remain silent. Each of these jury (Tex.Code shall conduct a trial conditional rights parceled duties or is out Crim. 1.13), art. court, state, separate pun shall hold a or the defendant. Proc. hearing ishment the trial Each death negates duty condition that sought 37.071, (TexCode each Proc. art. right decision to can waive be in Crim. (3)(a)(l)), § only voked person duty and shall sentence the defen whose or right parole it is. dant to either life The trial court cannot force without 37.071, defendant to death art right (Tex.Code waive his counsel or Crim. Proc. (2)(g)). § dismiss a general provision case before trial without A that- states prosecutor state’s consent. trial cannot court shall deliver to the deny request charge.1 from defense counsel for court’s Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. Article charge 36.14 mandates that the defendant to examine the court's submit or defense counsel shall reasonable time *37 a parole rather than the court’s onment without specific

36.14. The article trials, imposed. article death sentence be charge capital-murder 37.071, two that explicitly mandates issues sug- my knowledge, one has To no ever jury always the must answer and third or of the first two gested that either both that, jury “Yes” instruction the answers clearly They may issues be waived. are issues, mandatory each the first of two the on the sentence necessary to decision by jury. must be the also answered it, then, the that Why to be assessеd. is the issue, necessary also third mandated in Capital

Article Procedure Case 37.071 assessed, to be decision on the sentence can be waived? the frequently given is ‍​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‍that answer 2(b) presenta- On of the Sec. conclusion state,” “belong to the first two issue evidence, sub-

tion of the the court shall mitigation the proof, has a of burden while following jury: mit the issues By issue is “the defendant’s issue.” waiv (1) probability there is a whether instruction, mitigation the ing giving criminal the defendant commit may fore reasoning says, a defendant the acts of violence that would constitute victim-impact of and vic presentation stall continuing society; threat state; a de by evidence the tim-character (2) charge the jury in cases in which up the instruction and gives fendant guilt stage permit- at the innocence evidence, may not and the state mitigating jury to find the defendant ted with victim- then evidence “rebut” 7.01 guilty party under Sections impact and -character evidence. We Code, 7.02, Penal whether See, e.g., Ripkowski said so ourselves. caused the death of actually defendant (Tex.Crim.App. actually did not cause the deceased or 2001). of might persuaded I the validi but intend- the death the deceased way if that were the ty position of that ed to kill the deceased or another or world, it is things in the real but worked anticipated that a human life would be world, capital not. the real defendants taken. only to mitigation instruction waive the that, by asserting find the victim- is admissi impact and -character evidence legal theory, ble under some other 2(e)(1) The Sec. court shall instruct the that the very state introduces if the returns an affirma- keep the instruction defendant waived issue submitted un- finding tive each waiver, benefits from the out. The state (b), it shall der Subsection answer in ways-no loses two defendant following issue: struction, no evidence. Whether, into all taking consideration first evidence, including possible I resolutions. The the circum- see two mere to rule that offense, is this Court stances of the defendant’s in- legislatively mandated background, giving and the character and pres- door” to “open the de- struction personal culpability moral does fendant, mitigat- and victim-char- victim-impact is a sufficient entation of there state; admissibility acter evidence circumstance or circumstances to ing evidence, evidence, other impris- of that like all sentence life warrant opportunity. Curiously, prose- cution not accorded the same objections it. written *38 governed by would be Rules of Evidence that,

403 and 404. The second if the waived, victim-impact

instruction is may

victim-character evidence not be ad- applies

mitted. The first limits to the

nature and extent of victim-impact and

victim-character evidence. The second en- gets

sures that the defendant some benefit

from his bargain.

I point dissent as to of error oné and judgment

otherwise concur in the

Court. Lynn ROUTIER, Appellant,

Darlie

The STATE of Texas.

No. AP-75617. Appeals

Court of Criminal of Texas.

June

Rehearing Sept. Denied

Case Details

Case Name: Williams v. State
Court Name: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Jun 11, 2008
Citation: 273 S.W.3d 200
Docket Number: AP-74391
Court Abbreviation: Tex. Crim. App.
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