Williams v. State
423 N.E.2d 598
Ind.
1981
Check Treatment

*1 FINNEY judgment of the Parke Circuit Court Finney

in the cause Richard O. v. John T.

Shuttle, Supt. Depart- Indiana State Police

ment, being Cause C No. 78 46 in said

Court, reversed, is cause remand- judgment

еd with instructions vacate ‍‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‍injunction dissolve of March

1979. DeBRULER, HUNT- PIVARNIK, JJ.,

ER and

Ivery WILLIAMS, Appellant, Lee Indiana, Appellee.

STATE

No. 781S192.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

July

599 rights. Plainfield, appel- have waived his Miranda The trial for Meyer, Douglas W. hearing the сourt conducted a on admissibil- lant. The evidence at this ity of the statement. Gen., Pearson, Atty. Palmer K. Linley E. testimony hearing was the of the town mar- Gen., Indianapolis, Ward, Atty. for Deputy on the shall who found Williams appellee. and elicited the statement. DeBRULER, Justice. The marshall testified that he discovered truck, the it “passed Williams out” in that peti- ease is before us on a This to awaken him took him about two minutеs Appeals, of transfer from the Court tion to shoulders, that shaking by the and him opinion of that court is District. The First walk appellant was unable to to the the grant 118. We the reported at 415 N.E.2d The trial patrol car without his assistance. and vacate the petition for transfer marshall if Williams under- court asked the below. being him. “I what was said to be- stood in a Appellant Williams was convicted did,” replied the marshаll. He also lieve he recklessness, a trial to the court of criminal “breathalyzer” test adminis- testified that a 35-42-2-2(b); felony, D Ind.Code § class fоrty-five tered on Williams within minutes stop causing injury, a failure to after and registered of this encounter .37% blood misdemeanor, Ind.Code 9—2-1- class A Thе trial court overruled the ob- alcohol. 40(b). jection and admitted the statement. following issues: appeal raises the The is on thе to a) The burden State court erred in: whether the trial that the prove beyond a reasonable doubt knowingly ad- finding ‍‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‍was that Williams voluntary, were waiver and the statement rights before he his constitutional vised of ruling in statement; reviewing the trial court’s b) find- incriminating made an weigh not the еvidence these matters we do knowingly waived his constitu- ing that he there is suf self-incrimination; simply determine whether but right against tional finding. support to ficient evidence incriminating statement c) admitting the State, (1979) Ind., See, 385 g., Rodgers e. v. evidence; (2) was suffi- whether there into case, the was In this evidence N.E.2d 1136. finding guilt support a of evidence to cient the waiver at the time uncontradicted that each on given, were Williаms and the statement 1979, m., 25, a. Wil- at 12:30 August On only evidence that in quite The was drunk. driving his truck on was drunk and liams he nevertheless spite his drunkenness struck a man Highway when thе truck doing was the mar- understood what he bicycle right-hand lane riding a statement, he did “I believe shall’s [under roadway. Williams edge of the the оuter is insufficient to This evidence stand].” Bain- stop. that afternoon a did not Later finding knowing judge’s trial Williams un- bridge Marshall found Town knowing waiver. advisement and his truck farther west conscious or judge for the trial requiring reversal error marshall roused along Highway 36. The incriminating state to have аdmitted him of his Miranda appellant, advised ment. him about proceeded question rights and he then said that the accident. Williams through Indianapo- Tipton

had driven II. analysis of Highway A chemical lis on for a and remand we reverse Since for blood alcohol. showed .37% his blоod of our determination trial because new issue, appel first we next consider I. sufficiency of the challenge to the lant’s Wе hold each count. supporting trial, admis- objected to the At Williams ‍‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‍reckless the criminal the evidence on ground that he that on the sion of his statement appellant is insufficient. knowingly ness not that he could was so drunk discharge therefore entitled to a on this driver of the truck that struck the cyclist, count. stop. not did State, (1972) Reversed and In remanded. 259 Ind.

288 N.E.2d this Court reversed con- PRENTICE, JJ., HUNTER ‍‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‍and viction for The reckless reckless homicide. *3 pro- homicide statute in effect at the time GIVAN, dissents with an in vided: PIVARNIK, J., which concurs. “(a) Any person a who drives vehicle Justice, dissenting. Chief disregard safety with for the reckless I respectfully majority dissent from the thereby others causes ‍‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‍the death of opinion. person guilty another shall be of the of- ” authority cites as the reversing fense of reckless homicide. . . . Ind. case on the recklessness, оf criminal (1971) Code 9-4-1-54 § State, DeVaney the case of DeVaney driving while intoxicated and Ind. 288 N.E.2d 732. It should be the center crossed over line of the DeVaney noted that appellant had striking going a car opposite in the di- been convicted of both reckless homiсide killing rection and occupant an of it. We causing the death of another while unanimously insufficiency reversed for only intoxicated. This Court reversed the evidence of part recklessness. We did so in reckless homicide conviction and allowed light of the existence within the reckless causing the conviction for the death of an- separate homicide statute of the offense оf driving other while while under the influ- causing the death of driving another while liquor ence of to stand. under the influence of alcohol. We said It is оbvious in DeVaney case that there that while evidence of intoxication both convictions could not be allowed to jury could be considered in determin- stand, as we had a dual conviction for a ing disregard,” whether there was “reckless single Further, offense. the сhoice was ob- it could not alone be sufficient to convict vious appellant since the specifi- had been for reсkless only homicide. The other evi- cally causing convicted of a death while dence, that the defendant had crossed the under the intoxicating influence of liquor. roadway, center line of the was also held to However, bar, in the case at Williams had be insuffiсient. only been convicted of criminal reckless- distinguishable is not from this ness. statutory case on the basis or on the factual appear It would ample there is basis. Other than evidence of Williams’ in the record to a conviction for drunkenness, there was no evidеnce of reck- recklessness, notwithstanding the lessness. appellant fact that was intoxicated. person engages “A in conduct ‘reckless- appellant’s As far as statement ly’ engages plain, if he in the conduct in driving had been vicinity the truck in the conscious, unjustifiablе disregard of accident, hardly statement itself can might harm that result disregard be considered to be crucial in the case inas- involvеs a substantial deviation from ac- appellant much as the found ceptable standards of conduct.” Ind.Code behind the wheel of his truck in the vicini- 35-41-2-2(c) (Burns Repl.) ty, making thus any person it obvious to sufficient, The evidence was how concerned driving that he had in fact been еver, on the second A mirror vicinity. In view of the other evi- Williams’ case, truck was dence in spot hardly found at it can be con- where thе sidered to be bike rider crucial to his conviction. was struck. Williams was found in the truck the same road vote, My therefore, deny would be to on which the accident occurred. This was opinion. transfer without sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact have PIVARNIK, J., could inferred that Williams was concurs.