Dеfendant (Appellant) was convicted in a jury trial of Burglary, a Class B Felony, Ind.Code § 35-43-2-1 (Burns 1979), Robbery, also a Class B Felony, Ind.Code § 35-42-5-1 (Burns 1979), and Rape, a Class A Felony, Ind.Code § 35-42-4-1 (Burns 1979). He was sentenced to twenty (20) years imprisonment on the Burglary conviction, tеn (10) years imprisonment on the Robbery conviction and forty (40) years imprisonment on the Rape conviction. The sentences for Burglary and Rape were to run consecutively, while the sentence for Robbery was to run concurrently.
This direct appeal presents the following issues:
(1) Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for bond reduction;
(2) Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for additional discovery;
(3) Whether the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion for a protective order;
(4) Whether the trial court erred in refusing to order the divulgence of an “informant’s” identity;
(5) Whether the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion in limine;
(6) Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s challenge to one of the jurors for cause;
(7) Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of Defendant’s other criminal activities;
(8) Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for judgment on the evidence; and
(9) Whether the sentences upon the Burglary and Rape convictions were excessive and unreasonable.
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ISSUE I
On February 2, 1979, an information was filed against the defendant and bond was set at $110,000, in accordance with the Marion County bond schedule. The defendant moved tо reduce his bond on February 6 and a hearing was held upon that motion the next day. It was determined at the hearing to reduce the bond to $20,000, and the defendant also entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, Defendant postеd bond and was released.
On March 7, the defendant’s trial was set for June 4.
On March 22, Judge Daugherty ordered a hearing for March 30 for reconsideration of the previous reduction in bond. The defendant opposed the order, and on March 29 moved for a change of judgе. At the March 30 hearing, Judge Daugherty, over the defendant’s objection, premised on the Judge’s lack of jurisdiction, reset Defendant’s bond at $110,000. But, on April 2, the change of judge motion was granted, and the case was transferred to Judge Tran-berg. Defendant, thereafter, moved for a reduction in bond before Judge Tranberg, who denied the motion.
Defendant contends that the bond was excessive and that, because he was unable to meet it, his ability to aid the defense was diminished. He also argues that Judge Daugherty was without jurisdiction to increase the amount, inasmuch as a motion for a change of judge was pending.
We need not consider the defendant’s challenge to Judge Daugherty’s jurisdiction. The defendant’s motion for a change of judge was ultimately sustained and another bond reduction hearing was held before Judge Tranberg. Thus, the defendant had the amount of his bond considered upon its merits and determined by a judge, who, without question, possessed jurisdiction. The matter lay within his sound discretion.
See Hughes
v.
Sheriff,
(1978)
*331 ISSUES II & III
The defendant was originally charged with two rapes, which were two of six recent incidents known as the “southside” rapes. The defendant sought and received complete discovery as to the two rapes with which he was charged. However, on March 26, 1979, he moved for additional discovery with regard to the other four rapes. Specifically, he sought all the reports made by the Indianapolis Police Dеpartment, the Marion County Sheriff’s Department, the Indiana State Police Department and the Marion County Prosecutor’s office with reference to the other four rapes. The State opposed the motion and moved for a protective order. The trial court held a hearing on the matter on May 10, 1979 and denied the defendant’s motion.
The defendant now contends that the trial court erred in denying the motion. He asserts that the information sought wаs material to the defense, because if it could have been shown that the other four rapes were committed by someone other than the defendant, then it was less likely that he committed the two rapes with which he was originally charged. The defendant also contends, for the same reason, that the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion for a protective order.
We have assiduously combed the record in an attempt to determine whеther the trial court granted the State a protective order. While our attempt was futile, we perceive the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for additional discovery to be tantamount to a granting of a protective order. Accordingly, the two issues have been merged.
The scope of criminal discovery generally lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Vaughn v. State,
(1978)
ISSUE IV
The defendant next assigns error to the trial court’s refusal to compel the disclosure of an “informant’s” identity. The “informant” had contacted the police and told them that the defendant may have been involved in the “southside” rapes. The police responded by including the defendant’s photograph in a photographic array displayed to three of the rape victims, two of whom selected the defendant’s picture as depicting one of their assailants. Defendant contends that the “informant’s” identity was necessary for investigative purposes, with a view toward a potential motion to suppress the idеntifications. We do not agree.
In this case, the only effect of the information was to prompt the inclusion of Defendant’s photograph in an array. The identifications did not in any way hinge upon the credibility of the informant and Dеfendant could have gained nothing from knowing his identity.
McCulley v. State,
(1971)
ISSUE V
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion in li-mine prohibiting disclosure to the jury of the results of a polygraph examination which had been given to the defendant. Thе defendant had earlier undergone another polygraph examination, under an agreement that the results could be admitted into evidence. He submits that such stipulation “carried over” to the second polygraph exаmination, but we do not agree.
*332 At the outset, we note that the record is devoid of a valid stipulation to the admissibility of the results of the first polygraph examination. Although the record contains a writing which purports to be a stipulation of admissibility, it does not bear the signature of a representative of the State.
Assuming the validity of the purported stipulation, however, there is no basis for concluding that it was intended to extend to the second examination, which hаd been arranged by Defendant without prior approval of the State and administered without any participation on behalf of the State, by a private examiner.
ISSUE VI
The defendant next contends that the trial court erred in dеnying his challenge for cause to one of the jurors. The challenge was based upon the alleged bias or prejudice of the juror, see Ind.Code § 35-1-30-4(11) (Burns 1979), in that she had admitted having once been the victim of a burglary or robbery. The contеntion is without merit, as the juror also swore that she would be able to give the defendant a fair trial. There is no basis in the record for concluding that she violated her oath.
ISSUE VII
The defendant next contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his other criminal activities. As stated hereinbefore, the defendant was originally charged with two counts of rape. However, pursuant to his motion, the two were separated for trial. One rape occurrеd on December 27, 1978 and the other on January 4, 1979. The case before us relates to the December 27 offense, and the defendant asserts that the trial court erred in admitting testimony that he committed the January 4th rape.
The evidеnce was admissible under the “common scheme or plan” exception to the general rule excluding evidence of an accused’s other crimes. “This exception requires much more than mere repetition of similаr crimes; ‘The device used must be so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature.’ ”
Biggerstaff v. State,
(1977)
ISSUE VIII
The defеndant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment on the evidence at the close of the State’s case-in-chief. In support thereof, he submits that the State did not prove that it was the defendant who actually cоnsummated the rape.
While the matter may be deemed waived because the defendant submitted evidence subsequent to the denial of his motion, e.
g., Parker
v.
State,
(1976)
*333 ISSUE IX
The defendant’s final contention is that the sentences imposed upon the Rape and Burglary convictions are excessive and unreasonable. He submits thаt the trial court did not substantiate the enhanced sentences for the Rape and Burglary convictions with a statement of reasons. Further, he asserts that the trial court erred in denying him a psychiatric evaluation and in failing to takе into account his “no prior felony” record.
Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the trial court did make a statement of reasons in support of the enhanced sentences as required by Ind.Code § 35-50-1A-3 (Burns 1979).
See Page v. State,
(1980) Ind.,
Although the defendant set forth the denial of his motion to have an additional person with him at counsel table in his Statement of Issues, he has presented no argument thereon. Ind.R.App.P. 8.3(A)(7).
We find no reversible error. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.