Williams v. State

statute, repay attorney companion Krovitch to fees rests Additionally, a. 34-10-1-2, light of the facts within its discretion. § states: Ind.Code presented, that there was no abuse of we find person If the court is satisfied discretion. application proceed as an [to who makes an person] does not have sufficient indigent action, or defend the prosecute

means to CONCLUSION the court shall above, For the reasons stated the evidence (1) prosecute or applicant admit supported trial court’s decisions to dis- person; and indigent an defend as pense adoption with Krovitch’s consent to the attorney prose- assign an to defend proceeding, to terminate Krovitch’s court- cute the cause. counsel, appointed and to order Krovitch to above, County. Notwithstanding attorney the court fees to the reimburse “if the assigning counsel also annul an order Judgment affirmed. representation person assigned [who (1) any im- indigent person] guilty is an BAILEY, JJ., DARDEN and concur. § proper 34-10-2-2. conduct.” I.C. case, In the instant the court found misrepresented indigency

that Krovitch status in an affidavit he had submitted to the

court. Krovitch testified at trial that he was

employed earning overtime as full-time and well but not informed the court of his had WILLIAMS, Appellant- E. James employment. R. at 828. Krovitch Defendant, job not wanted a also testified that he had burgers” he left one “flipping and that had job concerned about what because he was Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. STATE at work. doing Colleen was when he was consequently found that Krovitch The court No. 48A02-9707-CR-463. voluntarily unemployed. R. at had been Appeals Court of of Indiana. result, judge the trial could 549-552. As in- misstatements in his find Krovitch’s Aug. “im digency affidavit rose to the level of Sept. Rehearing Denied § proper conduct” under I.C. 34-10-2-2. Therefore, it was not erroneous to terminate by court-appointed representation

Krovitch’s counsel. Attorney Repayment Fees

IV. Finally, while I.C. 34-10-2-2 al appointing an order lows for annulment of counsel, regarding provision there is no attorney repre

obligation repay fees once recog sentation has ceased. we un policy nize here the same considerations derlying statutory provision annulling assigning

an order counsel. Our case law places in the indigency determinations sound Campbell v.

discretion of the trial courts. (Ind. Group, Criterion 1992). party’s purported As a abuse of indi- rewarded, gency we con status will not be ordering clude that the trial court’s decision Hurst, Anderson, Appellant-

Donald H. for Defendant. Modisett, General,

Jeffrey Attorney A. Borek, Rosemary Deputy L. Attorney Gener- al, Indianapolis, Appellee-Plaintiff.

OPINION

BAKER, Judge. Appellant-defendant James E. Williams appeals Burglary,1 his conviction for a Class felony. B Specifically, he that contends court violated his of confrontation admitting videotape a into evidence.

FACTS 12, 1995, August

On someone Pa- entered tricia guns Morrow’s house and took two later, days from her A few bedroom. son, Wenzel, seven-year-old Williams’ told his mother, Williams, Darlene that Williams and gone he had to Morrow’s house and Williams guns. had taken the Darlene then took Wen- police they zel to the station where met with Hay Detective Tom of the Anderson Police Department. During videotaped conversa- Hay, tion with Detective Wenzel that stated days a few earlier he and Williams rode house, bike to Morrow’s that Williams window, opened a screen lifted Wenzel through open him window and told door. Wenzel also stated that after he door, house, opened the Williams entered the went into Morrow’s bedroom and took two guns from under the mattress. also Wenzel Hay Detective told the two then left the house and Williams warned him not to tell they his mother about what had done. September On Williams was charged jury burglary. During with tri- al, held November Wenzel testi- fied he went Morrow’s home with his father and knocked on the door, nobody but was home. Record at 101. Ind.Code 35-43-2-1. taped presence statement out of the that when Morrow arrived He also stated Nevertheless, memory. jury to refresh his home, R. at 101. his father left. he and during testimony, trial testified entering house and Wenzel denied Morrow’s although talking his father were while he and testified in August detective of he did not re- there, that a window was “busted he noticed him, “being what in that member he said also testified that open.” R. at 101. Wenzel tape” talking to the detective video videotaped inter- making the tape. R. at 245-48. Wenzel also testi- video view, if he recalled but when asked fied that he did not remember whether he incriminating his father the statements on 1995. R. was with his father recalling burglary, alternated between he cross-examination, at 245-46. On Williams’ denying them. R. at 101. the statements and counsel asked Wenzel whether he knew the permitted to was then introduce State telling truth difference between and tell- videotaped interview of into evidence the ing responded a lie to which that he Wenzel objection. R. over Wenzel Williams’ did. R. at 249. Williams’ counsel then asked evidence, At the conclusion of the Williams again whether he remembered “back burglary. was convicted of again in August of 1995” to which Wenzel Thereafter, appealed burglary Williams responded that he did not. The State then conviction, contending trial court videotaped offered statement under Wenzel’s by admitting videotaped erred interview hearsay exception. the recorded recollection Wenzel, hearsay. he claimed was of which Despite objection Williams’ that the admis- disputing a brief The State failed to file tape sion of the violated his Sixth Amend- contention. In December of Williams’ confrontation, right of trial court ment unpublished opinion, this court deter- videotaped admitted Wenzel’s interview into prima fa- mined that Williams demonstrated evidence, evidence. At the conclusion of the videotape by showing cie error that the was again burglary. of Williams convicted not admissible as a inconsistent state- appeals. Williams now 801(d)(1)(A). ment under Ind. Evidence Rule burglary we reversed his convic- AND DISCUSSION DECISION tion and remanded the case for a new trial. appeal sole contention on is that Wiliams’ State, v. See Williams No. 48A05-9603-CR- by admitting the trial court erred the video- Dec.30, (Ind.Ct.App., 674 1054 N.E.2d taped Although interview of Wenzel. 1996).2 videotaped Wiliams concedes that the inter-

During jury May trial on Williams’ second view was admissible under the recorded rec- 20, 1997, rule,4 exception3 hearsay Wenzel was shown his video- ollection to the he Although provide Williams failed to a tran- 4.Because Williams concedes that Wenzel’s trial, videotaped script of his first we were able to ascertain statement was admissible under the exception, proceed testimony recorded recollection we will of Wenzel’s from the contents analysis deciding prior unpub- with our without that issue on FACTS contained in this court’s State, appeal. we do note that a state- opinion. before lished See Williams v. 48A02- 9603-CR-120, 1054, slip ment can be admitted under the recorded recol- op. at 674 N.E.2d 3 hearsay 1996). exception, lection certain foundational (Ind.Ct.App., Dec. met, requirements including must be some ac- knowledgment that the statement was accurate exception 3. The Recorded Recollection to the MILLER, when it was made. See 13 INDIANA hearsay provides as follows: (1995). Although our re- PRACTICE 803.105 (5) Recorded A Recollection. memorandum specifically search reveals no case which ad- concerning a matter about or record requirement dresses extent to which this witness once had but now has in- must be satisfied when the State is confronted witness, sufficient recollection to enable the witness to with a hostile other courts have indicat- testify fully accurately, to have been willingness requirement, espe- shown ed a relax adopted made or the witness when the cially when the witness’ oral statement is record- party matter was fresh in the witness’s ed verbatim another and the witness Id; knowledge correctly. repudiate to reflect that ted, If admit- that statement. See Unit- does not Sollars, (8th may or record be read memorandum ed States 979 F.2d Cir.1992) (witness’ into evidence but not itself be received as statement was admissible un- party. hearsay exception der after an exhibit unless offered an adverse recorded See, by admitting videotape exception tion hearsay contends e.g. rule. evidence, State, 28, 36, into the court violated his Gee Ind. confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to (recognizing recorded recol I, Article the U.S. Constitution and Section rule); exception lection as see also 13 of the Indiana Constitution. Grimes v. 258 Ind. (1972) (same). also note We

I. Federal Constitution that the circuit tenth has held that the use of Williams first contends that firmly the ad recorded recollection is a rooted videotape mission of the violated rule. Hatch v. confrontation under the Oklahoma, (10th Sixth Amendment to State 58 F.3d 1447 Cir. Although hearsay Constitution. the U.S. 1995), denied, 1235, cert. 517 U.S. gen rules and the Confrontation Clause are 1881, 176; Penney 135 L.Ed.2d see also J.C. values, erally designed protect to similar N.L.R.B., (10th 479, Co. v. 384 F.2d 484 Confrontation Clause bars admission of Cir.1967) (use of recorded some evidence that would otherwise be ad practice has firm many become as one exception hearsay missible under an to the rule). exceptions Therefore, hearsay to we 805, 814, 110 Wright, rule. Idaho v. 497 U.S. conclude that the recorded recollection is a 3139, (1990). 111 In S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 638 order firmly exception hearsay rooted to the incriminating admissible un and, such, videotaped the use of the inter der an rule to com view as a recorded recollection not did violate Clause, ply with the Confrontation the State Williams’ right Sixth Amendment of confron must that the show declarant is unavailable tation under the U.S. Constitution. adequate and that the statement bears “indi reliability.” Owings, cia of State v. 622 II. Indiana Constitution (Ind.1993). 948, Reliability, N.E.2d 952 can be inferred without more in a case where the next Williams contends that the ad firmly excep evidence falls within a rooted videotaped mission of the interview violated State, tion to rule. Arndt v. 642 right I, of confrontation under Article (Ind.1994), Idaho, citing N.E.2d 228 497 13,5 Constitution, Section of the Indiana 815, 110 U.S. S.Ct. 3139. gives which right defendant the to “meet Initially, the witnesses face to face.” we note

Initially, we note that Williams con objections that Williams’ at trial not cedes that lack did as Wenzel’s of recollection made addition, any him sert claim of unavailable. violation of the Indiana although formerly Indiana adopt did not Constitution. he has waived this Indiana State, appeal. Rules Evidence until issue on Indiana court’s See Hart v. (Ind.1991) (failure long recognized have the recorded reeollec- object N.E.2d talking she testified that she remembered talking to a trial Wenzel testified agent Further, BATF but that she could not remember to the detective in of 1995. him), denied, what she told cert. 507 U.S. captured videotape statement was on and was (1993); 123 L.Ed.2d 484 United not a characterization of Wenzel's statement (8th Riley, States v. 657 F.2d 1385-86 the detective. We believe these factors would be 1981) (witness' prior taped Cir. and written state reliability accuracy to establish sufficient and ments were admissible under recorded recollec of the statement under the recorded recollection hearsay exception tion after witness testified that hearsay exception. present memory she had clear no question, listening events in even after provides pros- 5. This section all criminal [i]n statement); tape reviewing and written United ecutions, right the accused shall have the to a Lewis, (7th States v. 954 F.2d Cir. trial, public impartial jury, counly in (inmate’s 1992) agent’s statement contained committed; have offense shall been report was admissible as recorded recollection counsel; be heard himself and to demand the inmate where telling agent anything testified that he did not remember him, against nature and cause of accusation and that the events in thereof; question copy were fresher in his when the and to have to meet the wit- report face, agent was made and testified that he accu compulsory pro- nesses face to and to have rately prepared transcribed the notes when he obtaining cess for witnesses in his favor. Here, report). during the record reveals that meeting place if took grounds at trial face” face face on Indiana Constitutional witness).7 question defendant failed to appeal). in waiver on results Judgment affirmed. notwithstanding, Williams’ ar Waiver Indiana’s Confrontation gument fails. KIRSCH, J., concurs. counterpart in its federal differs from Clause J., SULLIVAN, opinion. with dissents meeting face contemplates a face to

that it and the witness can see which the accused SULLIVAN, Judge, dissenting. State, Brady recognize another. v. one recognizes Indiana that a criminal defen- (Ind.1991). Although 987-88 575 N.E.2d right only not dant has a constitutional opportunity to must have an the accused against him meet the witnesses face to face during the face to the witness cross-examine (confrontation) also to cross-examine but confrontation, opportunity face does (1993) Ind., Owings those witnesses. State or successful and the have to be seized 948; Ind., Brady v. State can be waived. Pierce latter assures a 575 N.E.2d 981. The (Ind.1997). 39, 50 opportunity defendant that he will have the effectively” “fully challenge to the testi- Here, reveals that Wenzel the record presented against him. monial evidence Ow Therefore, during the second trial. testified 951; Brady, ings, 622 at opportunity to meet Williams had the Wenzel Presumably, it is the view of the him. face-to-face and to cross-examine majority that a defendant need not have an fact, the reveals that Williams did effectively record to cross-examine with opportunity Wenzel, perform damaging a brief cross-examination reference to the crucial and sub- recorded”; “past truthfulness it questioning regarding him the stance of the recollection Thereafter, testimony. enough physically is the declarant is present of his present competent in the court room and to attempted question to Williams could have respectfully disagree. I take an oath. prior truthfulness of his Wenzel about the Although acknowledge that statement. we majority begins analysis its with the stated that he was unable to remem Wenzel is, assumption that Wenzel’s statement in said, previously Williams ber what he had fact, past admissible under the attempt im opportunity to to still had the hearsay exception. necessary It recorded is peach jury judge the to and to allow assumption to make this because Con- credibility in answer Wenzel’s demeanor analysis frontation Clause under Idaho v. Thus, though ing questions.6 even Wen- Wright 497 U.S. memory, to a lack of zel was unavailable due applies only initially if 111 L.Ed.2d 638 it has opportunity provided Williams that a within been determined statement falls to cross-exam meet Wenzel face-to-face and hearsay exception. v. a valid See Idaho regarding prior (“In him statement. ine Wright, 497 U.S. at Thus, Roberts, he was denied we cannot conclude that general ap- we forth ‘a Ohio set confrontation under the Indiana proach’ determining incriminating for when (defendant cannot exception Constitution. id. statements admissible under an See requirements rule also meet the claim loss of to meet witnesses “face note, however, supreme pri- effectively premised upon 6. We order to test was court’s that in State, regarding the cross-examine Wenzel truthfulness or decision in Patterson v. 263 Ind. statement, would first have (1975), of his Williams explicitly N.E.2d 482 which was over set forth the content of the statement. State, (Ind. ruled 578 N.E.2d 649 Modesitt Thus, attempt counsel have chosen not to 1991), September in which was handed down impeach incriminating Wenzel so that the nature Traver, to the extent that emphasized. of the statement would not he was handed down in March of conflicts decisions, supreme with the court's more recent although 7. We also note Traver v. we conclude that it too was overruled Mode (Ind.1991) a different test N.E.2d 1009 sets forth sitt. determining for a witness’s out of court whether Clause, this statements violate the Confrontation Clause.”)- lies, however, Unlike the events. The rub in the fact of the Confrontation I met majority, presupposes cannot assume that the State that this that the declarant ad- requirements admitting the foundational mits the statement at the time but 803(5).8 a statement under Evid. R. Accord- now is unable to recollect what he said or rule, must, ing among a record others presupposes knew at the time. It also things, concern a matter about which a wit- the record is an accurate reflection of what knowledge ness once had and must reflect actually the declarant knew at the time. Fi- correctly. of the witness As nally, presupposes it that the circumstantial adopted jurisprudence, in American adequate trustworthiness is an substitute for past permitting recollection recorded as an ambiguity cross-examination. An exists exclusion rule and reasoning this ignores dangers that it evidence, required as substantive the witness perception of “defective or or narra- “to affirm that ‘he knew it to be true at the only tion” which can adequately be tested time’ was made.” Notes And [the statement] cross-examination. See 30 Charles A. Recorded, Legislation, Past Recollection Jr., Wright and Kenneth W. Graham Federal (1943); Iowa L.Rev. 530 at 534-535 31 Mi- (1997). Practice and Procedure 6333 at 85 Graham, chael H. Federal Practice and Pro- instances, may, many Cross-examination (1997). cedure, § Consequently, 6756 at 323 upon veracity east accuracy doubt of a express preclude the view which I would having superficial statement or circumstan- many proffered admission of opponent tial If trustworthiness. cannot past recollection recorded unless the witness effectively cross-examine the declarant as to at trial indicates some minimal recollection of statement, accuracy neither the incident, or a recollection of the statement at the time the record was made facts at the time the statement was made nor the of the declarant at the trial, During recorded. the second crucial time of the in question events can be testified that he had no of the tested. I am square unable to the not making incident and did recall the video- increasing frequency with which recorded statement; tape only talking questiona- recollections are admitted to the detective.9 corollary ble circumstances with the result precedent there is that the rec- that, notwithstanding questions serious as to may ord be admitted if the “conduct sur- accuracy the and trustworthiness of the re- rounding making the of the event re- [sic] statement, corded that statement receives that veals the memorandum must have been imprimatur the of absolute truth in it is that perceived a true account of what was ...” 28 susceptible challenge or contravention. L.Rev., supra, concept Iowa at 535. This recognize my may appear I that imports also view accuracy trustworthiness and from implementation to undercut the of the rule as the of the statement itself. The necessity” ques- a “rule of cases and the cast some commentators seem to con- guarantee clude that a of tion as to whether the evidence is admitted trustworthiness reliability pursuant from comes the inherent in a rec-' to the rule under the mistaken and self-serving premise ord made while events were fresh in the that it is reliable and accurately trustworthy merely mind and which reflects those because it has become 984, interesting adopts 8. I believe it is to note that in the first unless the declarant the statement trial, the State offered Wenzel’s statement under her own recorded recollection or vouches for its 801(d)(1)(A) Evid. R. statement, as a inconsistent accuracy, satisfy such statement does not the argument upon but made no such 803(5). requirements foundational of Evid. R. In appeal. We reversed that initial conviction be- view, my physical further evidence of Wen- comply cause the statement did not with the presence zel’s and voice at of the the recordation Rule, i.e., requirements given it was not carry requisite does not with statement it apple, under oath. Given second bite of demonstration that he did in fact have knowl- changed strategy the State its and offered edge of events which his statement alluded to or 803(5). statement under Evid. R. that the substantive content of his recorded "rec- view, my ollection” was an accurate reflection of his actu- simply expressed 9. In and as in United Cir., 973, (1996) States Collicott 9th 92 F.3d al recollection of the events. firmly hearsay falls within a rooted “necessity.”10 It dence firmly as a rule rooted 66, apparent exception.” that for the rule to 2531. seem 448 U.S. S.Ct. would validity, evidence must bear concept Bourja have The same was enunciated (1987) reliability 171, and trustworthiness ily attributes v. United States U.S. to how essential the State regard which, without 181-84, 97 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. to be to its burden to considers that evidence 801(d)(2)(E) although treating Federal Rule beyond a reasonable prove disputed fact statement, co-conspirator’s as to a utilized notwithstanding a I this belief doubt. retain hearsay because rules and the rationale (1990) Wright 497 U.S. suggestion in Idaho v. protect designed are Confrontation Clause 111 L.Ed.2d 805 at values, if an similar (1980) 448 U.S. drawing from Ohio v. Roberts been established for certain evi rule has 66, 100 that 56 at 65 L.Ed.2d dence, there are no confrontation or cross- firmly must fall within a statement impediments admissibility examination hearsay exception particular “or” have rooted the relia and we need not be concerned with (Emphasis guarantees of trustworthiness. bility of the state or the trustworthiness reading Roberts does not supplied). My I is too ment. submit resolution “firmly rooted” factor is an indicate that the accepted.11 blindly facile to be require- to the trustworthiness alternative (1994) Nevertheless, Ind., in Arndt v. State clearly contrary, Roberts re- ment. To the Supreme our held Court principle that once the witness is flects exist, “exceptions unavailable, i.e., that the necessi- found to be in which certain out-of because manner exists, ty the statement must also be deter- virtually guaran court statements are made trustworthy. In to be reliable and mined words, reliability.” tee their other relia however, diluting language, somewhat bility prerequi are the and trustworthiness requisite in Roberts concluded that the Court exception becoming firmly rooted. reliability may in site for and trustworthiness some may ... the evi- The latter status not be found to exist instances be “inferred where requisite "necessity” perceived law has The It be noted that Indiana case availability emphasized the for cross-examination Supreme the Unites States Court to exist when 801(d)(1) admissibility. regard with to Evid. R. testimony at the declarant is "unavailable” for decisions, however, principal two do not 448 U.S. trial. Ohio Roberts appear to be harmonious. In Watkins v. State 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597. subse- Ind., 949, (1983) 446 N.E.2d the Court held a may quently the "una- that Court have relaxed inadmissible, part, prior the statement in because vailability” requirement in White v. Illinois making declarant did not remember it and was 736, (1992) 502 U.S. 112 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 116 therefore not available for cross-examination. In found that the declarant where the Court Ind., (1996) Brown State need not be declared unavailable before the out- however, the court refused to follow the Watkins admitted, is if statement is of-court statement the but, so, appeared rationale in order to do recaptured by in- reliable and cannot be later “vety draw a thin” factual See Wil- distinction. Indiana, testimony. requisite degree the court Gestae, Harvey, Rulings, liam F. Rules & Res only "necessity” present of is deemed to be not November at 43. The distinction was that physical unavailability, or the wit- for total when while in Watkins the declarant did not remember totally lacking, ness’s is but also when statement, making the in Brown the declarant memory is insufficient to allow the witness to the exactly what said. One did not remember was testify “fully accurately.” Court Rules Anno- and upon might speculate that Watkins was based the tated, 803(5), Commentary, Evid. R. Committee v. State since discredited decision Patterson Six, (D) (Burns Ed.1998). In this Part Code and, (1975) 263 Ind. 324 N.E.2d 482 there- respect, may noted that under the Indiana it be fore, worthy precedent. is not of consideration Rule, availability non-availabilily the de- of decision, however, The Brown was not based clarant as a trial witness is not material to the upon reasoning. upon perceived this It rested a admissibility impor- of his statement. It is degree the concern- difference in of recollection therefore, analysis, recognize tant to our ing making the the of the and content expressly past the Committee stated that the rec- may, Be that as it reason- statement. one. rule ollection recorded availability meaningful ably conclude that for cases,” cross-examination, cautiously applied thorough "be in criminal or the fact of cross- Indiana, precisely availability because the of confronta- examination or its at the time of the statement, implicated and or should be crucial to the tion and cross-examination are earlier is admissibility might infringed. determination. be Id.

855 presence presented re- R. 801 without the of the foundational under Evid. and as dis- of quirement reliability and trustworthiness. supra, cussed in Watkins v. note 11. sense, then, I not In this would allow the us, In the case the majority before deter- “necessity” a of to become rule of “conve- videotaped mines that Wenzel’s statement is to abrogate nience” when the effect is the trustworthy and rehable because state- the safeguards of 30 cross-examination. See obviously ment made him at time Graham, Wright supra 6332 and at 83.12 when the facts would have been in his fresh precise point, perhaps, More is State memory. carry Such does conclusion not (1993) Ind., Owings N.E.2d day, however. It has been demonstrat- (1895) (citing Mattox v. United States ed, except by bootstrapping analysis, that 409) U.S. 39 L.Ed. which Wenzel did in fact at knowledge have recognized that of confrontation question time in of the matters were “occasionally and must cross-examination subject majority of the statement. The give way public policy to considerations impart rationale would existence Court, and the necessities of case.” knowledge any statement made with re- however, very clearly explicitly noted real, gard imagined, or falsified events. prior testimony a subsequently from The mere of a statement does not only unavailable witness is admissible if the reflect the declarant did indeed once opportunity defendant had the to confront knowledge have that the facts as stated did testimony the witness when the was original- Furthermore, occur. there is showing no ly given. Id. Some of eases cited if even Wenzel have did Omngs remarkably are similar to the situa- (the events on date us, i.e., (1991)Ind., Brady tion before v. State (the burglary) days or ten thereafter date of deposition (videotaped N.E.2d 981 testi- statement), his recorded statement re- mony presence taken outside the of defen- knowledge accurately. flected The State trial); dant and used at Miller v. State provided missing has not otherwise those Ind., (videotaped statement of other by offering elements than into evidence notice). child where defendant received no the statement itself. Quite clearly, here, defendant did not and have could not cross-examined Wenzel at I would reverse the conviction remand time the detective took and recorded proceedings. for further Furthermore, statement. the fact that Wen- satisfy

zel at the testified first trial does not opportunity meaningful cross-exami nation because that time Wenzel alternat denying making any

ed between incriminating his recalling father and not

making such statements. Williams v. State 48A05-9603-CR-120,

No. (December slip op. 30, 1996). Obviously, at 3 oppor under the circumstances there was no tunity regard to cross examine with the videotaped questioning

substance of the detective. The situation is akin to that might legitimately question merely trying please satisfy

12. One the trustwor- mother and reliability incriminating thiness and of the state- by giving along sug- detective answers the lines burglary ments made Wenzel in that the vic- gested by questions. these factors get along, tim and the defendant did not totality indicate test circumstances police brought Wenzel was ten station trustworthiness, guaranteeing as discussed in mother, days after occurrence Wright, supra, Idaho v. have not been met cousin, victim’s and that Wenzel was afraid danger admitting such dramatize inherent might hurt no defendant his mother. There was without substance of state- evidence fact to demonstrate that Wenzel was in being subject ment to cross-examination. coached in his statement or that was he

Case Details

Case Name: Williams v. State

Court Name: Indiana Court of Appeals

Date Published: Aug 31, 1998

Citation: 698 N.E.2d 848

Docket Number: 48A02-9707-CR-463

Court Abbreviation: Ind. Ct. App.