Williams v. StateWilliams v. State
Defendant-Appellant Jordan M. Williams appeals from his conviction of one
I.
Factual Background
Corporal Shawn Brittingham of the Georgetown, Delaware Police Department noticed Williams walking along the median of Route 113 in Georgetown at approximately 3:50 a.m. on October 13, 2006. Because it was cold and windy, Officer Brittingham approached Williams to offer assistance. Officer Brittingham pulled his car up about 10 feet behind Williams and activated his strobe light. He then approached and asked Williams if he needed a ride. Williams declined, explaining that his car had broken down and that he was walking to a nearby gas station where he was going to be picked up by his mother.
Officer Brittingham testified that he did not notice anything about Williams before or after the encounter that created any suspicion that Williams was engaged in criminal activity. The officer also testified that Williams’s direction of travel was consistent with his explanation and that he was polite, calm, and friendly while answering questions. As a matter of routine, Officer Brittingham asked Williams for his name and date of birth, which Williams gave him. 1 After the encounter, which lasted approximately two to three minutes, Williams continued on his way. Officer Brittingham then ran the name and date of birth through his mobile computer. That search revealed that Williams had outstanding arrest warrants for unpaid traffic fines.
Acting upon the warrants, Officer Brit-tingham again approached Williams and asked, ‘You know why I am back, right?” Williams responded affirmatively, acknowledging that he had outstanding warrants. Officer Brittingham then asked Williams whether he had any weapons on his person that would be of concern. Williams voluntarily responded that he had a handgun. Officer Brittingham ordered Williams to put his hands on top of his head, searched Williams, and found a handgun positioned in Williams’s waistband. Williams was charged with carrying a concealed deadly weapon.
Williams filed a motion to suppress, alleging an unlawful search and seizure in violation of his rights under
Standard of Review
We review the grant or denial of a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion. 2 To the extent the trial judge’s decision is based on factual findings, we review for whether the trial judge abused his or her discretion in determining whether there was sufficient evidence to support the findings and whether those findings were clearly erroneous.” 3 To the extent that we examine the trial judge’s legal conclusions, we review them de novo for errors in formulating or applying legal precepts. 4
Williams was not seized during the initial encounter
Williams contends that his encounter with Officer Brittingham, which resulted in Williams’s giving his name and date of birth, was an unreasonable seizure in violation of 11 Del. C. 1902, Article I, Section 4 of the Delaware Constitution, and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Specifically, Williams argues that once Officer Brittingham determined that he did not need assistance, the officer no longer had any reason to detain Williams, and Officer Brittingham lacked reasonable articulable suspicion for further detention and questioning.
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that not every encounter with the police is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 5 Where, as here, the alleged seizure was a brief investigatory stop, the Fourth Amendment does not require that the officer have probable cause to support an arrest. Rather the officer need only possess a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity. 6 However, before we can determine whether the seizure was supported by reasonable suspicion, we must first answer the threshold inquiry of whether a seizure actually occurred. 7
As the United States Supreme Court has explained, under the Fourth Amendment “police can be said to have seized an individual ‘only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.’ ”
8
Later, as
Although we have acknowledged the parameters of the Fourth Amendment as set forth by the Supreme Court, 12 we have declined to follow Hodari when enforcing the protection from illegal searches and seizures afforded by the Delaware Constitution. 13 Instead, we have retained a pre-Nodari standard based on the articulation by the Supreme Court in Michigan v. Chesternut, 14 Like Chesternut, our standard under the Delaware Constitution focuses on the actions of the police officer and whether a reasonable person would have believed he or she was not free to ignore the police presence. 15
Even under this more stringent standard, “law enforcement officers are permitted to initiate contact with citizens on the street for the purpose of asking questions.”
16
This type of interaction is an encounter and, if consensual, neither amounts to a seizure nor implicates the Fourth Amendment.
17
During a consensual encounter, a person has no obligation to answer the officer’s inquiry and is free to go about his business. Only when the totality of the circumstances demonstrates
Here, Williams’s first encounter with Officer Brittingham was not a seizure. The officer observed Williams walking on a highway median at 3:50 a.m. in cold and windy weather. He parked his patrol car about ten feet behind Williams, activated his strobe light — not his emergency flashers — and approached Williams to ask if he needed a ride. Williams voluntarily answered Officer Brittingham’s questions, including his name and date of birth. After a brief period, the encounter ended with Williams continuing to walk toward his destination.
Under the Fourth Amendment, this encounter lacked the physical force or submission to the assertion of authority to amount to a seizure. Furthermore, viewing the totality of the circumstances — Officer Brittingham’s inquiry, Williams’s voluntary response to questions, and the amicable end to the encounter — a reasonable person would believe he was free to ignore the police presence. Because the encounter was consensual and not a seizure; the pedigree information gathered by Officer Brittingham was obtained lawfully. 19
Even if there was a seizure, the community caretaker doctrine applies
Assuming arguendo that Officer Brittingham’s encounter with Williams constituted a seizure, his actions during the initial encounter were nonetheless reasonable and valid. Although a warrantless seizure is presumed unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, this presumption may be rebutted by showing that a specific exception to the warrant requirement applies. 20
One exception recognized by many jurisdictions is the non-criminal, non-investigative “community caretaker” or “public safety” doctrine.
21
The doctrine stems from a recognition that “[l]ocal police have multiple responsibilities, only one of which is the enforcement of criminal law....”
22
The modern police officer is a “jaek-of-all-emergencies,” with “ ‘complex
The role of police as community caretakers has long been recognized under federal law. 24 Forty years ago, in Terry v. Ohio, 25 the Supreme Court’s seminal case on investigative stops, the Court explained that “[s]treet encounters between citizens and police officers are incredibly rich in diversity.... Encounters are initiated by the police for a wide variety of purposes, some of which are wholly unrelated to a desire to prosecute for crime.” The Court further acknowledged in Cady v. Dombrowski, 26 that “[l]ocal police officers ... frequently ... engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.”
In response to this federal recognition, many jurisdictions have subsequently addressed the community caretaker doctrine, with a majority adopting some form that permits police officers to investigate situations in which a citizen may be in peril or need some type of assistance.
27
Some ju
We have not previously had the occasion specifically to address the effect of the community caretaker function in Delaware. 30 We agree with the majority of jurisdictions, and find, that the doctrine appropriately reflects that the role of police in Delaware is not limited to merely the detection and prevention of criminal activity, but also encompasses a non-investigative, non-criminal role to ensure the safety and welfare of our citizens. 31
First, as long as there are objective, specific and articulable facts from which an experienced officer would suspect that a citizen is in need of help or is in peril, then that officer has the right to stop and investigate. Second, if the citizen is in need of aid, then the officer may take appropriate action to render assistance or mitigate the peril. Third, once, however, the officer is assured that the citizen is not in peril or is no longer in need of assistance or that the peril has been mitigated, then any actions beyond that constitute a seizure implicating ... the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment, but more importantly, those greater guarantees afforded under [state law]. 33
We adopt this' test to ensure that investigations conducted in Delaware under the community caretaker doctrine are reasonable.
The community caretaker doctrine has three elements. First, if there are objective, specific and articulable facts from which an experienced officer would suspect that a citizen is in apparent peril, distress or need of assistance, the police officer may stop and investigate for the purpose of assisting the person. Second, if the citizen is in need of aid, then the officer may take appropriate action to render assistance or mitigate the peril. Third, once, however, the officer is assured that the citizen is not in peril or is no longer in need of assistance or that the peril has been mitigated, the caretaking function is over and any further detention constitutes an unreasonable seizure unless the officer has a warrant, or some exception to the warrant requirement applies, such as a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.
Williams contends that even if the community caretaker doctrine applies to his initial encounter with Officer Brittingham, once he declined the proffered assistance, Officer Brittingham’s caretaking function was at an end. Williams argues that by not terminating his questioning at this point, Officer Brittingham illegally detained Williams without any reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in any crim
In
Commonwealth v.
Evans,
39
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that the community caretaker function allowed a trooper to approach a vehicle parked in the breakdown lane at 11:30 p.m. with its right blinker flashing. Intending to see if the defendant needed
Similarly, in State v. Brunette, 42 in evaluating the extent of the community caretak-ing exception, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that a peace officer’s “limited request for information [license and registration], which would enable her to maintain a record of her contact with the vehicle’s owner in the event that any questions about the vehicle or her contact with the owner subsequently arose was a reasonable exercise of her community care-taking duties.” 43
We agree with the Supreme Courts of Massachusetts and New Hampshire that a police officer’s limited request for information is reasonable because it enables him to maintain a record of his contact with the individual encountered. Officers are often required to make written reports of all encounters; an officer must also know who he has assisted in case someone files a legal claim against him; and innocent activity can turn out later to be criminal activity.
Here, Officer Brittingham’s entire initial encounter with Williams was reasonable under the community caretaking doctrine. The weather conditions and early morning hour are objective, specific and articulable facts from which an experienced officer would suspect that Williams was in apparent peril, distress or need of assistance. Thus, it was proper for Officer Britting-ham to stop and investigate for the purpose of assisting Williams. 44
Since it appeared Williams was in need of aid, the officer could take appropriate action to render assistance or mitigate the peril. We agree with the Superior Court that Officer Brittingham’s actions were an appropriate effort to render assistance. He stopped his car ten feet behind Williams, approached with his flashlight, and asked Williams if he needed assistance. A two to three minute exchange followed in which Williams declined a ride and explained that his car had broken down and he was walking to meet his mother at a nearby gas station. The community caretaking function did not cease at this point. As part of it, the officer could make an administrative record of the encounter. As Officer Brittingham testified, he asked for Williams’s name and date of birth so that he could create a record of the encounter and have a contact in case someone reported him missing or if
Once the officer is assured that the citizen is not in peril or is no longer in need of assistance or that the peril has been mitigated, the caretaking function is over and any further detention constitutes an unreasonable seizure unless the officer has a warrant, or some exception to the warrant requirement applies, such as a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Here, Officer Brittingham terminated the initial encounter once he was assured Williams was not in need of assistance and his caretaking function was at an end. His subsequent seizure of Williams was based upon the outstanding warrants for Williams’s arrest, which the officer discovered after the initial encounter. Williams’s arrest was authorized by these warrants and, once the arrest had occurred, Officer Brittingham could lawfully search Williams incident to that arrest. 45 The Superior Court did not err in denying Williams’s motion to suppress.
III.
The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
Notes
. Officer Brittingham testified that the purpose behind requesting the name and date of birth for contacts was to have a reference point in case something happened to him, if a crime occurred in the area, or if there was a missing persons report or “check on the welfare” complaint out on him. Additionally, he indicated that Williams could contact him if he required any assistance.
.
Lopez-Vazquez v. State,
.
Lopez-Vazquez,
.
Lopez-Vazquez,
.
Muehler v. Mena,
.
Terry,
.
Lopez-Vazquez v. State,
.
Michigan v. Chestemut,
.
.
Hodari D.,
.
Muehler,
[L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, by putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a criminal prosecution his voluntary answers to such questions. Nor would the fact that the officer identifies himself as a police officer, without more, convert the encounter into a seizure requiring some level of objective justification. The person approached, however, need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way.
Royer,
.
See State v. Rollins,
.
See Flonnory,
.
.
Jones v. State,
.
Lopez-Vazquez,
.
Lopez-Vazquez,
. Lopez-Vazquez,
.
.
Mason v. State,
.
See State v. Lovegren,
.
State v. Acrey,
. 3 Wayne R. Lefave, Search and Seizure § 5.4(c) (4th ed.2004) (citing Am. Bar. Ass’n, Standards for Criminal Justice §§ 1-1.1(b), 1-2.2 (2d ed.1980));
see also Acrey,
.
See Cady v. Dombrowski,
.
.
.
See, e.g., Duck v. State,
.
E.g. Marsh v. State,
.
E.g. Enos, 2003
WL 549212;
Matter of Clayton,
. In
Guererri v. State,
. In addition to a mere license to investigate, if contraband or other evidence of crime is discovered incident to the lawful performance of an officer's duties under the community caretaker function, the officer need not ignore that which is discovered. 3 LeFave,
supra note
22, at § 5.4(c) ("[Ejvidence of
crime is
sometimes inadvertently come by when a person is searched for some purpose not directly tied to the objective of detecting criminal activity. ... If a reasonable and good faith search is made of a person for such a purpose, then the better view is that evidence of
.
. Id. at 475-76.
.Despite the widespread acceptance of the community caretaker doctrine, there remains a tension between a police officer’s function as a community caretaker and the intrusion onto the privacy of individuals. Thus, the scope of any investigatory stop authorized by the doctrine must be limited to only those actions necessary to carry out the purposes of the stop, unless particularized suspicion of criminal activity or some other exception to the warrant requirement subsequently arises.
For example, in
State v. Dube,
.
. Sam B. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 Va. L. Rev. 315 (1942). Prof. Warner was the reporter for the Interstate Commission on Crime, which eventually drafted the Uniform Arrest Act. Id. at 316.
. In
Rickards v. State,
.
Compare
Ark Crim. Proc. R. 2.2
with Allen v. State,
.
. Id. at 846.
. Id. at 844, 846.
.
.
Id.
at 274.
But see State v. Gonzales,
.In addition, Officer Brittingham testified that inmates were sometimes released from a local prison during the overnight shift, and that he often offered rides to those individuals to their intended destination, if it was within town limits, or else to a nearby twenly-four hour business.
.
Harris v. State,