Williams v. StateWilliams v. State
Anthony Williams appeals a judgment of convictions for first degree felony murder and robbery of Barbara Meller Jensen, a German tourist visiting Miami. We affirm.
Williams raises several issues on appeal. We address each issue in turn. First, he raises as error the denial of his motions to recuse the trial judge based on her alleged bias in favor of the prosecution. The initial and amended motions asserted five grounds in support of recusal: 1. the trial court sua sponte оffered a race-neutral reason upon Williams’ objection to one of the state‘s peremptory strikes; 2. the court denied defense counsel‘s request to continue voir dire until the next day; 3. the court sua sponte objected to defense counsel‘s comments to the venire; 4. the court embarrassed defense counsel by sua sponte making аnd sustaining an objection to defense counsel‘s question to a prospective juror; and 5. the court denied defense counsel‘s request to address the court outside the prospective jurors’ presence as to Williams’ request for a stay to file a writ of prohibition. We find no error in the court‘s denials of the motions.
“A [recusal] motion is legally sufficient if it shows that the party making the motion has a well-grounded fear that he or she will not receive a fair trial from the presiding judge.” Barwick v. State, 660 So.2d 685, 691 (Fla.1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 823, 133 L.Ed.2d 766 (1996);
The remaining grounds for rеcusal asserted by Williams merely denote a dissatisfaction with the trial court‘s rulings rather
Second, Williams argues that the state did not present a prima facie corpus delicti of the felony murder or robbery charge thereby precluding admission of Williams’ confession. The state sought to admit into evidence Williams’ confession describing his participation in the crime. In his statement to police, Williams admitted driving a friend‘s car and intentionally bumping the victim‘s car in order to rob her. He stated that the victim stopped and exited her vehicle to examine the damage. At that point, twо passengers got out of Williams’ car and grabbed the victim‘s purse. When the assailants returned to the car, the victim grabbed the door handle of Williams’ car. Williams then backed up the car, drove forward, and felt the car sway from side to side as if it had run over something. Williams continued driving and when he looked in the rear-view mirror, he saw the victim lying on the ground. Williams then drove tо a canal where the assailants searched the purse, filled the purse with rocks, and threw it into the canal. Williams directed the police to that canal, and the police retrieved the victim‘s purse.
“An individual‘s confession to a crime is insufficient evidence of a criminal act where no independent evidence exists to substantiate the occurrence of the crime.” Sochor v. State, 580 So.2d 595, 600 (Fla.1991), judgment vacated on other grounds, 504 U.S. 527, 112 S.Ct. 2114, 119 L.Ed.2d 326 (1992). In addition, “[a] defendant‘s confession or statement `may be considered in connection with the other evidence,’ but `the corpus delicti cannot rest upon the confession or admission alone.‘” Schwab v. State, 636 So.2d 3, 6 (Fla.)(quoting Cross v. State, 96 Fla. 768, 781, 119 So. 380, 384 (1928)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 950, 115 S.Ct. 364, 130 L.Ed.2d 317 (1994). Therefore, the state must introduce substantial independent evidence of corpus delicti that tends to show that the chаrged crimes were committed. Farinas v. State, 569 So.2d 425, 430 (Fla.1990); Thomas v. State, 531 So.2d 708, 711 (Fla.1988). A prima facie corpus delicti serves to ensure “[t]he judicial quest for truth [which] requires that no person be convicted out of derangement, mistake or official fabrication.” State v. Allen, 335 So.2d 823, 825 (Fla.1976); Burks v. State, 613 So.2d 441, 443 (Fla.1993).
The corpus delicti for homicide requires independent direct or circumstantial proof of three elements: a person‘s death, the сriminal agency of another as the cause,
The state presented evidence that the victim, a tourist from Germany, arrived at Miami International Airport and rented a car at an airport car rеntal agency; a short time later her car was bumped by another car, and she exited the car; at that time, she sustained a crushing head injury when a car ran over her head; her wallet was found on the ground near her body;3 her address labels were found in a blue Cadillac; and her missing purse was found loaded with stones in a canal. Thus, the record contains evidenсe that tends to show that the perpetrators bumped the victim‘s car in order to rob her and that she was run over and killed as the car left the scene. Furthermore, Williams’ confession “correspond[s] well” with the physical evidence: the victim‘s head had been run over by a car tire, and the victim‘s purse was found filled with stones in a canal. Schwab v. State, 636 So.2d at 6. Although some of the evidence is circumstantial, it is not, as Williams suggests, equally or more likely that the death was caused by a noncriminal car accident. Circumstantial evidence by its nature, is subject to diverging interpretations. However, in this case, the evidence is “sufficient to negate all reasonable defense hypotheses as to cause of death and show beyond a reasonable doubt that the death was caused by the criminal agency of another person.” Golden v. State, 629 So.2d 109, 111 (Fla.1993). See Davis v. State, 582 So.2d at 700 (unnecessary to negate all noncriminal explanations before admitting confession); Hester v. State, 310 So.2d 455, 457 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). Therefore, the record establishes that the state presented prima facie corpus delicti evidence of felony murder.
In addition, this evidence establishes thе corpus delicti of robbery. Contrary to Williams’ contention, there is sufficient evidence permitting the inference that the assailants robbed the victim of her purse, either from her car or her person when she exited her car, and that the force used to effect the robbery occurred at that time. Therefore, the state has shown that the victim suffered the type of harm contemplated by the robbery charge and that the harm was caused by the criminal agency of another. See State v. Allen, 335 So.2d at 825; Knight v. State, 402 So.2d 435 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). See also Kearse v. State, 662 So.2d 677, 685 (Fla.1995). Hence, reversal on this basis is inappropriate. Because the state presented independent evidence of corpus delicti, we conclude that the court properly admitted Williams’ confession.
Williams’ third сontention is that he is entitled to a new trial because the judge failed to inquire into allegations of juror misconduct. Williams requested a jury inquiry based on an article which appeared in the Miami Herald. The article stated that several jurors glared at Williams and his co-defendant and a female juror started to cry during the testimony of the victim‘s husband. The article did not identify the jurоrs, did not indicate whether they were members of Williams’ venire or his codefendant‘s venire,4 nor did it state that other jurors noticed these reactions. Neither the judge nor defense counsel observed the jurors’ alleged reactions to the testimony. The court denied Williams’ inquiry request. Williams did not make any proffer of the jurors’ identification at that time or before thе trial was completed.
Fourth, Williams contends that the trial court erred in permitting the state to cross-examine Officer Ramieres about statements made by Alexander Jensen, the victim‘s son. Alexander, who was six years old when the incident occurred, was an eyewitness to the robbery and death of his mother. Officer Ramieres testified as a defense witness that Alexander knew his colors and that he had stated that the assailants’ car was gold. Over defense objection, the court permitted the state to elicit on cross-examination the remainder of Alexander‘s statement in which he described the crime: after his car was bumped, Alexander observed a car passenger taking his mother‘s purse, slamming her to the ground, and the car driving over his mother.6
We find that Williams’ argument has no merit. Under the “rule of completeness,”
Next, Williams argues that he is entitled to a new trial by virtue of the state‘s
Let‘s talk about Alexander Jensen for a moment. Alexander [is] six years old. What could be a more tragic horrible event? What would be more egregious than the loss of a parent? What‘s even worse than that is witnessing the loss of a parent. You‘re six years old. [T.3635-3636.]
The trial court overruled Williams’ objection that such comment constituted an impermissible “golden rule” argument. In general, a “golden rule” argument encompasses requests that the jurors place themselves in the victim‘s position, that they imagine the victim‘s pain and terror, or that they imagine that their relative was the victim. Davis v. State, 604 So.2d 794, 797 (Fla.1992); Bertolotti v. State, 476 So.2d 130, 133 (Fla.1985); Adams v. State, 192 So.2d 762 (Fla.1966); Worden v. State, 603 So.2d 581 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 613 So.2d 13 (1992); Shaara v. State, 581 So.2d 1339 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Clark v. State, 553 So.2d 240 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Peterson v. State, 376 So.2d 1230 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)(on rehearing), cert. denied, 386 So.2d 642 (Fla.1980). See Rhodes v. State, 547 So.2d 1201 (Fla. 1989). We disagree with Williams’ contention that the argument here constitutes a “golden rule” argument. “The proper exercise of closing argument is to review the evidence and to explicate those inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence.” Bertolotti, 476 So.2d at 134. Here, the state properly asked the jury to understand thе circumstances of the child witness‘s viewing of the crime as a plausible explanation of Alexander‘s confusion as to the car‘s color. The argument was not a plea for the jury to abandon its obligation to determine the case based solely on the evidence and to place itself in the victim‘s position. However, assuming, arguendo, that the stаtement could be construed as an improper reference to Alexander‘s suffering, the isolated comment was harmless and does not mandate a new trial. Williams v. State, 544 So.2d 1114, 1115 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)(“state‘s single reference during closing argument to the tears of the [murder] victim‘s parents was an improper appeal to the sympathy of the jury” but not reversible error).
Sixth, Williams argues that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the state to recall Willard Delancy, a crime-scene investigator, to testify after he had already testified as both a state and defense witness. During the defense case, Delancy testified that “yellow or gold paint” was scraped from the bumper of the victim‘s red rental car.7 It was the defense‘s contention that the assailants drove a gold car rather than the blue car that Williams drove. After he testified, the state requested that Delancy look at the actual paint scrapings. Then after the defense rested, the state recalled Delancy as a witness and introduced the paint scrapings in evidence through his testimony. Delancy testified that he had once again looked at the sсrapings at the police property office and that his testimony that the scrapings contained gold paint was incorrect: that no foreign paint was found on the victim‘s rental car.
The court has discretion to grant or deny a request to recall or reexamine a witness. Tafero; Hampton v. State, 680 So.2d 581, 584 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Dawson v. State, 401 So.2d 819 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 408 So.2d 1092 (1981). Williams has made no showing that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting this testimony. Thus, we decline to disturb this ruling on appeal.8 Assuming, arguendo, that the admission of thе testimony was error, the error is harmless in light of the other evidence adduced against Williams.
We find no merit in Williams’ final point regarding the trial court‘s failure to suppress his confession. The alleged error
Based on the foregoing reasoning, we affirm the judgment in all respects.
Affirmed.