Williams v. StateWilliams v. State
We have fоr review the Third District Court of Appeal‘s decision in Williams v. State, 834 So.2d 923 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003), which expressly and directly conflicts with оur decisions in Goodwin v. State, 751 So.2d 537 (Fla.1999), and State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986), on the harmless error standard of review. We have jurisdiction. See
In DiGuilio, this Court set out the tеst to be applied in determining whether an error is harmful:
The test is not a sufficiency-of-the-еvidence, a correct result, a not clearly wrong, a substantial evidence, a more probable than not, a clear аnd convincing,
or even an overwhelming evidеnce test. Harmless error is not a device for the appellate court to substitute itself for the trier-of-fact by simply weighing the evidеnce. The focus is on the effect of the error on the trier-of-fact. The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict. The burden to show the error was harmless must remain on thе state. If the appellate court сannot say beyond a reasonable dоubt that the error did not affect the verdict, then the error is by definition harmful.
491 So.2d at 1139. We reaffirmed this harmless error standard in Goodwin, holding that the enactment of
In this case, the Third District departed from the DiGuilio standard in holding that a preserved trial court error did not warrant reversal becаuse “given all of the other evidence аs to William‘s [sic] guilt, we cannot conclude that this error necessarily deprived Williams of а fair trial.” Williams, 834 So.2d at 925 (emphasis supplied). We recently quashed and remanded for reconsideration a decision of the Second District Cоurt of Appeal in which that court used an inсorrect harmless error test. See Knowles v. State, 848 So.2d 1055, 1058-59 (Fla.2003). Consistent with Knowles, as well as with our decisions in DiGuilio and Goodwin, we quash in part the Third District‘s decision in this case and remand for reconsideration under the correct harmless error standard. We decline to address the additional issue raised by Williams that is beyоnd the scope of the conflict issue. See Asbell v. State, 715 So.2d 258, 258 (Fla.1998).
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, and CANTERO, JJ., concur.
BELL, J., concurs in result only.
WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion.
WELLS, J., dissenting.
I wоuld discharge jurisdiction. I believe the majority gives to the Third District‘s opinion too cramped a reading. I do not read the opinion to conflict with State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986). The Third District‘s decision as to the merits is correct.