Harvey WILLIAMS, Jr. v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 82-102
Supreme Court of Arkansas
December 13, 1982
January 10, 1983
642 S.W.2d 887
Steve Clark, Atty. Gen., by: Victra L. Fewell, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
GEORGE ROSE SMITH, Justice. Williams was convicted of having committed capital felony murder on February 23, 1981, in that he fatally stabbed Sidney Riley after raping her. In appealing from the ensuing sentence to life imprisonment without parole Williams contends primarily (1) that the trial judge erred in finding his confession to have been voluntary without first requiring the State to produce all witnesses material to the issue of voluntariness and (2) that the confession and certain clothing and other articles seized by the police should have been excluded as the fruits of a warrantless arrest made without probable cause.
Testimony taken at the hearing on the motions to suppress is pertinent to both contentions. The murder occurred on February 23 in the living room of the victim‘s home near Antoine, but was not discovered until two days later. Williams was living with his sister and her husband in
When the three men walked up to the house, Williams came across the yard to meet them. He recognized Arnold, who had represented him when he was convicted of manslaughter in 1967. Out of Williams‘s hearing the officers commented on the resemblance between Williams‘s toboggan cap and certain red fuzz found on a blanket under the victim‘s body when the crime was discovered. Arnold told them to warn Williams of his rights and to check with the police laboratory at Little Rock about the red fuzz.
Officer Ursery warned Williams before he was questioned. Williams first said he had not known the victim, but he then said he had seen her working in her yard a few days earlier. The four men walked to the victim‘s house, where the officers’ vehicle was parked. While the sheriff began checking with the laboratory, Officer Ursery again warned Williams of his rights. Williams said that on the earlier day he had walked up the road, had seen Ms. Riley working in her garden, and had carried to her some mail that he took from her mail box. He tried to explain that he was the brother of her neighbor, but she became frightened, ran into the house, and threatened to call the police. He followed her into the kitchen, but did not go beyond that point into the living room.
Officer Ursery then asked Williams if he would go to Hope and take a polygraph examination to show that he only went into the kitchen area. Williams said he would. Sheriff Baker and Officer Ursery then drove Williams to the state police office at Hope. There Ursery used a printed waiver to again warn Williams of his rights while they waited a few minutes for the polygraph examiner to arrive. When he got there Williams refused to take the test. Another state police officer, Finis Duvall, then told Williams they needed to take his clothes for examination. Williams said he would tell the officers what they wanted to know. After interrogation he signed a highly damaging statement in
Probable cause for an arrest existed when Sheriff Baker, Officer Ursery, and Williams left the scene to drive to Hope. Williams had first denied knowing the victim, but changed his story. His account of having removed mail from her mail box to take it to her was suspect, for such actions would hardly be performed with an innocent motive by a stranger. Williams admitted that the woman was frightened, that she ran to the house with a threat to call the police, and that he followed her into the house. His assertion that he stopped short of going into the living room could indicate guilty knowledge of where the crime occurred. Both officers attached significance to the red fuzz. The proof supplied the recognized elements of probable cause. See Sanders v. State, 259 Ark. 329, 334, 532 S.W.2d 752 (1976).
It was not essential, as the appellant argues, for the trial court to pinpoint the moment of arrest. The officers were not required to make an arrest when they first had probable cause to do so. State v. Coleman, 412 So. 2d 532 (La., 1982). Although
The court was wrong, however, in not requiring the State to produce all material witnesses to the confession or
The court properly refused to disqualify Arnold as the prosecutor merely because he had represented Williams when he was convicted in 1967. The motion to disqualify asserted that if the manslaughter conviction were used as an aggravating circumstance, Arnold might be in a position to use confidential information to the detriment of his former client. That possibility, however, was eliminated by Arnold‘s assurance that he would only use the proof of the conviction. That was done; so there is no indication of prejudice.
Since the jury was apparently selected at random, there is no proof of a systematic exclusion of blacks. We need not speculate about the possible proof upon a retrial. The court properly refused to quash the jury panel merely because a clerical employee who assisted in preparing the jury list had not taken the oath required by
HICKMAN, J., not participating.
Supplemental Opinion on Denial of Rehearing delivered January 10, 1983
GEORGE ROSE SMITH, Justice, on rehearing. The State‘s petition for rehearing is denied. The case of Hignite v. State, 265 Ark. 866, 581 S.W.2d 552 (1979), is not controlling, because there the issue was merely that of voluntariness in general, not the State‘s failure to call all necessary witnesses to testify at the Denno hearing.
The appellant‘s petition for rehearing is also denied. In response to his request for clarification of the opinion, we state that a second Denno hearing will be proper.